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This thesis deals with the relevant law up to 30 September 2012. 
 
This thesis analyses the inter-relationship in particular between ss 1(c), 33, 41(1), 
195(1) and 237 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (‘the 
Constitution’) (collectively referred to as ‘constitutional obligations’); s 4(2) of 
the South African Revenue Service Act 34 of 1997 (‘SARS Act’); the Promotion 
of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 (‘PAJA’); and a decision by the 
Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service (‘the Commissioner’ or 
‘SARS’, as the case may be) to exercise his powers under ss 74A and 74B of the 
Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 (‘ss 74A and 74B of the Income Tax Act’) by 
requiring taxpayers to produce or provide information, documents and things at 
the commencement of an inquiry or audit of taxpayers, and concludes that such a 
decision constitutes ‘administrative action’ as defined in s 1 of PAJA, or, 
alternatively is subject to the constitutional principle of legality. This conclusion 
is reached on the basis that such a decision, of an administration nature made, or 
leading to a further decision proposed to be made, or required to be made, to issue 
revised assessments will: 
 
• have been taken by an organ of State exercising a public power in terms of 
legislation; 
• involve the exercise of a discretionary power, where SARS determines 
whether and in what circumstances it will require a taxpayer to provide 
information, documents and things; 
• adversely affect taxpayers’ rights, and has a direct, external legal effect. 
The fact that the power in question is preliminary and investigative, and 
that its exercise does not in itself determine whether any tax, penalties and 
interest is payable, does not detract from the impending conclusion usually 
made by the same SARS officials that tax, penalties and interest will most 
likely become payable following from the preliminary investigation. The 
decision imposes on taxpayers an obligation to do something (to produce 
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or provide information, documents and things) which, but for the exercise 
of that power, taxpayers would not in law be obliged to do, due to 
taxpayers’ privacy rights in terms of s 14 of the Constitution, and entitling 
them to expect SARS to abide by its constitutional obligations. A failure 
by taxpayers to comply exposes them to criminal prosecution under s 
75(1)(b) of the Income Tax Act. Furthermore, the power exercised by 
SARS is not subject to the normal objection and appeal processes in the 
Income Tax Act, limiting the opportunity for taxpayers to challenge such a 
decision in terms of the Income Tax Act. 
Lastly, there is no relevant exclusion in the definition of ‘administrative action’ 
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1.1 THE THESIS CONTRIBUTION TO KNOWLEDGE IN TAXATION 
The South African tax system has experienced significant changes within the 
purview of the advent of the Constitution, PAJA, and with the proposed 
promulgation of the Tax Administration Act.1 The aim of the Tax Administration Act 
is to streamline the administrative provisions across the various tax Acts and 
consolidate these provisions into a single piece of legislation. It will bring to the fore 
the significance of a balance between the rights of taxpayers and the authority of 
SARS.  
One such area is the power of SARS to audit and inquire into the tax-related affairs 
of taxpayers, and as such in terms of ss 74A and 74B of the Income Tax Act, require 
taxpayers to give information, documents or things, and to conduct an audit and 
inquiry on the taxpayer’s premises. 
These powers will be revisited in the new Tax Administration Act. The development 
in the Income Tax Act through the legislative changes, and supported more recently 
by various analogous supporting case law, has created an emerging body of 
jurisprudence that, although in its infancy, is developing into a formidable aspect of 
constitutional and administrative law, as applicable to these audit and inquiry 
provisions of SARS. 
The Constitution protects the fundamental rights of taxpayers in South Africa. There 
are 27 fundamental rights outlined in ss 9 to 35 of the Constitution, collectively 
referred to as the Bill of Rights. Not all of the fundamental rights listed in the Bill of 
Rights are relevant to the SARS’ audit and inquiry provisions.  However, there are 9 
fundamental rights that protect taxpayers. These are:  
• Equality (s 9), 
• Human dignity (s 10),  
• Privacy (s 14), 
• Freedom of trade, occupation and profession (s 22),  
• Property (s 25),  
                                               
1Tax Administration Act 28 of  2011. 
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• Access to information (s 32), 
•  Just administrative action (s 33),  
• Access to courts (s 34) and  
• Arrested, detained and accused persons (s 35).  
The area of research for this dissertation focuses on the constitutional and 
administrative rights of taxpayers specifically in relation to the audit and inquiry 
powers of SARS (s 33 read with ss 1(c), 2, 41, 195 and 237). Emphasis in this study 
will specifically be directed to the taxpayers’ right to just administrative action in the 
context of these audit and inquiry powers. 
This dissertation aims to critically analyse the sections set out above as the 
foundation of taxpayers rights, and their entitlement to having SARS adhere to their 
constitutional obligations. This analysis will extend to the definition of 
‘administrative action’ in PAJA, and the provisions of ss 3, 5 and 6 of PAJA. The 
constitutional obligations of SARS in s 4(2) of the SARS Act are also analysed.  
This analysis will draw on leading constitutional and administrative case law in 
support of the hypothesis that taxpayers facing any SARS audit or inquiry, are being 
subjected to ‘administrative action’ as defined in PAJA, or in accordance with the 
constitutional principle of legality, and are entitled to question the public powers of 
SARS. Either way, if SARS acts outside the scope of their powers, as analysed, 
taxpayers have the right to take that conduct by SARS on review to the High Court. 
1.2 THE CONTRIBUTION THAT THIS DISSERTATION WILL MAKE TO 
TAX LAW LITERATURE  
Although the Constitution has been in existence for some 18 years, the rights of 
taxpayers has not been well developed within a constitutional context. Not many 
taxpayers challenge tax legislation or the conduct of SARS as being unconstitutional. 
There has thus been a lack of specific judicial decision in the context of tax 
legislation. There is also a  shortage of scholarly text regarding the constitutional and  
administration rights of taxpayers. There is a particular dearth of literature in respect 
of the audit and inquiry powers of SARS. What is  available is dealt with in a cursory 
manner without an in depth analysis, which this dissertation aims to achieve. 
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Thus far there has been almost no scholarly literature and no judiciary review 
regarding taxpayers’ rights in relation to SARS powers to audit and inquire into 
taxpayers’ affairs. Research into the influence on taxpayers’ rights with regards to 
both procedural law and substantive law is important in determining the balance 
between SARS’ powers and taxpayers’ rights. Having an understanding of these two 
perspectives will enable taxpayers to protect themselves against unconstitutional 
legislation and conduct from SARS. Similarly, research in this area should be 
beneficial to SARS in that they too can recognise the limits of their powers and not 
violate taxpayers’ rights. 
1.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESIS 
The aim of this dissertation is to critically evaluate SARS information gathering 
powers from the following two perspectives: 
• The Income Tax Act restrictions placed on SARS without specific reference 
to the Constitution, the transgression of which will infringe on taxpayers’ 
constitutional rights and the rule of law; 
• The administration and constitutional restrictions placed on SARS, the 
transgression of which will infringe on taxpayers’ constitutional rights and 
the rule of law.
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1.4 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES, METHODOLOGIES AND POTENTIAL FINDINGS 
1.4.1 Research Objectives 
The primary objective of the research done in this dissertation is to critically analyse the 
provisions of ss 74A and 74B and the application by SARS of these powers to determine 
where the conduct of SARS infringes on the constitutional rights of taxpayers, and the 
constitutional obligations taxpayers can expect SARS to fulfil.  
1.4.2 Methodologies 
The research upon which this dissertation is based, analyses and interprets the 
Constitution, the relevant tax legislation, relevant case law and scholarly writings in this 
regard. The research thus falls within the domain of legal research. 
The Council of Australian Law Deans,1 in their Statement on the Nature of Legal 
Research, summarises the nature of legal research as follows: 
Legal research is multi-faceted. It is distinctive in some respects, and 
part of the mainstream of the humanities and social sciences in others. 
It would equally be mistaken to think of legal research as wholly 
different from or wholly same as other research in the humanities and 
social sciences. 
The Statement refers to the Pearce Report,2 which categorized legal research as either 
“doctrinal”, “theoretical” or “reform-oriented” research. It also refers to the Canadian 
Arthurs Report,3 which identified “fundamental” legal research as a fourth category. 
The two reports described these four categories as follows: 
• doctrinal – the systematic exposition, analysis and critical evaluation of legal 
rules and their inter-relationships; 
                                               
1Council of Australian Law Deans, Statement on the Nature of Legal Research 
http://www.cald.asn.au/docs/cald%20statement%20on%20the%20nature%20of%20legal%20research%20-
%202005.pdf (last accessed 21 November 2013). 
2Dennis Pearce, Enid Campbell, & Don Harding, Australian Law Schools: A Discipline Assessment for the 
Commonwealth Tertiary Education Commission, AGPS, 1987, paras 9.10 - 9.15 
3Harry Arthurs, Law and Learning: Report to the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada by 
the Consultative Group on Research and Education in Law (1983). 
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• theoretical – the conceptual bases of legal rules and principles; 
• reform-oriented – recommendations for change, based on critical examination; 
and 
• Fundamental – law as a social phenomenon, exploring social, political, economic, 
philosophical and cultural implications and associations. 
The Council of Australian Law Deans emphasize that the categories are overlapping, 
rather than mutually exclusive – convenient, rather than precise ways of thinking about 
legal research.  
The review of literature for this dissertation consisted of an analysis of the Constitution, 
the relevant provisions of the Income Tax Act, the draft Tax Administration Act and other 
related fiscal legislation. The case law and common law principles together with the 
relevant reference textbooks and journal articles were also be researched.  
Foreign reported decisions were referred to where appropriate. Section 38(1) of the 
Constitution requires the judiciary to consider international law and permits the judiciary 
to refer to foreign law when interpreting the Bill of Rights. This is a proviso that the 
judiciary “must promote the values that underlie an open and democratic society based on 
human dignity, equality and freedom”. 
 As far as the local court decisions are concerned, a comprehensive search has been done 
on the LexisNexis Electronic Library and through various offshore online library 
databases. Appropriate cases relating to the this dissertation were selected. An internet 
search was also done for various published articles on the subject under consideration, 
both locally and internationally. 
1.4.3 Potential Findings 
The legislature introduced measures enabling SARS to obtain information, documents 
and things to assist in assessing and collecting taxes in terms of their powers under ss 
74A and 74B. These measures may be regarded as being in line with the founding 
principles of the Constitution, but the manner in which SARS uses these powers may be 
constitutionally questionable, unless SARS pays careful attention to its constitutional 
obligations and taxpayers fundamental rights. The conduct of SARS in enforcing such 
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powers must measure up to the standards required by the founding principles of the 
Constitution. In the event that SARS conduct does not respect taxpayers constitutional 
rights or meet the constitutional standards, taxpayers are entitled to address the 
misconduct of SARS through a judicial review process, either in terms of PAJA, or in 
terms of the constitutional principle of legality. 
1.5 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HOW THE METHODOLOGIES 
EMPLOYED WILL ADDRESS THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
The present research analyses and interprets the Constitution, together with relevant case 
law, and scholarly writings to identify a framework of taxpayer rights, and uses this 
framework to analyze, interpret and critique the use by SARS of its ss 74A and 74B 
powers. This is done in order to determine whether, how and to what extent the use by 
SARS of these powers may infringe upon taxpayers’ rights.  
This dissertation has 7 chapters. Chapter 2 is an introduction to the fundamental 
constitutional rights of taxpayers in the context of ss 74A and 74B powers. Chapter 3 
deals with the legislative limitations of ss 74A and 74B. Chapter 4 sets out the 
constitutional obligations of SARS when invoking ss 74A and 74B powers. Chapter 5 
deals with the judicial remedies available to taxpayers aggrieved by SARS’ misuse of its 
ss 74A and 74B powers. Chapter 6 covers the immediate future after this dissertation with 
the proposed advent of the Tax Administration Act. Chapter 7 is the conclusion. 
Each issue raised in this dissertation is inter-connected with other emerging issues so as 
to meet the overall objective of this dissertation, namely to critically analyze the 
constitutional rights of taxpayers, and to determine when SARS’ powers conferred on 




  16 
 
 
  17 
CHAPTER 2 




2.1 ADVENT OF THE CONSTITUTION 18 
2.2 THE RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 24 
2.2.1 Foundational Values 24 
2.2.2 Bill of Rights 26 
2.2.3 Other Constitutional Provisions 27 
2.2.4 Conduct, decisions and public power 28 
2.2.5 Conduct, audits and inquiries 33 
2.2.6 Conduct and legitimate expectations 34 
2.3 A CONSTITUTIONAL BALANCE OF SARS’POWERS 
 AND THE ‘ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION’ DEBATE 35 
2.3.1 Introduction 35 
2.3.2 Administrative action 36 
2.3.3 Conclusion 44 
2.4 THE RELEVANCE OF PAJA AND THE PRINCIPLE OF 
 LEGALITY 44 
2.4.1 Introduction 44 
2.4.2 The principle of legality 47 
2.4.3 Recent developments in the principle of legality 52 
2.5 ADEQUATE REASONS 53 
2.5.1 Introduction 53 
2.5.2 The relevance of s 74 of the Income Tax Act 54 
2.5.3 The meaning of ‘adequate reasons’ 58 
2.5.4 Conclusion 60 
 






2.1 ADVENT OF THE CONSTITUTION 
 
Prior to the advent of the Constitution1 and the start of a new democracy in South Africa, 
judicial reviews, and the grounds for judicial review, in respect of discretionary 
decisions, and the exercise of power generally, were governed solely by the common law. 
The grounds for judicial review in terms of the common law could broadly be categorized 
as excess of power, use of powers for ulterior purpose2, bad faith3 or dishonesty, gross 
unreasonableness4, and breach of the audi alteram partem rule.5 To this can be added 
vagueness6 and the fettering by rigidity7 of discretion.   
 
Since then the development of administrative law has advanced significantly with the 
promulgation of the Constitution, such as in the leading constitutional case of 
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of South Africa and another:  In Re: Ex Parte 
President of the Republic of South Africa and Others8 and as commented on by some 
academic writers.9 In the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers case10 the Constitutional Court 
held that the common law was not a body of law separate and distinct from the 
Constitution. The court held that there was only one system of law shaped by the 
Constitution, which was the supreme law. All law, including the common law, derived its 
force from the Constitution and was subject to constitutional control. Therefore, courts no 
                                               
1Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 108 of 1996, hereinafter abbreviated as ‘the Constitution’ in this thesis. 
2 See section 3.3.3.1: Improper or ulterior purpose or motive infra. 
3 See section 3.3.3.2: Mala Fides or Bad Faith infra. 
4 See section 3.4: Reasonableness infra. 
5 See section 3.5.2: Audi Alteram Partem infra. 
6R v Jopp 1949 (4) SA 11 (N); R v Shapiro 1935 NPD 155; S v Meer 1981 (1) SA 739 (N); and Dawood v Minister of 
Home Affairs 2000 (3) SA 936 (CC).  
7Britten v Pope 1916 AD 150; Johannesburg Town Council v Norman Anstey & Co 1928 AD 335; and 
Moreletasentrum (Edms) Bpk v Die Drankraad 1987 (3) SA 407 (T). 
8Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of South Africa and another:  In Re:  Ex Parte President of the Republic of 
South Africa and Others 2000 (2) SA 674 (CC), hereinafter referred to in this chapter as the Pharmaceutical 
Manufacturers case. 
9See also Currie I & Klaaren J The Promotion of Administrative Justice Act Benchbook (2001) SiberInk; and 
Constitutional Cases Commentary De Rebus (September 2003) Lexis Nexis (last accessed 11 January 2013); See also 
the analysis in section 1.3: A Constitutional Balance of SARS’ Powers and the ‘Administrative Action’ Debate of this 
thesis. 
10Supra footnote 11 at para’s [41], [45] and [50]. 
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longer had to claim space and push boundaries to find means of controlling public power. 
What would have been ultra vires under the common law by reason of a functionary 
exceeding a statutory power was invalid under the Constitution according to the doctrine 
or principle of legality. In this respect, at least, constitutional law and common law were 
intertwined with there being no real difference between them. The same was held to be 
true of constitutional law and common law in respect of the validity of administrative 
decisions. The Constitutional Court held that what is ‘lawful administrative action’, and 
‘procedurally fair administrative action’ justifiable in relation to the reasons given for it, 
‘cannot mean one thing under the Constitution, and another thing under the common 
law’. 
 
Furthermore, just administrative action referred to in s 33 of the Constitution, requires all 
administrative action to be lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair,11 and in cases where 
rights (and legitimate expectations)have been materially and adversely affected by 
administrative action, those taxpayers affected are entitled to be given written reasons.12 
 
In LAWSA13 the authors describe just administrative action in the following terms as 
emanating from the non-judicial branch of government, such as organs of state. It implies 
a system of public administration which upholds principles of fairness, reasonableness, 
equality, propriety and proportionality. These principles accountability and control, 
review and supervision, openness and consultation are promoted, with both procedural 
and substantive elements.  Procedurally just administrative action requires compliance 
with the rules of procedural fairness. Substantively just administrative action requires 
compliance with the requirements of reasonableness, proportionality and rationality. 
 
The explanation of just administrative action in LAWSA emanates from the provisions of 
ss 1(c) and 195(1) of the Constitution, read with s 33 in the Bill of Rights of the 
Constitution. Section 237 of the Constitution compels the an organ of state such as SARS 
and the Commissioner to diligently carry out all its obligations imposed upon it by the 
terms of the Constitution. Just ‘administrative action’ is analysed in this thesis in the 
context of ss 74A and 74B. 
                                               
11See section 3.3: Lawfulness, 3.4: Reasonableness and 3.5: Procedural Fairness infra. 
12‘Written reasons’ referred to in s 33 of the Constitution are expanded in ss 3 and 5 of the Promotion of Administrative 
Justice Act 3 of 2000; See also section 2.5: Adequate Reasons infra. 
13 LAWSA Volume 1 Administrative Law 2nd ed Lexis Nexis at para 74 footnote 3 (last accessed 11 March 2013). 
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Sections 74A and 74B provide: 
 
74A. Obtaining information, documents and things. - The 
Commissioner or any officer may, for the purposes of the 
administration of this Act in relation to any taxpayer, require such 
taxpayer or any other person to furnish such information (whether 
orally or in writing), documents or things as the Commissioner or 
such officer may require. 
 
74B.   Obtaining of information, documents or things at certain 
premises.—(1)  The Commissioner, or an officer named in an 
authorisation letter, may, for the purposes of the administration of 
this Act in relation to any taxpayer, require such taxpayer or any 
other person, with reasonable prior notice, to furnish, produce or 
make available any such information, documents or things as the 
Commissioner or such officer may require to inspect, audit, 
examine or obtain. 
(2)  For the purposes of the inspection, audit, examination or 
obtaining of any such information, documents or things, the 
Commissioner or an officer contemplated in subs (1), may call on 
any person— 
(a) at any premises; and 
(b) at any time during such person’s normal business hours. 
(3)  For the purposes of sub-section (2), the Commissioner or any 
officer contemplated in sub-section (1), shall not enter any 
dwelling-house or domestic premises (except any part thereof as 
may be occupied or used for the purposes of trade) without the 
consent of the occupant. 
(4) Any officer exercising any power under this section, shall on 
demand produce the authorisation letter issued to him. 
 
The conduct by SARS in exercising its public power in deciding to apply the provisions 
of ss 74A and 74B to taxpayers, must comply with procedural just administrative action. 
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This requires procedural fairness, including the audi alteram partem principle14 (the 
taxpayers right to be heard as part of procedural fairness), and impartial equitable conduct 
without bias. It also requires substantive just administrative action, namely, lawfulness 
(proper authority, compliance with jurisdictional facts and exercising discretion without 
abuse) and reasonableness (rationality and proportionality). These principles also form 
part of the constitutional principle of legality as discussed in section 2.4 below, and are 
analysed in Chapter 3.  
 
Subsequent to the advent of the Constitution, the Promotion of Administrative Justice 
Act15 with its codified twenty separate grounds for judicial review of administrative 
action16 was promulgated.  However, the concept of administrative action is open to 
interpretation, even though the term ‘administrative action’ is now defined in PAJA. A 
broader meaning was given to ‘administrative action’ in the Supreme Court of Appeal 
case of Grey’s Marine Hout Bay (Pty) Ltd and Others v Minister of Public Works and 
Others17 where the court, in referring to the ‘cumbersome’ definition, came to the 
conclusion that at the core of the definition was the idea of action (namely conduct, 
which includes exercising a discretion) often administered by public bodies undertaking 
their functions. In the Constitutional Court case of Mazibuko and Others v City of 
Johannesburg and Others18 the court held that the clear purpose of PAJA was to give 
effect to s 33 of the Constitution, and that the meaning of administrative action be 
identified primarily with reference to PAJA’s definition thereof. As will become more 
apparent during the discourse of this thesis, that the conduct of SARS in making a 
decision to exercise its powers in terms of ss 74A and 74B is administrative action. 
 
An analysis of the term ‘administrative action’ is therefore relevant to the core conclusion 
reached in this thesis. This entails the right of taxpayers to challenge a decision based on 
the powers of SARS invoking the inquiry and audit provisions in terms of  ss 74A and 
74B of the Income Tax Act.19 The Income Tax Act makes provision for original, 
                                               
14 See section 3.5.2: Audi Alteram Partem infra. 
15 Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000, hereinafter abbreviated as ‘PAJA’ in this thesis. 
16 Section 6 (1) of PAJA. 
17 2005 (6) SA 313 (SCA), hereinafter referred to in this chapter as the ‘Grey’s Marine case’. 
18Mazibuko and Others v City of Johannesburg and Others 2010 (4) SA 1 (CC). 
19Income Tax Act 58 of 1962, hereinafter referred to as ‘the Income Tax Act’ in this thesis, and ss74A and 74B of the 
Income Tax Act 58 of 1962, hereinafter referred to as ‘ss 74A and 74B’ in this thesis. 
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additional and estimated assessments and certain decisions20 by the Commissioner or by 
any officer or person engaged in carrying out the said provisions under the control, 
direction or supervision of the Commissioner and SARS to be subject to objection and 
appeal.21 A decision taken by SARS for the request of information, documents or things, 
to inquire into and audit the tax affairs of a taxpayer in terms of ss 74A and 74B is not 
subject to objection and appeal. However, there is the process of judicial review22 for 
challenging those decisions of the SARS that are not subject to objection and appeal, 
where SARS’ conduct is unlawful, unreasonable or procedurally unfair.  
 
In the first tax-related case dealing with administrative law and the Constitution, Metcash 
Trading Limited v C SARS and Another23 (but before the promulgation of PAJA), 
Kriegler J, in a landmark judgment (dealing with the ‘pay-now-argue-later’ principle) 
provided insight into the influence of the Constitution on administrative law, and the 
exercise by the Commissioner24 of his discretion in tax legislation.25 
 
In Metcash26 Kriegler J made it clear that the High Court had the inherent power and 
jurisdiction to review decisions made by SARS. The question was: What is meant by a 
decision? In the judgment of Metcash, the ‘decision’ under consideration by the 
Constitutional Court related to a ‘discretion’ to be exercised by SARS. It is submitted that 
a similar discretion exists in ss 74A and 74B, in that the provisions of ss 74A and 74B are 
permissive in nature, as the word ‘may’ is used to allow SARS to exercise its powers.27It 
follows that a decision must be taken by SARS to enable it to invoke these discretionary 
powers. 
 
                                               
20Ibid. sections 3, 77, 78 and 79. 
21Ibid. sections 81 and 83. 
22 Refer to the analysis in Chapter 5 on Judicial Review with reference to ss 74A and 74B infra. 
23 2001(1) SA 1109 (CC). 
24 And his officials, hereinafter referred to as ‘SARS’ in this thesis, where appropriate. 
25Carlson Investments Share Block (Pty) Ltd v C:SARS 2001 (3) SA 210 (W) where a s 79(1) of the Income Tax Act 
challenge that the provision was contrary to procedural fairness and finality of tax assessments, using the principle of 
functus officio, failed. Section 79 specifically terms overrides the functus officio principle; See also the discussion at 
section 4.2.7: Limitations to s 195(1). 
26Metcash Trading Limited v C SARS and Another 2001(1) SA 1109 (CC). 
27Commissioner of Taxes v Ferera 1976 (2) SA 653 (R): ‘… the Commissioner is obliged to exercise his powers under 
the section if … he is of the “opinion” that the requisite [jurisdictional facts are] present ...’. 
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Consequently, if taxpayers can demonstrate that the decision of SARS is ‘administrative 
action’ as defined in PAJA,28 a judicial review process is available to these taxpayers, 
despite ss 74A and 74B not being subject to objection and appeal. In addition, taxpayers 
may raise the appropriate ‘just cause’ defence in terms of s 75(1)(b) of the Income Tax 
Act for failing to comply with SARS’ request for information, documents or things, or 
refusing to participate in a tax audit, invoked in terms of ss 74A and 74B, where 
taxpayers can show ‘just cause’ in not meeting SARS’ demands. The ‘just cause’ defence 
is analysed in section 3.8 below.29 
 
If a decision taken by SARS is ‘administrative action’ in terms of PAJA, taxpayers are 
entitled to access the provisions of PAJA where SARS must follow the procedurally fair 
process in terms of s 3(2) of PAJA. In terms of this section SARS must comply with five 
elements before ‘administrative action’ is taken against the taxpayer to ensure the process 
is procedurally fair: 
 
(a) Adequate notice of the nature and purpose of the proposed 
administrative action must be given to the taxpayer; 
(b) A reasonable opportunity to make representations must be given to the 
taxpayer; 
(c) A clear statement of the administrative action must be made; 
(d) Where applicable, adequate notice of any right of review or internal 
appeal must be given; 
(e) Adequate notice of the taxpayer’s right to request reasons in terms of s 
5 of PAJA must be given. 
 
SARS must then comply with the provisions of ss 5(1) and (2) of PAJA and provide 
adequate reasons with reference to the principles set out in the decision of the Supreme 
                                               
28In that their rights or legitimate expectations are adversely affected, with a direct, external legal effect; or that the 
decision of SARS is the exercise of public power, so that taxpayers may invoke the constitutional principle of legality. 
What is the constitutional principle of legality? See section 2.4: The Relevance of PAJA and the Principle of Legality 
infra; See also Hoexter C Administrative Law in South Africa 2ed Juta (2012) at pages 121-5, hereinafter referred to in 
this thesis as ‘Hoexter (2012). 
29See section 3.8: ‘Just Cause’ Defence infra; See also Chetty v Law Society of Transvaal 1985(2) SA 756 (AD); 
Attorney-General, Tvl v Abdul Aziz Kader 1991(4) SA 727 (A); Shidiack v Union Government (Minister of the Interior) 
1912 AD 642; Britten v Pope 1916 AD 150. 
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Court of Appeal case of CSARS v Sprigg Investments 117CC t/a Global Investment.30 
What are ‘adequate reasons’? This is analysed in section 2.5 below. 
 
Any transgression of these fair administrative procedural provisions would entitle the 
taxpayer to launch the appropriate judicial review application to the High Court in terms 
of ss 6, 7 and 8 of PAJA, citing one or more of the codified grounds of review in s 6(2) of 
PAJA. If that were simply the case, it would have been the end of this thesis, and nothing 
further would need to be analysed. However, a potential fundamental problem exists as to 
whether or not ‘administrative action’ in PAJA includes a decision of SARS31 to exercise 
the powers of ss 74A and 74B. Hence, the necessity for the analysis in this thesis in 
arguing that a decision of SARS in terms of ss 74A and 74B is ‘administrative action’ as 
defined in PAJA. If not, the constitutional principle of legality will apply to such a 
decision anyway. In both instances, entitling the taxpayer to review SARS’ powers 
exercised in terms of ss 74A and 74B. 
 
2.2 THE RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
 
2.2.1 Foundational values 
 
Section 1 of the Constitution, dealing with the foundational values of the Constitution, 
reads: 
 
The Republic of South Africa is one, sovereign, democratic state 
founded on the following values: 
 
(a) Human dignity, the achievement of equality and the advancement 
of human rights and freedoms. 
(b) Non-racialism and non-sexism. 
(c) Supremacy of the constitution and the rule of law… 
                                               
30CSARS v Sprigg Investments 117CC t/a Global Investment 73 SATC 114 (SCA) at  para’s [12] and [13] and a quote 
from Ansett Transport Industries (Operations) Pty Ltd and Another v Wraith and Others (1983) 48 ALR 500 at para 
[12]; See also Van Dorsten J L The Right to reasons for Decisions in Taxation Matters The Taxpayer October (2005) at 
186 -190 before CSARS v Sprigg Investments 117CC t/a Global Investment 73 SATC 114 (SCA). 
31 This submission emanates from the writer acting for and on behalf of various taxpayers in unreported cases such as 
that of Drs Du Buisson, Bruinette and Kramer Inc. v C:SARS Case No. 4594/02 in the High Court of the Transvaal 
Provincial Division.. 
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 (Emphasis supplied) 
 
Section 2 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, dealing with the 
supremacy of the Constitution, states that:  
 
This constitution is the supreme law of the Republic; law or conduct 
inconsistent with it is invalid, and the obligations imposed by it must be 
fulfilled.’ (Emphasis supplied) 
 
The discretion exercised by SARS in the form of a decision invoking its powers in terms 
of ss 74A and 74B is conduct: ‘the act, manner, or process of carrying on or 
managing…mode or standard of personal behaviour.’32 The constitutional obligations 
imposed on SARS ‘must be fulfilled’.  
 
In the work Constitutional Law of South Africa33 it is suggested that the word ‘law’ 
means that all forms of law, from legislature to delegated legislation and from common 
law to customary law and indigenous law, fall within the ambit of the ‘law’ referred to in 
s 2 of the Constitution. 
 
Any law that is in inconsistent with the Constitution34 is subject to judicial review read 
with s 172(1)(a) of the Constitution.35  
 
2.2.2 Bill of Rights 
 
In addition, 7(2) of the Constitution states that: 
 
The State must respect, protect, promote and fulfill the rights in the Bill of 
Rights.  
 
This positive obligation placed upon the State, with the obligation to fulfill its other 
                                               
32Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary of Law 1st ed (1996) Springfield, MA: Merriam-Webster. 
33 Chaskalson et al Constitutional Law of South Africa (1996) Wits: Juta at pages 10-4. 
34 Section 2 of the Constitution. 
35Chaskalson et al Constitutional Law of South Africa (1996) Wits: Juta at page 32. 
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constitutional obligations, places those same obligations on state officials, in the scope of 
their employment, to fulfill. In considering a well-entrenched principle in American 
Constitutional jurisprudence,36 when a state official acts outside the ambit of the 
Constitution, that individual is stripped of her official character. This would arguably also 
be the case in South Africa.37 In terms of s 172 of the Constitution the courts are given a 
wide discretion to order what is just and equitable under the circumstances where conduct 
is found to be ‘invalid’ under s 2 of the Constitution. 
 
Section 8(1) of the Constitution binds all organs of state. SARS is an organ of state38 and 
accordingly it is bound by the obligations and duties imposed upon it by the Constitution. 
This is also confirmed and repeated in s 4(2) of the South African Revenue Service Act,39 
where specific reference is made to SARS performing its functions in the most cost-
efficient and effective manner in accordance with the values and principles mentioned in 
s 195(1)40 (read with ss 1(c) and 41(1)) of the Constitution).  This also places a 
constitutional obligation on SARS. In the same way, SARS officials carry out the 
functions of the Commissioner and are bound by those constitutional obligations.41 
 
The authors of Fundamental Rights in the Constitution: Commentary and Cases42 
conclude that the Bill of Rights applies to all law in all its applications, including 
governmental action and acts of private individuals. 
 
Section 33 of the Constitution deals with ‘just administrative action’ and states that 
everyone has the right to administrative action that is lawful, reasonable and procedurally 
fair. This section also entitles anyone whose rights have been adversely affected by 
administrative action to written reasons43 for such administrative action.  
 
National legislation that was to be enacted to give effect to these rights in s 33 of the 
                                               
36Ex Parte Young 209 US 123 (1908). 
37 The courts are encouraged to consider foreign law in terms of s 39(1)(c) of the Constitution; See also Fose v Minister 
of Safety and Security 1997(3) SA 786 (CC) at paras [60]-[61], [67] and [74]. 
38Ibid. sections 195 and 239 read with s 4(2) of the SARS Act. 
39 Act 34 of 1997, hereafter referred to as ‘the SARS Act’ throughout this thesis. 
40See Chapter 4 infra for an analysis of the provisions of s 195(1). 
41Supra footnote 32; There is nothing that prohibits officials acting outside the scope of their duties to be sued in their 
personal capacities in South Africa in terms of the Constitution; See also Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 1997(3) 
SA 786 (CC) at para’s [60]-[61], [67] and [74].  
42 Davis et al Fundamental Rights in the Constitution (1997) Wits: Juta at page 44. 
43 See section 2.5: Adequate reasons infra; CSARS v Sprigg Investments 117CC t/a Global Investment 73 SATC 114 
(SCA) at para’s [12] and [13]. 
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Constitution was effected in the form of PAJA, which came into force on 30 November 
2000.  
 
2.2.3 Other Constitutional provisions 
 
In addition to this, ss 41(1) and 195(1) of the Constitution (apart from public 
administrators having to comply with the rule of law) public administrators can only 
assume power given to them in terms of the Constitution, and public administration must 
be governed by the democratic values and principles enshrined in the Constitution and, in 
particular, that services must, inter alia, be provided in accordance with high standards of 
professional ethics, impartially, fairly, equitably and without bias. It also states that public 
administration must be transparent and accountable.44 
 
The duties set out in s 195(1) of the Constitution should also be read with the principles 
of s 1(c) stating the rule of law is supreme, and co-operative government and 
intergovernmental relations, as set out in s 41(1) of the Constitution: ‘…All…state 
organs…must…provide effective, transparent, accountable and coherent government for 
the Republic as a whole…be loyal to the Constitution … not assume any power or 
function, except those conferred on them in terms of the Constitution …  (Emphasis 
supplied). Then there is the obligation placed on SARS (an organ of State) to perform its 
duties diligently and without delay.45 Section 237 of the Constitution states that organs of 
state must diligently and without delay performs its constitutional obligations. In s 4(2) of 
the SARS Act it states: 
 
(2) SARS must perform its functions in the most cost-efficient way 
and in accordance with the values and principles mentioned in s 
195 of the Constitution. (Emphasis supplied) 
 
These constitutional obligations of SARS in the context of ss 74A and 74B, give rise to a 
right of judicial review to taxpayers where the decision is ‘administrative action’, and if 
not, judicial review in terms of a transgression of the principle of legality. 
 
                                               
44Sections 195 (1)(d)-(g) of the Constitution; See also Chapter 4 infra for an analysis of these provisions. 
45Section 237 of the Constitution. 
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2.2.4 Conduct, decisions and public power 
 
The effect of these provisions and commentary above, is that the provisions of ss 74A and 
74B would be required to pass constitutional muster with particular reference to ss 1(c), 
33, 41(1), 195(1) and 237 of the Constitution, read with s 4(2) of the SARS Act. In 
essence, the effect of reading these constitutional provisions together with the cases 
referred to above, is that any decision that adversely affects the rights of a taxpayer must 
be subject to a procedural and substantive due process. Croome holds the view that a 
decision by SARS in terms of ss 74A and 74B invariably affects the taxpayer’s patrimony 
which constitutes a right envisaged in s 33(2) of the Constitution in that ‘a decision … 
may affect the income tax payable by the taxpayer, the timing of payment, and whether 
the tax is subject to interest or additional tax (and penalties).’46 
 
When SARS makes a decision in terms of ss 74A and 74B, it is submitted that taxpayers’ 
rights are adversely affected, with an impending direct, external legal effect, in line with 
the determination theory.47 The significance of this reasoning is that such a decision is 
‘administrative action’ as defined in PAJA. Alternatively, the decision, being an exercise 
of power, would be subject to the principle of legality. If a court were to decide the 
decision was not administrative action – an additional remedy would be for the taxpayer 
to approach the court to declare the actual definition of ‘administrative action’ in PAJA as 
law inconsistent with the Constitution and therefore invalid. This would also be done 
through the application of s 172(1) of the Constitution.  
 
                                               
46Croome B Taxpayers’ Rights in South Africa Juta 2010 at page 207 and at 224 where the author quotes from 
Wheelright K Taxpayer’ Rights in Australia in Bentley D Taxpayers’ Rights: An International Perspective Revenue 
Law Journal Bond University: Queensland 1998 at page 49 giving an international perspective. 
47Woolman et al Constitutional Law of South Africa 2nd ed Juta 2002 at page 63-21 footnote 2, where the authors state: 
‘Applying the deprivation theory would, in our view, render the (P)AJA unconstitutional, as to hold that administrative 
justice only applies to decisions which deprive a person of his or her rights cannot be said to give effect to the 
constitutional right to just administrative action (footnote 4 - Hoexter C The Future of Judicial Review in South African 
Administrative Law (2000) 117 South African Law Journal page 484 at page 516 states that the deprivation theory 
'clearly creates an unacceptably high threshold for admission to the category of "administrative action" '). In addition, 
had the Act intended to be more restrictive, it could have inserted the words 'existing rights' instead of 'rights' (footnote 
5 - Some support for the determination theory may be found in the following dictum of Borochowitz J in Association of 
Chartered Certified Accountants v Chairman, Public Accountants' and Auditors' Board 2001 (2) SA 980 (W) at 997, in 
holding that the relevant decision amounted to administrative action: '[T]he Board's decision has plainly affected the 
rights and interests of the applicant. It has determined its rights' )’; See also Croome B Taxpayers’ Rights in South 
Africa Juta 2010 at page 208 where the author expresses the view that the wider meaning to the ‘determination theory’ 
should apply ‘extending the reach of the Constitution.’ citing Currie I & De Waal J The Bill of Rights Handbook 5ed 
Juta 2005 at para 6.3 at page 148 and at page 149: ‘The purposive approach to interpretation therefore invariably 
requires a value judgment to be made about which purposes are important and protected by the Constitution and which 
are not.’ 
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Following the reasoning of the authors in Fundamental Rights in the Constitution: 
Commentary and Cases,48 it is clear from ss 2, 8(1) and 8(2) that the Constitution  
regulates conduct. The authors in Fundamental Rights in the Constitution: Commentary 
and Cases49 argue that conduct is subject to the provisions of the Constitution because the 
State and its functionaries can only act if authorised by law.  Unauthorised conduct is 
unlawful as confirmed in s 41(1)(f) and read with s 1(c) of the Constitution, in that 
functionaries can only assume such powers as conferred on them in terms of the 
Constitution - meaning powers that are lawful, reasonable, procedurally fair and with 
‘adequate reasons’. Either the law offends because it is unconstitutional, or the law is 
interpreted to render the conduct unlawful. 
 
An example of the latter situation would be conduct by SARS outside the jurisdictional 
facts50 of ss 74A and 74B.  Any request or investigation by SARS must be for purposes of 
‘the administration of the Act’,51 as defined in s 74 of the Income Tax Act.  If one or 
more of those defined jurisdictional facts are not present, then the conduct by the 
Commissioner or his official would be unauthorised and hence unlawful and 
unconstitutional. The empowering provisions are not necessarily unconstitutional, but the 
manner in which they are applied may be (ie. the conduct of SARS). If these sections 
were interpreted and enforced in a manner that is in conflict with ss 1(c), 33, 41(1) and 
195(1) of the Constitution, the conduct of SARS would also be unlawful, unreasonable or 
procedurally unfair and as being contrary to just administrative action, or the principle of 
legality. 
 
In one of the leading Constitutional Court cases on the principle of legality (also now 
known as the constitutional principle of legality), namely, the Pharmaceutical 
Manufacturers case,52 Chaskalson P held: 
 
                                               
48 Davis et al Fundamental Rights in the Constitution (1997) Wits: Juta at pages 32-5,37,45. 
49Ibid. at page 33. 
50 See section 3.3.2: Jurisdictional facts infra. 
51In Industrial Equity Ltd v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation and Others (1990) 170 CLR 649 at 659 the Australian 
High Court held that the powers of access and inquisition must be exercised for the purpose of the Act and that question 
is to be considered in the context of the provision levying income tax, as envisaged in that definition in s 74 of the 
Income Tax Act. 
52Supra footnote 11 para’s [20], [27], [41], [45] and [49] - [51]. 
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[20] The exercise of all public power must comply with the 
Constitution which is the supreme law and the doctrine of legality 
which is part of that law… (Emphasis supplied) 
 
There can be no legitimate excuse for a SARS official not complying with the 
Constitution in exercising public power by invoking the provisions of ss 74A and 74B.  
 
[27] The principle applies … ‘not only to review of … legislative 
action but also to the review of administrative action.’… 
(Emphasis supplied) 
 
The administrative action contemplated would be that envisaged in the Grey’s Marine 
case,53 where the Supreme Court of Appeal observed that administrative action is:  
 
… the conduct of the bureaucracy (whoever the bureaucratic 
functionary might be) in carrying out the daily functions of the State 
which necessarily involves the application of policy, usually after its 
translation into law, with direct and immediate consequences for 
individuals or groups of individuals.  
 
The conduct of the bureaucracy known as SARS carries out the functions of 
administering the provisions of the Income Tax Act, inter alia, ss 74A and 74B. 
However, the conduct of the bureaucracy is subject to what the Constitutional Court held 
in the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers case:54 
 
[41] Powers that were previously regulated by the common law 
under prerogative and the principle developed by the courts to 
control the exercise of public power are now regulated by the 
Constitution. (Emphasis supplied) 
 
The powers of ss 74A and 74B, in line with this authority, are regulated by the 
Constitution.   
                                               
53Grey’s Marine case op. cit. footnote 21 at para [24]. 
54Supra footnote 11 at para’s [41], [45] and [51] as quoted below. 
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[45] Courts no longer have to claim space and push boundaries to 
find means of controlling public power.  That control is vested in 
them under the Constitution which defines the role of the courts, 
their powers in relation to other arms of government and the 
constraints subject to which public power has to be exercised. 
(Emphasis supplied) 
 
As a result, the Constitution empowers the Courts to control the powers of SARS under 
ss 74A and 74B, and as aptly described in the final quote:   
 
[51] Although common law remains relevant to this process, 
judicial review of the exercise of public power is a constitutional 
matter that takes place under the Constitution and in accordance 
with its provisions. (Emphasis supplied) 
 
This includes its constitutional obligations in ss 1(c),33, 41(1) and 195(1) of the 
Constitution, giving rise to a series of compulsory duties. Non-compliance with these 
duties or constitutional obligations would in turn give rise to a right to taxpayers to 
enforce these constitutional obligations as envisaged in the Constitutional Court 
judgments of Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security and Another (Centre for 
Applied Legal Studies Intervening)55 and the more recent Glenister v President of the 
Republic of South Africa and Others.56 
 
As to the invalidity of the law or conduct, the following analysis is appropriate. 
 
Law for the purposes of this thesis (as already analysed above) means the actual wording 
of ss 74A and 74B, read with ss 74 and 75(1)(b) of the Income Tax Act. Conduct can 
only flow from authorising law or inherent power as per ss 1(c) and 41(1)(f) of the 
                                               
55 2001 (4) SA 938 (CC) at para [36]. 
562011 (3) SA 347 (CC); See also Premier, Western Cape v President of the Republic of South Africa 1999 (3) SA 657 
(CC)  at para [44];  The Permanent Secretary, Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape Provincial Government and Ano v 
Ngxuza and Others 2001 (4) SA 1154 (SCA) at para [15] footnote 23;  Reuters Group Plc and Others v Viljoen NO and 
Others 2001 (2) SACR 519 (C) at para [46]; Carephone (Pty) Ltd v Marcus NO and Others 1999 (3) SA 504 (LAC); 
See Chapter 4 infra. 
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Constitution. The Commissioner has no inherent power to exercise any conduct57 not 
prescribed in an act of Parliament.58 Sections 74A and 74B of the Income Tax Act would 
be the authorising law giving rise to the conduct, but subject to the constitutional duties 
imposed on SARS in terms of the Constitution.  The constitutionality of the conduct is 
determined through interpreting ss 74A and 74B with reference to the lawfulness, 
reasonableness or procedural fairness requirements and the constitutional obligations 
placed on SARS in terms of the Constitution.59 
 
This conduct must not be inconsistent with the following specific provisions, namely: ss 
10 (dignity); 14 (privacy); 33 (just administrative action – procedural and substantive due 
process) ; and ss 41(1) and 195 (1) of the Constitution. Section 33 leads more specifically 
to ss 3, 5 and 6 of PAJA. 
 
2.2.5 Conduct, audits and inquiries 
 
Wheelright K in Taxpayer’ Rights in Australia in Bentley D Taxpayers’ Rights: An 
International Perspective,60 gives a good summary and places into perspective what 
would be considered to be fair procedural due process when a tax authority like SARS 
initiates an inquiry and audit. He states that taxpayers should be given prior notification 
of the audit and the opportunity to request postponement of the audit if they have good 
reasons. As in any administrative decision, the tax authority should explain to taxpayers 
why they are chosen for an audit, what taxes and what years the audit will cover, what 
documents, books and other records will be required, how the audit will proceed, and give 
the taxpayer the opportunity to contact and use a legal or other representative in dealing 
                                               
57 See also Murphy J The Constitutional Review of Taxation (1997) Revenue Laws at pages 89 and 105: ‘In a literal 
sense taxation can be seen as a species of expropriation. For that reason many bills of rights explicitly delimit the scope 
of property rights by enacting a saving provision to admit taxation without incurring any obligation to pay just 
compensation… Since the rights affected by taxation are unquestionably ‘rights in property’… we need to infer a 
saving of the taxing power from an interpretation of s 28 as a whole. In the first instance it may be argued that taxation 
is a ‘deprivation’ of rights in property under s 28(2) and, therefore, shall be permitted ‘in accordance with a law'. The 
concept of a ‘deprivation' is a wide one and may take many forms. Section 28(3) makes it plain that expropriation is but 
one species of a wider genus of deprivations. Taxation is feasibly another. Accordingly, Revenue will argue, the sole 
requirement for the taxing power in relation to property rights is for it to be ‘in accordance with a law'…’. This analysis 
holds accord with a reading of s 25 of the Constitution, fundamental right against deprivation of property, where 
deprivation of property can only take place in accordance with a law of general application, bringing the power to tax 
within the Constitution’s limitation of rights clause in s 36 – a specific law and provision of general application must 
give the power to do so. 
58 Based on the ‘rule of law’ as being supreme in s 1(c) of the Constitution, and s 41(1)(f) where SARS may ‘not 
assume any power or function, except those conferred on them in terms of the Constitution.’(Emphasis supplied) 
59 Refer to Davis et al Fundamental Rights in the Constitution (1997) Juta at page 33. 
60Wheelright K Taxpayer’ Rights in Australia in Bentley D Taxpayers’ Rights: An International Perspective Revenue 
Law Journal Bond University: Queensland 1998 at page 49. 
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with the tax authority. All these statements are in line with the provisions of s 33 of the 
Constitution and s 3 of PAJA. 
 
The author goes on to express the view that at the commencement of the audit the 
taxpayer should receive clear guidelines from the revenue authority, setting out the audit 
procedures, the rights and duties of taxpayers during the audit as well as details of the tax 
authorities practices and rules governing the outcome of the audit. 
 
Compliance with these requirements would satisfy some of the constitutional obligations 
placed on SARS, and holds accord with the SARS Service Charter and Standards (under 
review) referred to as the Code of Conduct in this thesis, and further analysed in 
sections3.3: Lawfulness, 3.6: Legitimate Expectations, 4.2.4: Services must be provided 
impartially, fairly, equitably and without bias, and 4.2.5: Public administration must be 
accountable, infra. 
 
Furthermore, the application of ss 74A and 74B must not breach the rule of law and the 
principle of legality. SARS must be lawfully authorised to invoke the powers conferred 
upon it in accordance with the jurisdictional facts of these provisions,61 when approaching 
taxpayers for inquiry and audit. A decision of SARS must be rationally related to the 
purpose for which that power was given them, ensuring that the conduct of SARS is not 
unlawful or unconstitutional. 
 
2.2.6 Conduct and legitimate expectations 
 
Taxpayers may also have an opportunity in limited circumstances to rely on the legitimate 
expectations doctrine62 which exists when SARS invokes its powers under ss 74A and 
74B. Such a legitimate expectation is transgressed when SARS fails to follow an 
established practice in conducting audits or inquiries, such as following the processes and 
                                               
61Fedsure 1998 (12) BCLR 1458 (CC); President of the Republic of South Africa v South African Rugby Football 
Union 1999 (2) SA 14 (CC) at para [42]; and also President of the Republic of South Africa and another v South 
African Rugby Football Union and others  2000(1) SA 1 (CC). 
62 See section 3.6: Legitimate expectations infra; Legitimate expectations are not defined in the s 1 definition of 
‘administrative action’ of PAJA. However, the Constitutional Court in Premier of Mpumalanga and Another v 
Executive Committee of the Association of Governing Bodies of State-Aided Schools: Eastern Transvaal 1999 (2) 
BCLR151 (CC) at para [31] has indicated that a ‘right’ should probably be interpreted more broadly to include liability 
incurred by the state through the making of unilateral promises or undertakings, which includes in its ambit legitimate 
expectations. See Currie I & Klaaren J Promotion of Administrative Justice Act Benchbook (2001) SiberInk at 80. See 
also Williams R C et al Silke on Tax Administration (2009) Lexis Nexis at para 3.25 generally. 
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procedures in the Code of Conduct63and the SARS Internal Audit Manual.64 SARS is 
obliged to conduct its actions in a fair, impartial, unbiased, accountable and transparent 
manner in accordance with s 195(1) of the Constitution. At any time that SARS engages 
with the taxpayer in terms of ss 74A and 74B, the taxpayer should point out that it is 
SARS’ duty to promote a rational connection between the provisions it relies on and the 
specific purpose for invoking its powers. Otherwise it would be acting ultra vires.65 
SARS should abide by its internal audit guidelines in doing so. This will evidence the fact 
that it is fulfilling its constitutional obligations towards the taxpayer. SARS’ 
constitutional obligations are enhanced by its own self-imposed, restrictive practice 
creating a legitimate expectation that it will comply with its own self-imposed guidelines 
in an impartial, fair and unbiased manner at the inquiry and audit phase.66 SARS would 
be embarrassed by showing compliance with its internal guidelines towards one taxpayer, 
and then not towards the next one: displaying clear partial and biased treatment towards 
the latter taxpayer.  
 
2.3 A CONSTITUTIONAL BALANCE OF SARS’ POWERS AND THE 




As submitted in this thesis, the exercise of public power68 by SARS to request 
information, documents or things, in terms of ss 74A and 74B, is a decision69 that 
                                               
63Revised from time to time by SARS at http://www.sars.gov.za/home.asp?pid=54195 (last accessed 31 March 2013) 
and referred to as the Code of Conduct in this thesis. 
64 The SARS Internal Audit Manual – Part 4:  The Audit Process; See 3.2: The SARS Internal Audit Manual infra for 
extensive extracts of its provisions; See Williams R C et al Silke on Tax Administration (April 2009) Lexis Nexis at 
para 8.17 generally.  
65 See section 3.3: Lawfulness infra; LAWSA Volume 1 Administrative Law 2nd ed Lexis Nexis at para 144; FH 
Faulding & Co Ltd v The Commissioner of Taxation for the Commonwealth of Australia 94 ATC 4867, where the tax 
authority was held to have exceeded its information gathering powers in making a request for information in 
circumstances involving offshore information where the section did not entitle them to do so. (Emphasis supplied) 
66 LAWSA: Volume 1: Administrative Law. 2nd ed: Lexis Nexis at para 113. 
67 Croome B & Olivier L Tax Administration 2010 (Juta) at pages 27-30. 
68 In Glen Anil Development Corporation Ltd v SIR 1975 (4) 715 (A) at 727A to 728A the court held that Revenue’s 
powers should not unnecessarily be restricted by interpretation. But this is now subject to scrutiny under the 
Constitution. 
69In Bhugwan v JSE Ltd 2010 (3) SA 335 (GSJ) Williams R C The Concept of a “Decision” as the threshold 
requirement for Judicial Review in terms of the Promotion of AdministrativeAct PER/PELJ2011(14)5 
http://www.ajol.info/index.php/pelj/article/viewFile/70039/58153 (last accessed 30 March 2013), Williams states: ‘… It 
is arguable that the reason why the legislation includes a decision “proposed to be made” in the statutory definition of a 
“decision” was to prevent an administrative decision-maker from remaining outside the scope of PAJA by the stratagem 
of saying to the affected party something along the lines of – we have resolved to take view x of the matter unless and 
until you persuade us otherwise. If the definition of “decision” were not wide enough to encompass such a provisional 
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amounts to ‘conduct’ in terms of s 2 of the Constitution. If such conduct transgresses the 
constitutional obligations placed on SARS set out in this thesis, the conduct is 
inconsistent with the Constitution and is invalid. This gives the taxpayer the opportunity 
to approach the High Court through s 172(1) of the Constitution. Relying on the 
interpretation that the decision is ‘administrative action’ it will be subject to judicial 
review in terms ofss6(1), 6(2), 7 and 8 of PAJA;70 failing that, it will be subject to review 
in terms of the principle of legality on the basis that the decision is unlawful, 
unreasonable or procedurally unfair.71 It also gives taxpayers an opportunity to raise the 
‘just cause’ defence in refusing to participate in an inquiry and audit instigated by SARS, 
as analysed in section 2.8 below. 
 
2.3.2 Administrative action 
 
A decision of SARS must fall within the definition of ‘administrative action’ as defined 
in PAJA in order for the taxpayer to invoke the review remedies in ss 6, 7 and 8 of PAJA. 
The limitations to such a decision falling under that definition can be summarised as 
follows.72 The decision of SARS is arguably neither final nor ripe for adjudication by the 
courts. It is part of a multi-staged process that will ultimately result in a final decision 
(such as issuing a revised assessment) that in itself will be subject to all of the internal 
remedies of objection and appeal73 in the Income Tax Act.  
 
In mitigating a strict interpretation of ‘administrative action’ the Supreme Court of 
Appeal in case of Grey’s Marine case74 gave a wider meaning to the definition. A 
company established in Hout Bay by a group of women who had historically been 
                                                                                                                                            
or prima facie decision, a decision-maker could ensure that his response remained outside the scope of PAJA 
indefinitely, or at least for a protracted period, as each supply of further information by the affected person was deemed 
inadequate to persuade the decision-maker to alter his provisional view.’ 
70 William R C et al Silke on Tax Administration Lexis Nexis (April 2009) at para 3.4 states: ‘The Constitution now 
protects the institution of judicial review of administrative power from legislative interference and provides individuals 
with justiciable rights to claim relief from the effects of unlawful administrative action (Currie, I and de Waal, J, The 
Bill of Rights Handbook, 5th ed, 643). The supremacy of the Constitution is as applicable to tax legislation as to any 
other legislation. As the Constitutional Court has observed ‘even fiscal statutory provisions, no matter how 
indispensable they may be for the economic well-being of the country – a legitimate governmental objective of 
undisputed high priority – are not immune to the discipline of the Constitution and must conform to its normative 
standards.’ First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v C: SARS 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) at 787B at para [31]’. 
71 For an analysis of the principle of legality see section 2.4 infra; Hoexter (2012) at pages 121-5. 
72 The authors of Silke on Tax Administration Lexis Nexis (April 2009) at para 8.9 hold a different view. They simply 
state, without performing the analysis done in this thesis, that s 74B is ‘administrative action’ and therefore subject to 
the provisions of PAJA. They cite Bentley D Taxpayer Rights: An International Perspective (1998) 49 and Daiber C 
Protection of Taxpayer’s Rights in Germany as authority. 
73 See section 5.4: Review Application directly to the Tax Court infra. 
74Grey’s Marine case supra footnote 21 at para’s [19] to [23]. 
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excluded from the fishing industry applied to the Minister of Public Works to use 
property for the establishment of a fish-processing facility and associated restaurant. The 
Minister of Public Works agreed to let a property to them. The appellants, who were 
neighbouring occupiers, felt that the development of this area would cause traffic 
congestion, deprive tenants and visitors of parking and impede access to their premises 
and to the waterfront. They applied to court to review and set aside the Minister’s 
decision. 
 
The question at the outset was whether the Minister’s decision constituted ‘administrative 
action’ falling within the provisions of PAJA. The court held that the Constitution is the 
repository of all state power, which power is distributed by the Constitution, both directly 
and indirectly, amongst the various institutions of the state where its exercise is subject to 
inherent constitutional constraint.  The extent of the constraint varies according to the 
nature of the power that is being exercised.  Where the power is significant, the constraint 
would be proportionately greater. Where it is less, the constraint would be less. In the 
case of ss 74A and 74B, because these powers of SARS are exercised early in a multi-
staged process, the need to exercise constraints must be balanced against the necessity of 
SARS to have access to the required information, documents or things to conduct a 
proper inquiry and audit into the taxpayer’s affairs. Because the exercise of this public 
power usually affects the taxpayer’s patrimony and gives rise to culpability75 by virtue of 
the impending issue of revised assessments by the same SARS officials, it is submitted 
that the power is significant, and any constraints should be proportionately greater, 
ensuring the full suite of constitutional protections envisaged in PAJA being made 
available to the affected taxpayer. 
 
In referring to the restrictive definition of ‘administrative action’ in PAJA, the Supreme 
Court of Appeal came to the conclusion in Grey’s Marine case76 that at the core of the 
definition was the idea of action (a decision) often administered by public bodies 
undertaking their functions.  Sections 74A and 74B require action on the part of SARS in 
requesting information, documents or things so as to commence a regulatory inquiry and 
                                               
75 Viking Pony Africa Pumps (Pty) Ltd t/a Tricom Africa v Hidro-Tech Systems (Pty) Ltd & another 2011 (1) SA 327 
(CC) at para [37]. 
76Grey’s Marine case supra footnote 21 at para [23]. 
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audit, that may inevitably lead to revised assessments being issued by the same SARS 
officials.  
 
In the Grey’s Marine case77 the Supreme Court of Appeal also pointed out that the 
definition had to be construed consistently and, wherever possible, with the meaning that 
is attributed to administrative action as that term is used in s 33 of the Constitution (from 
which PAJA originates), in order to avoid constitutional invalidity. In this regard, it is 
submitted that the fact that the power is investigative and that its exercise does not in 
itself determine whether any tax is payable does not detract from this conclusion. The 
decision imposes on taxpayers an obligation to do something (to produce information, 
documents and things) which, but for the exercise of the power, taxpayers would not in 
law be obliged to do. When SARS exercises these powers the information, documents of 
things must be produced to a SARS official. A failure by taxpayers to comply exposes 
them to criminal prosecution under s 75 of the Income Tax Act. 
 
In the Grey’s Marine case,78 it was held that administrative action is the conduct of the 
bureaucracy in carrying out the daily functions of the state, and necessarily involves the 
application of policy, usually after its translation into law, with direct and immediate 
consequences for individuals or groups of individuals. The relevant factors to be taken 
into account in determining what ‘administrative action’ is, are as follows:79 
 
a. The source of the power; 
b. The nature of the power; 
c. The subject matter of the power; 
d. Whether the power involves the exercise of a public duty; 
e. How closely the power is related, on the one hand, to policy matters which are not 
administrative, and on the other hand to the implementation of legislation, which 
is. 
 
By SARS exercising its powers under ss 74A and 74B: 
 
                                               
77Ibid. at para [22]. 
78Ibid. 
79President of the Republic of South Africa v South African Rugby Football Union 2000 (1) SA 1 (CC). 
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a. The source of the power is specifically set out in the Income Tax Act; 
b. The nature of the power is to regulate tax compliance; 
c. The subject matter of the power is conduct in the form of exercising a discretion; 
d. The power is exercised by SARS officials who are empowered to exercise specific 
public duties prescribed in the Income Tax Act; 
e. The implementation of the policy of tax compliance through legislation is to audit 
taxpayers in pre-identified areas as envisaged in s 74 of the Income Tax Act, in 
the definition of ‘the administration of this Act’. In this regard, SARS have also 
compiled an internal guideline80 to guide and direct SARS officials in audit and 
inquiry cases where the powers of ss 74A and 74B (read with s 74) are invoked. 
 
In addition, prior to the advent of the new Constitution, the Supreme Court of Appeal 
‘vigorously reappraised’ the reasoning that preliminary decisions linked to investigations 
do not affect existing rights – where the Supreme Court of Appeal held that preliminary 
decisions can have devastating effects.81 Hoexter states that: ‘…South African courts will 
have to work out South African meanings for terms such as ‘direct, external legal effect’ 
and that ‘limited progress has been made in this regard.’ And then: ‘…it would be a great 
pity if the term ‘direct’ were to be read as flatly contradicting this jurisprudence or as 
rendering preliminary decision-making entirely unreviewable.’82 These difficulties are in 
fact being worked out in the development of the constitutional principle of legality. In the 
Nextcom (Pty) Ltd v Funde NO and Others83 the court recognised that irregularities 
performed in leading to a decision where a right to procedurally fair administrative action 
had been infringed, the complainant was entitled to bring an immediate review application 
to review the conduct of the Minister: 
 
…[W]here a recommendation is a nullity because of irregularities 
committed in the course of proceedings leading to the decision to make that 
                                               
80 See section 3.2: The SARS Internal Audit Manual infra. The information contained therein sets out internal guidelines 
to be followed by SARS officials to ensure their methodology is lawful, reasonable (rational and proportional) and 
procedurally fair in auditing taxpayers. 
81Du Preez v Truth and Reconciliation Commission 1997(3) SA 204 (A) and Director: Mineral Development, Gauteng 
Region v Save the Vaal Environment 1999(2) SA 709 (SCA). 
82Hoexter (2012) at page 229 footnote 438 – Du Preez v Truth and Reconciliation Commission 1997(3) SA 204 (A) and 
Director: Mineral Development, Gauteng Region v Save the Vaal Environment 1999(2) SA 709 (SCA). Hoexter goes 
on at page 207 to state that: ‘…South African courts will have to work out South African meanings for terms such as 
‘direct, external legal effect’. Limited progress has been made in this regard.’ And further at page 229: ‘…it would be a 
great pity if the term ‘direct’ were to be read as flatly contradicting this jurisprudence or as rendering preliminary 
decision-making entirely unreviewable.’ (footnote excluded) 
83 2000 (4) SA 419 (T). 
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particular recommendation, it means that a right to procedurally fair 
administrative action has been infringed. That infringement cannot be 
rectified by the Minister’s decision; it remains an infringement of a 
constitutional right. …Once unlawfulness is manifest in a form which 
cannot be corrected no matter how the public authority continues to act, 
there is no point in insisting that the complainant should continue to go 
through the motions before bringing the matter to court. (Baxter, 
Administrative Law, p 720.) In my view the review application and this 
application is not premature. (Emphasis supplied) 
 
This set of circumstances is very similar to a taxpayer subjected to its rights to just 
administrative action being infringed whilst SARS embarks upon an inquiry and audit 
into the taxpayer’s affairs. 
 
Notwithstanding this, there is still a temptation for courts to narrowly view preliminary 
natured decisions as not having an immediate ‘direct, external legal effect’ in an attempt 
to disqualify a taxpayer from relying upon the grounds of review in s 6(2) of PAJA. The 
decisions and powers of SARS in terms of ss 74A and 74B fall into this category of 
preliminary decisions linked to investigations, which may devastatingly affect existing 
rights.84 These powers are a form of ‘seizure’85 encroaching upon various taxpayer rights. 
The authors of  Constitutional Law of South Africa 2nd ed also argue that the 
interpretative approach of the determination theory should be followed in arriving at a 
conclusion where the ‘courts will, in practice, work in from the determination theory by 
accepting that all public power which determines rights will constitute administrative 
action…’.86 Baxter supports this conclusion in his authoritative work Administrative 
Law87 where he states that the criterion as to whether or not a sufficiently ‘ripe’ action 
constitutes a reviewable decision depends on ‘whether prejudice has already resulted or is 
                                               
84See also Croome B Taxpayers’ Rights in South Africa Juta 2010 at page 207; Compare Law Society, Northern 
Provinces (Incorporated as The Law Society of The Transvaal) v Maseka and Another 2005(6) SA 372 (BH) at 382B-
E, The Master v Deedat and others 2000(3) SA 1076 (N) at 1083G, and Van der Merwe and Others v Slabbert NO and 
Others 1998(3) SA 613 (N) at 624D-E, where the courts held that if a functionary merely performs an investigative 
function that does not materially and adversely affect a person’s rights, it is not an administrative decision. It is 
submitted in this thesis that a ss 74A and 74B investigative decision and function does materially and adversely affect a 
taxpayer’s rights. 
85R v McKinlay Transport Ltd S.C.R. 627. 
86See the authorities at footnote 53 to 55 supra. 
87 Baxter L Administrative law (1984) Juta. 
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inevitable, irrespective of whether the action is complete or not’.88 Nextcom’s case89 
supports this line of reasoning and in effect follows the determination theory, that all 
public power which determines rights that will result in inevitable prejudice (whether the 
action is complete or not), will constitute administrative action and be reviewable.90 The 
reviewable conduct includes all exercise of public power that defies constitutional 
obligations. This includes s 195(1) of the Constitution read with s 4(2) of the SARS Act. 
It also includes non-compliance with s 41(1) (c), (d) and (f) of the Constitution,91 which 
applies to ‘conduct’ of public administration (including SARS),92 and provides that 
SARS can only carry out the functions under the strict guidance of the basic norms and 
objective value system93 derived from the Constitution. This means that SARS does not 
have inherent power other than that derived from specific statutory provisions.94 Non-
compliance with one or more of the eight jurisdictional facts in s 74 of the Income Tax 
Act and the definition of ‘administration of this Act’ would be non-compliance with the 
scope of SARS’ powers. Encroaching upon the privacy (and dignity) of the taxpayer 
without proper justification95 would also be unlawful conduct. 
 
The underlying right of just administrative action as regulated through the definition of 
‘administrative action’ in PAJA would be circumvented by the simple technique of 
                                               
88 Quoted in Williams R C The Concept of a “Decision” as the threshold requirement for Judicial Review in terms of 
the Promotion of Administrative Act PER/PELJ 2011(14)5 
http://www.ajol.info/index.php/pelj/article/viewFile/70039/58153 (last accessed 30 March 2013) at page 235. 
89Supra footnote 82. 
90Woolman et al Constitutional Law of South Africa 2nd ed Juta 2002 at page 63-21. 
91‘41. Principles of co-operative government and intergovernmental relations. - (1) All spheres of government and 
all organs of state within each sphere must- 
… 
(c) provide effective, transparent, accountable and coherent government for the Republic as a whole; 
(d) be loyal to the Constitution of the Republic and its people; 
… 
(f) not assume any power or function except those conferred on them in terms of the Constitution…’; Section 41(1) of 
the Constitution. 
92Ibid. s 239. 
93Woolman et al Constitutional Law of South Africa 2nd ed Juta 2002 at pages 13-10 and 13-11. 
94High School Carnavon & another v MEC for Education and others [1999] 4 All SA 590 (NC); The Monastery 
Diamond Mining Corporation (Edms) Bpk v Schimper 1983 (3) SA 538 (O); Drakensberg Administration Board v 
Town Planning Appeals Board 1983 (4) SA 42 (N) at 45A); Baxter Administrative Law at 408; Wiechers 
Administratiefreg 2 ed at 156; ; Barrett NO v Macquet 1947 (2) SA 1001 (A) at 1015–1016; See also Gzell I V The 
Taxpayer’s Duty of Disclosure (Paper) October 2006 Hong Kong: where the presenter concluded that a ‘taxpayer’s duty 
of disclosure is a creature of statute. The content of the duty will depend upon the proper construction of the statutory 
provision.’ http://www.lawlink.nsw.govau/lawlink/Supreme_Court/ll_sc.nsf/pages/SCO_gzell131006 (last accessed 31 
March 2013); See also section 3.3: Lawfulness infra. 
95The direct legal effect is that the fundamental right to privacy of the taxpayer is intruded upon, outside justifiable 
grounds. However, the case law on justification says that there is no 'privacy' when investigating business affairs (see 
Bernstein and Others v Bester and Others NNO 1996(2) SA 751 (CC). Here the deprivation versus the determination 
theory comes to play, where the latter is broader in meaning - one must merely show that determined rights that emerge 
going forward may be affected. Various academic writers favour this approach, such as Hoexter (2012) and Woolman 
et al Constitutional Law of South Africa 2nd ed Juta 2002 at page 63-21. 
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compelling taxpayers to comply without question at the commencement of the pre-
assessment investigation in terms of ss 74A and 74B. Despite the fact that the inevitable 
revised assessment, penalties and interest charges may follow. This legalistic and literal 
interpretation is questionable, especially as the result of the inquiry and audit is the 
immediate enforcement of the ‘pay now argue later’ principle to any revised assessment 
raised against the taxpayer.  
 
For this reason, it is submitted, taxpayers are entitled to challenge SARS before the actual 
issuing of the revised assessments, where the powers of SARS under ss 74A and 74B 
have been applied in an unlawful, unreasonable, procedurally unfair manner, or without 
adequate reasons. If not, the effect is simply to paralyse the rights of taxpayers in a 
process that takes them down an avenue of direct, external legal consequences, where the 
Constitution exists to otherwise protect them. SARS, as an organ of state, cannot escape 
that scrutiny of the Constitution by simply forcing the taxpayer to submit to these powers, 
without taxpayers having the right to challenge these powers in terms of PAJA, or the 
constitutional principle of legality. 
 
As already stated, the reality is that the inquiry and audit is usually the trigger for the 
inevitable issue of revised assessments shortly after the commencement of that inquiry 
and audit. In Park-Ross96 Tebbutt J stated that preliminary inquiries that may result in 
inevitable, significant consequences for the subject under investigation and for this reason 
the effect on fundamental rights of the person under investigation should not be ignored. 
It is also noteworthy that in Nomala v Permanent Secretary, Department of Welfare and 
Another,97 the court held that a matter was ripe for adjudication in relation to the 
lawfulness98 of administrative action where prejudice was inevitable even though the 
action had not yet occurred. 
 
In Viking Pony Africa Pumps (Pty) Ltd t/a Tricom Africa v Hidro-Tech Systems (Pty) Ltd 
& another 2011 (1) SA 327 (CC) the Constitutional Court held: 
 
                                               
96Park-Ross and Another v Director: Office for Serious Economic Offences 1995 (2) SA 148 (C) at pages [1641-165A]. 
97 2001 (8) BCLR 844 (E).  
98 See also section 3.3: Lawfulness infra. 
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[37] PAJA defines administrative action as a decision or failure to take a 
decision that adversely affects the rights of any person, which has a direct, 
external legal effect.99 This includes “action that has the capacity to affect 
legal rights”.100 Whether or not administrative action, which would make 
PAJA applicable, has been taken cannot be determined in the abstract. 
Regard must always be had to the facts of each case. 101 (Emphasis supplied) 
 
Whether or not administrative action, which would make PAJA applicable, has been 
taken, ‘…cannot be determined in the abstract. Regard must always be had to the facts of 
each case.’102 A decision to investigate, and the process of investigation, which excludes 
a determination of culpability, could not adversely affect the rights of the appellant’s in a 
manner that has a direct and external legal effect.103 So too a decision to institute 
proceedings in the High Court for an interdict does not affect the rights of the appellants, 
or have that capacity. It is the High Court which decides that the Act is being contravened 
and decides to grant the interdict.104 
 
Having regard to the typical facts and circumstances that occur at the time of a SARS 
decision to inquire and audit, the inter-relationship between ss 1(c), 33, 41(1), 172(1), 
195(1) and 237 of the Constitution, s 4(2) of the SARS Act, and PAJA, such a decision is 
considered to be ‘administrative action’ for the following reasons: 
 
                                               
99 Section 1 provides that “administrative action”— 
“means any decision taken, or any failure to take a decision, by— 
(a) an organ of state, when— 
(i) exercising a power in terms of the Constitution or a provincial 
constitution; or 
(ii) exercising a public power or performing a public function in 
terms of any legislation; or 
(b) a natural or juristic person, other than an organ of state, when exercising a public 
power or performing a public function in terms of an empowering provision, 
which adversely affects the rights of any person and which has a direct, external legal effect”. 
100Grey’s Marine case supra footnote 21 at para [23]. 
101Viking Pony Africa Pumps (Pty) Ltd t/a Tricom Africa v Hidro-Tech Systems (Pty) Ltd & another 2011 (1) SA 327 
(CC) at para [37]; Joseph & another v City of Johannesburg & others 2010 (4) SA 55 (CC) at para [27]; Grey’s Marine 
case supra footnote 21 at para [23]; City of Cape Town v Hendricks & another [2012] ZASCA 90; J R de Ville Judicial 
Review of Administrative Action in South Africa, (2003) para 2 1 6; Hoexter (2012) at pages 220-7; See also recent 
Corpclo 2290 cc t/a U-Care v The Registrar of Banks [2013] 1 All SA 127 (SCA) at para [26]: the Supreme Court of 
Appeal held that the Registrar’s decisions to investigate the appellant’s business and institute proceedings against the 
appellant’s for an interdict in terms of s 81 of the Act were not administrative actions for the purposes of PAJA as they 
did not (as required by the definition of ‘administrative action’ in s 1 of PAJA) adversely affect the rights of the 
appellant’s or have a direct, external legal effect or have that capacity. 
102Ibid. at para [37]. 
103Corpclo case op. cit. at para [26]. 
104Ibid; Competition Commission of SA v Telkom SA Ltd & another [2010] 2 All SA 433 (SCA) at para [11]. 
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(a) the decision has been taken by an organ of State exercising a public power or 
performing a public function in terms of legislation; 
(b) the decision involves the exercise of a discretionary power, in that it is for SARS to 
determine whether and in what circumstances it will require any particular taxpayer 
to submit, produce or make available information, documents of things; 
(c) the decision adversely affect taxpayers’ rights, and has a direct, external legal effect. 
The fact that the power in question is preliminary and investigative, and that its 
exercise does not in itself determine whether any tax, penalties and interest is 
payable, does not detract from the conclusion that tax, penalties and interest may 
become payable as a result of the preliminary investigation. The decision imposes 
on taxpayers an obligation to do something (to submit, produce or make available 
relevant material (as defined)) which, but for the exercise of the power, taxpayers 
would not in law be obliged to do: normally taxpayers would have a right to keep 
private and confidential information, documents and things that must now be 
produced or provided to a SARS official. A failure by taxpayers to comply exposes 
them to criminal prosecution. Furthermore, these powers exercised by SARS are not 
made specifically subject to the normal objection and appeal processes in the 
Income Tax Act; 
(d) there is no relevant exclusion in the definition of ‘administrative action’ that 
removes this type of decision from that definition in PAJA;  
(e) a decision made by SARS in terms of ss 74A and 74B can and will most probably 
result in culpability in the form of revised assessments being issued by the same 
SARS assessors conducting the inquiry and audit, resulting in a decision by SARS 
that will ‘materially and adversely affect(s) rights’ and have a ‘direct, external legal 
effect’ on taxpayers.105 
2.3.3 Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, despite it being preliminary and investigative in nature, it is submitted that 
a decision of SARS in terms of ss 74A and 74B is ‘administrative action’ as contemplated 
in s 33 of the Constitution, and as defined in PAJA. The safeguards incorporated in PAJA 
should be applied to SARS. Taxpayers should be entitled to the full suite of rights in s 
                                               
105Viking Pony Africa Pumps (Pty) Ltd t/a Tricom Africa v Hidro-Tech Systems (Pty) Ltd & Another 
2011 (1) SA 327 (CC) at para [37]. 
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3(2) of PAJA at the commencement of an inquiry and audit. Adequate reasons in terms of 
s 5(2) of PAJA will also be required by SARS. Any defective administrative action by 
SARS will be subject to the grounds of review in s 6(2) of PAJA, and subject to the 
provisions of ss 7 and 8 of PAJA. If not, SARS is still bound by the constitutional 
principle of legality, which entails exercising public power that must be carried out 
lawfully, reasonably, in a procedurally fair manner, and with adequate reasons, as 
discussed in the next section:1.4 The Relevance of PAJA and the Principle of Legality. 
 




With the development of constitutional law and the promulgation of PAJA giving effect 
to s 33(3) and the rights referred to in ss 33(1) and (2) of the Constitution, the provisions 
of PAJA must now, first and foremost, be considered in any review proceedings initiated 
against SARS for invalid conduct.106 PAJA regulates ‘administrative action’ (in the 
absence of applying the constitutional principle of legality). Chaskalson CJ in Minister of 
Health v New Clicks South Africa (Pty) Ltd107 rejected the Supreme Court of Appeal’s 
approach to review the regulations for lawfulness by applying the provisions of s 33(1) of 
the Constitution and the common law directly, and not in terms of PAJA. Chaskalson 
pointed out that PAJA had been enacted pursuant to a constitutional command to give 
effect to the right to administrative justice. To allow applicants to go behind the 
provisions of PAJA to utilise s 33(1) of the Constitution to review administrative action 
would frustrate the purpose with which s 33(3) of the Constitution required the enactment 
of PAJA. In a concurring judgment, Nqcobo108 held that to allow access for review to s 
33(1) of the Constitution would allow for the development of two parallel systems of law 
with the same subject matter which would be untenable. He went on to state that litigants 
would only be entitled to rely directly upon s 33(1) of the Constitution where it was 
                                               
106 Hoexter (2012) at pages 121-5 and 359; Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd v Greater Johannesburg Transitional 
Metropolitan Council 1999(1) SA 374 (CC) at para’s [56] and [58] (principle of legality is an aspect of rule of law); 
President of the Republic of South Africa v SARFU 2000(1) SA 1 (CC) para [148] (act in good faith and do not 
miscontrue powers – see also section 3.3: Lawfulness and 3.3.3.2: Mala Fides or Bad Faith infra); Pharmaceutical 
Manufacturers case supra footnote 11 at para’s [20], [44], [45], [49] - [51], and [79] – [90] (public power should not be 
arbitrary or irrational, and rationality is a minimum threshold for the exercise of public power – see also section 3.4: 
Reasonableness and 3.4.1: Rationality infra).  
107 2006 (2) SA 311 (CC) at para [95]. 
108Ibid. para’s [436] and [437]. 
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alleged that the remedies afforded by PAJA were deficient – the action would be directed 
at the offending provision of PAJA, and not at the offending administrative action itself.  
 
If the conclusion drawn in section 2.3.3 above is incorrect, and a court determines that the 
narrow definition of ‘administrative action’ in PAJA excludes a decision in terms of ss 
74A and 74B, it is submitted that the definition of administrative action in PAJA would 
be questionable,109 and the definition would be subject to constitutional review. 
 
If PAJA does not apply, the other avenue of review open to the taxpayer would be the 
constitutional principle of legality, as an overriding general provision of constitutional 
law, creating justiciable rights for the taxpayer, empowering the taxpayer to apply to 
court to review conduct that is invalid under s 2 of the Constitution. The principle of 
legality is ‘capable of filling the “accountability vacuum” (footnote omitted) when PAJA 
does not apply.’110 
 
This submission is also based on the judgment of Chaskalson CJ in Minister of Health v 
New Clicks South Africa (Pty) Ltd:111 
 
[97]Professor Hoexter sums up the relationship between PAJA, the 
Constitution and the common law, as follows: 
“The principle of legality clearly provides a much-needed safety net 
when the PAJA does not apply. However, the Act cannot simply be 
circumvented by resorting directly to the constitutional rights in s 33. 
This follows logically from the fact that the PAJA gives effect to the 
constitutional rights… Nor is it possible to sidestep the Act by 
resorting to the common law… The common law may be used to 
inform the meaning of the constitutional rights and of the Act, but it 
cannot be regarded as an alternative to the Act.” (footnotes and 
emphasis omitted) 
                                               
109 See also the analysis supra in 2.3: A Constitutional Balance of SARS’ Powers and the ‘Administrative Action’ 
Debate; Croome B Taxpayers’ Rights in South Africa Juta 2010 at page 208 where the author states: ‘I submit that if the 
taxpayer can show that PAJA unreasonably restricts his constitutional rights in violation of s 36 of the Constitution, he 
may challenge the validity of PAJA.’ He cites Currie I & Klaaren J The Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 
Benchbook SiberInk 2001 para 1.29 at page 29. 
110 Hoexter (2012) at page 248 and footnote 577: Michael Taggart ‘The Province of Administrative Law Determined?’ 
in Michael Taggart (ed) The Province of Administrative Law (1997) 1 at page 3. 
111 2006(2) SA 311 (CC) at para’s [93] to [96]. 
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I agree. 
 
Raz112 defined the essence of the rule of law as relating to two features:  
(a) that all people (including the government) should be 
ruled by the law and obey it; and  
(b) that the law should be such that people should be able 
to be guided by it.113 
The rule of law principle requires that all government action must comply with the law, 
including the Constitution. Government action includes the exercise of public power. As 
such, the exercise of all public power is subject to the Constitution. The Constitution 
contains constitutional obligations such as those in ss 41(1), 195(1) and 237 of the 
Constitution, irrespective of whether or not such exercise of power amounts to 
administrative action. The standards demanded by the Constitution for the exercise of 
public power by the Executive and other functionaries (such as SARS) are that it should 
not be arbitrary. Decisions must be rationally related to the purpose for which the power 
was given: whether a decision is rationally related to the purpose for which the power 
was given calls for an objective inquiry.114 
 
In relation to the exercise by SARS of ‘public power’ under ss 74A and 74B, the rule of 
law will require that the exercise of public power not be arbitrary, and that the decision 
taken to request information, documents or things be rationally related to the purpose for 
which the power was given; namely, for purposes of administration115 of the Income Tax 
Act as defined in s 74. In applying these principles to ss 74A and 74B in making a 
decision to request information, documents or things, SARS must carry out its 
constitutional obligations in line with the rule of law. 
 
                                               
112Raz J The Rule of Law and its Virtue (1977) 93 Law Quarterly Review195, at page 198. 
113 Stewart C The Rule Of Law And The Tinker bell Effect: Theoretical Considerations, Criticisms And Justifications 
For The Rule Of Law. MacQuarie Law Journal at page 7. 
114Pharmaceutical Manufacturers case supra footnote 11 at paras [20], [44], [45], [49] - [51], and [79] – [90]; See also 
University of Cape Town v Ministers of Education & Culture (House of Assembly & House of Representatives) 
1988 3 SA 203 (C) ; LAWSA Volume 1 2nd ed Administrative Law Lexis Nexis at para 139 footnote 6. 
115In Industrial Equity Ltd v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation and Others (1990) 170 CLR 649 at 659 the Australian 
High Court held that the powers of access and inquisition must be exercised for the purpose of the Act and that question 
is to be considered in the context of the provision levying income tax - as envisaged in the definition of ‘administration 
of this Act’ in s 74 of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962. 
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SARS (as an organ of State) can exercise only those powers lawfully conferred upon 
them as set out in s 41(1) of the Constitution. This is part of the rule of law. This can also 
be extended to mean, from the authorities quoted infra, that compliance with the 
Constitution is the starting point of compliance with the rule of law. Non-compliance 
would mean that the organ of state has acted unlawfully and ultra vires the Constitution. 
As such, the Constitution extends the meaning of compliance by the organ of state (such 
as SARS) with the powers conferred upon them to include compliance with constitutional 
values, principles and obligations.  
 
2.4.2 The principle of legality 
 
The principle of legality was considered as an aspect of the rule of law in Fedsure Life 
Assurance Ltd v Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council116where the 
Constitutional Court held that local government may only act within the powers lawfully 
conferred upon it: ‘(I)t is a fundamental principle of the rule of law,117 recognised widely, 
that the exercise of public power is only legitimate where lawful.  The rule of law – to the 
extent at least that it expresses this principle of legality – is generally understood to be a 
fundamental principle of constitutional law…’.118 
 
In President of the Republic of South Africa and another v South African Rugby Football 
Union and others119 the Constitutional Court held that public power must be exercised in 
good faith and in exercising those powers, should not be misconstrued. In this regard: 
 
                                               
116 1998 (12) BCLR 1458 (CC) to para’s [56]-[57]. 
117 Footnote to para [56] – see Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution 10ed. (Macmillan Press, 
London 1959) at 193, in which Dicey refers to this aspect of the rule of law in the following terms: ‘We mean in the 
second place, when we speak of the ‘rule of law’ as a characteristic of our country, not only that with us no man is 
above the law, but (what is a different thing) that here every man, whatever be his rank or condition, is subject to the 
ordinary law of the realm and amenable to the jurisdiction of the ordinary tribunals. … With us every official, from the 
Prime Minister down to a constable or a collector of taxes, is under the same responsibility for every act done without 
legal justification as any other citizen.’ [footnotes omitted] (Emphasis supplied) 
118See also, for example, Reference Re Language Rights under the Manitoba Act, 1870 [1985] 19 DLR [4th] 1 at 24, 
where the Supreme Court of Canada held that: ‘The Constitution, as the supreme law, must be understood as a 
purposive ordering of social relations providing a basis upon which an actual order of positive laws can be brought into 
existence. The founders of this nation must have intended, as one of the basic principles of nation building, that Canada 
can be a society of legal order and normative structure: one governed by rule of law. While this is not set out in a 
specific provision, the principle of the rule of law is clearly a principle of our Constitution.’ 
119 2000(1) SA 1 (CC) at para [148]; See also section 3.3: Lawfulness infra and 3.3.3.2: Mala Fides or Bad Faith infra. 
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[148]… the exercise of the powers must not infringe any provision of the 
Bill of Rights; the exercise of the powers is also clearly constrained by the 
principle of legality. (Emphasis supplied) 
 
The Constitutional Court has made it clear that, in accordance with the constraints placed 
on public power by the rule of law and the principle of legality, the exercise of all public 
power is subject to the Constitution. This gives taxpayers the opportunity to review any 
conduct of SARS that is contrary to the rule of law (including the principle of legality), 
without having to ‘claim space and push boundaries’ to find means of controlling public 
powers.120 
 
In the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers case,121 the Constitutional Court established the 
following: 
 
[85]It is a requirement of the rule of law that the exercise of public power 
by the Executive and other functionaries should not be arbitrary.  
Decisions must be rationally related to the purpose for which the power 
was given, otherwise they are in effect arbitrary and inconsistent with this 
requirement… 
 
[86] The question whether a decision is rationally related to the purpose 
for which the power was given calls for an objective inquiry.  Otherwise a 
decision that, viewed objectively, is in fact irrational, might pass muster 
simply because the person who took it mistakenly and in good faith 
believed it to be rational.  Such a conclusion would place form above 
substance, and undermine an important constitutional principle. 
(Emphasis supplied) 
 
These principles are not unique to the Executive. The Constitutional Court made specific 
reference to ‘other functionaries’. This would include SARS. Hence, in relation to the 
exercise by SARS of its powers under ss 74A and 74B, the rule of law including the 
principle of legality will at the very least require the following, that: 
                                               
120Pharmaceutical Manufacturers case op. cit. at para [45]. 
121Ibid. at para’s [85]-[86]. 
 
  49 
 
(a) the exercise of SARS’ power must fall within the powers lawfully conferred upon 
them in terms of the Constitution (ss 1(c) and 41(1)), and must not be arbitrary or 
irrational;122 
 
(b) the decision taken to request information, documents or things must be rationally123 
related to the purpose for which the power was given,124 namely, for ‘the 
administration of the Act’, as defined in s 74 of the Income Tax Act; 
 
(c) this requirement must be satisfied so as not to fall short of the standards demanded 
by the Constitution, which would include compliance with the principle of legality 
generally, and various constitutional obligations such as s 195(1) of the 
Constitution; and 
 
(d) merely accepting that the person making the decision has done so mistakenly and in 
good faith, believing it to be rational, would place form over substance, 
undermining the applicable constitutional principles. 
 
The principle of legality and the duty imposed by s 7(2) of the Constitution that the State 
must respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights are also well 
illustrated in the unanimous decision of the Constitutional Court in Mohamed and 
Another v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others.125 In this case, the 
Constitutional Court found that immigration officers, in handing over ‘Mohamed’ to the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation in the United States of America without getting at the 
very least a guarantee from the United States government that he would not be subject to 
a death sentence on conviction, was a gross transgression of the values inherent in the 
Constitution ‘… and contrary to the underlying values of our Constitution. It is 
                                               
122Ibid. at 261. 
123Pharmaceutical Manufacturers case supra footnote 11 at para [45]; See also University of Cape Town v Ministers of 
Education & Culture (House of Assembly & House of Representatives) 1988 3 SA 203 (C); LAWSA Volume 1 2nd ed 
Administrative Law Lexis Nexis at para 139 footnote 6; ‘In order to establish a prima facie case for enforceability of an 
Internal Revenue Service summons, plaintiffs must plead: (1) that the investigation has a legitimate purpose and that the 
inquiry may be relevant to that purpose, (2) that the information sought is not already within the Government's 
possession, and (3) that the Government has followed the procedural steps required by the Internal Revenue Code’: US 
v McCarthy 514 F 2d 368. 
124Ibid. at para [45]. 
125 2001(3) SA 893 (CC) at para’s [37], [48], [52], [53], [58], and [68] and quoting Justice Brandeis in Olmstead et al. v 
United States 277 U.S. 438 (1928), a case about using unlawfully obtained evidence from wire tapping violations.  
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inconsistent with the government’s … and it ignores the commitment implicit in the 
Constitution that South Africa will not be party to the imposition of cruel, inhuman or 
degrading punishment.’ Having found that the conduct of the state in handing over 
Mohamed to the United States was unlawful, the Court went on to state that it was a 
serious finding as the State lead by example: ‘If the government becomes a lawbreaker, it 
breeds contempt for the law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself, it invites 
anarchy.’ 
 
In applying these principles to ss 74A and 74B when making a decision to request 
information, documents or things, SARS must protect taxpayers’ constitutional rights, 
uphold their constitutional obligations, and not break the law. If not, its actions (by 
analogy) will be seen to breed contempt for the law. SARS must lead by example. The 
legitimacy of the constitutional order is undermined when SARS acts unlawfully, 
unreasonably or without procedural fairness and adequate reasons. This conclusion is 
supported by the clear obligation placed upon SARS to diligently and without delay 
perform its obligations in terms of the Constitution. The principle of legality can be 
viewed in a broad sense to mean that SARS must, in the first instance, uphold the 
principles and values of the Constitution in exercising any decision or executing any 
conduct. It must comply with the jurisdictional facts of ss 74A and 74B read with the 
definition of ‘administration of this Act’ in s 74, and comply with its constitutional 
obligations set out in ss 1(c), 33, 41(1), 195(1) and 237 of the Constitution.  SARS must 
do so diligently and without delay.126 This means, inter alia, that SARS cannot: exercise 
power not conferred upon it in terms of the Constitution; ignore its constitutional 
obligations such as those in terms of s 195(1) of the Constitution; and, exercise power 
arbitrarily and merely in good faith, in the belief that its decision is rationally127 related to 
the purpose for which the power was given, albeit mistakenly. This would give credence 
to form over substance, undermining constitutional principles. To transgress these 
provisions in the Constitution would amount to conduct that is unlawful and ultra vires128 
the Constitution and ‘invalid’.  
 
                                               
126Section 237 of the Constitution. 
127Pharmaceutical Manufacturers case op. cit.; University of Cape Town v Ministers of Education & Culture (House of 
Assembly & House of Representatives) 1988 3 SA 203 (C); LAWSA Volume 1 2nd ed Administrative Law Lexis Nexis 
at para 139 footnote 6. 
128 See section 3.3: Lawfulness infra. 
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In practice, the first inquiry as to the reviewability of ‘invalid’ conduct by SARS would 
be to determine whether that conduct is ‘administrative conduct’ under PAJA, and then 
subject to the codified grounds of review in s 6(2) of PAJA. If this step is not satisfied, 
the ‘accountability vacuum’ referred to by Professor Hoexter above129 is filled by the 
taxpayer relying upon the principle of legality in reviewing the ‘invalid’ conduct by 
SARS. The applicable review actions available to taxpayers both through PAJA, or the 
principle of legality, are discussed and analysed in this thesis. 
 
The conclusion was reached in 1.3: A Constitutional Balance of SARS’ Powers and the 
‘Administrative Action’ Debate above that the definition of ‘administrative action’ 
includes a transgression by SARS of its constitutional obligations in ss 1(c), 33,41(1) and 
195(1) of the Constitution when SARS make a decision in terms of ss 74A and 74B. 
SARS must: comply with the rule of law, only assume powers as provided for in the 
Constitution; apply just administrative action; display a high standard of professional 
ethics; provide efficient economic and effective use of resource; provide services that are 
provided impartially, fairly, equitably and without bias; respond to the people’s needs; 
and, act in an accountable and transparent manner, by providing the public with timely 
accessible and accurate information.130 
 
One of the emerging problems with s 195(1) of the Constitution is that, although it 
regulates Public Administration generally by imposing constitutional obligations SARS 
(an organ of State), the Constitutional Court has held that it does not give rise to 
justiciable rights - Chirwa v Transnet Limited and Others:131 
 
[76] Therefore although section 195 of the Constitution provides valuable 
interpretive assistance it does not found a right to bring an action. 
 
The claimant attempted to raise s 195(1) as support for a justiciable right the party had. 
The Constitutional Court was not impressed with the argument, simply stating s 195(1) 
does not create a set of justiciable rights. They do however creating duties and obligations 
that must be fulfilled, otherwise conduct is inconsistent with the Constitution. In the 
                                               
129 Hoexter (2012) at page 248. 
130 Sections 41(1)(f) and 195(1)(a), (b), (d), (e), (f) and (g); Mpande Foodliner CC v C SARS 63 SATC 46 at pages 51 
and 64. 
1312008 (4) SA 367 (CC) at [74] – [76], [146] and [195]. 
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recent Constitution Court decision in Glenister v President of the Republic of South 
Africa and Others132 the court held that the High Court had jurisdiction to hear 
applications challenging the non-fulfilment of constitutional obligations such as ‘to act 
reasonably and accountably; to cultivate good human resource management; to respect 
international treaty obligations; … and to respect values enshrined in the Bill of Rights.’ 
It is submitted, similarly, the failure by SARS to adhere to its constitutional obligations 
such as ss 1(c), 33, 41(1) and 195(1) of the Constitution, read with s 4(2) of the SARS 
Act, is unlawful and would be the non-fulfillment of constitutional obligations as 
envisaged in theGlenister case,133 bringing such failure by SARS to act consistently with 
the Constitution within the ambit of a judicial review on grounds of unlawfulness, with 
the resultant remedies available to the taxpayer through s 172(1) of the Constitution in 
terms of s 6(2) of PAJA, or the constitutional principle of legality. 
 
2.4.3 Recent developments in the principle of legality 
 
The courts are also beginning to accept in the recent development of the constitutional 
principle of legality, that failure to give reasons is a further transgression of that 
principle.134 
 
The following recent decisions are significant in this regard: In Albutt v Centre for the 
Study of Violence and Reconciliation135 the Constitutional Court made it clear that 
rationality may demand procedural fairness in appropriate cases. The High Court also 
recently supported the proposition that ‘the principle of legality, which includes 
rationality and accountability, imposes a duty upon the functionary exercising a public 
power to provide reasons for its act or decision’ in the full bench decision of Van Der 
Merwe J in Wessels v Minister for Justice and Constitutional Development.136 In a recent 
decision of Koyabe v Minister for Home Affairs137 the Constitutional Court also seems 
‘willing to source the obligation to give reasons elsewhere than in s 5 of PAJA’.138 
 
                                               
1322011 (3) SA 347 (CC) at para’s [13] and [22]. 
133Ibid. 
134 Hoexter (2012) at pages 121-5 and 359. 
135 2010 (3) SA 293 (CC) at para [49] et seq. 
136 2010 (1) SA 128 (GNP) at para’s 141I-J. 
137 2010 (4) SA 327 (CC). 
138Ibid. at page 359. 
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Consequently, it can be argued that the constitutional principle of legality has now come 
full circle, to encapsulate all the duties of SARS in terms of PAJA: the duty to act 
lawfully, reasonably, procedurally fairly, and to give reasons, where appropriate. If the 
provisions of ss 3 and 5 of PAJA, through the definition of administrative action, does not 
apply to SARS when invoking their powers in terms of ss 74A and 74B, then the 
constitutional principle, as described above, will apply, opening the taxpayer’s door to 
taking any conduct by SARS that is inconsistent with these constitutional principles and 
obligations on review. 
 
Chapters 2 and 3 below analyse the substantive limitations to SARS’ powers in ss 74A 
and 74B, and the significance of SARS’ constitutional obligations in s 195(1) of the 
Constitution. 
 




If a decision by SARS in terms of ss74A and 74B is ‘administrative action’ as defined in 
PAJA, and the decision and a taxpayers ‘rights have been materially and adversely 
affected’ as contemplated in s 5(1) of PAJA, SARS will have to give adequate reasons as 
contemplated in s 5(2), failing which it will be presumed that the administrative action of 
SARS was ‘taken without good reason’ (s 5(3) of PAJA), bringing the transgression 
within the ambit of a s 6(2)(c) and (i) of PAJA ground of review. 
 
Hoexter states139 that although PAJA gives effect to the constitutional right to reasons for 
administrative action as defined, and therefore only applies to those rights and legitimate 
expectations ‘materially and adversely affected by administrative action’,140 reasons will 
increasingly be accepted as part of the content of fairness, even where rights are not 
involved, or as the subject matter of the discourse of public power in the broader sense, 
outside the narrowly defined scope of ‘administrative action’ in PAJA.  
 
2.5.2 The relevance of s 74 of the Income Tax Act 
                                               
139 Hoexter C & Lyster R The New Constitutional & Administrative (2002) Juta at page 203. 
140 As envisaged in s 5(1) of PAJA. 
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However, the necessity for adequate reasons goes beyond the requirements of PAJA. 
Sections 74A and 74B require an inquiry or audit to be ‘for the purposes of the 
administration of this Act’. This phrase is defined in s 74 of the Income Tax Act. Section 
74 of the Income Tax Act reads: 
 
74. GENERAL PROVISIONS WITH REGARD TO 
INFORMATION DOCUMENTS OR THINGS… 
 
‘administration of this Act’ means– 
 
(a) obtaining of full information in relation to any – 
 
(i) amount received by or accrued to any person; 
(ii) property disposed of under a donation by any 
person; and 
(iii) dividend declared by any company; 
 
(b) ascertaining of the correctness of any return, 
financial statement, document, declaration of facts 
or valuation; 
 
(c) determination of the liability of any person for any 
tax, duty or levy and any interest or penalty141 in 
relation thereto leviable under this Act; 
 
(d) collecting of any such liability; 
 
                                               
141See the Canadian Supreme Court case of R v Jarvis 2002 (3) SCR 757 as support for this submission – discussed 
later in this thesis at page 88; In Palmer v McMahon 133 US 660 (1890) the court held that the imposition of the 
penalty did not deprive the taxpayer of liberty and property without due process of law, as the taxpayer had the 
opportunity to object before the assessment. In South Africa, objection only happens after the revised assessment and 
the imposition of punitive penalties, so if SARS were to use the inquiry and audit provisions in s 74 to investigate 
punitive penalties (as opposed to administrative penalties) and obtain evidence to pursue the punitive penalties and any 
criminal charges, the conduct of SARS would, it is submitted, be unconstitutional. 
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(e) ascertaining whether an offence in terms of this 
Act has been committed; 
 
(f) ascertaining whether a person has, other than in 
relation to a matter contemplated in paragraphs 
(a),(b),(c),(d) and (e) of this definition, complied 
with the provisions of this Act; 
 
(g) enforcement of any of the Commissioner’s 
remedies under this Act to ensure that any 
obligation imposed upon any person by or under 
this Act, is complied with; and 
 
(h) performance of any other administrative function 
which is necessary for the carrying out of the 
provisions of this Act. (Emphasis supplied). 
 
It is not sufficient for SARS to simply restate the provisions in s 74 as the purpose for its 
inquiry and audit. A rational objective reason for invoking the provisions must exist.142 A 
reasonable decision143 must be supported by ‘concrete evidence’144 with reasons145 given 
for taking the decision in the first place. The decision must be objectively capable of 
                                               
142Ferucci and Others v Commissioner for South African Revenue Service and Another 65 SATC 47 at page 52 and 
pages 54-5. 
143 See section 3.4: Reasonableness infra; LAWSA Volume 5(3) 2nd ed at para 165: ‘There is no quantitative legal 
yardstick since the quality of reasonableness of the provision (or conduct) under challenge “must be judged according 
to whether it arbitrarily or excessively invades the enjoyment of a constitutionally guaranteed right”’; Commissioner of 
Taxes v CW (Pvt) Ltd 1989 (3) ZLR 361 (S) at 370F-372C; Union Government (Minister of Mines and Industries) v 
Union Steel Corporation (South Africa) Limited 1928 AD 220 , 236-7; and National Transport Commission v Chetty's 
Motor Transport (Pty) Ltd 1972 (3) SA 726 (A); See also Local 174 International Brotherhood of Teamsters v US, 240 
F.2d 387 (quoted from the headnote): where ‘(i)n proceedings by revenue agents to compel a union's production of 
records relating to transactions with the taxpayer-president, agents had a burden to show that a demand was reasonable 
under all circumstances and to prove that books and records were relevant or material to the tax liability of the 
taxpayer and that the union possessed the books or records containing items relating to the taxpayer's business’. 
(Emphasis supplied) 
144 Preiss, M, Silke J, & Zulman R H The Income Tax Practice Manual (November 2012), www.mylexisnexis.co.za. at 
para B 8 (7): ‘The inference to be drawn from the decision in an unreported case in 1944, and from other decisions, is 
that the Court, while giving due weight to the onus placed upon the taxpayer under s 82, will not be satisfied with 
guesses by SARS which are not supported by concrete evidence and that if it has to decide on probabilities it will be 
guided by the relative strength of the evidence tendered by the appellant and by the Commissioner respectively.’ 
(Emphasis supplied) 
145 See also Park-Ross and Another v Director: Office for Serious Economic Offences 1995 (2) SA 148 (C) at pages 
1641-165A; Sachs v Minister of Justice 1934 AD 11. 
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furthering the purpose for which the power was given and for which the decision was 
taken.  
 
In the case of Nkondo & Gumede v Minister of Law and Order,146  the Appellate Division 
held that repeating the wording of the enabling legislation did not constitute reasons: ‘I 
cannot accept the proposition that if the Minister acts on one of these grounds and 
informs the person concerned of that fact by repeating the relevant words in the relevant 
paragraph, that ground thereby assumes the character of "reasons"…’. In this case the 
court held that: the functionary must comply with the jurisdictional facts of the 
empowering provisions, otherwise the notice is invalid; all prescribed procedures must be 
complied with; a statement of statutory grounds is not reasons for a notice - as such, 
reasons must give the person concerned an opportunity to make proper representations; 
the Minister cannot act arbitrarily or capriciously; he must make a decision based on the 
information before him, otherwise he is acting arbitrarily. This is also supported by 
Hoexter,147who states that:‘… reasons are not really reasons unless they are properly 
informative.  They must explain why action was taken or not taken.’ 
 
The decision taken by SARS in taking a decision in terms of ss 74A and 74B must 
therefore be rationally148 related to the purpose (one of those listed in s 74) for which the 
power was given.149 In order to require information, documents or things, SARS must 
give an informative and adequate reason for the decision. For instance, the request for 
information, documents, or things could be formulated along the following lines, in order 
to comply with these provisions: 
 
The taxpayer is required to furnish, produce or make available 
information, documents or things for the purposes of the administration of 
the Income Tax Act, in accordance with the provisions of ss 74A and 74B, 
for the following reasons: 
 
                                               
146 1986 (2) SA 756 (A) at page 785; See also Sachs v Minister of Justice 1934 AD 11. 
147 Hoexter & Lyster R The New Constitutional & Administrative Law (2002) Juta at page 244. 
148Pharmaceutical Manufacturers case op. cit. at para [85]; University of Cape Town v Ministers of Education & 
Culture (House of Assembly & House of Representatives) 1988 3 SA 203 (C); LAWSA Volume 1 2nd ed 
Administrative Law Lexis Nexis at para 139 footnote 6. 
149 Wheelright K Taxpayer’ Rights in Australia in Bentley D Taxpayers’ Rights: An International Perspective Revenue 
Law Journal Bond University: Queensland 1998 at page 49; Pharmaceutical Manufacturers case op.cit. 
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At this juncture, SARS would have to be selective in choosing one or more of the 
following, so as to demonstrate the rational exercise (as opposed to arbitrary exercise) of 
its power in line with a specific purpose. An example of such a lawful inquiry by SARS 
which is compliant with the jurisdictional facts of the sections mentioned follows: 
 
1.  to obtain full information in relation to the amount 
specified in item __ of the tax return, as supported by 
item __ of the attached financial statements; 
2. to ascertain the correctness of the tax return at item __ 
as supported by item __ of the attached financial 
statements; 
3. to determine the liability for income tax with respect to 
the following transactions [with specific reasons why 
the liability for tax is being questioned].150 
 
Failure by SARS to formulate reasons along the suggested lines at the commencement of 
an inquiry and audit would mean that SARS have failed to comply with the jurisdictional 
facts of s 74 of the Income Tax Act and s 3(2) of PAJA (if the decision in terms of ss 74A 
and 74B is ‘administrative action’).  
 
2.5.3 The meaning of  ‘adequate reasons’ 
 
Hoexter notes151 that although PAJA gives effect to the constitutional right to reasons for 
administrative action as defined, and therefore only applies to those rights and legitimate 
expectations ‘materially and adversely affected by administrative action’152 as required in 
s 5(2) of PAJA, reasons will increasingly be accepted as part of the content of fairness, 
even where rights are not involved, or as the subject matter of the discourse of public 
power in the broader sense, outside the narrowly defined scope of ‘administrative action’ 
in PAJA. She states that this has been the trend in England and Australia. The point is 
also made that administrators should tend to err on the side of caution in giving reasons 
                                               
150 An example drafted by the writer based upon reviewing many such requests in the past two decades of tax practice. 
151 Hoexter C & Lyster R The New Constitutional & Administrative (2002) Juta at page 203. 
152 As envisaged in s 5(1) of PAJA. 
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for decisions.153 Consequently, it is submitted that reasons in terms of the provisions of s 
74 of the Income Tax Act would be required, even in a situation where it may be held by 
a court that a decision in terms of ss 74A and 74B is not administrative action defined in 
PAJA. This submission is supported by the commentary of Hoexter154 and the decision in 
Wessels v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development155 where a full bench, 
obiter, supported the argument that ‘the principle of legality, which includes rationality 
and accountability, imposes a duty upon the functionary exercising a public power to 
provide reasons for its act or decision’.  
 
In CSARS v Sprigg Investments 117CC t/a Global Investment156 the Supreme Court of 
Appeal quoted with approval from Ansett Transport Industries (Operations) Pty Ltd and 
Another v Wraith and Others157 the requirements for ‘adequate reasons’ in respect of tax 
matters in South Africa is definitively spelt out by the Supreme Court of Appeal as 
follows:  
 
…[T]he decision-maker [must] explain his decision in a way which will 
enable a person aggrieved to say, in effect: ‘Even though I may not agree 
with it, I now understand why the decision went against me. I am now in a 
position to decide whether that decision has involved an unwarranted 
finding of fact, or an error of law, which is worth challenging. This 
requires that the decision-maker should set out his understanding of the 
relevant law, any findings of fact on which his conclusions depend 
(especially if those facts have been in dispute), and the reasoning 
processes which led him to those conclusions. He should do so in clear 
and unambiguous language, not in vague generalities or the formal 
language of legislation... 
                                               
153 Wheelright K Taxpayer’ Rights in Australia in Bentley D Taxpayers’ Rights: An International Perspective Revenue 
Law Journal Bond University: Queensland 1998 at page 49; Hoexter C & Lyster R The New Constitutional & 
Administrative (2002) Juta at page 203. 
154Hoexter (2012) at page 472 where the author refers to a discussion by Plasket C Administrative Law (2009) Annual 
Survey page 1 at page 21 in discussing the judgment of Mokgoro J in Koyabe & others v Minister for Home Affairs & 
others (Lawyers for Human Rights as amicus curiae) 2009 (12) BCLR 1192 (CC) where the court recognised the right 
to reasons without requesting them, as a duty rested upon the administrators even though no express provision required 
them to do so: ‘…it is an incident of the founding value of the rule of law enshrined in section 1(c) of the Constitution. 
The rule of law was held to be the source of the development of a general duty to give reasons in Indian law, based on 
the same general idea as that expressed by Mokoro J in Vedachala Moodliar v State of Madras AIR 1952 Madras 276; 
Gautam v Union of India 1993 (1) SCC 78.’ 
1552010 (1) SA 128 (GNP) at para’s 141I-J. 
15673 SATC 114 (SCA) at para’s [12] and [13]. 
157(1983) 48 ALR 500. 
 
  59 
 
In Industrial Equity Ltd v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation and Others158 the Australian 
High Court held that the powers of access and inquisition must be exercised for the 
purpose159 of the taxing act, and that question is to be considered in the context of the 
provision levying income tax.160 Section 264 of the Australian Income Tax Assessment 
Act 1936 (Cth) is similar in its terms to ss 74A and 74B of our Act. The Australian 
Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 is broadly similar to PAJA, and 
s 13 thereof (like s 5 of PAJA) requires public officials to give adequate reasons for 
administrative decisions. The Australian courts, including the highest court, have 
consistently held that decisions calling upon taxpayers to produce information and 
documents under s 264 are administrative decisions reviewable under the Judicial Review 
Act and for which reasons must be given.161 
 
However, in R v  McKinlay Transport Ltd162 Lamer J and Wilson J held that a demand for 
information or documents is to enforce compliance with the Canadian Income Tax Act.  
While a demand for information163 constitutes a ‘seizure’ it is not an unreasonable one. They 
went on to state that the integrity of the tax system can only be maintained by a system of 
random monitoring and the information gathering provisions164 provides the least intrusive 
means by which effective monitoring of compliance with the Canadian Income Tax Act can 
be effected.  A taxpayer's expectation of privacy with regard to the information and 
documents in question is relatively low, where seizures in the administrative or regulatory 
context may have a lesser standard.165 However, it is submitted that this reasoning does 
                                               
158 (1990) 170 CLR 649 at 659. 
159 See also section 3.3: Lawfulness infra. 
160See also Local 174 International Brotherhood of Teamsters v US 240 F.2d 387 where ‘revenue agents … had (the) 
burden to show that (the) demand was reasonable under all circumstances and to prove that books and records were 
relevant or material to (the) tax liability of taxpayer…’; May v Davis 7 F Supp 596. 
161 Refer to the overview furnished in Carbone Statutory Judicial Review of the Administration of the Income Tax 
Assessment Act 1936 [1996] 6 Revenue Law Journal 104; and see also Industrial Equity Ltd v Deputy Federal 
Commissioner of Taxation [1990] HCA 46 at para [25]. In O’Reilly v State Bank of Victoria Commissioners [1983] 
HCA 47 Gibbs CJ said that s 264 conferred on the Commissioner a power whose exercise ‘will be likely adversely to 
affect rights of individuals” (para 7; see also the judgment of Mason J in the same case at para [18]; and see Fieldhouse 
v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation [1989] FCA 397 at para [22] per Hill J). 
162[1990] 1 S.C.R. 627.  
163Canadian Income Tax Act (R.S.C., 1985, c.1(5th Supp.)) ss 231.1(1) and 231.2(1). 
164Ibid. ss 231.1 and 231.2. 
165For comparative American law see US v McKay 372 F.2d 174 where the court held that the ‘(p)ower of 
Commissioner of Internal Revenue to investigate records and affairs of taxpayers is greater than that of a party in civil 
litigation; such power may be characterized as an inquisitorial power, analogous to that of (a) grand jury and one which 
should be liberally construed, in context of which the criteria of relevancy and materiality have broader connotations 
than in context of trial evidence.’; See also Industrial Equity Ltd v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (1990) 170 CLR 
649 at para’s [14]-[24]: ‘It is the function of the Commissioner to ascertain the taxpayer’s taxable income. To ascertain 
this he may need to make wide-ranging inquiries, and to make them long before any issue of fact arises between him 
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not detract from the constitutional obligation of SARS in South Africa to furnish adequate 





These judgments, read in conjunction with the views expressed by Hoexter, emphasizes 
the importance of SARS giving ‘adequate reasons’ when a decision in terms of ss 74A 
and 74B is made. These submissions must also be read with the arguments set out in 
section 4.2.5: Public Administration must be Accountable in this thesis. An administrator 
may deviate from supplying adequate reasons where reasonable and justifiable in terms of 
s 5(3) of PAJA.167 In De Freitas v Permanent Secretary of Agriculture, Fisheries, Lands 
and Housing 1998 3 LRC 62 the Privy Council, on the issue of what is ‘reasonably 
justifiable in a democratic society’ to limit a person’s fundamental constitutional rights, 
stated168: ‘1.Whether the legislative objective is sufficiently important to justify limiting a 
fundamental right? 2.Whether the measures designed to meet the legislative objective are 
rationally connected to it? 3.Whether the means used to impair the right or freedom are 
no more than is necessary to accomplish the objective?’ 
 
These principles would apply in the limited instances where SARS can prove that it was 
not necessary to furnish adequate reasons. The only instance in practice where SARS 
would be justified in not furnishing such reasons would be a case where the information 
is required as a matter of urgency. In an urgent situation the adequate reasons would be 
given after the fact. Otherwise, failure to do so would transgress PAJA and the 
constitutional principle of legality,169 where SARS would be required to account for its 
actions with reference to the facts and the law as to why the inquiry and audit was 
necessary; ensuring the audit is cost effective and efficient; that it is displaying a high 
                                                                                                                                            
and the taxpayer.’ 
166Supra footnote 168. 
167 Corder H and Van der Vijver (eds) Realising Administrative Justice SiberInk 2002 at page 11: ‘No doubt the drafters 
of the PAJA will argue that such limitations on the availability of rights are justifiable and reasonable…for the 
‘promotion of efficiency’…The matter has yet to be brought court.’ 
168Cited with approval in Law Society of Zimbabwe and Another v Minister of Finance 61 SATC 458; See also Ferucci 
and Others v Commissioner for South African Revenue Service and Another65 SATC 47 at page 52 and pages 54-5. 
169Hoexter (2012) at pages 121-5. 
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degree of professional ethics; it is exercising its powers impartially, fairly, equitable and 
without bias; and in a transparent manner.170 
 
Failure by SARS to give adequate reasons as analysed supra would constitute a 
transgression envisaged in s 5(3) of PAJA: 
 ‘If an administrator fails to furnish adequate reasons for an administrative action, it 
must, subject to subsection (4) and in the absence of proof to the contrary, be presumed in 
any proceedings for judicial review that the administrative action was taken without good 
reason.’ 
 
                                               
170Complying with its constitutional obligation in ss 195(1) and 237 of the Constitution, so as not to be criticised for 
conduct that is inconsistent with s 2 of the Constitution. 
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3.1 THE STATUTORY PROVISIONS: SS  74A, 74B, 74 and 75 
 
This chapter analyses the limitations to SARS invoking its discretion in terms of ss 74A 
and 74B, in making a decision to inquire about and audit information, documents and 
things of taxpayers.  
 
The key provisions of ss 74A and 74B that limit of SARS’ powers lies in the words and 
phrases ‘may’, ‘for the purposes of the administration of this Act’, ‘taxpayer’ and ‘shall 
on demand produce the authorisation letter issued to him’. Each of these phrases are 
defined, or have express meanings attached to them in the Income Tax Act. 
 
The provisions of ss 74A and 74B must also be read in conjunction with the relevant 
portions of ss 74 and 75(1)(b) of the Income Tax Act. Section 74 provides the meaning of 
‘for the purposes of the administration of this Act’ and an ‘authorisation letter’. Section 
75(1)(b) provides the ‘just cause’1 defence to taxpayers where they refuse to adhere to the 
requests by SARS in terms of s 74A and 74B. Each of these provisions contain conditions 
that SARS must meet in order to advance towards lawful conduct when invoking their 
powers to investigate and audit. The fulfilment of those conditions demonstrate the 
presence of a lawful authority, the fulfilment of relevant jurisdictional facts, and conduct 
that is intra vires ss 74A and 74B, reasonable and procedurally fair.  
 
3.2 THE SARS INTERNAL AUDIT MANUAL 
 
As a part of the justifiable and accountable conduct of SARS that is lawful, reasonable 
and procedurally fair in making decisions in terms of ss 74A and 74B, it must follow its 
self-imposed practices impartially, including any published and internal guidelines, that 
ensures practical compliance with its constitutional obligations,2 when its conduct 
‘materially and adversely affect’3 the rights and legitimate expectations of taxpayers. 
                                               
1For an analysis of the term ‘just cause’ see section 3.8: ‘Just cause’ Defence infra; See also Chetty v Law Society of 
Transvaal 1985(2) SA 756 (AD); Attorney-General, Tvl v Abdul Aziz Kader 1991(4) SA 727 (A); Shidiack v Union 
Government (Minister of the Interior) 1912 AD 642; Britten v Pope 1916 AD 150. 
2 Sections 1(c), 33, 41(1) and 195(1) (a) – (g) of the Constitution analysed in this thesis: rule of law, just administrative 
action, high standard of professional ethics, impartiality, fairness, unbiased, accountable and transparent conduct. 
3Section 3 of PAJA; Key elements of PAJA are ‘borrowed’ from German law and Germanic administrative law will 
have a bearing on interpretations given to administrative law concepts such as ‘materially and adversely affect’; 
Mahendras P Singh German Administrative Law in Common Law Amazon Kindle Edition Location 2378 (last accessed 
31 March 2013). 
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Internal guidelines are created by management of SARS to set out guidance that assessors 
should follow in order to control the efficiency and effectiveness of these SARS officials 
as mandated by s 4(2) of the SARS Act. It also ensures careful direction to a broad group 
of officials on the procedures they should be following in complying with the scope, 
purport and spirit of the Constitution, as stated in the Constitutional Court case of 
Dawood and another v Minister of Home Affairs and others; Shalabi and another v 
Minister of Home Affairs and others; Thomas and another v Minister of Home Affairs 
and others4: that in relation to broad, unguided discretionary powers (such as those 
prevalent in ss 74A and 74B) guidelines should be provided and must be adhered to, 
ensuring compliance with duties imposed by the Constitution. 
 
The SARS Internal Audit Manual5 sets the expected conduct of SARS in line with the 
constitutional obligations imposed on them. The creation of the expected conduct of 
SARS standards creates a self-imposed limitation that SARS should not deviate from, 
except with sufficient reason. If SARS applies these standards regularly in the exercise of 
its discretion in terms of ss 74A and 74B, then SARS will violate the principles of 
impartiality, equality, fairness and accountability if it does not apply them to all 
taxpayers undergoing audits or inquiries. 
 
To carry this analysis further it is necessary to quote key extracts from the guidelines 
contained in the SARS Internal Audit Manual, as the manual is not available to the public, 
despite numerous attempts to have SARS make it available:6 
                                               
4 2000 (3) SA 936 (CC). 
5 An unofficial copy was obtained from SARS for the purposes of this thesis: SARS Internal  Audit Manual – Part 4:  
The Audit Process; In Scherer v Kelley (1978) 584 F.2d 170 (quoted from the headnote): where the United States of 
America Freedom of Information Act §552(a)(2)(C) requires agencies to make public administrative staff manuals and 
instructions to staff that affect members of the public; See also Williams R C et al Silke on Tax Administration (April 
2009) Lexis Nexis at para 8.17 generally; Minister for Provincial and Local Government of the RSA v Unrecognised 
Traditional Leaders of the Limpopo Province, Sekhukhuneland [2005] 1 All SA 559 (SCA). 
6  The writer corresponded with SARS requesting an official copy of the SARS Internal Audit Manual, but was advised 
it was not available due to the fact that it was still in draft form. This is contrary to information obtained from the 
SARS Germiston office that the manual was being used as a field audit manual for taxpayer inquiries and audits. The 
attitude of SARS is also contrary to the decision of Minister for Provincial and Local Government of the RSA v 
Unrecognised Traditional Leaders of the Limpopo Province, Sekhukhuneland [2005] 1 All SA 559 (SCA) where the 
appeal court found in favour of the public member seeking a report upholding the right of access to information held by 
the State, read with sections 36 (the limitation clause) and 39(2) (obliging every court to promote “the spirit, purport 
and objects of the Bill of Rights of the Constitution”);Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs 
2004 (7) BCLR 687 (CC) followed; In Earthlife Africa (Cape Town Branch) v Eskom Holdings Ltd [2006] 2 All SA 
632 (W) the court referred to the United States decision of Vaughn v Rosen (1974) 484 F.2d 820 where the Vaughn 
index originates, describing each exempt record with enough detail for the court to determine whether or not the record 
is subject to exemption from ‘transparency’ and disclosure, where a copy is handed to the opponent to enable them to 
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In order to carry out his tasks properly the auditor has to make 
professionally and technically sound decisions on the nature and 
scope of the audit.  This requires insight into the knowledge of the 
business process of the taxpayer as well as those of the industry or 
target group of which it is part.7 
… 
 
The risk profiling team will manually select cases to be audited by 
screening the tax returns in order to determine the level of risk per 
case, and to establish which cases warrant an audit (desk or field); 
selection will be done under the guidance and ambit of the Manual 
Risk document.8 
 
The Audit Assignment 
 
The audit plan includes the schedule and set up of audits to be 
carried out within a certain time period.  The audit plan translates 
itself into the audit assignment, which indicates which taxpayers 
and which elements of the tax return(s) need to be audited.  This is 
important for each auditor, as it sets out the nature and scope of the 
audit. 
 
The audit assignment is thus the link between the audit plan and 
the auditing process.9 
 
2. Stage 1:  AUDIT PLANNING 
 
…  The team leader will have to prioritise each case assigned.  All 
decisions taken at this stage of the audit process and all 
                                                                                                                                            
challenge the exemption claims. This procedure is in line with ss 195(1) and 32 of the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa 108 of 1996, read with the Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 of 2000. 
7SARS Internal Audit Manual – Part 4:  The Audit Process, at page 2. 
8Ibid. at page 4. 
9Ibid. at page 5. 
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information and considerations on which decisions are based, are 




Not as critical in our environment, although the following two 
components of pre-planning should still be relevant: 
 
• An engagement letter informing the taxpayer of the audit, i.e. 
notice of the intention to audit, when, purpose, approximate 
duration, information required and other general aspects. 




Prior to the audit, information will have to be collected on the 
taxpayer to be audited, as this will provide inside information into 
the entity. 
 
• Information on the taxpayer himself.  Obtained from the 
existing tax files of the taxpayer. … 
• Information from other sources (third parties) … 
• Information on the business processes, administrative 
organisation and the internal control of the entity. … 
• Information from minutes of meetings e.g. board of … 
• Information from the file of the tax consultant and/or 
accountant/ external auditor of the taxpayer. … 
 
The auditor should restrict the initial information collected to the 
potential issues of the relevant case, which will be of value to the 
audit of the risk areas identified.  
… 
                                               
10Ibid. at page 6. 
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Carrying out the preliminary analytical review 
 
The purpose of this exercise is not to produce volumes of 
interesting, but ultimately useless information. 
 
…  The preliminary review may require that the auditor researches 
the tax laws and court cases that are relevant to particular issues to 
be examined in the audit of the entity.  Notes on the research are 
incorporated into the audit working papers. 
 
Risk analysis based on the tax return 
 
In determining which activities will be carried out to achieve the 
audit objectives, the team leader continually considers the 
relationship between the cost and the benefits of the audit … 
 
3.  Stage 2:  THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AUDIT 
PROGRAMME … 
 
The general rule is as follows: 
 
• Where the auditor finds no or immaterial mistakes or 
errors, the audit in that particular area should be stopped. 
• Where many material mistakes or errors are detected, the 
audit should be expanded in that particular area. 
• If it appears that the taxpayer’s returns are substantially 
correct, the audit should be terminated. 
 
The auditor must consider whether advice or support from a well-
informed colleague is necessary... 
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All decisions at this stage of the auditing process, as well as the 
information and considerations on which they are based, are 
recorded in the audit file... 
 
4.  Stage 3:  CONCLUSION 
 
In this stage of the auditing process the auditor in charge reviews 
and summarises the findings of the audit and forms a conclusion 
based on these findings. 
 
During the discussion with the taxpayer the auditor informs him of 
the conclusions reached on the tax return(s) and explains the 
decision.  If the taxpayer does not agree with the judgement, the 
auditor listens to the reasons and considers whether these reasons 
may call for an adjustment of the conclusion.  If it is decided that 
no adjustment is required, bearing in mind the outcome of previous 
consultation with colleagues, the auditor discusses the taxpayer’s 
reason and arguments with the audit manager. 
 
Where compromises are reached, they are recorded in the file and 
included in the report.  SARS and the taxpayer should sign the 
compromises. 
 
After the concluding discussions with the taxpayer and the audit 
manager, the position of SARS is determined.  There are two 
possibilities: 
 
• No further action is required; or 
• The results of the audit necessitate further action, which 
usually involves adjustment of the assessments as well as the 
levying of interest, penalties and additional tax. 
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In some instances this is not sufficient and it is necessary to extend 
the audit to the criminal domain.  This calls for a change in the 
nature of the audit.  The timely recognition of such a change is an 
essential element of the auditing process.  Refer to part 7 of the 
audit manual. 
 
The audit report is completed and forwarded to the team leader 
who reviews, monitors and controls the completion and quality of 
the audits being performed. 
 
The team leader communicates the relevant findings to the research 
and analysis team and the risk evaluation committee.  (Emphasis 
supplied) 
 
The significance of the SARS Internal Audit Manual is that it sets out internal SARS 
guidelines that SARS must follow to conduct a lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair 
inquiry and audit into the tax affairs of a taxpayer, in terms of ss 1(c), 33, 41(1) and 
195(1) read with s 4(2) of the SARS Act. These guidelines ensure SARS are acting 
within the boundaries of the rule of law, where they are: acting with a high degree of 
professional ethics, in an efficient, effective, impartial, fair, unbiased, transparent, 
accountable and coherent manner, and will not assume powers or functions except those 
conferred on them in terms of the Constitution. Any transgression from these guidelines 
would be an indicator that the SARS officials are violating these principles. Reference 
will be made in this thesis infra to relevant portions of the SARS Internal Audit Manual, 
read together with the publically published Code of Conduct.11 Furthermore, its 
provisions are in line with the international benchmark rules of the International Ethics 




                                               
11 referred to by SARS as the ‘SARS Service Charter and Standards (under review)’; 
http://sars.gov.za/home.asp?pid=54086 (last accessed 31 March 2013). 
12Handbook of the Code of Ethics for Professional Accountants, 2012 edition, International Federation of Accountants 
(IFAC), www.ethicsboard.org, at pages 17-24; See section 4.2.3: High Standards of Professional Ethics infra for a 
summary of the relevant rules. 
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Lawfulness is the first part of just administrative action contemplated in s 33(1) of the 
Constitution, and in PAJA, and the first principle of legality. Lawfulness, embraces 
authority, jurisdictional facts, and abuse of discretion, including improper or ulterior 
purposes or motives, mala fides or bad faith, the failure to apply mind, or failure take into 
account relevant, and taking into account irrelevant considerations, unlawful fettering of a 
discretion, and arbitrary and capricious decision-making by SARS, and in the context of 
this thesis, in exercising its powers under ss 74A and 74B.  
 
In Industrial Equity Ltd v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation and Others13 the Australian 
High Court held that the powers of access and inquisition must be exercised for the 
purpose of the taxing act, and that question is to be considered in the context of the 
provisions levying income tax.  
 
American jurisprudence has also developed significantly in this area.14 A summary of 
American jurisprudence, analogous to the principles analysed in this thesis, includes: in 
making inquiries and obtaining information from taxpayers, the investigation must have a 
legitimate purpose; the information must not already be in the State’s possession; all 
procedural steps must have been followed; the demands must not be overbroad; taxpayers 
                                               
13 (1990) 170 CLR 649 at 659; See also FH Faulding & Co Ltd , The Commissioner of Taxation for the Commonwealth 
of Australia 94 ATC 4867 where the tax authority was held to have exceeded its information gathering powers in 
making a request for information in circumstances involving offshore information where the section did not entitle them 
to do so. 
14 But an analysis thereof is beyond the scope of this thesis; For American comparative law that may influence court 
decisions in South Africa in terms of s 39(1)(c) of the Constitution (quoted from the headnotes): US v McCarthy 514 F 
2d 368: ‘…(1) that the investigation has a legitimate purpose and that the inquiry may be relevant to that purpose, (2) 
that the information sought is not already within the Government's possession, and (3) that the Government has 
followed the procedural steps required by the Internal Revenue Code’; Martin v Chandis 128 F.2d 731: where the Ninth 
Circuit held: ‘(t)he rights of an internal revenue agent to require production of papers and records for examination are 
statutory, and in order to obtain the relief granted by statute, he must bring himself within the terms thereof’; In US v 
Williams 337 F Supp 1114: ‘…message slips held by taxpayer's telephone answering service … to check his returns … 
subpoena was overbroad and out of proportion to ends sought, and as such not entitled to enforcement’; First National 
Bank of Mobile v US 160 F.2d 532: where ‘(a) third party should not be called upon to produce records and give 
evidence … unless such records and evidence are relevant to or bear upon the matter being investigated’; US v 
Coopers and Lybrand 413 F Supp 942: where ‘Internal Revenue Service summons requesting records, papers, and other 
data of a taxpayer will be enforced only if the information sought is not already in the possession of the IRS is designed 
to protect taxpayers and third parties from the abuse of summons power’; Hubner v Tucker 245 F.2d 35: where a 
‘(s)pecial agent, internal revenue service, who sought to enforce subpoena against third person to compel production of 
records in investigation of others' tax liability, had no right to examine any paper unless it was proved to have therein 
entry relating to tax liability of persons under investigation, under statute relating to examination of books and 
witnesses’; US v Brown 536 F.2d 117: where the cout held ‘“Books, papers, records, or other data” to be produced 
under … the Internal Revenue Code relating to examination of books and witnesses … did not … authorize the IRS to 
require the manufacture of documents or other data for examination’; Local 174 International Brotherhood of 
Teamsters v US 240 F.2d 387: where ‘(i)n proceeding by revenue agents to compel union's production of records 
relating to transactions with taxpayer-president, agents had burden to show that demand was reasonable under all 
circumstances and to prove that books and records were relevant or material to tax liability of taxpayer and that union 
possessed books or records containing items relating to taxpayer's business’. (Emphasis supplied); See also US v 
Newman 441 F.2d 170. 
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do not have to manufacture documents not in their possession; and must relate to persons 
and information that will have a bearing on the tax being investigated in respect of the 
taxpayer under investigation. 
 
A lawful decision of SARS must comply with the constitutional obligations of: 
impartially, fairness, equitable and unbiased conduct, in an accountable and transparent 
fashion with timely, accessible and accurate information in respect of s 195(1) as 
analysed in Chapter 4 infra.  
 
To ensure the lawfulness of an inquiry and audit, consideration must also be given to any 
legitimate expectation created by SARS in its Code of Conduct, with its internal 
guidelines in the SARS Internal Audit Manual,15 which in the case of exercising a 
discretion in terms of ss 74A and 74B includes: 
 
(a) ‘insight into…the business process of the taxpayer…’;16 
(b) ‘(after) screening the tax returns…(the taxpayer)…warrant(s) an 
audit…’;17 
(c) it has identified ‘which elements of the tax return(s) need to be 
audited…’;18 and 
(d) obtaining ‘information from other sources…(on)…the potential issues of 
the relevant case…’.19 
 
The inquiry and audit should be based on specific facts as effectively called for in the 
definition of ‘for the purposes of the administration of this Act’ in s 74 of the Income Tax 
Act: 
 
(a) there must be an amount received by accrued to any person that must be in 
question;20 
(b) there must be a property disposed of under a donation;21 
                                               
15 The SARS Internal Audit Manual, see 3.2 supra. 
16Ibid. at page2. 
17Ibid. at page 4. 
18Ibid. at page 5. 
19Ibid. at page 6. 
20 Section 74(1)(a)(i) of the Income Tax Act. 
21Ibid. s 74(1)(a)(ii). 
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(c) there must be a dividend declared22 under investigation;   
 (d) the investigation must be in relation to an inquiry in a return, financial 
statement, document, declaration of facts or valuation, and the originating 
document must also exist to enable the further inquiry;23 
(e) the investigation must relate to the determination of the liability for any 
tax, interest or penalty; here the existence of general evidence to suggest 
that the person is a taxpayer should at least exist;24 
(f) the investigation must relate to collecting a liability, and the liability must 
exist;25 
(g) ascertaining whether or not an offence has been committed by the 
taxpayer, whilst conducting the inquiry and audit. This is a very 
controversial issue as civil investigation provisions are being used to 
investigate criminal conduct by the taxpayer, where the taxpayer is being 
compelled26 to give incriminating evidence, in contravention of the 
provisions of s 35(3) of the Bill of Rights. This is prima facie 
unconstitutional;27 
(h) ascertaining general compliance, which is vague28 and very general; this 
should also be prefaced by evidence that the person under investigation is 
the subject of an inquiry and audit owing to the existence of some 
evidence that warrants the exercise of the power to ensure that the decision 
of SARS is not arbitrary, capricious or has an ulterior or improper purpose. 
The random selection29 of a taxpayer, without any form of preparatory 
justification by SARS for the inquiry and audit, may fall foul of the 
                                               
22Ibid. s 74(1)(a)(iii). 
23Ibid. s 74(1)(b). 
24Ibid. s 74(1)(c). 
25Ibid. s 74(1)(d). 
26Constitution ss 35(3)(h)-(j). See also ITC 1818 69 SATC 98 and Seapoint Computer Bureau (Pty) Ltd v McLoughlin 
and de Wet NNO 1997 (2) SA 636 (W). 
27This analysis based on the Canadian Supreme Court case of R v Jarvis 2002 (3) SCR 757 discussed later in this thesis 
at page 88.  
28 See Local 174 International Brotherhood of Teamsters v US, 240 F.2d 387 for comparative American jurisprudence 
where the court held (quoted from the headnote): ‘agents had [a] burden to show that [the] demand was reasonable 
under all circumstances and to prove that books and records were relevant or material to tax liability of taxpayer 
…and the taxpayer… possessed books or records containing items relating to taxpayer's business.’ (Emphasis supplied) 
29 In US v Third Northwestern National Bank 102 F Supp 879 the court held (quoted from the headnote): ‘A ‘fishing 
expedition’ under statute permitting Internal Revenue agent to examine records bearing upon matters to be included in 
income tax return cannot amount to an inquisition or arbitrary inquiry on the part of an Internal Revenue agent, and 
determination as to whether inquiry is reasonable, and therefore justifiable ‘fishing’, must be determined from all the 
facts in each case, including the end for which the information is sought, and proof and prevention of tax frauds is not 
the only factor to be considered’ (Emphasis supplied). This basic requirement limits a simple random taxpayer selection 
without SARS performing some preparatory work. 
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impartiality30 provision in s 195(1) of the Constitution. It should also be 
clear that the audit or investigation is in respect of a named person who is 
or should be a ‘taxpayer’31 as defined in the Income Tax Act;   
(i) the enforcement and performance of administrative function provisions, 
which again is a very vague and general provision, requiring some 
justification32 from SARS that the inquiry and audit is necessary and 
within the scope and purport of its powers, as qualified by the requirement 
of effectiveness and efficiency set out in s 4(2) of the SARS Act. 
 
All of these facts will have a source, giving rise to the initial information upon which 
SARS relies to enable it to commence the inquiry and audit in the first place.  At this 
point it becomes important for SARS to follow its own internal guidelines, and to provide 
the necessary justification to proceed with the inquiry and audit, otherwise the conduct of 
SARS will prima facie be unlawful. Furthermore, taxpayers can also expect that in 
carrying out its audit and inquiry functions, SARS will not act in a vexatious or 




The exercise of power must be authorised by law. In Fedsure Life Assurance Limited v 
Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council34 the Constitutional Court 
stated that it is:  
 
                                               
30 In Reckitt and Coleman (NZ) Ltd v The Taxation Board of Review and The Commissioner of Inland Revenue Turner J 
stated: ‘It is of the highest public importance that in the administration of [tax] statues every taxpayer shall be treated 
exactly alike, no concession being made to one to which another is not equally entitled…Where there is no express 
provision for discretion, however, and none can be properly implied from the tenor of the statute, the Commissioner can 
have none; he must with Olympian impartiality hold the scales between the taxpayer and the crown giving to no one 
any latitude not given to others.’ (Emphasis supplied) 
31 Section 74(1)(f) of the Income Tax Act. 
32 For the requirements of lawful justification, see Premier of Mpumalanga and Another v Executive Committee of the 
Association of Governing Bodies of State-Aided Schools: Eastern Transvaal 1999 (2) BCLR151 (CC) at para [42]: 
‘…no question of justification …can arise as the decision taken…did not constitute ‘a law of general application’ as 
required by that provision…’; cf.Registrar of Pension Funds and another v Angus NO and others [2007] 2 All SA 608 
(SCA) where the court held ‘in terms of law [of general application]’ would enable a decision. SARS decisions are 
enabled ‘in terms of law [of general application]’. 
33Chairman of the Board on Tariffs and Trade and Others vs Brenko Inc and Others 64 SATC 130 at para’s [29] and 
[30], where it was held by the Supreme Court of Appeal that ‘…investigatory proceedings, which have been recognised 
to be absolutely essential to achieve important policy objectives, are nevertheless subject to the constraint that the 
powers of investigation are not exercised in a vexatious, oppressive or unfair manner (cf. Bernstein and Others v Bester 
and Others NNO 1996(2) SA 751 (CC) at 584F-I)...’; See also Gardener v East London Transitional Local Council and 
Others 1996(3) SA 99 (E) at para’s 116E-G. 
34 1999(1) SA 374 (CC) at para [58]. 
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…central to the conception of our constitutional order that the 
legislature and executive in every sphere are constrained by the 
principle that they may exercise no power and perform no function 
beyond that conferred  upon them by law. 
 
It follows by analogy from this dictum that SARS does not have inherent powers35 to do 
as it likes, and that the exercise of public power by SARS must be derived from a lawful 
empowering source. Sections 74A and 74B, read with s 74 of the Income Tax Act, is such 
a source, but a source of authority that must be read through the prism of the Constitution 
and s 4(2) of the SARS Act. In terms of s 41(1)(d) of the Constitution: 
‘…administrators…must…not assume power or function except those conferred on them 
in terms of the Constitution;’. Therefore any decision made by SARS that affects 
taxpayers, without lawful authority and compliance with the Constitution, is unlawful and 
ultra vires.36 
 
Lawful authority in terms of s 74B requires that SARS must be able to provide an 
‘authorisation letter’ as defined in s 74, if demanded by any taxpayer. Failure by SARS to 
comply with this requirement would mean that the SARS official concerned would not 
have the lawful authority to act. Production of the ‘authorisation letter’ does not apply to 
s 74A, but this does not mean that the SARS official must not be properly authorised to 
act on behalf of the Commissioner in terms of s 3 of the Income Tax Act.    
 
If SARS makes a decision without the required authority, the decision would be defective 
and reviewable in terms of the principle of legality, and the codified grounds of review in 
terms of s 6(2) of PAJA. Section 6(2)(a)(i) of PAJA would apply in that SARS ‘was not 
authorised to do so by the empowering provision’. The defective conduct would not be 
authorised by law and would also be unlawful and constitutionally invalid.37 The 
                                               
35 Hoexter (2012) at pages 255-6. 
36Ibid.; In FH Faulding & Co Ltd, The Commissioner of Taxation for the Commonwealth of Australia 94 ATC 4867 the 
tax authority was held to have exceeded its information gathering powers in making a request for information in 
circumstances involving offshore information where the section did not entitle them to do so. 
37 Such an unlawful or invalid act must be set aside by the courts; See section 4.1 infra and the reference to Oudekraal 
Estates (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town and Others 2004 (6) SA 222 (SCA) para’s [26] – [31]. 
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appropriate Rule 5338 application would be launched by the taxpayer in the High Court, in 
terms of PAJA, or the principle of legality. 
 
3.3.2 Jurisdictional facts 
 
Before SARS is entitled to make a decision in terms of ss 74A and 74B, read with s 74, to 
investigate a taxpayer, it must satisfy the jurisdictional facts in those sections. SARS must 
first consider the empowering law and decide whether the facts of the matter warrant 
exercising the power: (1) that the investigation has a legitimate purpose and that the 
inquiry may be relevant to that purpose, (2) that the information sought is not already 
within SARS’ possession, and (3) that SARS has followed the procedural steps required 
by the Income Tax Act and the Constitution.39 Jurisdictional facts include conditions 
imposed by the empowering legislation that the SARS must satisfy. In South African 
Defence and Aid Fund and Another v Minister of Justice40 Corbett J held: ‘if the 
jurisdictional fact does not exist, then the power may not be exercised and any purported 
exercise of the power would be invalid.’ (Emphasis supplied) 
 
Proper compliance with the jurisdictional facts of ss 74A and 74B would include the 
following: proper delegation of the relevant powers by the Commissioner to the SARS 
officials in terms of s 74 and s 3 of the Income Tax Act; ensuring that the inquiry relates 
                                               
38Rule 53, Uniform Rules of Court, GNR 48 of 12 January 1965, made under s 43(2)(a) of the Supreme Court Act  59 
of 1959, hereinafter referred to as ‘Rule 53’. 
39 See American comparative law: US v McCarthy 514 F 2d 368 (quoted from the headnote): ‘…(1) that the 
investigation has a legitimate purpose and that the inquiry may be relevant to that purpose, (2) that the information 
sought is not already within the Government's possession, and (3) that the Government has followed the procedural 
steps required by the Internal Revenue Code’. 
40 1967 (1) SA 31 (C): Corbett J at page 33 states: ‘Before the State President is entitled to exercise this power to 
declare an organisation to be an unlawful organisation he must be satisfied that one or more of the conditions … exist. 
In order to satisfy himself in this way he must have before him some information relating to such matters as the aims 
and objects of the organisation in question, its membership, organisation and control, the nature and scope of its 
activities, what its purpose is and what it professes to be…The content of this kind of condition is often referred to as a 
'jurisdictional fact' (see Minister of the Interior v Bechler and Others, 1948 (3) SA 409 (AD) at p. 442; Rose-
Innes,Judicial Review of Administrative Tribunals in S.A., at pages 99 - 100) in the sense that it is a fact the existence 
of which is contemplated by the Legislature as a necessary pre-requisite to the exercise of the statutory power. The 
power itself is a discretionary one. Even though the jurisdictional fact exists, the authority in whom the power resides is 
not bound to exercise it. On the other hand, if the jurisdictional fact does not exist, then the power may not be exercised 
and any purported exercise of the power would be invalid.’ (Emphasis supplied); Farjas (Pty) Ltd another v Regional 
Land Claims Commissioners, KwaZulu-Natal 1998(5) BCLR 579 (LCC) at para [22]; Baxter L Administrative Law 
(1984) Juta at page 456 ff: ‘A public official must first consider the law which empowers her and decide whether on the 
facts of the particular matter, she has the power or jurisdiction to deal with it (at 452)’; See also Martin v Chandis 128 
F.2d 731 (quoted from the headnote): where it was held that the ‘production of papers and records for examination are 
statutory, and in order to obtain the relief granted by statute, …(the tax authority)… must bring himself within the terms 
thereof’; US v McCarthy 514 F 2d 368(quoted from the headnote): ‘In order to establish a prima facie case for 
enforceability of an IRS summons, plaintiffs must plead: (1) that the investigation has a legitimate purpose and that the 
inquiry may be relevant to that purpose, (2) that the information sought is not already within the Government's 
possession, and (3) that the Government has followed the procedural steps required by the Internal Revenue Code’.  
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to a ‘taxpayer’ as defined in the Income Tax Act; and ensuring compliance (with 
supporting facts) with one or more of the eight sub-sections in s 74 under the definition 
‘the administration of this Act’. 
 
In addition, compliance by SARS with the duties and responsibilities attached to 
exercising discretion in respect of ss 74A and 74B is required. This is especially so where 
SARS officials are given broad discretionary powers that are not subject to specific 
guidelines, such as was the case in Dawood’s case.41 See section 3.2 above. In that case 
the Constitutional Court held that unguided discretionary powers should be subject to 
provided guidelines, which must be adhered to.  
 
In this regard the guidelines contained in the SARS Internal Audit Manual42 should not, 
without lawful justification, be ignored by SARS in exercising its discretion in terms of ss 
74A and 74B. These guidelines are important in assisting SARS officials to prepare and 
engage in exercising their powers of inquiry and audit, in that the following key factual 
areas are to be taken into account as prescribed in their guidelines: does SARS have 
proper ‘insight into … the business process of the taxpayer …’?; ‘has SARS screened the 
tax returns of the taxpayer and determined that they warrant an audit’?; has SARS 
identified ‘which elements of the tax return(s) need to be audited’?; and has SARS 
obtained ‘information from other sources … (on) … the potential issues of the relevant 
(audit) …’?43 
 
Hoexter is of the view44 that South African law has adopted a compromise between 
objective and subjective jurisdictional facts.45 In terms of objective jurisdictional facts,46 a 
fact or state of affairs must exist objectively before the power can be validly exercised. 
However, in the case of subjective jurisdictional facts, the court needs only to consider 
                                               
41Dawood and another v Minister of Home Affairs and others; Shalabi and another v Minister of Home Affairs and 
others and Thomas and another v Minister of Home Affairs and others 2000 (3) SA 936 (CC). 
42 See section 3.2: The SARS Internal Audit Manual. 
43Ibid. at pages 2-6. 
44 Hoexter (2012) at pages 296-302. 
45 as identified by Corbett J in South African Defence and Aid Fund v Minister of Justice 1967 (1) SA 31 (C) at pages 
34H-35D; See also Martin v Chandis 128 F.2d 731 where it was held that the ‘production of papers and records for 
examination are statutory, and in order to obtain the relief granted by statute, …(the tax authority)… must bring himself 
within the terms thereof’. 
46CSARS v Sprigg Investments 117CC t/a Global Investment 73 SATC 114 (SCA) at para’s [12] and [13] where the 
Supreme Court of Appeal favoured an objective approach to the furnishing of adequate reasons by SARS. 
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the opinion of the administrator to determine whether or not the facts or state of affairs 
exist. 
 
Subjective clauses such as ss 74A and 74B which give wide discretionary powers47 to 
SARS are curbed. The constitutional principle of legality implies that courts must be able 
to satisfy themselves as to the lawfulness of the administrative action, or exercise of 
public power,48 including factual assumptions on which the action is based. This is taken 
further by the right to reasonable administrative action49 and the requirement of 
rationality inherent in the principle of legality.50 
 
There are also instances where SARS will be obliged to exercise a discretion in favour of 
a taxpayer, notwithstanding the fact that it has an unfettered discretion in terms of 
legislative provisions such as ss 74A and 74B. 
 
The locus classicus in this regard is Stroud Riley & Co Ltd v SIR:51 
 
It seems to me that in dealing with a matter of this nature the 
respondent is required firstly to enquire into the facts. If after such 
enquiry he is satisfied … he is bound, as a matter of duty, to 
authorize the refund to the taxpayer…In the latter respect he has no 
discretion in the matter in spite of the use of the word ‘may’ in the 
section which authorizes him to make a refund. The general 
principle applicable was laid down in Macdougall v Paterson 
(1851) 11 CB 755 at 766 by Jervis CJ as follows: 
 
‘The word “may” is merely used to confer the authority: and the 
authority must be exercised, if the circumstances are such as to 
call for its exercise.’ 
 
In dealing with a similar provision in Australian legislation, it was 
                                               
47 In Amoils v Johannesburg City Council 1943 TPD 386 the court held ‘an unreasonably wide by-law should not be 
held to be valid because of any presumption that a by-law will be reasonably administered by a local authority.’ 
48Henbase 3392 (Pty) Ltd v Commissioner, South African Revenue Services 2002 (2) 180 (T). 
49 See section 3.4: Reasonableness infra. 
50 Hoexter (2012) at pages 121-5. 
51SATC 143 at page 151; Also refer to the dictum of Corbett J in footnote 47 supra. 
 
  79 
held in Finance Facilities (Pty) Ltd v Federal Commissioner of 
Taxation52: 
 
If the Commissioner, having considered the matter, is satisfied of 
facts out of which the power to allow the rebate arises, he cannot 
nevertheless refuse to allow it.53 (Emphasis supplied) 
 
SARS is therefore obliged to exercise its discretion in favour of the taxpayer if certain 
conditions (jurisdictional facts) are not met. For instance, if SARS is to comply with the 
jurisdictional facts of ss74A and 74B it cannot commence a proposed investigation 
against a person that is not a ‘taxpayer’ as defined. An example is a group of persons 
whose identity as taxpayers is unknown. The discretion to commence the inquiry or 
investigation should not be made; or exercised in favour of the taxpayer.   
 
Another example in determining whether or not to proceed is where SARS is obliged to 
review the relevant facts about the taxpayer at hand in line with its own internal 
guidelines as discussed above. Failure to comply with it’s internal guidelines is an 
indication that SARS have not taken into account relevant factors (s 6(2)(e)(iii) of PAJA), 
or have failed to comply impartially with a mandatory procedure or condition imposed by 
internal policy. In terms of s 6(2)(b) of PAJA, the failure by SARS to comply with a 
‘mandatory’ procedure or condition54 will result in the official’s conduct being unlawful, 
in that a precondition to a jurisdictional fact has not been met. As to a distinction between 
mandatory and directory provisions, the mere fact that a provision is directory does not 
mean that it can be ignored.55 
 
3.3.3 Abuse of Discretion 
 
As explained by Hoexter56, discretionary powers are easily recognised by the permissive 
statutory language and the use of words like ‘may’57 in provisions such as ss 74A and 
                                               
52 (1971) 2 ATR 573 at  page 578. 
53See also Crown Mines, Ltd v Commissioner for Inland Revenue 32 SATC 190at 100,102; Noble & Barbour v SAR & 
H 1922 AD 527 at page 540; CIR v King 1947(2) SA 196(AD) 4 at page 209. 
54 Croome B & Olivier L  Tax Administration 2010 (Juta) at page 52. 
55 Klaaren J Teaching Procedural Jurisdictional Facts (1990) South African Journal on Human Rights 14: at page 63. 
56 Hoexter C & Lyster R The New Constitutional & Administrative Law (2002) Juta at pages 25-6. 
57 See also Wade H W R & Forsyth C F Administrative Law 7th ed (1994) Oxford at 391. 
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74B. The exercise of such discretions creates the temptation to abuse the discretion, 
which is why significant authority exists on abuse of discretion.58 The traditional grounds 
of abuse of discretion are: mala fides, ulterior purpose or motive, and failure to apply 
mind. Abuse of discretion could also fall within the description in s 6(2)(f)(ii) of PAJA of 
not being rationally connected to: the purpose of the empowering provision; the 
information before the administrator; and, the reasons given for it (all of which would 
also form part of the principle of legality). 
 
In Dawood’s case,59 O’Regan J of the Constitutional Court in a unanimous decision held 
the following in relation to discretionary powers: 
 
[53] Discretion plays a crucial role in any legal system60. … It is 
for the Legislature to ensure that, when necessary, guidance is 
provided as to when limitation of rights will be justifiable. It is 
therefore not ordinarily sufficient for the Legislature merely to say 
that discretionary powers that may be exercised in a manner that 
could limit rights should be read in a manner consistent with the 
Constitution in the light of the constitutional obligations placed on 
such officials to respect the Constitution. Such an approach would 
often not promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of 
Rights. Guidance will often be required to ensure that the 
Constitution takes root in the daily practice of governance. … 
 
[46] … conferring a broad discretion upon an official, who may be 
quite untrained in law and constitutional interpretation, and 
expecting that official, in the absence of direct guidance, to 
                                               
58 Hoexter (2012) at pages 307-25. 
59 2000 (3) SA 936 (CC) at para’s [46] to [54]. 
60 Footnote 73 in the case - Although there was a time when some thought that discretion was inappropriate in a legal 
system based on the rule of law (see for example, Dicey Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution 10ed. 
(Macmillan, London 1959)), this is no longer the case. It is recognised that discretion cannot be separated from rules 
and that it has an important role to play in any legal system. See the ground-breaking work by K C Davis Discretionary 
Justice: A Preliminary Inquiry (Louisiana State University Press, Baton Rouge, 1969). Administrative lawyers now 
generally acknowledge the importance of discretion to a functioning legal system. The challenge for administrative law 
is to ensure that discretion is properly regulated. See, generally, Galligan Discretionary Powers: A Legal Study of 
Official Discretion (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1986); Harlowand Rawlings Law and Administration 2ed. (Butterworths, 
London, 1997); Craig Administrative Law 3ed. (Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1994); and Baxter Administrative Law 
(Juta, Cape Town, 1984). See also Baron v Canada (1993) 99 DLR (4th) 350 at 363, 365-8; and the discussion in the 
dissenting judgment of L'Heureux-Dubé J in Young v Young (1993) 108 DLR (4th) 193 at 238 and where Young v 
Young (1993) 108 DLR (4th) 193 referred to. 
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exercise the discretion in a manner consistent with the provisions 
of the Bill of Rights. …  
 
[47] It is an important principle of the rule of law that rules be 
stated in a clear and accessible manner.61 It is because of this 
principle that s 36 requires that limitations of rights may be 
justifiable only if they are authorised by a law of general 
application. (Emphasis supplied) 
 
The definition of ‘administration of this Act’ in s 74 of the Income Tax Act has defined 
the parameters within which SARS can make a decision ‘for the purposes of 
administration of this Act’ envisaged in ss 74A and 74B. But it contains no specific 
guidelines. Furthermore, the mere reiteration by SARS of the specific sub-sections in that 
definition would not be regarded as adequate reasons62 to justify the necessity to proceed 
with an inquiry or audit, and could therefore amount to an abuse of its discretion,63 in that 
the discretion exercised is arguably not rationally connected to the purpose of the 
empowering provision, or, the information before the administrator, or, the reasons given 
for it. 
 
In addition to this, the principles set out in the Stroud Riley64 above (which in some 
instances compel SARS to exercise its discretion in a particular manner such as not to 
proceed with the inquiry and audit) will apply. If SARS fails to comply with its own 
internal guidelines (SARS Internal Audit Manual),65 as envisaged in Dawood’s case 
above, in commencing an inquiry and audit, such conduct would be indicative of an abuse 
of discretion. For instance, in line with its internal guidelines, the initial gathering of the 
facts of a targeted taxpayer will assist in determining whether or not SARS should 
proceed with the inquiry and audit. The information before SARS will assist in justifying 
a rational connection between the decision and the purpose of the empowering provision. 
The internal guideline states that the SARS assessor, in the absence of evidence to the 
                                               
61 Footnote 71 in the case – ‘The rule of law is a foundational value of our Constitution (see s 1(c) of the Constitution of 
the Republic of South Africa 108 of 1996). See also Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of SA and Others: In 
re Ex parte President of the Republic of South Africa and Others 2000 (2) SA 674 (CC) at para [40].’ 
62See section 2.5: Adequate Reasons supra. 
63 Hoexter (2012) at pages 307-25. 
64Stroud Riley & Co Ltd vs SIR 36 SATC 143 at 151. 
65See section 3.2: The SARS Internal Audit Manual at pages 2-6. 
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contrary, should cease the inquiry and audit. The taxpayer will also know the ‘substance 
of the case’ being faced.66 Otherwise, it may arguably be exercising its powers for some 
ulterior purpose or motive, in an arbitrary, capricious manner, or without having satisfied 
all the jurisdictional facts –unconstitutional conduct in terms of s 2 of the Constitution. 
 
 
3.3.3.1 Improper or ulterior purpose or motive 
 
Improper or ulterior purpose or motive67 forms a sub-section to abuse of discretion.  
Section 6(2)(e)(ii) of PAJA deals with an improper or ulterior purpose or motive. Should 
SARS act with improper or ulterior purpose or motive in relation to the provisions of ss 
74A and 74B, its conduct will be invalid. That would be sufficient to launch a judicial 
review application on the strength of a transgression of s 6(2)(e)(ii) of PAJA; or the 
principle of legality, where the administrator should exercise such powers only for the 
purposes they were conferred. 
 
A typical example of an improper or ulterior purpose or motive occurs where SARS is in 
conducting a criminal investigation, under the guise of a civil regulatory investigation, in 
contravention of the principles in s 35(3)(j) of the Constitution, the guarantee against self-
incrimination, under the auspices of a ss 74A and 74B inquiry or audit. 
 
In Probe Security CC v Security Offices’ Board and Others68,the inspectors of a 
regulatory authority conducted an inspection into the affairs of the applicant at its 
premises, carried out a search of the premises and demanded inspection and copies of 
certain documents at these premises. The applicant claimed that the inspection was a 
violation of its common-law and constitutional rights, inter alia, those to privacy. It was 
clear that the regulatory authority permitted regulatory inspection. However, Satchwell, J 
was of the opinion that in instances where criminal offences have been committed in 
relation to those regulations, and criminal prosecutions are admissible, certain minimum 
                                               
66Chairman of the Board on Tariffs and Trade and Others vs Brenko Inc and Others 64 SATC 130 at para’s [29] and 
[30]. 
67Croome B & Olivier L Tax Administration 2010 (Juta) at page 53; Orangezicht Estates Ltd v Cape Town Town 
Council (1906) 23 SC 297, 308; Fernwood Estates Ltd v Cape Town Municipal Council 1933 CPD 339, 403; Sinovich v 
Hercules Municipal Council 1946 AD 783, 792; Van Eck NO & Van Rensburg NO v Etna Stores 1947(2) SA 984 A; 
Oos-Randse Administrasieraad v Rikhoto 1983 (3) SA 595 (A); and University of Cape Town v Ministers of Education 
and Culture (House of Assembly and House of Representatives)1988 (3) SA 203 (C). 
68 98 JER 0849 (W). 
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requirements as to reasonableness69 and fairness have to be met before the inspection 
authority can be held to be acting intra vires and lawfully. While inspections could be of 
a routine regulatory nature, they could well incorporate an investigatory and disciplinary 
function that could result in the seizure of documents and which, in turn, could form the 
basis for the support of allegations of contraventions of the governing legislation.  
Furthermore, these inspections of a regulatory nature could lead to a violation of the 
security officers’ rights to a fair trial.  Unless safeguards were built into the regulations, 
they could result in a failure to meet the test of constitutionality. Satchwell, J was of the 
view that serious questions for consideration had been raised, which would be considered 
in a later review application.  In this case, in conclusion, while the balance of 
convenience demanded protection for the applicant, the court refused to grant a temporary 
interdict holding that, while the inspection could take place, the fruits of such inspections 
could not be used in the procurement of or in the course of any criminal proceedings 
against the applicant.70 
 
The effect of this judgment is resonated in the more detailed judgment of the Canadian 
Supreme Court in R v Jarvis,71 where the court held that the nature and scope of a 
preliminary investigation by a tax authority impacts on the powers that the tax authority 
can use, and the later use of any evidence obtained from the taxpayer. If a criminal 
investigation is being conducted under the auspices of a routine verification audit, the 
conduct by SARS would be an abuse of power with an improper or ulterior purpose or 
motive. Furthermore, any direct or indirect evidence obtained from the taxpayer under 
                                               
69 See section 3.4: Reasonableness infra; LAWSA Volume 5(3) 2nd ed at para 165; Commissioner of Taxes v CW (Pvt) 
Ltd 1989 (3) ZLR 361 (S) at 370F-372C; Union Government (Minister of Mines and Industries) v Union Steel 
Corporation (South Africa) Limited 1928 AD 220, pages 236-7; and National Transport Commission v Chetty's Motor 
Transport (Pty) Ltd 1972 (3) SA 726 (A); Local 174 International Brotherhood of Teamsters v US, 240 F.2d 387. 
70  Jazbhay S A Recent Constitutional Cases (1999) De Rebus (373) February at page 44. 
71 2002 (3) SCR 757; This is similar to the comparative jurisprudence in the United States of America: Hale v Hinkle 
201 US; Murdock v Pa 319 US 105;Couch v US 409 US 322 where the US Supreme Court held (quoted from the 
headnote): ‘(c)ompulsion upon person asserting it is an important element of the privilege against self-incrimination 
and prohibition of compelling a man to be a witness against himself is a prohibition of use of physical or moral 
compulsion to extort communication; it is the extortion of information from accused himself that offends our sense of 
justice’; Miranda v Arizona 384 US 436 (1966) at page 460, where it was held that (quoted from the headnote): 
‘prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of a 
defendant unless it demonstrates use of procedural safeguards effective to secure privilege against self-incrimination.’; 
US v LaSalle Bank 437 US 298 where ‘summons authority does not exist to aid criminal investigations solely’ and 
‘(p)rior to recommendation for prosecution to Department of Justice, Internal Revenue Service must use its summons 
authority in good faith’. 
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compulsion whilst conducting a verification audit would be inadmissible as evidence in 
any subsequent criminal investigation against the taxpayer.72 
 
It is likely that a similar conclusion would be reached by the courts in relation to powers 
exercised in terms of ss 74A and 74B. The audit and inquiry would be allowed to 
continue, provided that the ‘fruits of the inspections’ were not used in the procurement of 
or in the course of any criminal proceedings against the taxpayer. 
 
Furthermore, if the taxpayer suspects that the information, documents or things are 
required for the ulterior purpose or motive of gathering evidence in a move towards 
prosecuting the taxpayer for any criminal transgression in terms of any tax legislation or 
at common law, the taxpayer can show ‘just cause’ why it should not allow SARS to 
access any such information, documents or things as required under ss 74A and 74B, and 
raise a successful defence to SARS’ attempt to compel the taxpayer to do so in terms of s 
75(1)(b) of the Income Tax Act. 
 
If SARS is in fact conducting a criminal investigation, SARS will not be able to avail 
itself of the broad inquiry and audit provisions73 in terms of 74A and 74B, but will be 
required to pursue the matter against the taxpayer in terms of the provisions of ss 74C and 
74D74 of the  Income Tax Act, or in terms of the Criminal Procedure Act.75 
 
Because the definition of ‘administration of this Act’ in s 74(1) includes the power to 
investigate an offence committed by the taxpayer, that part of s 74(1) is arguably law 
contrary to the guarantee against the self-incrimination clause s35(3)(j) of the 
Constitution. A taxpayer would be entitled to request SARS whether or not the inquiry or 
audit involves such a criminal investigation or inquiry, particularly where the inquiry and 
audit pertains to taxes such as Value-Added Tax and ‘Pay-As-You-Earn’, where it is not 
uncommon for taxpayers to use the money collected on behalf of the fiscus, thereby 
                                               
72Ferreira v Levin NO and Others; Vryenhoek and Others v Powell NO and Others 1996 (1) BCLR 1 (CC) at para’s 
[165] – [166]. 
73R v Jarvis 2002 (3) SCR 757 also discussed in this thesis at page 88 below; Ferreira v Levin NO and Others; 
Vryenhoek and Others v Powell NO and Others 1996 (1) BCLR 1 (CC) at para’s [165] – [166]; see also US v LaSalle 
Bank 437 US; Hale v Hinkle 201 US; Murdock v Pa 319 US 105. 
74Williams R C et alSilke on Tax Administration (April 2009) Lexis Nexis at para 8.12 generally; Pullen NO Bartman 
NO & Orr NO v Waja 1929 TPD 838; Haynes v Commissioner for Inland Revenue 2000 (6) BCLR 596 (T); See also 
Hunter et al v Southam Inc (1984) 2 SCR 184, (1984) 11 DLR (4th) 641 (SCC). 
75 Act 51 of 1977. 
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prima facie committing fraud. If SARS refuses to answer, or answers ‘yes’, the inquiry or 
audit would be contrary s 35(3)(j) of the Constitution. The ‘just cause’ defence in s 
75(1)(b) of the Income Tax Act will also be available to the taxpayer. 
 
3.3.3.2 Mala fides or bad faith 
 
A mala fide76 decision by SARS is any discretion exercised by SARS in bad faith, 
entailing harassment, fraud or dishonesty, where it knowingly uses its power for reasons 
outside the ambit of the law. A discretion must be exercised for substantially valid 
reasons77 with bona fides, and must also be exercised in respect of each individual case78 
without the presence of dishonesty on the part of the decision-maker – as apparent from 
the motives of the decision-maker.79 
 
For instance, if SARS simply applied ex parte to the court for a warrant of search and 
seizure in terms of s 74D, without first exhausting and applying the less intrusive means 
of obtaining information, documents or things from a taxpayer through ss 74A and 74B, 
because it was irritated with the initial correspondence exchanged between the parties, 
where the taxpayer was questioning the entitlement of SARS to make inquiries in the first 
place, the decision would arguably be mala fides.80 This would also be contrary to the 
principle of proportionality, a sub-section of reasonableness in section 3.4.2 below. SARS 
should use the least intrusive means to impose upon the fundamental rights of taxpayers 
to privacy in terms of s 14 of the Constitution.  
 
Another obvious example of a mala fide decision would be SARS simply issuing revised 
assessments if the taxpayer failed to comply with the initial ss 74A and 74B requests, 
without properly considering the taxpayers reasons for not complying. 
 
                                               
76Hoexter (2012) at pages 310-12; Hani v Rogers NO and Another 20 SATC 296; Adam’s Stores (Pty) Ltd v 
Charlestown Town Board 1951 (2) SA 508 (N); Bloem v Minister of Law and Order 1987(2) SA 436 (O); Harvey v 
Umhlatuze Municipality 2011 (1) SA 601 (KZP) atpara’s  [136]-[146].  
77Tayob v Ermelo Local Road Transportation Board & another 1951 (4) SA 440 (A) at page 449; Dungarshi Morajee 
& Co. v Zoutpansberg Rural Licensing Board 1927 T.P.D. at page 993; Ochberg v Cape Town Municipality 1924 
C.P.D. at pages 488-9; and for the objects intended by the Legislature: Associated Provincial Picture Houses, Ltd., v 
Wednesday Corporation [1947] 2 All E.R. 680 at page 682. 
78Britten & others v Pope, 1916 A.D. at page 169. 
79 Hoexter (2012) at page 311; Waks v Jacobs 1990(1) SA 913 (T); Hart v Van Niekerk NO 1991(3) SA 689 (W). 
80Haynes v C:SARS 64 SATC 321at page 355. 
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Mala fide conduct will be subject to review in terms of ss 6, 7 and 8 where the codified 
grounds of review in s 6(2)(e)(i) and/or(ii) and/or 6(2)(e)(v) of PAJA would apply; or in 
terms of the constitutional principle of legality.81 
 
3.3.3.3 Failure to apply mind or relevant and irrelevant considerations 
 
The failure by SARS to apply its mind in exercising a discretion in terms of ss 74A and 
74B will result in its failure to exercise its public power properly.82 Such transgressions 
by SARS are also covered by other administrative transgressions, such as the failure to 
comply with the ‘jurisdictional facts’ of ss 74A and 74B, or the general transgression of 
acting arbitrarily or capriciously, or mala fide.83 
 
Hoexter84 refers to relevant and irrelevant considerations, fettering, and arbitrary and 
capricious decision-making as sub-sections of failure to apply mind. Hoexter also refers 
to s 6 of PAJA as codifying the relevant remedies available to taxpayers aggrieved by 
SARS’ failure to apply its mind.85 
 
As for what are relevant and irrelevant considerations, Henning J best described these in 
Bangtoo Bros v National Transport Commission86 as a case of a factor of obvious and 
paramount importance being relegated to a position of insignificance, while another 
factor is given weight far in excess of its actual value.  
 
What are relevant considerations in the context of ss 74A and 74B?  An example is where 
the taxpayer has been subjected to a full review by SARS of the same period under 
review, and no new evidence has been introduced by SARS to suggest additional tax 
exposure. 
                                               
81Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of South Africa and another:  In Re:  Ex Parte President of the Republic 
of South Africa and Others 2000 (2) SA 674 (CC) at para [50]: What would have been ultra vires under the common 
law by reason of a functionary exceeding a statutory power is invalid under the Constitution according to the doctrine 
of legality. In this respect, at least, constitutional law and common law are intertwined and there can be no difference 
between them. The same is true of constitutional law and common law in respect of the validity of administrative 
decisions within the purview of section 24 of the interim Constitution. What is “lawful administrative action”, 
“procedurally fair administrative action” justifiable in relation to the reasons given for it, “cannot mean one thing under 
the Constitution, and another thing under the common law”; Hoexter (2012) at page 254. 
82 Hoexter (2012) at page 313; Johannesburg Stock Exchange v Witwatersrand Nigel Ltd 1988 (3) SA 132 (A) at para’s 
152C-D. 
83Ibid. 
84 Hoexter (2012) at pages 316, 318 and 325. 
85Ibid. at page 316 and s 6(2)(e)(iii) of PAJA. 
86 1973 (4) SA 667 (N) at para’s 685A – D. 
 
  87 
 
What are irrelevant considerations in the context of ss 74A and 74B?  The audit and 
inquiry into the tax affairs of a taxpayer, that is a prominent participant in a particular 
industry, will send a strong message to similar taxpayers to be more compliant.87 
 
A review by the courts of this function does carry the risk of turning judges into 
administrators and for this reason alone, reliance on this factor may cause further 
problems for the taxpayer.88 If SARS fails to apply its mind or takes account of irrelevant 
considerations, and not relevant ones, the decision would be contrary to the rule of law 
and would be reviewable as public power being applied in an unlawful manner. Section 
6(2)(e)(iii) and (vi) of PAJA would apply, as would the principle of legality.   
 
3.3.3.4 Unlawful fettering 
 
SARS officials should not exercise their discretionary powers under ss 74A and 74B 
acting under dictation by simply adhering blindly, without further thought, to policies or 
directives given.89An official purporting to exercise a discretion under the unauthorised or 
unwarranted dictates of another person or body, is unlawful and reviewable,90 as is the 
referral by an authorised administrator of the taking of a decision to one who is 
unauthorised.91 
 
In exercising their discretionary powers, SARS officials may not place limits on their 
own powers by adhering rigidly to policies.92 
 
In Kemp NO v Van Wyk93 the following principles were summed up: 
 
A public official who is vested with a discretion must exercise it 
with an open mind but not … a mind that is untrammelled by 
existing principles or policies…What is required is only that he or 
                                               
87Minister of Law and Order v Dempsey 1988 (3) SA 19 (A) at pages 541-2. 
88 Hoexter (2012) at page 317. 
89Ibid. at page 319. 
90 Section 6(2)(e)(iv) of PAJA; Ulde v Minister of Home Affairs 2009(4) SA 522 (SCA); Mabi v Venterspost Town 
Council 1950 (2) SA 793 (W); Hofmeyr v Minister of Justice 1992 (3) 108 (C). 
91Vries v Du Plessis NO 1967 (4) SA 469 (SWA). 
92 Hoexter (2012) at page 319. 
93 2005 (6) SA 519 (SCA) at para [1]. 
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she does not elevate principles or policies into rules that are 
considered to be binding, with the result that no discretion is 
exercised at all. 
 
An example in the case of the application of ss 74A and 74B would be a rote fashioned 
following by SARS assessors of a directive given by the Commissioner that they should 
audit all the top 1,000 taxpaying companies before a particular year of assessment 
prescribes, within the statutory three year period from the date of the original assessment, 
without taking into account the fact that some of these companies may have already 
undergone extensive tax risk management processes with the co-operation of various 
SARS offices, or extensive civil regulatory audits, to check that the very years of 
assessment in question had been dealt with correctly by those taxpayers, and thereby 
without first complying with the SARS Code of Conduct, and taking into account the 
facts required to be considered by SARS assessors before selecting taxpayers for audit, as 
required in terms of the SARS Internal Audit Manual. 
 
‘Fettering’94 is not a ground specifically incorporated into s 6 of PAJA.95 However, it is a 
well-established basis of review at common law,96 and is covered by the ‘catch-all 
grounds’ in s 6(2)(i) of PAJA under the phrase conduct ‘otherwise unconstitutional or 
unlawful’. 
 
3.3.3.5 Arbitrary and capricious decision-making 
 
Section 6(2)(e)(vi) provides for review ‘if action is ‘(taken)’ arbitrarily or capriciously’. 97 
It is a long standing common law grounds for review,98 entrenched in the Constitution 
through the provisions of ss 33 and 195(1) of the Constitution. Public power exercised 
                                               
94Ibid. 
95As it does not specifically appear as a codified ground of review in PAJA. 
96 Wrong or non-performance giving rise to common-law review; Hira v Booysen 1992 (4) SA 69 (A); Shidiack v 
Union Government (Minister of the Interior) 1912 AD 642; Britten v Pope 1916 AD 150. 
97 Croome B & Olivier L  Tax Administration 2010 (Juta) at page 52; The authors discuss the unlawfulness of IRS 
agents pursuing arbitrary set targets in tax audit results and quotas, as this was expected to affect the objectivity of the 
agents. 
98Beckingham v Boksburg Licensing Board 1931 TPD 280 at 282; JSE and Another v Witwatersrand Nigel Ltd and 
Another 1988(3) SA 132(A) 152 A – E; Hira v Booysen 1992 (4) SA 69 (A); Shidiack v Union Government (Minister 
of the Interior) 1912 AD 642; Britten v Pope 1916 AD 150. 
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must be rationally connected to the purpose for which it was given, and cannot be 
exercised in an irrational or arbitrary manner.99 
 
In Johannesburg Liquor Licensing Board v Kuhn100, Holmes JA described arbitrariness 
as: ‘Arbitrariness connotes caprice, or the exercise of the will instead of reason or 
principle, without a consideration of the merits…’ (Emphasis supplied). 
 
Arbitrariness denotes ‘absence of reason or at very least the absence of a justifiable 
reason’.101 The failure by SARS to comply with the preliminary measures spelt out in the 
SARS Internal Audit Manual102 would be an indication that the decision of SARS to 
conduct an inquiry or audit into the affairs of a taxpayer is arbitrary and capricious. The 
issue of randomness103 for SARS is a challenge to justify, as randomness in the true sense 
is an arbitrary act. The challenge for SARS is to justify overcoming the constitutional 
obligation of rational, reasonable and results orientated inquiries and audits, so as to 
ensure that SARS is utilising its resources efficiently as it is obliged to do in terms of s 
195(1)(b) of the Constitution read with s 4(2) of the SARS Act, so as to successfully 




In Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v The Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism,104 
O’ Regan J set out a number of factors to be used in determining whether a decision is 
reasonable,105 namely: 
 
(T)he nature of the decision, the identity and expertise of the 
decision maker, the range of factors relevant to the decision, the 
reasons given for the decision, the nature of the competing interest 
                                               
99Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of South Africa and another:  In Re:  Ex Parte President of the Republic 
of South Africa and Others 2000 (2) SA 674 (CC) at para’s [20], [44], [45], [49] - [51], and [79] – [90]. 
1001963 (4) SA 666 (A) at 67. 
101Woolworths (Pty) Ltd v Whitehead [2000] 6 BLLR 640 (LAC). 
102 See section 3.2: The SARS Internal Audit Manual. 
103In Du Preez v Truth & Reconciliation Commission 1997 (3) SA 204 (A) the court held that the affected person 
should be made fully aware of the allegations against him or her. There is no definite rule on how much detail must be 
provided: this will depend on the circumstances of each case, and more particularly the seriousness of the case; this is 
authority for the submission that the ability for SARS to simply perform random inquiries and audits is limited without 
some preparatory work justifying its decision to do so; US v Third Northwestern National Bank 102 F Supp 879. 
104 2004 (4) SA 490 (CC); 2004 (7) BCLR 687 (CC). 
105 Croome B & Olivier L Tax Administration 2010 (Juta) at page 25. 
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involved and the impact of the decision on the lives and well-being 
of those affected.106 
 
In order to arrive at the points set out in the excerpt above, the rationality and 
proportionality of the decision must be determined.   
 
The reasonableness standard was dealt with in Sidumo and Another v Rustenburg 
Platinum Mines Ltd and Others,107 where Navsa AJ said in the context of s 6(2)(h) of 
PAJA, that a ‘judge’s task is to ensure that the decisions taken by administrative agencies 
fall within the bounds of reasonableness as required by the Constitution’. 
 
In taking the constitutional obligation of reasonableness further, in ITC 1717,108 Davis J 
said: 
 
However, I will assume in favour of appellant that at the time of 
the dispute, appellant was constitutionally entitled to a decision 
that was justifiable in terms of the reasons given. The question 
then arises as to the meaning of “justifiable”. 
… 
In my view, justifiable must mean grounded in a rational 
justification. (Emphasis supplied) 
 
As stated in LAWSA109 ‘there is no quantitative legal yardstick since the quality of 
reasonableness110 of the provision (or conduct) under challenge must be judged according 
to whether it arbitrarily or excessively invades the enjoyment of a constitutionally 
guaranteed right’. (Emphasis supplied) 
                                               
106Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v The Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism2004 (4) SA 490 (CC); 2004 (7) 
BCLR 687 (CC) at para [45]. 
107 2008 (2) SA 24 (CC) at page 59 and para [109]. 
108 64 SATC 32 at page 40. 
109 LAWSA Volume 5(3) 2nd ed at para 165; See also Commissioner of Taxes v CW (Pvt) Ltd 1989 (3) ZLR 361 (S) at 
370F-372C; Union Government (Minister of Mines and Industries) v Union Steel Corporation (South Africa) Limited 
1928 AD 220 pages 236-7; and National Transport Commission v Chetty's Motor Transport (Pty) Ltd 1972 (3) SA 726 
(A). 
110 See also American jurisprudence in this regard: Local 174 International Brotherhood of Teamsters v US, 240 F.2d 
387 where ‘(i)n proceeding by revenue agents to compel union's production of records relating to transactions with 
taxpayer-president, agents had burden to show that demand was reasonable under all circumstances and to prove that 
books and records were relevant or material to tax liability of taxpayer and that union possessed books or records 
containing items relating to taxpayer's business’. (Emphasis supplied) 
 




A decision of SARS under ss 74A and 74B is open to challenge on the grounds of 
irrationality111 where the decision is ‘so outrageous in its defiance of logic or of accepted 
moral standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the question to be 
decided could have arrived at it’.112 This ground is also codified in s 6(2)(e)(h) of PAJA. 
This in practice is a difficult ground to prove. 
 
The Commissioner in Drs Du Buisson, Bruinette & Kramer Inc. v C:SARS113 attempted to 
justify the random basis on which they selected the taxpayer for audit, under 
circumstances where the same taxpayer had just undergone a major tax audit a few month 
earlier by another SARS branch. He stated that: (1) taxpayers report their tax affairs on a 
self-disclosure basis; (2) historically, tax morality has been very low in South Africa and 
many taxpayers have not reported their tax affairs honestly;  (3) for this reason, it was 
important that SARS as a regulator inquired into and investigated the tax affairs of 
taxpayers; (4) because SARS did not have sufficient resources to do this in the case of all 
taxpayers, it had to do so randomly.114 The question is: is this so outrageous as to defy 
logic or accepted moral standards? Probably not. 
 
But then the objection by the taxpayer to this justification can be found in insisting that 
SARS complies with its constitutional obligations: s 4(2) of the SARS Act read with s 
195(1)(b) of the Constitution. Does non-compliance by SARS with these constitutional 
obligations defy logic? The justification by SARS to randomly audit taxpayers, without 
complying with these obligations becomes more problematical for them. SARS will need 
to communicate more comprehensive reasons for their actions, other than a mere random 
                                               
111 University of Cape Town v Ministers of Education & Culture (House of Assembly & House of Representatives) 
1988 3 SA 203 (C); LAWSA Volume 1 2nd ed Administrative Law Lexis Nexis at para 139 footnote 6. See also s 
6(2)(f) of PAJA. 
112 Routledge Cavendish Constitutional Law 5ed. (2006) at page 134; See also section 4.2.3 on moral standards in this 
thesis, analysing s 195(1)(a) of the Constitution and a high standard of professional ethics.   
113 Case No. 4595/02 in the High Court of the Transvaal Provincial Division. 
114 As per the affidavit of Commissioner Pravin Gordhan in the unreported matter of Drs Du Buisson, Bruinette & 
Kramer Inc. v C:SARS Case No. 4595/02 in the High Court of the Transvaal Provincial Division. This approach is 
limited when considering the decision in US v Third Northwestern National Bank 102 F Supp 879; However, in US v 
McKay 372 F.2d 174 where the court held the‘(p)ower of Commissioner of Internal Revenue to investigate records and 
affairs of taxpayers is greater than that of a party in civil litigation; such power may be characterized as an inquisitorial 
power, analogous to that of grand jury and one which should be liberally construed, in context of which the criteria of 
relevancy and materiality have broader connotations than in context of trial evidence’. 
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selective – especially in a case such as Drs Du Buisson, Bruinette & Kramer Inc. 
Furthermore, the issue of proportionality (which follows this section) will also require 
SARS to exercise its powers in the least intrusive manner.115 In this regard the SARS 
Internal Audit Manual116 clearly demonstrates an internal methodology developed at 
SARS to administer tax legislation in an efficient and cost-effective manner, and in 
compliance with its duties under s 195(1) of the Constitution.  There are a number of very 
good reasons in their internal guidelines why SARS should conduct a preliminary internal 
investigation into the affairs of a taxpayer they wish to audit, before taking the next steps 
in doing so.  For instance, SARS should not unnecessarily on a random basis be auditing 
taxpayers who have already been audited in respect of specific tax returns, unless new 
material facts have come to light, justifying an additional inquiry or investigation.  In this 
manner, SARS will not be criticised for the using its powers and resources in an 
unjustified and illogical manner, and contrary to its constitutional obligations. It will also 
limit any intrusion into the private affairs of a taxpayers.117 
 
In considering the provisions of s 6(2)(f)(ii)(aa) to (dd) of PAJA the: 
 
‘action itself … (must be) … rationally connected to – 
(aa) the purpose with which it was taken; 
(bb) the purpose of the empowering provision; 
(cc) the information before the administrator; or 
(dd) the reasons given for it by the administrator’. 
 
Hoexter118 states that these provisions cover much of the same territory as pre-existing 
common-law grounds, such as ulterior purposes, failure to apply the mind and 
arbitrariness.119 In light of the Constitution, a rational connection is merely required by 
SARS to overcome this ground of review, rather than the court having to substitute the 
                                               
115 SARS are entitled to verify taxpayers affairs if compliant with the statutory provisions: R v McKinlay Transport 
[1990] 1 S.C.R. 627. 
116 See section 3.2: The SARS Internal Audit Manual supra. 
117US v Coopers and Lybrand 413 F Supp 942 where ‘Internal Revenue Service summons requesting records, papers, 
and other data of a taxpayer will be enforced only if the information sought is not already in the possession of the IRS is 
designed to protect taxpayers and third parties from the abuse of summons power’. 
118 Hoexter C Unreasonableness in the Administrative Justice Act in Claudin Lange & Jakkie Wessels (eds) The right to 
know: South Africa’s Promotion of Administrative Justice Act and access to Information Act (2005) 148 at page 159. 
119Ibid. at page 309. 
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decision because it is substantively incorrect.120Again, in practice this may be difficult for 
taxpayers to prove. 
 
Taxpayers may question SARS as to the application of its internal guidelines in 
determining the suitability of the taxpayer for an inquiry and audit. SARS, through its 
obligation to share information and be transparent, would be obliged to share this 
information with inquiring taxpayers.121Failure by SARS to provide the information 
requested by the taxpayers, would entitle these taxpayers not to participate in the inquiry 
and audit (on the basis of ‘just cause’ shown), and to consider launching review 
proceedings on the basis that SARS’ cannot show a rational connection between its 
decision to invoke ss 74A and 74B and an inquiry and audit of a named taxpayer, other 
than it being a random selection. The justification of the Commissioner in Drs Du 
Buisson, Bruinette & Kramer Inc. above, it is submitted, would not be sufficient where 
the taxpayer seeks compliance by SARS with its broader constitutional obligations. 
Where the taxpayer can demonstrate that there is no material reason for SARS to pursue 
another audit of the taxpayer, a logical and rational connection envisaged ins 
6(2)(f)(ii)(aa) to (dd) of PAJA 
 
3.4.2 Proportionality  
 
Apart from the necessity for a rational connection to be present justifying SARS’ decision 
to audit a taxpayer, the decision must also be proportional to the facts and circumstances 
of the case. Proportionality can best be described in the famous sentence of Lord Diplock 
in the English case of R v Goldstein:122 ‘You must not use a steam hammer to crack a nut, 
if a nutcracker would do.’ 
 
Sachs J in Minister of Health v New Clicks South Africa (Pty) Ltd123 states: 
‘[p]roportionality will always be a significant element of reasonableness’.  However, 
Hoexter states that this ground of review remains controversial.124 Section 6(2)(h) of 
PAJA, the ground dealing with unreasonable effects, does not specifically refer to 
                                               
120Niewoudt v Chairman, Amnesty Subcommittee, Truth and Reconciliation Commission 2002(3) SA 143(c) at para’s 
155G-H, and para’s 164G – H.  
121 Section 195(1)(g) of the Constitution. 
122[1983] 1 WLR 151. 
1232006 (2) SA 311 (CC) at para [637]; Prophet v National Director of Public Prosecutions  2007 (6) SA 169 (CC). 
124 Hoexter (2012) at pages 344-5. 
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proportionality. The section reads: ‘the exercise of the power or the performance of the 
function authorised by the empowering provision, in pursuance of which administrative 
action was purportedly taken, is so unreasonable that no person could have so exercised 
the power or performed the function.’ However, the wording is similar to the well-known 
test in the English case of Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury 
Corporation,125 also known as the Wednesbury rule. In applying the test for 
proportionality, based on the Wednesbury rule, English courts will ask the following 
questions: 
(a) Whether the action pursued a legitimate aim; 
(b) Whether the means adopted to achieve the aim were appropriate; 
(c) Whether less restrictive means were adopted to achieve that aim; 
(d) Whether the interference in the individual’s rights is justified in the interest of a 
democratic society.126 
 
In supporting the contention that proportionality is part of the reasonableness enquiry by 
the courts in South Africa, it is submitted that the Wednesbury rule will have persuasive 
value before South African courts, particularly in light of the provisions of s 39 of the 
Constitution, encouraging courts to review foreign applicable jurisprudence.127 
 
In the context of ss 74A and 74B, it is difficult to establish a set of circumstances where 
these questions would not be answered in favour of SARS. There are, however, a few 
examples. 
 
Where SARS asks for information not relevant to determining a tax liability of the 
taxpayer (for instance, a survey to obtain certain industry facts which in turn may be used 
in the audit of other taxpayers); where SARS as a matter of course audits all refunds 
where in a given case it is clear that the taxpayer merely mistakenly overpaid provisional 
tax which is due and payable to the taxpayer; where SARS has already conducted an audit 
into the affairs of the taxpayer and unjustifiably recommences an inquiry and audit into 
                                               
125[1947] 2 All ER 680 (CA) at pages 683E and 685C. 
126 Routledge Cavendish Constitutional Law 5ed. (2006) at page 143; R v Goldstein[1983] 1 WLR 151. 
127First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v C: SARS 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) at para [94] et seq. 
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the same tax affairs of a taxpayer; where SARS had less restrictive means to gather 
information, documents of things – such as where the information is already in the 
possession of SARS, albeit in a different department within SARS.128 
 
In many tax risk management processes conducted for multi-national corporations,129 it 
has become clear that these corporations interact with many different SARS offices and 
that the same tax issues are investigated by different tax offices time and time again, 
without any co-operation between them.  It often happens that a particular tax issue is 
resolved by one tax office, only for it to be raised again by another. Under such 
circumstances the taxpayer would aver that the decision by SARS to conduct an inquiry 
and investigation is not pursuant of a legitimate aim; the means adopted to achieve the 
aim are not appropriate; a less restrictive means could be adopted to achieve the aim; and, 
the interference with the taxpayer’s rights is not justified. The simple fact is that one 
SARS office could have obtained all the relevant information from the other SARS 
offices that had already conducted an inquiry and investigation. SARS is, vis-a-viz 
taxpayers, one organisation. 
 
In order to ensure that SARS are compliant with its constitutional duties and act 
proportionately in line with these duties, it is submitted that taxpayers are entitled to 
question SARS at the commencement of an inquiry and audit. These taxpayers would be 
entitled to adequate reasons at the commencement as discussed in section 2.5: Adequate 
Reasons above. 
 
Should SARS fail to properly justify its intrusion into the affairs of a taxpayer by giving 
adequate reasons, the initial appropriate defence would be the ‘just cause’ defence 
discussed in section 3.8 below. The conduct by SARS would also be reviewable as 
‘otherwise unconstitutional or unlawful’ in terms of the codified ground of review in s 
6(2)(i) of PAJA; alternatively, as being contrary to the principle of legality, in that the 
basic requirement for rational and proportional conduct by SARS would be absent. 
 
                                               
128Haynes v Commissioner for Inland Revenue 2000 (6) BCLR 596 (T). 
129 Generally on tax risk management: Erasmus et al Tax Risk Management: From Risk to Opportunity IBFD (2012); 
Erasmus D N Tax Intelligence: The 7 Habitual Tax Mistakes made by Companies Xlibris (2010); and, by the writer 
over the past two decades, including corporations such as SAB Ltd, Tsogo Sun Ltd, Accenture (South Africa) Ltd,  
Edcon Group, Peermont Group Ltd, AECI Ltd, Mr Price Ltd, Altron Group, Zico Group, Nampak Products Ltd and 
MTN Group Ltd.  
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The test for bias (or nemo iudex in sua causa) emerges from the Appellate Division 
judgment of BTR Industries South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Metal and Allied Workers’ Union,130 
where the Court confirmed the ‘reasonable suspicion’ test for bias.  In order to have a 
SARS decision set aside for reasons of financial bias, the taxpayer has to prove the mere 
appearance of partiality, rather than its actual existence.131 The courts accept that the 
‘smallest pecuniary interest’ will be sufficient to raise the suspicion of bias.132 
 
Section 195(1)(d) of the Constitution also places an obligation on SARS to provide 
services that are without bias. This includes financial bias. Should any SARS official be 
suspected of having the smallest pecuniary interest in the outcome of an investigation, 
that conduct would arguably be contrary to procedural fairness and s 195(1)(d).133 
 
An example of such an instance would be an attempt by a SARS official to conduct an 
investigation into the affairs of a taxpayer prior to the end of the SARS financial year on 
31 March in order to meet his or her annual revised assessment budget in order to meet 
certain key performance indicators within SARS.134 Such an action is clearly not for the 
purposes of the ‘administration of the Act’ as envisaged in s 74 of the Income Tax Act.  
The conduct by SARS in exercising a discretion in terms of ss 74A and 74B under these 
circumstances would be procedurally unfair(as being subject to personal bias)135 and 
invalid conduct.  
                                               
130 1992 (3) SA 673 (A). 
131South African Commercial Catering and Allied Workers Union v Irvin & Johnston Ltd (Seafoods Division Fish 
Processing) 2000 (3) SA 705 (CC) at para’s [11]-[17]. 
132Rose v Johannesburg Local Road Transportation Board 1949 (4) SA 272 (W). 
133 Croome B & Olivier L  Tax Administration 2010 (Juta) at page 52; The authors discuss the unlawfulness of IRS 
agents pursuing arbitrary set targets in tax audit results and quotas, as this was expected to affect the objectivity of the 
agents, resulting in bias. 
134 Something which SARS will not make public, despite attempts by the writer and other colleagues to request the 
details under the Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 of 2000. The matter has not been tested in court yet. For 
access to the courts on this type of issue see Alliance Cash and Carry (Pty) Ltd v Commissioner, South African Revenue 
Service 2002 (1) SA 789 (T); Scherer v Kelley (1978) 584 F.2d 170; In Minister for Provincial and Local Government 
of the RSA v Unrecognised Traditional Leaders of the Limpopo Province, Sekhukhuneland [2005] 1 All SA 559 (SCA) 
the appeal court found in favour of the public member seeking a report upholding the right of access to information held 
by the State, read with sections 36 (the limitation clause) and 39(2) (obliging every court to promote “the spirit, purport 
and objects of the Bill of Rights” of the Constitution (Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs 
2004 (7) BCLR 687 (CC) followed)). 
135Rose v Johannesburg Local Road Transportation Board 1947(4) SA 272 (W). 
 
  97 
 
For this reason, the letter of findings process announced by the Commissioner in 2002,136 
and which has become standard practice with larger taxpayers, is an essential part of the 
inquiry and audit process, in that taxpayers are able to answer to the detailed findings of 
the assessors and address their concerns before SARS issues a revised assessment. The 
taxpayer has the opportunity to correct any incorrect findings of fact and law, with the 
opportunity to have a more senior SARS official review the letter of findings and the 
response, before revised assessments are issued. This process creates the impression of  
unbiased conduct by SARS in conducting fair administrative process. Procedural fairness 
is a principle of good administration that requires an impartial decision-maker.137 
 
Failure to adhere to this procedure properly will result in the taxpayer being entitled to 
review the unfair conduct of SARS on the basis of bias and a failure by SARS to adhere 
to a legitimate expectation in the form of the letter of findings.138 
 
3.5.2 Audi alteram partem139 
 
Procedural fairness in the form of the audi alteram partem principle140 gives taxpayers an 
opportunity to participate in any decisions that will adversely affect them, and gives them 
a chance to influence the outcome of those decisions.141 This will improve the quality and 
the rationality of administrative decision-making, enhancing legitimacy.142 An example is 
the letter of findings process referred to above where SARS must give adequate reasons 
                                               
136 In the unreported application of Drs Du Buisson, Bruinette & Kramer Inc. v C:SARS Case No. 4595/02 in the High 
Court of the Transvaal Provincial Division brought by the taxpayer to prevent SARS proceeding with an audit in terms 
of ss 74A and 74B, under the advice and guidance of the writer. 
137 Hoexter (2012) at pages 362-4. 
138 In the unreported case of Xstrata South Africa (Pty) Ltd v C:SARS North Gauteng Provincial Division Case No 
53772/2010 (21 September 2010) the applicant obtained a consent order against SARS to set aside a defective letter of 
findings issued by SARS, 2 days before the years of assessment for issuing revised assessments in terms of s 79 of the 
Income Tax Act prescribed. SARS were unable to remedy the defect within the 2 day period and the years of 
assessment prescribed – the writer was the tax attorney adviser to the applicant; On bias, see also Griffin v Licensing 
Board, Durban (1898) 19 NLR 37.  
139Attorney-General, Eastern Cape v Blom  1988 (4) SA 645 (A), 660H; and Podlas v Cohen NO and others NNO 1994 
(3) BCLR 137 (T) where it was held that the audi alteram partem principle applies when a statute empowers a public 
official to make a decision prejudicially affecting an individual in his liberty, property or existing rights, unless 
excluded by necessary implication; Bailey v Commissioner for Inland Revenue 1933 AD 204 at 220; Cekeshe and 
Others v Premier, Eastern Cape, and Others 1998 (4) SA 935 (Tk); Morelettasentrum (Edms) Bpk v Die Drankraad 
1987 (3) SA 407 (T); For a qualified contrary view see Contract Support Services (Pty) Ltd v C:SARS 61 SATC 338 
analysed in section 4.7: Pitfalls in bringing the Rule 53 Applicationinfra. 
140Podlas v Cohen NO and others NNO 1994 (3) BCLR 137 (T) where it was held that the audi alteram partem 
principle applies when a statute empowers a public official to make a decision prejudicially affecting an individual in 
his liberty, property or existing rights.  
141 Hoexter (2012) at page 363. 
142Ibid. 
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at the conclusion of an audit and inquiry, and an opportunity to the taxpayer to respond. 
Failure by SARS to adhere to this process properly will result in a review, either setting 
aside the revised assessment or the letter of findings.143 
 
Goldstone J in Janse van Rensburg v Minister of Trade and Industry NO144 explained the 
importance of fairness in relation to discretionary power: 
 
…it has become more and more common to grant far-reaching powers to 
administrative functionaries. The safeguards…all the more 
important…Observance of the rules of procedural fairness ensures that an 
administrative functionary has an open mind and a complete picture of the 
facts and circumstances within which the administrative action is to be 
taken. In that way the functionary is more likely to apply his or her mind 
to the matter in a fair and regular manner. 
 
In the Supreme Court of Appeal Conradie JA stated that fairness must be decided on the 
circumstances of each case and whatever is done must display the attributes of fairness 
and transparency: Metro Projects CC v Klerksdorp Local Municipality.145 These are also 
obligations imposed on SARS through s 195(1) of the Constitution. 
 
Hoexter146acknowledges that there are many instances where the legislated procedure of 
fairness and the audi alteram partem principle are just not catered for in PAJA owing to 
the restrictive nature of the definition of ‘administrative action’. Sections 74A and 74B 
are arguably such provisions if this type of decision by SARS is considered not to be 
administrative action. In order to overcome this problem, Hoexter147 advocates that the 
courts make use of the constitutional principle of legality that governs the use of all 
public power rather than just the narrower realm of administrative action.148 As stated 
                                               
143 The letter of findings approach was announced as a practice by the Commissioner in the unreported application of 
Drs Du Buisson, Bruinette & Kramer Inc. v C:SARS Case No. 4595/02 in the High Court of the Transvaal Provincial 
Division brought by the taxpayer to prevent SARS proceeding with an audit in terms of ss 74A and 74B; Also see the 
Xstrata case in footnote 145 supra.  
144 2001 (1) SA 29 (CC). 
145 2004 (1) SA 16 (CC). 
146 Hoexter (2012) at page 397. 
147Ibid. 
148 See section 2.4 supra; See also Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd v Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan 
Council 1999 (1) SA 374 (CC) at para [59]. 
 
  99 
earlier in this thesis, the exercise of public power is only legitimate where lawful149 and 
can only be lawful if the body exercising the public power acts within the powers 
lawfully conferred upon it.150 More recently there have been developments to suggest that 
this includes the right to be heard.151 
 
Procedural fairness includes giving taxpayers the opportunity to interact with SARS to 
ensure that considered and rational decisions are made, that relate to the purpose that 
SARS is given power to inquire and audit into the tax  affairs of taxpayers: namely, to 
verify proper compliance. Not to meet personal revised assessment budgets, but to 
comply with the jurisdictional facts of ss 74A and 74B as read with the appropriate sub-
sections of s 74. This is where the interactions, through the audi alteram partem rule, 
between taxpayers and SARS will give taxpayers the assurance that SARS is not 
transgressing its constitutional obligations in ss 1(c), 33, 41(1), 195(1) and 237 of the 
Constitution. A failure by SARS to justify the exercise of its public power in terms of ss 
74A and 74B in compliance with the audi alteram partem principle, diligently and 
without delay, would cause its conduct to be invalid in terms of s 2 of the Constitution.  
 
Taxpayers affected by this conduct will be entitled to launch a review application either 
in terms of PAJA - ss 7 and 8 read with s 6 of PAJA in that ‘action was procedurally 
unfair’ in terms of s 6(2)(c), or s 6(2)(i) in that the ‘…action is otherwise unconstitutional 
or unlawful’, or that the conduct is a transgression of the principle of legality. 
Finally, there are instances where the courts have held that the audi principle need not be 
adhered to where a prior hearing would defeat the process being embarked upon.152 In 
Gardener v East London Transitional Council and Others153 it was stated that fairness 
was a relative concept: ‘The meaning to be attached to ‘procedurally fair administrative 
action’ must therefore be determined within the particular framework of the act in 
question viewed in the light of the relevant circumstances.  The procedure must be fair 
not only to the holder of the right affected by the administrative act but also the executive 
or administration acting in the public interest.’ The court went on to state that it does not 
                                               
149Ibid. at para [56]. 
150Ibid. at para’s [56]-[59]; Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of SA: In re Ex parte President of the Republic 
of South Africa 2000 (2) SA 674 (CC). 
151 Hoexter (2012) at pages 121-5; Albutt v Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation 2010 (3) SA 293 (CC). 
152Contract Support Services (Pty) Ltd and Others v CSARS 61 SATC 338 at page 350; Arepee Industries Ltd v CIR 55 
SATC 139 at pages 144-5. 
153 1996 (3) SA 99 (ECD) at para’s 116 D-G. 
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believe: ‘that the audi principle is absolutely applicable to every administrative act.  Such 
an interpretation would make possible the misuse of the Constitution to hold up necessary 
social reform measures or for that matter any executive or administrative act…’. 
Following this line of reasoning, SARS may also rely on the Supreme Court of Appeal 
judgment in Chairman of the Board on Tariffs and Trade and Others v Brenko Inc and 
Others,154 where the court held that there was no single set of principles for giving effect 
to the rules of natural justice which would apply to all investigations, inquiries and 
exercises of power, regardless of their nature; on the contrary, the courts have recognised 
and restated the need for flexibility in the application of the principles of fairness in a 
range of different contexts.  
Following the reasoning in these judgments, SARS may argue that when considering the 
wide powers conferred upon it (which have both an investigative function as well as a 
determinative function in imposing additional tax on taxpayers), whilst it has a duty to act 
fairly, it does not follow that it must discharge that duty precisely in the same way in 
regard to the different functions performed by it. However, when SARS exercises its 
deliberative function, taxpayers have a right to know the substance of the case that they 
must meet. Moreover, taxpayers will be entitled to an opportunity to make 
representations. There is always the suspicion that the assessors are attempting to meet an 
internal SARS financial budget, where there is no rational connection between the 
purpose behind SARS being entitled to inquire into and audit a taxpayer’s affairs to verify 
tax compliance, and the SARS official’s personal goals. SARS officials are nevertheless 
bound by their constitutional obligations by adhering to the rule of law and displaying a 
high standard of professional ethics; unbiased, impartiality, and equitable conduct; and 
conduct that is accountable and transparent. These constitutional obligations in terms of 
ss 1(c), 41(1), and 195(1) of the Constitution supports taxpayers rights to natural justice 
and the audi principle. 
The problem of whether or not the audi principle applies to ss 74A and 74B is also 
overcome in some instances where taxpayers have a legitimate expectation that SARS 
must uphold. This aspect is dealt with in the section 3.6 below, where there is now a 
legitimate expectation that SARS issues a letter of findings at the conclusion of an inquiry 
and audit.  
                                               
154 64 SATC 130. 
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It is submitted that this also applies to the Code of Conduct and the SARS Internal Audit 
Manual155 where the legitimate expectations of the fair, impartial and unbiased standards 
of SARS in an inquiry and audit, has been created. The taxpayer can make inquiries about 
the scope, purpose and motivation behind the inquiry and audit, when SARS 
communicates with the taxpayer to commence the inquiry and audit. The taxpayer can 
enquire about SARS’ duties to gain insight into the business process of the taxpayer, the 
industry of the taxpayer, and any industry or taxpayer specific risks identified, as 
envisaged in the SARS Internal Audit Manual.156 In this way, the audi principle is 
fulfilled. 
 
3.6 LEGITIMATE EXPECTATIONS 
 
3.6.1 The Legitimate Expectations Doctrine in the context of ss 74A and 74B 
 
A legitimate expectation may arise in the context of taxation157 by means of a ruling or 
undertaking, the issuing of interpretation notes, media statements, practice notes and 
advance rulings or opinions; or a legitimate expectation based on a prevailing practice or 
a publically published document: such as the Code of Conduct, as supported by the 
unpublished SARS Internal Audit Manual. Taxpayers may expect SARS to apply these 
legitimate expectations fairly, impartially and without bias to all taxpayers. 
 
The requirements that should be met in determining the legitimate expectations created 
by SARS, are as follows:158 
                                               
155See section 3.2: The SARS Internal Audit Manual supra. 
156Ibid.:‘In order to carry out his tasks properly the auditor has to make professionally and technically sound decisions 
on the nature and scope of the audit.  This requires insight into the knowledge of the business process of the taxpayer as 
well as those of the industry or target group of which it is part’. 
157Williams R C et al Silke on Tax Administration (April 2009) Lexi Nexis at para 3.25 generally. 
158 Summarised from a collective reading of the various cases that have contributed to the development of the legitimate 
expectations doctrine in South Africa: Administrator, Transvaal and Others v Traub and Others 1989 (4) SA 731 (A) at 
para’s 756H-J; Lord Fraser in the English case Council of Civil Service Unions and Others v Minister for the Civil 
Service [1984] 3 ALL ER 935 (HL); Lord Templeman in the English case Re Preston [1985] 2 ALL ER 327; 
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of South Africa and another:  In Re:  Ex Parte President of the Republic of 
South Africa and Others 2000 (2) SA 674 (CC) at para [33]; ITC 167462 SATC 116; South African Veterinary Council 
And Another v Szymanski 2003 (4) SA 42 (SCA) at page 49 and para [19] as quoted from National Director of Public 
Prosecutions v Phillips and Others 2002 (4) SA 60 (W) (2001 (2) SACR 542) at para [28]; Premier Mpumalanga and 
another v Executive Committee, Association of State-Aided School 1999 (2) SA 91 (CC) at para [38]; Jenkins v 
Government of the RSA 1996 1 All SA 659 (Tk); Dilokong Chrome Mines v Direkteur-Generaal, Departement van 
Handel en Nywerheid 1992 (4) SA 1 (A); National Director of Public Prosecutions v Phillips and Others 2002 (4) SA 
60 (W) (2001 (2) SACR 542) at para [28] where the requirements for legitimacy of the expectation, include the 
following: (i)The representation underlying the expectation must be ''clear, unambiguous and devoid of relevant 
qualification'': De Smith, Woolf and Jowell (op. cit. [Judicial Review of Administrative Action 5th ed] at page 425 para 
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(a) induced by the decision-maker159 – a ruling or undertaking, the issuing of 
interpretation notes, media statements, practice notes and advance rulings or 
opinions, and prevailing practice - are induced by SARS to taxpayers; 
 
(b) an express or implied promise or undertaking160 – a ruling or undertaking, the 
issuing of interpretation notes, media statements, practice notes and advance 
rulings or opinions, and prevailing practice, are express or implied promises or 
undertakings by SARS to taxpayers;  
 
(c) a general or specific representations161 – a ruling or undertaking, the issuing of 
interpretation notes, media statements, practice notes and advance rulings or 
opinions, and prevailing practice - are general or specific representations issued 
by SARS to taxpayers; 
 
(d) clear, unambiguous and devoid of relevant qualification162– a ruling or 
undertaking, the issuing of interpretation notes, media statements, practice notes 
and advance rulings or opinions, and prevailing practice - is generally ‘clear, 
unambiguous and devoid of relevant qualification’ by SARS to taxpayers; 
 
                                                                                                                                            
8-055). The requirement is a sensible one. It accords with the principle of fairness in public administration, fairness 
both to the administration and the subject. It protects public officials against the risk that their unwitting ambiguous 
statements may create legitimate expectations. It is also not unfair to those who choose to rely on such statements. It is 
always open to them to seek clarification before they do so, failing which they act at their peril. (ii)The expectation must 
be reasonable: Administrator, Transvaal v Traub ((1989 (4) SA 731 (A)) at 756I - 757B); De Smith, Woolf and Jowell 
(op. cit. at page 417 para 8-037). (iii)The representation must have been induced by the decision-maker: De Smith, 
Woolf and Jowell (op cit at 422 para 8 - 050); Attorney-General of Hong Kong v Ng Yuen Shiu [1983] 2 All ER 346 
(PC) at 350h - j. (iv) The representation must be one which it was competent and lawful for the decision-maker to make 
without which the reliance cannot be legitimate: Hauptfleisch v Caledon Divisional Council 1963 (4) SA 53 (C) at 59E 
- G.’ (Emphasis supplied); Attorney General of Hong Kong v Ng Yuen Shiu [1983] 2 All ER 346 (PC) at page 350; 
Walele v City Of Cape Town and Others 2008 (6) SA 129 (CC) at pages 183-4; Zuma and Others v National Director 
of Public Prosecutions[2008] 1 All SA 234 (SCA); ITC 168262 SATC 380 at page 403; De Ville J Judicial Review of 
Administrative Action in South Africa (2003) Juta at pages 219 and 220; Currie I & Klaaren J Promotion of 
Administrative Justice Act Benchbook (2001) SiberInk at page 80, Baxter L Administrative Law (1984) Juta; LAWSA 
Volume 1 Administrative Law 2nd ed Lexis Nexis at para 113 (last accessed 30 June 2008); Hoexter (2012) at pages 
394-6; Croome B & Olivier L Tax Administration 2010 (Juta) at pages 63-70. 
159South African Veterinary Council And Another v Szymanski 2003 (4) SA 42 (SCA) at para [49] and para [19] as 
quoted from National Director of Public Prosecutions v Phillips and Others 2002 (4) SA 60 (W) (2001 (2) SACR 542) 
at para [28]; The representation must have been induced by the decision-maker: De Smith, Woolf and Jowell (op cit at 
422 para 8 - 050); Attorney-General of Hong Kong v Ng Yuen Shiu [1983] 2 All ER 346 (PC) at para’s 350h - j. 
160Administrator Transvaal v Traub & Others 1989 (4) SA 731 (A) at para’s 756H-J. 
161Ibid. 
162SA Veterinary Council v Szymanski 2003 (4) SA 42 (SCA) at para [19]. 
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(e) reasonable, competent and lawful, and induced by the decision-maker163– a ruling 
or undertaking, the issuing of interpretation notes, media statements, practice 
notes and advance rulings or opinions, and prevailing practice - is generally 
reasonable, competent and lawful, and induced by SARS to taxpayers; 
 
In the context of ss 74A and 74B, failure by SARS to follow its legitimate expectations 
created, such as its published Code of Conduct, or any other substantive or procedural 
legitimate expectations created in respect of a particular taxpayer, will be conduct 
inconsistent with the Constitution and invalid. In terms of s 2 of the Constitution read 
with s 172 of the Constitution, such conduct would be subject to judicial review as 
explained in section 5.5.6 below. 
 
In the exercise of a decision in terms of ss 74A and 74B written communication between 
a taxpayer and SARS is required. This written communication may lead to and create a 
legitimate expectation between the taxpayer and SARS that the process between them 
will follow a particular procedure - such as SARS issuing a letter of findings before any 
revised assessment is issued. Such a legitimate expectation created by SARS triggers the 
applicability of the adequate notice provisions of ss 3(1) and (2) of PAJA.164 
 
Section 3(1) has a requirement that the legitimate expectation must be ‘materially and 
adversely’ affected.165  De Ville166 holds the view that ‘this appears to be nothing more 
than an expression of the de minimis non curat lex principle’ and that the phrase affecting 
legitimate expectations has been interpreted widely. De Ville goes on to state:167 ‘There is 
no natural limit to what can be understood as falling within the concept of ‘rights’ (or 
legitimate expectations) in section 3(1) of PAJA.’ (Insertion supplied) 
 
Thus, if SARS fails to comply with its legitimate expectations (read with the 
constitutional obligations of  s 195(1) of the Constitution (inter alia, a high standard of 
ethics, impartial, fair and unbiased conduct) and s 4(2) of the SARS Act) SARS will 
prima facie ‘materially and adversely’ affect the legitimate expectations of taxpayers. 
                                               
163Ibid. at para [29]. 
164Williams R C et al Silke on Tax Administration (April 2009) Lexi Nexis at para 3.25 generally. 
165 However, Williams R C et al ibid. at para 3.25 place no significance on this requirement in respect of legitimate 
expectations. 
166 De Ville J Judicial Review of Administrative Action in South Africa (2003) Juta at page 224. 
167Ibid. at page 227; Transnet Ltd v Goodman Brothers (Pty) Ltd 2001(1) SA 853 (SCA) at para [42]. 
 
  104 
Taxpayers are then entitled to rely upon the provisions of PAJA, and the fair procedural 
terms of s 3(1) of PAJA, and the provision of ‘adequate reasons’168 as contemplated in s 
5(2) of PAJA.  
 
As stated previously the salient provisions of the SARS’ Service Charter and Standards 
(under review) or Code of Conduct creates a legitimate expectation in favour of taxpayers 
in summarising the constitutional duties applicable to SARS when exercising its powers 
under ss 74A and 74B. The Code of Conduct prior to its current ‘under review’ format 
provided as follows: 
 
…This code of conduct has been formulated to help SARS 
employees to understand the standards of personal and 
professional behaviour required of them…(Emphasis supplied) 
 
In line with the high standard of professional ethics required of administrators in s 
195(1)(a) of the Constitution (one of SARS’ constitutional obligations), the SARS Code 
of Conduct records that a high standard of professional behaviour is required of SARS 
officials. What does this mean? It is at this juncture, it is submitted, that the SARS Internal 
Audit Manual169 of SARS plays a guiding role. The SARS Internal Audit Manual require 
of the SARS assessor: ‘… insight into the knowledge of the business process of the 
taxpayer as well as those of the industry or target group of which it is part’.170 Failure on 
the part of SARS to take this step is indicative that SARS’ conduct is not of a high 
professional standard.  
 
Another example is: ‘The audit plan includes the schedule and set up of audits to be 
carried out within a certain time period. The audit plan translates itself into the audit 
assignment, which indicates which taxpayers and which elements of the tax return(s) need 
to be audited.  This is important for each auditor, as it sets out the nature and scope of the 
audit. The audit assignment is thus the link between the audit plan and the auditing 
                                               
168See section 2.5: Adequate Reasons supra. 
169 See section 3.2: The SARS Internal Audit Manual supra. 
170Ibid. at page 2. 
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process.’171 The failure by SARS to conduct an audit scope plan is another example of 
conduct that falls short of the high standard of professional ethics standard. 
 
For instance, SARS have made international presentations to the African Tax 
Administration Forum to share with other African Tax Administrations best practice in 
the approach towards determining whether or not a taxpayer should undergo a transfer 
pricing and tax audit. The steps demonstrated in the presentation172 follow the audit 
process set out in the SARS Internal Audit Manual. The result is that by the time SARS 
decides to use its ss 74A and 74B powers in respect of a taxpayer, a collection of relevant 
information detailing the preliminary reasons for the inquiry and audit will exist. This 
information is available to the taxpayer as discussed below. Failure by SARS to plan the 
inquiry and audit, would also be indicative of a failure to adhere to the high professional 
ethics standard required as part of SARS’ constitutional obligations, and in line with their 
own internal standards, and the legitimate expectations created in their Code of Conduct. 
 
The Code of Conduct (prior to its current ‘under review’ format) stated: 
 
…SARS and its employees: 
 
1.1  are loyal to the Republic, honour the Constitution and abide by 
it in the execution of daily tasks; 
1.2  put the public interest first in the execution of daily duties. 
(Emphasis supplied) 
 
SARS’ Code of Conduct reiterates that SARS officials must abide by the provisions of the 
Constitution.  
 
The Code of Conduct continues: 
 
                                               
171Ibid. at page 5; In an Africa Tax Administration Forum presentation in Kigali, Rwanda – September 2011, SARS 
made a presentation to various African Tax Administrations confirming this process in respect of Transfer Pricing tax 
inquiries and audits (http://www.ataftax.net/events/events-calendar_1/technical-event-on-transfer-pricing-
implementation-and-case-studies.aspx. (last accessed 30 March 2013). 
172 In an Africa Tax Administration Forum presentation in Kigali, Rwanda – September 2011, SARS made a 
presentation to various African Tax Administrations confirming this process in respect of Transfer Pricing tax inquiries 
and audits (http://www.ataftax.net/events/events-calendar_1/technical-event-on-transfer-pricing-implementation-and-
case-studies.aspx(last accessed 29 January 2013). 
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…A SARS employee: 
 
2.1  will serve the public in an unbiased and impartial manner in 
order to create confidence in the SOUTH AFRICAN REVENUE 
SERVICE; 
2.2  is polite, helpful and readily accessible in his or her dealings 
with the public, at all times treating members of the public as 
valued clients who are entitled to receive the highest standards of 
service;… and 
2.7  recognises the public’s right of access to information 
excluding that information which is specifically protected by law. 
(Emphasis supplied) 
 
Transparency, as required in the provisions of s 195(1)(g) of the Constitution, is 
emphasized in the Code of Conduct (and detailed in the SARS Internal Audit Manual in 
respect of inquiries and audits as set out in section 3.2 above). SARS must disclose to 
taxpayers any information they require to justify the conduct of SARS. In terms of 
SARS’ practice, in following the steps demonstrated in the SARS Internal Audit Manual, 
by the time SARS decide to use its ss 74A and 74B powers in respect of a taxpayer, a 
collection of relevant information detailing the preliminary reasons for the inquiry and 
audit will exist. As this is the practice of SARS, all taxpayers have legitimate 
expectations, on the basis of fairness, impartiality and unbiased conduct, that similar 
information will exist at the commencement of their inquiry and audit, and be available to 
them in respect of their tax affairs. The only information that is excluded is that which is 
subject to legal professional privilege,173 and information about other taxpayers’ affairs, 
owing to the secrecy provisions in the Income Tax Act. 
 
The Code of Conduct continues: 
 
…A SARS employee… 
 
                                               
173See Heiman Maasdorp & Barker v SIR  1968 (4) SA 160 (W); Krew v Commissioner of Taxation (1971) 45 ALJR 
249 where documents subject to legal professional privilege fall outside the parameters of information, documents or 
things that SARS are entitled to. See generally Williams R C et al Silke on Tax Administration (April 2009) Lexis Nexis 
at para’s 3.15 and 3.16. 
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5.2
 
strives to achieve the objectives of the South African Revenue 
Service cost-effectively and cost efficiently without compromising 




will recuse himself or herself from any official action or decision-
making process which may result in improper personal gain, and 




promotes sound, efficient, effective, transparent and accountable 
administration; 
…. 
Compliance will ensure that the conduct of SARS personnel is not 
just legally correct but is ethical, enabling SARS to uphold its 
standards in a manner acceptable to Government and the public 
they serve.(Emphasis supplied) 
 
The undertakings of cost effective and efficient service; not compromising legitimate 
expectations; recusing themselves from decisions that may result in improper personal 
gain (because they may be biased as their remuneration, bonus or promotion depends 
directly or indirectly on the outcome of the inquiry and audit); and, with transparent and 
accountable administration, demonstrates the duties of SARS in s 4(2) of the SARS Act 
and s 195(1) of the Constitution. 
 
These principles set out in the Code of Conduct emphasizes the constitutional duties of 
SARS, and the rights and legitimate expectations of taxpayers, in a public document for 
the benefit of taxpayers. Furthermore, its provisions are in line with the international 
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benchmark rules of the International Ethics Standards Board for Accountants and its 
Code of Ethics for Professional Accountants.174 
 
An abuse of power could also occur if the Commissioner were to discriminate between 
different taxpayers in like circumstances, and deny to some the benefits of a discretion or 
power exercised favourably to others.  In the New Zealand case Reckitt and Coleman 
(NZ) Ltd v The Taxation Board of Review and The Commissioner of Inland Revenue175 
Turner J stated: ‘It is of the highest public importance that in the administration of [tax] 
statues every taxpayer shall be treated exactly alike, no concession being made …; he 
must with Olympian impartiality hold the scales between the taxpayer and the crown 
giving to no one any latitude not given to others.’ (Emphasis supplied) 
 
The statement of Turner J supports the constitutional obligations of SARS to diligently 
and without delay conduct itself in an impartial, equitable and fair manner towards all 
taxpayers; as others before them.  
 
The issuance of a letter of findings at the conclusion of all inquiries and audits is a clear 
example, despite the fact that this procedure is not a provision of tax legislation (but will 
change with the new s 42 in the Tax Administration Act 28 of 2011). Also if taxpayer’s 
have enjoyed a practice up until the date of an adverse decision taken by SARS, they can 
expect that in terms of the rule of law and the principle of legality, the practice will not be 
changed retrospectively, in line with the application of the doctrine of legitimate 
expectations. SARS failure to adhere to the rule of law and these legitimate expectations, 
would amount to unfairness and an abuse of power. The audi alteram partem principle 
will have to be adhered to, and the promise or practice would have to be left intact, prior 
to the change of decision.  
 
                                               
174Handbook of the Code of Ethics for Professional Accountants, 2012 edition, International Federation of Accountants 
(IFAC), www.ethicsboard.org (last accessed 31 March 2013), at pages 17-24; See section 4.2.3: High Standards of 
Professional Ethics infra for a summary of the relevant rules. 
175 [1996] NZLR 1032: ‘It is of the highest public importance that in the administration of [tax] statues every taxpayer 
shall be treated exactly alike, no concession being made to one to which another is not equally entitled.  This is not to 
say that in cases where the statute has so expressly provided the Commissioner has no discretion to differentiate 
between cases – but this is in my opinion only to be done when provision for it is expressly, or it may be impliedly, 
made in the legislation. Where there is no express provision for discretion, however, and none can be properly implied 
from the tenor of the statute, the Commissioner can have none; he must with Olympian impartiality hold the scales 
between the taxpayer and the crown giving to no one any latitude not given to others.’ (Emphasis supplied) 
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Finally, the onus is on the taxpayer to prove that the Commissioner has abused his 
powers.176 This is not an easy task to overcome. However, the standard of proof is based 
on the taxpayer showing that SARS has abused its powers on a balance of probabilities in 
the review application brought by SARS. 
 
3.6.2 Limitation to the Legitimate Expectation Doctrine 
 
An immediate potential limitation which appears in the Income Tax Act viz-a-viz the 
application of the legitimate expectations doctrine is s 3(2) of the Income Tax Act: 
 
Any decision made and any notice or communication issued or signed by 
any such officer [engaged in carrying out the provisions of the Act under 
the control, direction or supervision of the Commissioner] may be 
withdrawn or amended by the Commissioner... 
 
The application of the legitimate expectation doctrine is not ousted by this section in 
matters of tax. The doctrine applies notwithstanding the existence of various prescribed 
statutory powers such as in ss 74A and 74B, where these provisions must pass 
constitutional scrutiny in respect of the just administrative action provisions of s 33 of the 
Constitution, expanded by the provisions of PAJA, and the rule of law in s 1(c) of the 
Constitution and the constitutional principle of legality. SARS must display lawfulness, 
reasonableness and procedural fairness in its decision-making process to withdraw or 
amend a previous decision. Should SARS wish to withdraw a decision made as 
prescribed in s 3 of the Income Tax Act, an opportunity must be afforded to the taxpayer 
to state its case, in accordance with the audi alteram partem principle.  
 
Support for this submission can be found in Everett v Minister of the Interior177 case. The 
applicant had received no prior notification from the Minister that her temporary 
residence permit would be revoked and she applied to the Supreme Court for an order 
setting aside the notice purporting to withdraw her temporary residence permit on the 
                                               
176Kimberley Girls’ High School and another v Head of Department of Education, Northern Cape Province and others 
[2005] 1 All SA 360 (NC). 
177 1981 (2) SA 453 (C) at pages 458 – 459. The legitimate expectations doctrine first emerged in South Africa in 
Everrett v Minister of the Interior 1981 (2) SA 453 (C) which was the first South African case in administrative law 
that adopted the English doctrine of legitimate expectations. The court held that there had been a breach of natural 
justice, and that the Minister’s notice should be set aside. 
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ground, inter alia, that it was contrary to natural justice that she had not been afforded an 
opportunity of making representations to the Minister.  The court held that there had been 
a breach of natural justice, and that the Minister’s notice should be set aside. This applies 
equally to SARS is deciding to change or amend its decision in terms of s 3(2) of the 
Income Tax Act. 
 
Once the opportunity to be heard has been afforded to the taxpayer, may SARS simply 
change or amend its previous decision, retrospectively and retroactively? In other words, 
if a legitimate expectation has been created to provide a letter of findings at the 
conclusion of an audit, can SARS simply withdraw the requirement to produce a letter of 
findings at the conclusion of the audit? 
 
The answer partially lies in the applicability of the substantive protection of the legitimate 
expectation, which as summarised by Hoexter,178 has been cautiously approached by all 
South African courts, including the Constitutional Court. In essence, in the case of SARS 
back tracking on a legitimate expectation created in favour of a taxpayer, SARS would 
have to begin with procedural enforcement, where SARS will first hear the taxpayer 
affected, and then SARS would reach its decision taking into account all the relevant 
considerations, including the legitimate expectations, giving the latter sufficient weight. A 
decision that denies the legitimate expectations would be reviewable in terms of one of 
the grounds of review in s 6(2) of PAJA, and in particular on the basis of lack of 
rationality. If found to be irrational by the court, in exceptional circumstances (such as 
bias, incompetence or unjustifiable prejudice), the court may substitute its decision for 
that of the administrator.179 
 
Bias and incompetence is difficult to establish in practice in a matter against SARS. 
Therefore, unjustifiable prejudice caused to the taxpayer would be one appropriate 
ground of review to pursue, on the basis that the administrative action of SARS is 
‘otherwise unconstitutional or unlawful’. This enquiry plays into the functus officio 
doctrine.180 
 
                                               
178Hoexter (2012) at pages 432-6, quoting extensively from Campbell J Legitimate Expectations: The Potential and 
Limits of Substantive Protection in South Africa (2003) 12 South African Law Journal at page 292. 
179Ibid. at page 434, read with pages 552-7. 
180Ibid. at pages 276-7 generally. 
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Any public power to revoke or amend a previous decision would at the minimum have to 
be exercised in accordance with PAJA if administrative action, and comply with the 
principle of legality and the rule of law.181 In line with the preferred interpretation to a 
similar provision in s 10(1) of the Interpretation Act 33 of 1957, the power to revoke and 
amend existing ‘rules, regulations or by-laws’ enables administrators to exercise their 
powers anew in different situations, and not to revoke or amend existing decisions 
whenever they like.182 Hoexter summarises the law aptly: ‘The rule of law holds that 
individuals should be entitled to rely on … decisions, and to be able to plan their lives 
around such decisions, insulated at least to some degree from the injustice that would 
result from a sudden change of mind on the administrator’s part. There is also the 
fundamental principle that administrators must have lawful authority for everything they 
do – or undo. These considerations of certainty, fairness and legality help to explain why 
official decision-makers are said at common law to be functus officio once a decision has 
been made.’183 
 
The functus officio doctrine would arguably not apply to the Commissioner exercising his 
power to revoke or amend a legitimate expectation created by a SARS official in terms of 
s 3(2) of the Income Tax Act in line with the decision in Carlson Investments Share Block 
(Pty) Ltd v CSARS184 because an express legislated provision entitles him to do so, but the 
considerations of certainty, fairness and legality would come into play, with his lawful 
authority to do so, limiting his power to do so retrospectively where a ‘new determination 
does not affect completed transactions.’185 This is in line with the rule of law, that 
certainty with regard to existing rights of taxpayers should not alter in the past, where loss 
of those rights retrospectively would unjustifiably prejudice the taxpayer. That would be 
contrary to the rule of law. 
 
                                               
181Ibid. at page 276. 
182Ibid. at page 277. 
183Ibid. with reference to Pretorius D M The Functus Officio Doctrine in South African Administrative Law, with 
Reference to Analogous Principles in the Administrative Law of Other Commonwealth Jurisdictions (unpublished PhD 
thesis, University of the Witwatersrand, 2004) especially at page 420ff. 
184 63 SATC 295 at page 318. 
1853M South Africa (Pty) Ltd v CSARS [2010] ZASCA 20 at para [36] where in relation to similar provisions in the 
Customs and Excise Act 91 of 1964 granting the Commissioner the power to withdraw and amend previous 
determinations, the Supreme Court of Appeal held: ‘Having said that, however, it needs to be emphasised that the 
retrospective effect of the new determination does not affect completed transactions, but only applies in respect of 
uncompleted transactions…’. 
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It is submitted that a justifiable basis for the Commissioner to alter existing rights or 
expectations would be where, for instance, the legitimate expectation created in favour of 
the taxpayer was done so under false pretenses on the part of the taxpayer. Otherwise the 
legitimate expectation may give rise to both procedural and substantive expectations 
being protected, as quoted from Corbett CJ’s judgment in Administrator, Transvaal & 
Others v Traub & Others 1989 (4) SA 731 (A) 758 in the Carlson Investments Share 
Block case.186 The taxpayer in the Carlson Investments Share Block case argued that the 
Commissioner was functus officio after reassessing it to tax, and could not apply the 
express provisions of s 79 of the Income Tax Act to do so. The court held that in light of 
the express statutory provision, the Commissioner could reassess the taxpayer to tax 
again, provided it complied fully with the jurisdictional facts of that section, which in 
itself was a protection mechanism against arbitrary power. Furthermore, any harassment, 
malicious conduct or other unlawful conduct in applying that section would also be 
subject to review. None could be proven in that case. The taxpayer then attempted to rely 
on the legitimate expectations doctrine to uphold the previous reassessment by SARS, 
where the taxpayer would obtain substantive protection against SARS raising a revised 
assessment again within 3 years. The court found no evidence of a practice or 
communication that SARS would not revisit a previous decision to tax under these 
circumstances, so the doctrine was not applied in favour of the taxpayer.  
 
A transgression by the Commissioner of the principles set out above and applicable to 
revoking or altering a decision previously taken by a SARS official (within 3 years of that 
decision being taken unless all material facts were not placed before the SARS official 
when making the original decision), would be subject to review if the Commissioner 
acted outside the scope of the jurisdictional facts of s 3(2) of the Income Tax Act, or 
acted unlawfully in doing so. The discussion in this section is around an audit and 
inquiry, where SARS has created a practice to issue a letter of findings, where a 
legitimate expectation exists in favour of the taxpayer. If the Commissioner invokes his 
power to change the decision in terms of section 3(2), attempting to argue that he is acting 
unlawfully because the doctrine of functus officio applies, will most probably be met with 
no success in court. But arguing that the Commissioner is acting unlawfully because he 
does not comply with the legitimate expectation clearly created, would most probably be 
                                               
186 At page 322 footnote 194 of the Carlson Investment case footnote 191 supra. 
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met with success. Unless he has transgressed some statutory duty in creating the 
legitimate expectation in the first place. Under these circumstances, that it is highly 
unlikely.  
 
The grounds of review in s 6(2) of PAJA, or, the constitutional principle of legality – for 
failure to act lawfully, reasonably or in a procedurally fair manner – would be applicable. 
 
3.7 MULTI-STAGED DECISION-MAKING187 
 
Although administrative decisions are sometimes made in various stages, Hoexter makes 
the point that fairness should be applied at every stage of a multi-staged decision, and not 
only at the final stage where in the pre-Constitutional era, the rights of an individual had 
to be prejudicially affected,188 giving rise to quasi-judicial decisions, before the laws of 
natural justice applied. The courts in the pre-Constitutional era were loath to bury 
administrators in a flurry of hearings that would hinder practical expediency in dealing 
with administrative matters. Although hearings may be the fairest way of reaching 
decisions, they are not the most practical or the least expensive or time consuming.  
 
In the English case of Re Pergamon Press Ltd,189 where the court was concerned with an 
inquiry in terms of the Companies Act, where inspectors were expected to investigate and 
report, Lord Denning offered a warning against underestimating the importance of the 
inspector’s task: 
 
They have to make a report which may have wide repercussions. They 
may, if they think fit, make findings of fact which are very damaging to 
those whom they name. They may accuse some; they may condemn 
others; they may ruin reputations or careers. Their report may lead to 
judicial proceedings. It may expose persons to criminal proceedings or to 
                                               
187Hoexter (2012) at page 441; Hoexter C & Lyster R The New Constitutional & Administrative Law (2002) Juta at 
pages 206-8 and pages 222-6. 
188R v Ngwevela 1954 (1) SA 123 (A), followed by the decisions in Cassem v Oos-Kaapse Komittee van die 
Groepsgebiederaad 1959 (3) SA 651 (A) and South African Defence and Aid Fund v Minister of Justice 1967 (1) SA 
263 (A). 
189 [1970] 3 All ER 535 (CA). 
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civil actions…Seeing that their work and their report may lead to such 
consequences, I am clearly of opinion that the inspectors must act fairly.190 
 
However, notwithstanding the view of Lord Denning, Baxter191 states that the right 
balance must be struck, ‘continually modifying the actual requirements of natural justice 
in accordance with the importance of accurate and objective decision-making and in the 
light of administrative practicality.’ 
 
In counter-balancing the pre-Constitutional era when natural justice applied only to quasi-
judicial proceedings where individual rights were affected, the Supreme Court of Appeal 
in Director: Mineral Development, Gauteng Region v Save the Vaal Environment192 
rejected the application of the audi alteram principle, since the audi alteram principle 
would be applied at a later stage in the process under scrutiny. There was no need to 
apply it in the first stage. However, the court did reject an argument that no rights were 
violated in the first stage. The court held: 
 
It is settled law that a mere preliminary decision can have serious 
consequences in particular cases, inter alia, where it lays ‘…the necessary 
foundation for a possible decision…’ which may have grave results. In 
such cases the audi rule applies to the consideration of the preliminary 
decision…193. (Emphasis supplied) 
 
Furthermore, in Nomala v Permanent Secretary, Department of Welfare and Another,194 
the court held that a matter was ripe for adjudication in relation to the lawfulness of 
administrative action where prejudice was inevitable even though the action had not yet 
occurred. 
 
A decision by SARS in terms of ss 74A and 74B definitely ‘lays…the necessary 
foundation for a possible decision…which may have grave results…’ (emphasis 
                                               
190Re Pergamon Press Ltd [1970] 3 All ER 535 (CA)at page 539d-f, cited with approval in Du Preez v TRC 1997 (3) 
SA 204 (A) at pages 232H-233B. 
191 Baxter L Administrative law (1984) Juta at page 583. 
192 1999 (2) SA 709 (SCA). 
193Director: Mineral Development, Gauteng Region v Save the Vaal Environment 1999 (2) SA 709 (SCA)at para [17]. 
194 2001 (8) BCLR 844 (E). 
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supplied).The grave results referred to is the issuance by SARS of a revised assessment, 
with penalties and interest.  
 
In the Grey’s Marine case195 the Supreme Court of Appeal, obiter, stated that a capacity 
to affect rights is all that s 1 of PAJA and the definition of administrative action requires 
in relation to the elements of ‘adversely affected rights’ and ‘direct, external legal effect’ 
which in tandem merely serve to emphasise that administrative action impacts directly 
and immediately on individuals. 
 
Supporting the decision in the Grey’s Marine case, Fabricius AJ in Oosthuizen’s 
Transport (Pty) Ltd v MEC, Road Traffic Matters, Mpumalanga196 held that a decision to 
investigate whether or not to suspend operator of a fleet of vehicles was administrative 
action; attracting procedural fairness in terms of s 3 of PAJA; and, that representations 
should have been allowed during the deliberative stage of the investigation. This is 
analogous to an investigation commenced by SARS under ss 74A and 74B. 
 
In the Constitutional Court case of Viking Pony Africa Pumps (Pty) Ltd t/a Tricom Africa 
v Hidro-Tech Systems (Pty) Ltd & Another197 the court held that: 
 
[37] PAJA defines administrative action as a decision or failure to take a 
decision that adversely affects the rights of any person, which has a direct, 
external legal effect. This includes “action that has the capacity to affect 
legal rights”. Whether or not administrative action, which would make 
PAJA applicable, has been taken cannot be determined in the abstract. 
Regard must always be had to the facts of each case. 
 
[38] Detecting a reasonable possibility of a fraudulent misrepresentation 
of facts, as in this case, could hardly be said to constitute an administrative 
action. It is what the organ of state decides to do and actually does with 
the information it has become aware of which could potentially trigger the 
                                               
195Grey’s Marine Hout Bay (Pty) Ltd and Othersv Minister of Public Works and Others2005 (6) SA 313 (SCA) at para 
[23]; Hoexter (2012) at page 225. 
196 2008 (2) SA 570 (T); Hoexter (2012) at page 232. 
1972011 (1) SA 327 (CC) at para’s [37] and [38], footnotes excluded. 
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applicability of PAJA. It is unlikely that a decision to investigate and the 
process of investigation, which excludes a determination of culpability 
could itself adversely affect the rights of any person, in a manner that has 
a direct and external legal effect. 
 
Sections 74A and 74B results in a decision to investigate that includes a determination of 
culpability that could adversely affect the rights of the taxpayer, in a manner that has a 
direct and external legal effect, in that revised assessments may likely ensue, triggering 
the applicability of PAJA. 
 
In conclusion, the analysis above shows that the exercise by SARS of its public powers in 
terms of ss 74A and 74B is part of a multi-staged investigative process, where a 
determination of culpability that could adversely affect the rights of the taxpayer, in a 
manner that has a direct and external legal effect, may be inevitable through the issuing of 
revised assessments at the end of the process. Therefore, SARS must ensure that every 
step in its decision-making process is not unlawful, unreasonable or procedurally unfair, 
and that it complies with all its constitutional obligations in terms of ss 41(1), 195(1) and 
237 of the Constitution. The fact that it is multi-staged does not justify a deviation by 
SARS from these constitutional obligations.  
 
Where SARS fails to comply with these constitutional obligations, the courts through s 
172(1) of the Constitution will come to the aid of aggrieved taxpayers on the basis that 
non-compliance by SARS will result in an unconstitutional and ‘invalid’ decision – 
entitling taxpayers to invoke the grounds of review in s 6(2) of PAJA, or by virtue of the 
principle of legality. 
 
3.8 ‘JUST CAUSE’ DEFENCE 
 
The provisions of s 75(1)(b) of the Income Tax Act provide: 
 
75.   Penalty on default.—(1)  Any person who— 
 (a) fails or neglects to furnish, file or submit any return or 
document as and when required by or under this Act; or 
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 (aA) any person who fails to register as a taxpayer as 
contemplated in s 67; 
 
(b) without just cause shown by him, refuses or neglects to— 
(i) furnish, produce or make available any information, 
documents or things;  
(ii) reply to or answer truly and fully, any questions put to him; or  
(iii) attend and give evidence, 
as and when required in terms of this Act;  
… 
(3) Any person who has been convicted under sub-section (1) of failing to furnish 
any return, information or reply, shall, if he fails within any period deemed by the 
Commissioner to be reasonable and of which notice has been given to him by the 
Commissioner, to furnish the return, information or reply in respect of which the 
offence was committed, be guilty of an offence and liable on conviction to a fine 
of R50 for each day during which such default continues or to imprisonment 
without the option of a fine for a period not exceeding 12 months. (Emphasis 
supplied) 
 
Section 75(1)(b) provides the first line of defence that a taxpayer has against an attack by 
SARS when refusing to comply with a request for information, documents or things. If a 
taxpayer can show ‘just cause’ for its non-compliance with a SARS request, SARS will 
be unsuccessfully in obtaining a conviction in terms of s 75(3). 
 
What is ‘just cause’?  
 
In Chetty v Law Society of Transvaal,198 the court pointed out that ‘sufficient cause’ (or 
‘good cause’) defies precise definition. This was also found to be the case in Attorney-
General, Tvl v Abdul Aziz Kader:199 ‘Sufficient cause…comprises of two essential 
elements, namely that (a) the party seeking relief must present a reasonable and 
acceptable explanation for his default and (b) that on the merits such party has a bona fide 
defence which prima facie, carries some prospect of success…’.In Attorney-General, Tvl 
                                               
1981985(2) SA 756 (AD). 
1991991(4) SA 727 (A). 
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v Abdul Aziz Kader200 it was held the ‘just cause’ is not confined to matters of privilege, 
compellability and admissibility – and has a wider connotation than an excuse sanctioned 
by rules of law – otherwise it would have been ‘lawful cause’.  
 
The direct, external legal effect on rights that would entitle a taxpayer not to participate in 
a ss 74A and 74B inquiry and audit by using the ‘just cause’ defence, would be, inter 
alia, that the fundamental rights to privacy and dignity in terms of ss 10 and 14 of the 
Constitution are intruded upon, outside justifiable grounds201 (the case law on 
justification says that there is no 'privacy' when investigating business affairs - but on the 
premise of the encroachment being one that is intra vires i.e. within the scope of the 
empowering provision of section 74 and 'administration of this Act'). Here the deprivation 
theory is trumped by the determination theory, where the latter is broader in meaning. 
The taxpayer must merely show that determined rights that emerge going forward may be 
affected (such as the right to privacy and dignity;202 lawful, reasonable and fair 
procedural administrative action;203 compliance by SARS with its constitutional 
obligations that must obey and fulfil). Various academic writers favour this approach.204 
 
This would include non-compliance by SARS with the relevant jurisdictional facts. In 
Farjas (Pty) Ltd another v Regional Land Claims Commissioners, KwaZulu-Natal205 
Dodson J held the approach of the courts to judicial review on the ‘ground of illegality’ 
has been based on what is known as the ‘jurisdictional facts doctrine’: ‘A public official 
must first consider the law which empowers her and decide whether on the facts of the 
particular matter, she has the power or jurisdiction to deal with it ... These prerequisite 
legal facts and circumstances are usually described as “jurisdictional facts”. According to 
this doctrine, if the public official errs in her decision about the presence or absence of the 
necessary jurisdictional facts, then a court will not hesitate to intervene and set aside her 
decision to review because she will have acted outside her powers’.An example of a 
                                               
200Ibid. 
201Bernstein and Others v Bester and Others NNO 1996(2) SA 751 (CC) at para’s [67], [73] and [79]. 
202Section 10 and 14 of the Bill of Rights, the Constitution. 
203 See sections 3.3: Lawfulness, 3.4: Reasonableness and 3.5: Procedural Fairness, supra. 
204Hoexter C The Future of Judicial Review in South African Administrative Law (2000) 117 South African Law 
Journal 484 at page 516 states that the deprivation theory 'clearly creates an unacceptably high threshold for admission 
to the category of "administrative action" '. In addition, had the Act intended to be more restrictive, it could have 
inserted the words 'existing rights' instead of 'rights'.’; Woolman et al Constitutional Law of South Africa 2nd ed Juta 
2002 at page 63-21. 
2051998(5) BCLR 579 (LCC) at [22], quoting South African Defence and Aid Fund and another v Minister of Justice 
1967(1) SA 31(C) at pages 34H – 35F and Baxter L Administrative law (1984) Juta at page 456; See section 3.3.2: 
Jurisdictional facts supra. 
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‘public official err(ing) in her decision about the presence or absence of the necessary 
jurisdictional facts’would be the failure by SARS to give ‘adequate reasons’ in terms of s 
5(1) and (2) of PAJA, without justification in terms of s 5(3) of PAJA. The absence of 
adequate reasons would confirm that the conduct is devoid of reasons, unconstitutional 
and ‘invalid’. Non-compliance with the jurisdictional facts would be a ‘ground of 
illegality’, and give a taxpayer ‘just cause’ not to respond to a ss 74A and 74B inquiry 
and audit.  
 
‘Just cause’ used in the context of s 75(1)(b) contains the following key elements 
extracted from the case law set out above. The taxpayer: 
 
• must have ‘a reasonable and acceptable explanation for his default’; 
• must have some prima facie ‘prospect of success’ in respect of ‘the merits such 
party’ relies upon as ‘a bona fide’ defence; 
•  does not have to rely on an excuse sanctioned by rules of law, such as matters of 
privilege, compellability and admissibility.206 
 
In applying these principles to a refusal by a taxpayer to submit to a decision by SARS in 
terms of ss 74A and 74B, the following examples are appropriate. The taxpayer: 
 
• can explain that the conduct of SARS in making a decision in terms of ss 74A and 
74B is unconstitutional and ‘invalid’ in terms of s 2 of the Constitution, in that 
SARS has exercised its powers, and has therefore exercised unconstitutional and 
‘invalid’ conduct in one or more of the following ways: 
o SARS has transgressed ‘the rule of law’ in contravention of s 1(c) of the 
Constitution by failing generally to comply with its constitution 
obligations spelt out below – this includes the constitutional principle of 
legality; 
o SARS has failed to ‘respect and protect’ the dignity of the taxpayer, 
because the overhanded conduct by SARS in making demands without 
proper reasons impairs the self-esteem of the taxpayer, as the taxpayer 
                                               
206Attorney-General, Tvl v Abdul Aziz Kader1991(4) SA 727 (A). 
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regards SARS’ conduct offensive, in that SARS has failed to respect the 
taxpayer’s right to privacy without proper justification;207 
o SARS has acted ultra vires as demonstrated by not satisfying the 
jurisdictional facts of ss 74A and 74B, read with the constitutional 
obligations set out in ss 41(1), 195(1) and 237 of the Constitution, read 
with s 4(2) of the SARS Act; 
o SARS has not complied with the taxpayer’s right to ‘just administrative 
action’ in terms of s 33 of the Constitution, and as expanded in terms of 
PAJA, in that SARS has failed to comply with its obligations to give 
proper and adequate notice of its decision in terms of s 3(2) of PAJA, and 
‘adequate reasons’ in terms of s 5(1) and (2) of PAJA (without proper 
justification in terms of s 5(3)) for its decision in terms of ss 74A and 74B, 
thereby transgressing one or more of the grounds of review in s 6(2) of 
PAJA; 
o SARS has transgressed its constitutional obligation in terms of s 41(1) of 
the Constitution, and thereby the principle of legality by ignoring that 
provision – SARS is not entitled to ‘assume any power or function except 
those conferred on them in terms of the Constitution’, as set out in s 41(1). 
In terms of the principle of legality SARS cannot act ultra vires its 
empowering provision in ss 74A and 74B meaning compliance with the 
jurisdictional facts and all its constitutional obligations in ss 195(1) and 
237 of the Constitution, read with s 4(2) of the SARS Act; 
o SARS has transgressed its constitutional obligations in terms of s 195(1) 
of the Constitution, read with s 4(2) of the SARS Act, and thereby the 
principle of legality208 by ignoring those provisions – SARS is not entitled 
to conduct themselves contrary to: 
                                               
207 Sections 10 and 14 of the Bill of Rights; See Pretoria Portland Cement & Another v Competition ommission & 
Others 2003(2) SA 385 (SCA) where a warrant to enter premises did not approve of film crew entering premises, was a 
grave violation of the right to privacy and the right to dignity. This is analogous to a concern on the part of the taxpayer, 
if SARS gives inadequate explanation, reasons and details for an inquiry and audit in terms of ss 74A and 74B, that 
SARS may enter the taxpayers premises, or share information, documents and things, with persons not properly 
authorised by the Commissioner and subject to the secrecy provisions (s 4) of the Income Tax Act; Bernstein & Others 
v Bester NO & Others 1996(2) SA 751 (CC) at para’s [67], [73] and [79] identifies ‘privacy’ with the ‘inner sanctum of 
a person’, but that all privacy rights are limited ‘to the most personal aspects of a person’s existence, and not to every 
aspect within his/her personal knowledge and experience.’; Investigative Directorate: Serious Economic Offences v 
Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd: In re Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd v Smit NO 2001(1) SA 545 (CC) at 
para [18] where it was held that the right to privacy protects intimate space because such a space is a prerequisite for 
human dignity; Probe Security CC v Security Offices’ Board and Others 98 JER 0849 (W). 
208 Hoexter (2012) at pages 121-5. 
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 Promoting and maintaining ‘a high standard of ethics’; 
 Promoting ‘efficient, economic and effective use of resources’; 
 Services that are delivered ‘impartially, fairly, equitably and 
without bias’; 
 ‘accountable’ Public Administration; and 
 ‘timely, accessible and accurate information’ fostering 
‘transparency’, 
as set out in s 195(1)(a), (b), (d), (f) and (g). In terms of the principle of 
legality SARS cannot act ultra vires its empowering provision in ss 74A 
and 74B meaning compliance with the jurisdictional facts and all its 
constitutional obligations in ss 41(1) and 237 of the Constitution; 
o SARS has transgressed s 237 of the Constitution, and thereby the principle 
of legality by ignoring the provisions that state ‘all  constitutional 
obligations must be performed diligently and without delay’; 
o SARS has transgressed its legitimate expectations created in accordance 
with the analysis in section 3.6: Legitimate Expectations in this thesis. 
 
In conclusion, if a taxpayer can aver what is set out above, as substantiated with the 
relevant facts, ‘a reasonable and acceptable explanation for his default’ to the demands of 
SARS will be met; the taxpayer will be able to demonstrate a prima facie ‘prospect of 
success’ in respect of ‘the merits’ the taxpayer relies upon as ‘a bona fide’ defence;and 
the ‘just cause’ shown. It is not required for the taxpayer to rely on an excuse sanctioned 
by rules of law, such as matters of privilege, compellability and admissibility. As a result 
the taxpayer will successfully be entitled to raise the ‘just cause’ defence in terms of s 
75(1)(b) to an attempt by SARS to enforce its demands through criminal sanction, and s 
75 of the Income Tax Act.  
 
The averments set out above will apply equally in any review application brought by 
taxpayers against the unconstitutional and ‘invalid’ conduct of. What remains available to 





  122 
 
 
  123 
CHAPTER 4 
 
SECTION 195(1) OF THE CONSTITUTION AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 
DUTIES WITH REFERENCE TO SECTIONS 74A AND 74B  
__________________________________________________________ 
  
4.1 INTRODUCTION TO SECTION 195(1), PAJA 
 AND THE PRINCIPLE OF LEGALITY 124 
4.2 THE DUTIES OF SARS EMANATING FROM SECTION  
 195(1) OF THE CONSTITUTION 126 
 4.2.1 Introduction 126 
 4.2.2 What are the democratic values referred to in s 195(1)? 128 
 4.2.3 High standard of professional ethics 132 
 4.2.4 Services must be provided impartially, fairly, equitably 
  and without bias 141 
 4.2.5 Public administration must be accountable  143 
 4.2.6 Transparency must be fostered 147 




  124 
4.1 INTRODUCTION TO SECTION 195(1), PAJA AND THE PRINCIPLE OF 
LEGALITY 
 
Now that the Constitutional Court in the Bato Star Fishing case1 has held that the cause 
of action for judicial review ordinarily arises from PAJA and not the common law,2 the 
starting point to review any unconstitutional and invalid conduct by SARS in terms of 
ss 74A and 74B would be in terms of ss 6, 7 and 8, applying one or more of the codified 
grounds of review specified in s 6(2) of PAJA, as set out in section 5.5.6 below. 
Furthermore, to the extent that a review application is based on the principle of legality3 
(because the decision by SARS is held not to fall within the definition of ‘administrative 
action’ in PAJA) the codified grounds, it would be submitted in a review application to 
the High Court, should be applied to inform the grounds of review of the 
unconstitutional and invalid public power exercised by SARS in terms of s 2 of the 
Constitution. Hoexter, in her second edition of Administrative Law in South Africa4 
draws the conclusion that the constitutional principle of legality, in the past few years 
leading into 2012, has developed not only to incorporate reviewing the lawfulness and 
reasonableness of the exercise of public power, but that the basis of a principle of 
legality transgression review now also extends to lack of procedural fairness, and 
arguably failure to provide reasons in appropriate circumstances. 
 
The grounds for review would be applied to uphold the constitutional duties and 
obligations placed upon SARS in terms of s 195(1) of the Constitution. Section 195(1) 
is also arguably not subject to any constitutional limitation in terms of s 36 of the 
Constitution, because the provisions in s 195(1) fall outside the Bill of Rights. Section 
237 of the Constitution also takes care of the fact that they must carry out their 
constitutional duties and obligations. The conduct by SARS in the form of a decision 
can be reviewed in court. However, there are other limitations. In terms of Chirwa v 
Transnet Limited and Others5 the Constitutional Court has held that the provisions of s 
195(1) of the Constitution do not create justiciable rights such as those in the Bill of 
                                               
1Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism and Others 2004 (4) SA 490 (CC) at 
para’s [22] – [25]. 
2 See also generally De Ville J Judicial Review of Administrative Action in South Africa (2003) Juta at 401; Currie I & 
Klaaren J The Promotion of Administrative Justice Act Benchbook (2001) SiberInk at para 7.2. 
3 Hoexter (2012) at pages 121-5. 
4Ibid. 
5Chirwa v Transnet Limited and Others 2008 (4) SA 367 (CC) (28 November 2007) at para’s [74] – [76], [146] and 
[195]. 
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Rights, but merely provide interpretational assistance as to the duties of administrators 
like SARS. This finding does not detract from the provisions that s 195(1) read with s 
237 imposes constitutional obligations on SARS, which point was not argued before the 
Constitutional Court. The finding of the Constitutional Court merely states that these 
constitutional obligations of themselves do not create lone standing justiciable rights. 
The opportunity then remains for taxpayers to challenge the failure by SARS to meet 
these actual constitutional obligations, as being conduct that is inconsistent with the 
Constitution, and therefore invalid.6 That then brings into play either the grounds of 
review in PAJA, or the constitutional principle of legality. 
 
In further support of this line of reasoning, O’Regan J’s judgment in Bato Star Fishing7 
echoes Kriegler’s judgment in Metcash,8 where he stated that nowhere is judicial review 
excluded in the ordinary course, and that ‘it has long been accepted that when the 
Commissioner exercises discretionary powers conferred upon him (or her) by statute, 
the exercise of the discretion constitutes administrative action which is reviewable in 
terms of the principles of administrative law.’ Kriegler J 9 cited as his authority the case 
of Contract Support Services (Pty) Ltd and Others v C SARS and Others10 and KBI v 
Transvaalse Suikerkorporasie Bpk.11  
 
The discretionary powers of ss 74A and 74B would be subject to Kriegler J’s 
statements,12 as left open for development in terms of the provisions of s 39 of the 
Constitution13 and O’Regan J’s ratio in the Bato Star Fishing.14 Support for this 
submission is also to be found in the Grey’s Marine case.15 The discretionary powers of 
SARS in terms of ss 74A and 74B are subject to review where it can be shown that the 
conduct of SARS transgresses its constitutional obligations: ss 1(c), 33, 41(1), 195(1) 
                                               
6 For insight into this reasoning see section 1.4 infra and the anaysis of Glenister v President of the RSA and Others 
2011 (3) SA 347 (CC). 
7Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism and Others 2004 (4) SA 490 (CC) at 
paras [22] – [25]. 
8 2001(1) SA 1109 (CC) at page 1134 at paras [33] and [40]. 
9Metcash Trading Limited v C SARS and Another 2001(1) SA 1109 (CC) at page 1134. 
10 1999 (3) SA 1133 (W) at pages 1144 –5. 
11 1985 (2) SA 668 (T) at para’s 67I I and 671 E-F. 
12Metcash Trading Limited v C SARS and Another 2001(1) SA 1109 (CC) at  page 1134. 
13Section 39. Interpretation of Bill of Rights ‘When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court…must promote the 
values…(in the Constitution)…must consider international law; and…may consider foreign law.’. 
14Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism and Others 2004 (4) SA 490 (CC) at 
para’s [22]-[26] and [45]. 
15Grey’s Marine Hout Bay (Pty) Ltd and Othersv Minister of Public Works and Others 2005 (6) SA 313 (SCA) at 
para’s [19]-[43]. 
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and 237 of the Constitution. Depending upon the facts of each case, such transgressions 
by SARS would be conduct that is invalid. 
 
Such a review application takes place in terms of ss 6, 7 and 8, relying on the grounds of 
review in terms of s 6 of PAJA, or relying on the constitutional principle of legality, 
currently by way of a Rule 5316 application.17 
 





If SARS fails to exercise its discretion under ss 74A and 74B in accordance with the 
duties and responsibilities imposed upon it in the Constitution, it will fall foul of the 
following Constitutional Court dictum:18 
 
The exercise of all public power (which) must comply with the 
Constitution which is the supreme law and the doctrine of legality 
which is part of that law. 
 
It is clear from the Pharmaceutical case19 that all public power must comply with the 
Constitution, which includes the provisions of s 195(1).20 
 
The duties and constitutional obligations21 emanating from ss 41(1), 195(1) and 237 of 
the Constitution, quoted in their proper context, are as follows: 
 
                                               
16 Rule 53, Uniform Rules of Court, GNR 48 of 12 January 1965, made under s 43(2)(a) of the Supreme Court Act  59 
of 1959, hereinafter referred to as ‘Rule 53’. 
17As discussed and analysed in Chapter 5: Judicial Review with reference to ss 74A and 74B. 
18Pharmaceutical Society of SA and Others v Minister of Health and Another [2005] 1 All SA 196 (C) at para [20]. 
19Ibid. 
20This is and supported by what the Constitutional Court and Supreme Court of Appeal have held in the Bato Star 
Fishing 2004 (4) SA 490 (CC) and in Grey’s Marine Hout Bay (Pty) Ltd and Others v Minister of Public Works and 
Others2005 (6) SA 313 (SCA). 
21Premier, Western Cape v President of the Republic of South Africa 1999 (3) SA 657 (CC) at para [44];  The 
Permanent Secretary, Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape Provincial Government and Ano v Ngxuza and Others 
2001 (4) SA 1154 (SCA) at para [15] footnote 23;  Reuters Group Plc and Others v Viljoen NO and Others 2001 (2) 
SACR 519 (C) at para [46]; Carephone (Pty) Ltd v Marcus NO and Others 1999 (3) SA 504 (LAC). 
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Principles of co-operative government and intergovernmental 
relations 
 
41.(1) All spheres of government and all organs of state within 
each sphere must – 
… 
provide effective, transparent, accountable and coherent 
government for the Republic as a whole; 
 
(d) be loyal to the Constitution, the Republic and its people; 
… 
(a)  not assume any power or function except those conferred on 
them in terms of the Constitution; 
… 
Basic values and principles governing public administration 
 
195 (1)  Public administration must be governed by the democratic 
values and principles enshrined in the Constitution, including the 
following principles: 
 
(a) A high standard of professional ethics must be promoted and 
maintained. 
… 
(d) Services must be provided impartially, fairly, equitably and 
without bias. 
… 
(f) Public administration must be accountable. 
 
(g) Transparency must be fostered … 
… 
(2) The above principles apply to - 
… 
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(b) organs of State …22 
 
Diligent performance of obligations  
 
237. All constitutional obligations must be performed 






‘organ of state’ means – 
… 
(b) any other functionary or institution – 
… 
(ii) exercising a public power or performing a public function in 
terms of any legislation…23. (Emphasis supplied) 
 
These principles of collegiality and professionalism, impartiality, fairness, an absence of 
bias, and accountability and transparency underpin these duties (constitutional 
obligations) are repeated in s 4(2) of the SARS Act, emphasising their direct applicability 
to SARS. 
 
What follows is an analysis of the administrative law principles that inform the relevant 
provisions and principles set out in s 195(1) of the Constitution. 
 
4.2.2 What are the democratic values and principles referred to in s 195(1)? 
 
This sub-heading reflects the opening clause of s 195(1) of the Constitution, which does 
not limit the duties of SARS to ‘democratic values and principles enshrined in the 
Constitution’ as set out in s 195(1), but emphasises these together with the other 
                                               
22 Such as SARS. 
23 Section 4(2) of the SARS Act. 
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democratic values and principles enshrined in the rest of the Constitution: ss 1(c), 33, 
41(1) and 237.  
 
Much has been written in this thesis, in the context of SARS as a functionary, about these 
constitutional values and principles as they apply to a functionary exercising public 
power. What remains to be done now is an analysis of the duties of SARS under s 195(1) 
of the Constitution, and a demonstration of how these duties accord with their 
constitutional obligations. 
 
Section 195(1) sets out the requirements for good public administration. The SARS Act, 
as already noted above, also makes specific reference to s 195 of the Constitution in s 4 
(2): 
 
 4. FUNCTIONS 
… 
(2) SARS must perform its functions in the most cost efficient way 
and in accordance with the values and principles mentioned in s 
195 of the Constitution. (Emphasis supplied) 
 
The use of the word ‘must’ is peremptory and confirms the duties and obligations of 
SARS to adhere to the principles enshrined in the Constitution, including the rule of law 
in s 1(c) (including the principle of legality), s 33, s 41, and those listed in s 195(1), 
which together with s 237 of the Constitution and s 4(2) of the SARS Act, SARS are 
obliged to diligently perform without delay.   
 
In President of the Republic of South Africa and Others v South African Rugby Football 
Union and Others,24 the Constitutional Court stated that public administration is subject 
to constitutional controls, which entails: ‘establishing and maintaining an efficient, 
equitable and ethical public administration which respects fundamental rights and is 
accountable to the broader public… Chapter 10 of the Constitution, entitled ‘Public 
Administration’, sets out the values and principles that must govern public administration 
                                               
24 1999 (2) SA 14 (CC) at para’s [133]-[134]. 
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and states that these principles apply to administration in every sphere of government, 
organs of State and public enterprises.’ 
 
In The Permanent Secretary, Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape Provincial 
Government and Another v Ngxuza and Others25 it was held that the Constitution 
‘commands all organs of State to be loyal to the Constitution (as stated in s 41(1)(d)) and 
requires that public administration be conducted on the basis that ‘people’s needs must be 
responded to’ (s 195(1)(e))’.  It is the responsibility of the courts to safeguard any misuse 
of the law. 
 
Taxpayers’ needs must be responded to, including: a high standard of professional ethics 
being displayed; services being provided impartially, fairly, equitably and without bias; 
public administration being accountable; and transparency being fostered by providing 
the public with timely, accessible and accurate information. Furthermore, it is the 
responsibility of the courts to uphold these constitutional obligations.  
 
In Reuters Group Plc and Others v Viljoen NO and Others,26 the court stated the 
following: 
 
[46] In the President of the Republic of South Africa & Others v The South 
African Football Union & Others (2000 (1) SA 1 (CC)), the Constitutional 
Court observed at 62 paragraph 138: 
 
‘Public administration…is subject to a variety of constitutional control.  
The Constitution is committed to establishing and maintaining an 
efficient, equitable and ethical public administration which represents 
fundamental rights and is accountable to the broader public. The 
importance of ensuring that the administration observes fundamental 
rights and acts both ethically and accountably should not be 
understated.’ ...(Emphasis supplied) 
 
                                               
25Permanent Secretary, Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape Provincial Government v Ngxuza 2001 10 BCLR 1039 
(SCA) at para [15]. 
26 2001 (2) SACR 519 (C) at para [46]. 
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The reference to public administration acting both ethically and accountably is once again 
a reference by the courts to the obligations imposed on organs of state such as SARS.  
 
In Carephone (Pty) Ltd v Marcus NO and Others27 the Court held that any public 
institution created by the Constitution or by legislation finds it ultimate authority and 
competence in the Constitution and is subject to its provisions. If it involves the exercise 
of public power: ‘(i)t is also subject to the basic values and principles governing public 
administration (s 195(2)(b) of the Constitution)…In terms of s 195(1)(d) of the 
Constitution the service provided to the parties by the Commissioner must also be 
impartial, fair, equitable and unbiased.’ 
 
SARS, like the Commission in Carephone,28 finds its ultimate authority and competence 
in the Constitution, and is subject to its provisions including the provisions of s 195(1) of 
the Constitution where the service provided by SARS to the taxpayer must be impartial, 
fair, equitable and unbiased. 
 
Finally, in Democratic Alliance and Others v Acting National Director of Public 
Prosecutions and Others29 the Supreme Court of Appeal held: 
[58] …Chapter 4 of the Constitution deals with co-operative government 
and dictates that all spheres of government must adhere to constitutional 
principles in this regard and must conduct their activities within 
constitutional parameters.  
 (Emphasis supplied) 
 
The excerpt from the dictum in the Democratic Alliance case is significant in supporting 
the submission that all spheres of government (including organs of state such as SARS) 
must comply with the provisions of Chapter 4 of the Constitution, which includes being 
loyal to the Constitution and not assuming powers or functions except those conferred by 
them in terms of the Constitution (s 41(1)). Read with the basic values and principles that 
                                               
27 1999 (3) SA 504 (LAC) at para’s [9] – [14]; See also the authorities quoted: cf Executive Council, Western Cape 
Legislature, and Others v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others 1995 (4) SA 877 (CC) (1995 (10) 
BCLR 1289) at para [62];  President of the Republic of South Africa and Another v Hugo 1997 (4) SA 1 (CC) (1996 (6) 
BCLR 708) at para’s [11] and [28]. 
28Ibid. 
29 2012 (3) SA 486 (SCA) at para [58]. 
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Public Administration must comply with as set out in s 195(1), it is submitted that these 
constitutional principles apply to SARS and the exercise of its powers in terms of ss 74A 
and 74B. These constitutional obligations create duties SARS that SARS cannot ignore. 
These constitutional principles, and obligations, form part of the cornerstone of the rule 
of law in s 1(c) of the Constitution, and so form part of the constitutional principle of 
legality. Failure to comply diligently and without delay with these constitutional 
principles, and obligations, would be conduct that is reviewable in the High Courts – 
whether that conduct is regarded as ‘administrative action’ in terms of PAJA, or not. 
 
4.2.3 High Standard of Professional Ethics 
 
Section 195(1)(a) of the Constitution30 reads: 
 
195 (1) Public administration must be governed by the democratic values 
and principles enshrined in the Constitution, including the following : 
(a) A high standard of professional ethics must be promoted and 
maintained. (Emphasis supplied) 
 
What are professional ethics?31 In the absence of direct authority in any defining 
provisions in the Constitution, a dearth of case law, and a lack of legal academic writings 
on the subject, it is necessary to establish what is meant by this term in similar or 
analogous circumstances. 
 
The International Ethics Standards Board of Accountants (IESBA) has developed the 
Code of Ethics for Professional Accountants (the Code).32 Section 110 dealing with 
integrity, requires professional accountants to be straightforward, honest, dealing fairly 
and with truthfulness. Section 120 dealing with objectivity imposes an obligation on all 
                                               
30 To be read in conjunction with the constitutional obligations placed on organs of state such as SARS in terms of s 
41(1) of the Constitution: ‘…all organs of state…must…provide effective, transparent, accountable and coherent 
government…be loyal to the Constitution…not assume any power or function except those conferred on them in terms 
of the Constitution…’. 
31Generally see: Handbook of the Code of Ethics for Professional Accountants, 2012 edition, International Federation 
of Accountants (IFAC): ‘This publication(s)..mission is to serve the public interest by: contributing to the development, 
adoption and implementation of high-quality international standards and guidance; contributing to the development of 
strong professional accountancy organizations and accounting firms, and to high-quality practices by professional 
accountants; promoting the value of professional accountants worldwide; speaking out on public interest issues where 
the accountancy profession’s expertise is most relevant.’;  www.ethicsboard.org (last accessed 31 March 2013). 
32Op. cit. the Handbook of the Code of Ethics for Professional Accountants, 2012 edition, International Federation of 
Accountants (IFAC), www.ethicsboard.org (last accessed 31 March 2013), at pages 17-24. 
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professional accountants not to compromise their professional and business judgment 
because of bias, conflict of interest or the undue influence of others. Section 130 dealing 
with professional competence and due care, requires all professional accountants to act 
diligently in accordance with applicable technical and professional standards. Section 140 
dealing with professional behaviour, states that professional accountants must comply 
with relevant laws and regulations weighing all the specific facts and circumstances 
available.  
 
These international benchmark professional rules hold accord with the SARS Code of 
Conduct analysed in 3.6 above and sections 4.2.4 and 4.2.5 below (read with the SARS 
Internal Audit Manual discussed in section 3.2 above) and assists to inform the meaning 
of ‘a high standard of professional ethics’ that must be promoted and maintained by 
SARS. 
 
The Oxford English Dictionary33 defines ethics as: 
 
…  
b. The moral principles by which a person is guided … c. The rules of 
conduct recognised in certain associations or departments of human life 
… (Emphasis supplied) 
 
Moral is defined in the Oxford English Dictionary34 as: 
 
…of or pertaining to the distinction between right and wrong…4. Moral 
law:  the body of requirements in conformity to which right or virtuous 
action consists…opposed to ‘positive’ or ‘instituted’ laws, the obligation 
of which depends solely on the fact that they have been imposed by a 
rightful authority…7. Pertaining to, affecting, or operating on the 
character of conduct, as distinguished from the intellectual or physical 
nature of human beings… (Emphasis supplied) 
 
                                               
33The Compact Edition of the Oxford Dictionary (1971) Oxford University Pressat page 312. 
34Ibid. at page 288. 
 
  134 
Hammer, the author of Misconduct in Science:  Do Scientists need a Professional code of 
Ethics?,35 makes the point that a professional code of conduct will show all that 
professionals are concerned with proper conduct, human affairs, beliefs and perspectives, 
just as others in society. Although administrators such as SARS have an even greater 
responsibility towards taxpayers in light of their constitutional obligations, the reference 
to a professional code of conduct as set out in the SARS Code of Conduct and the SARS 
Internal Audit Manual (analysed in section 3.2 and 3.6 above, and 4.2.4 and 4.2.5 below) 
become an important tools to benchmark the conduct displayed by SARS officials 
towards taxpayers in an inquiry and audit situation, especially when read in the light of 
the IESBA Code referred to above. Non compliance with all these guidelines would be 
indicative of behaviour that is not of a high professional standard. 
 
In relation to other professions,36 it has been written that professional ethics refer not only 
to a basic duty of honesty, of doing what is right, but also to collegiality towards each 
other. This latter quality requires respect for the opinion of others, respect for the rights of 
others, the refusal to spread unfounded accusations or rumours about each other, 
commitment to discussing differences openly and honestly, the adoption of a high 
standard of fairness, and the upholding of the dignity of others. 
 
In Kekana v Society of Advocates of South Africa,37 the Supreme Court of Appeal had the 
following to say about a high standard of professional ethics: 
 
The preservation of a high standard of professional ethics having thus 
been left almost entirely in the hands of individual practitioners, it stands 
to reason, firstly, that absolute personal integrity and scrupulous honesty 
are demanded of each of them and, secondly, that a practitioner who lacks 
these qualities cannot be expected to play his part. (Emphasis supplied) 
 
SARS, as an organ of state, must promote and maintain a high standard of professional 
ethics as contemplated in s 195(1)(a) of the Constitution when exercising its discretion in 
                                               
35http://www.csu.edu.au/learning/eis/www_ethx.html,1 (last accessed June 2005). 
36www.arg.org/Publications/other%20Pubs/EthicsStatement.htmlOctober 18 1988 (last accessed June 2005). 
37 1998 (4) SA 649 (SCA). 
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terms of ss 74A and 74B.  The courts have held38 that organs of state such as SARS 
(when, exercising its discretion under ss 74A and 74B) are obligated to comply with the 
provision of promoting and maintaining a high standard of professional ethics. This 
according to the analysis above means: a basic duty of honesty, doing what is right, 
collegiality towards taxpayers; respect for the opinion of taxpayers; respect for the rights 
of taxpayers; the refusal to spread unfounded accusations or rumours about taxpayers 
(including conduct supportive of such a negative outcome); commitment to discussing 
differences openly and honestly; adopting a high standard of fairness; and upholding the 
dignity of taxpayers .  
 
In the build-up to Metcash,39 the Taxgram40 published an advertisement that illustrated 
the taxpayer’s frustrations, ‘accusing Revenue of high-handed, bullying tactics during the 
investigation’.  A section of the advertisement read: 
 
Metro abhors the high-handed and bullying tactics used by SARS … and 
feels that the commission arrangements existing between SARS and their 
investigators have given rise to the acts of SARS, and that SARS have 
failed to demonstrate the high standard of professional ethics or impartial, 
fair and equitable service, expected of a public administration … . 
(Emphasis supplied) 
 
In response, SARS issued a Media Release,41 part of which stated: 
                                               
38In the President of the Republic of South Africa & Others v South African Football Rugby Union & Others1999 (2) 
SA 14 (CC) at para [133], the Constitutional Court observed that: ‘Public administration … is subject to a variety of 
constitutional controls … [and] … The importance of ensuring that the administration observe fundamental rights and 
acts both ethically and accountably should not be understated.’ (Emphasis supplied); In Barkhuizen NO v Independent 
Communications Authority of South Africa and Another[2001] JOL 8458 (E) at para [19]the Court held: ‘… [a]  high 
standard of professional ethics must be promoted and maintained (s 195(1)(a)) …’. (Emphasis supplied); In Mpande 
Foodliner CC v Commissioner for South African Revenue Service and Others, 2000(4) SA 1048 (T) at para [46] Patel A 
J stated: ‘… In the circumstances, the fiscus owes a legal duty to the general body of taxpayers to act fairly when 
deploying its discretionary powers which are subject to the requirements of good management, namely by promoting 
and maintaining a high standard of professional ethics, efficient, economic and effective use of resources, providing a 
service that is impartial, fair, equitable and without bias as well as responding to needs and fostering transparency by 
providing the public with timely, accessible and accurate information (ss 195(1)(a),(b),(d),(e) and (g) of the 
Constitution), thereby ensuring that there are no favourites and no sacrificial victims.’; see generally Inland Revenue 
Commissioners v National Federation of Self-Employed and Small Business Ltd [1981] 2 All ER 93 at 112-13; Preston 
v Inland Revenue Commissioners [1952] 2 All ER 327 at page 339;  F & I Services Ltd v Custom and Excise 
Commissioners [2000] STC 364 (QB) at page 377; Income Tax Case 1674 2000 SATC 116 (ZA)).’ (Emphasis 
supplied) 
39Metcash Trading Limited v C SARS and Another2001(1) SA 1109 (CC). 
40Metro Cash, SARS and the laws (1999) Taxgram Juta October, at page 1. 
41 SARS Media Release No 22 of 1999 September; and Metro Cash, SARS and the law (1999) Taxgram Juta October, at 
page 2. 
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… SARS reiterates its open door policy for purposes of discussions with 
any taxpayer. It is the stated policy of SARS to be accessible to taxpayers 
and it invites frank discussions between it and taxpayers at any time … 
 
In the same Taxgram article42 Pierre du Toit, states: 
 
The overall job of revenue administration is not to get in the money at all 
costs; it is to administer our tax laws with efficiency and dispassionate 
objectivity. That involves both collection from, and protection for, the 
taxpayer. (Emphasis supplied) 
 
This sentiment is echoed in the stance taken by Professor Reynolds in A lawyer’s 
conscience43 when commenting on ethics and the legal profession: 
 
The personal attributes and moral standards required of the attorney are 
high. C.H. van Zyl put them as follows in his The Judicial Practice of 
South Africa 14 ed. (1931) 33: 
 
‘He must manifest in all business matters an inflexible regard for the 
truth; there must be a vigorous accuracy in minutiae, a high sense of 
honour and incorruptible integrity.’ 
 
It must be stated at the outset that most lawyers meet these standards, and 
are properly described as men of honour, dignity and integrity. As so often 
happens, however, it is the few ‘rotten apples that spoil the barrel’. 
(Emphasis supplied) 
 
One of the ‘rotten apples’ and, as Prof. Reynolds states, ‘possibly the most common one 
relates to matters monetary’.44 He states: 
 
                                               
42Metro Cash, SARS and the law (1999) Taxgram Juta October. 
43 Reynolds D A A Lawyer’s Conscience South African Law Journal (1993) 10 at page 153. 
44Ibid. at page 155. 
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But this aspect should, of course, never be elevated to the extent that his 
integrity – in the full sense of the word – and the ideals of professional 
service give way to the avid acquisition of a ‘heavy purse’. 
 
The words of Reynolds45 quoted above mirror the complaint in the press made by Metro 
Cash46 in respect to the commission arrangements between SARS and its investigators, 
giving rise to actions where SARS failed to demonstrate a high standard of professional 
ethics.  SARS, in compliance with its fundamental duties under the Constitution, will 
have to be mindful not to be seen to be doing this, especially in the more precise 
transgression of financial bias.47 
 
In the Third Interim Katz Commission Report, released in December 1995,48 the 
Commission recommended a charter of taxpayers’ rights.  SARS complied with this  by 
publishing on 4 December 199749 the first ‘Client Charter’50 (now replaced by Code of 
Conduct published by SARS)51: 
 
… containing thirteen points setting out what taxpayers are ‘entitled to 
expect’ from the SARS, three points stating what taxpayers can do if they 
‘are not satisfied’, and four points listing taxpayers’ reciprocal obligations 
towards the SARS. 
 
The accompanying media release52 stated that: 
 
…the Charter ‘is a commitment to the taxpaying public that SARS aims to 
deliver a professional, effective and efficient client service’. (Emphasis 
supplied) 
 
This is a restatement of the duties of SARS under ss 41(1) and 195(1) of the Constitution.  
                                               
45Ibid. 
46 Metro Cash, SARS and the law (1999) Taxgram Juta October, at page 1. 
47 Hoexter C & Lyster R The New Constitutional & Administrative Law (2002) Juta, at page 193; Rose v Johannesburg 
Local Road Transportation Board 1947 (4) SA 272 (W). 
48 South Africa.1995.Third Interim Report of the Commission of Inquiry into certain aspects of the Tax Structure of 
South Africa. Pretoria: Government Printers. Chairperson: M. Katz. 
49 Williams R C The South African Revenue Service ‘Client Charter’ South African Law Journal (1998) 115(3) at 527. 
50Ibid. 
51 See sections 3.6 supra and 4.2.4 and 4.2.5 infra. 
52Ibid at page 528. 
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As Prof. Williams puts it53 referring to the Code of Conduct (in its prior format to the one 
currently ‘under review’): 
 
The Charter is headed ‘Your rights and obligations’ … [and] … ‘You are 
entitled to expect the SARS …’.  In other words, what the Charter 
professes to articulate are legitimate expectations and not enforceable 
rights. 
 
The original Code of Conduct coincided with the release of the Batho Pele – People First:  
White Paper on Transforming Public Service Delivery,54 with its opening statement: 
 
…a guiding principle of the public service in South Africa will be that of 
service to the people … 
 
As explained by Beukes in The Constitutional Foundation of the Implementation and 
Interpretation of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000:55 
 
Batho Pele reflects the important message that the chief function of the 
public administration is to serve all the people of the country. In this sense 
it represents an affirmation of both s 195 and s 33. 
 
What is more, included in the ‘Revenue Handbooks, and internal memoranda’ referred to 
by the Katz Commission56 is, no doubt, the unpublished SARS Internal Audit Manual,57 
which provides clear guidelines to SARS officials on how to conduct itself in an inquiry 
                                               
53 Williams R C The South African Revenue Service ‘Client Charter’ South African Law Journal (1998) 115(3) at page 
530. 
54 South Africa.1997. Batho Pele – People First:  White Note on Transforming Public Service Delivery. Pretoria: 
Government Printers. 
55 C Lange et al (eds) The Right to Know Siberlnk 2004 at page 7. 
56 South Africa.1994. First Interim Report of the Katz Commission of Inquiry. Pretoria: Government Printer. 
57SARS Internal Audit Manual – Part 4:  The Audit Process; Williams R C et al Silke on Tax Administration (April 
2009) Lexis Nexis at para 8.17 generally. In Minister for Provincial and Local Government of the RSA v Unrecognised 
Traditional Leaders of the Limpopo Province, Sekhukhuneland [2005] 1 All SA 559 (SCA) the appeal court found in 
favour of the public member seeking a report upholding the right of access to information held by the State, read with 
sections 36 (the limitation clause) and 39(2) (obliging every court to promote “the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill 
of Rights” of the Constitution (Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs 2004 (7) BCLR 687 
(CC) followed)); In Scherer v Kelley (1978) 584 F.2d 170 where the United States of America Freedom of Information 
Act §552(a)(2)(C) requires agencies to make public administrative staff manuals and instructions to staff that affect 
members of the public. This is similar to provisions in the Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 of 2000. 
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and audit process.  This is of particular relevance to invoking the discretionary powers of 
SARS. The SARS Internal Audit Manual58 indicates clearly the ‘high standard of 
professional ethics’ that SARS must maintain and promote and which are also in line with 
the Batho Pele principles. 
 
In determining the duties of SARS in conforming to the principle of maintaining and 
promoting a high standard of ethics, it is essential to determine the rules of conduct 
applicable to SARS in executing its discretionary powers under ss 74A and 74B. It 
follows that one of the key areas in determining the accepted standards of conduct comes 
from SARS’ own internal memoranda, such as the SARS Internal Audit Manual. Owing 
to the fact that the high standard of professional ethics is based on doing right as opposed 
to wrong, s 195(1)(a) of the Constitution applies to virtually all SARS’ duties. 
 
Some of those duties contained in the SARS Internal Audit Manual are relevant to the 
duty of promoting and maintaining, inter alia, high standards of professional ethics. The 
opening section of these SARS guidelines refers to a high standard of professional 
ethics:59 
 
In order to carry out his tasks properly the auditor has to make 
professionally and technically sound decisions on the nature and scope of 
the audit… 
 
From a careful perusal of the SARS Internal Audit Manual, it becomes apparent that 
taxpayers need not tolerate non-compliance by SARS with its constitutional duty to 
maintain and promote a high standard of ethics in executing its functions as tax 
administrator. Any such non-compliance will amount to unconstitutional and ‘invalid’ 
conduct.   
 
This is reiterated in the Code of Conduct: 
 
2.6 In dealing with you, we will endeavor to: Respect, protect, promote 
and fulfill your constitutional rights; Act professionally and in accordance 
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with a high standard of professional ethics; Treat you impartially, fairly, 
equitably and without bias; …Be accountable; Provide you with timely, 
accessible and accurate information and feedback; Treat you with 
respect…; (Emphasis supplied) 
    
Conduct of a high, professional, ethical standard would include: 
 
(a) honest conduct as a basic requirement (SARS should be able to show 
clearly that it has no ulterior purpose or motive and that it is merely 
dispassionately establishing whether one of the criteria in the 
definition of ‘for the purposes of the administration of this Act’ in s 
74 exists); 
(b) collegiality (where SARS will inform the taxpayer of its conclusions, 
with an explanation of the decisions to be taken. If the taxpayer 
disagrees, SARS will listen to the reasons and consider whether these 
call for an unbiased adjustment of the conclusion); 
(c) respect for taxpayers’ opinions; 
(d) respect for the rights and legitimate expectations of taxpayers; 
(e) no unfounded accusations or rumours about taxpayers (including 
conduct supportive of such a negative outcome); 
(f) commitment to discussing differences openly and honestly with 
taxpayers; 
(g) a high standard of fairness towards taxpayers; 
(h) upholding the dignity of taxpayers. 
 
Most of these requirements in the Code of Conduct and the SARS Internal Audit Manual 
are reinterated in the international benchmark of professional accountants ethical 
standards published by the IESBA Code referred to above. 
 
In conclusion, the display of a high standard of professional ethics by SARS in exercising 
any discretion under ss 74A and 74B means: 
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(a) displaying the highest degree of honesty and integrity towards 
taxpayers in executing its duties in exercising its decision under ss 74A 
and 74B; 
 
(b) showing objectivity towards any taxpayer submissions, and giving 
those submissions the appropriate respect and consideration, as opposed to 
merely processing such submissions in a rote fashion with only a show of 
objectivity and respect; 
 
(c) displaying the highest degree of collegiality towards taxpayers in 
conducting audits and reviews, being concerned with the facts of each 
particular case, rather than with the policies foisted upon it by SARS 
management; 
 
(d) showing a degree of fairness greater than that expected from the 
general public towards each other; 
 
(e) being bound by moral principles rather than strict adherence to the law. 
 
The Supreme Court of Appeal has held that ‘…investigatory proceedings, which have 
been recognised to be absolutely essential to achieve important policy objectives, are 
nevertheless subject to the constraint that the powers of investigation are not exercised in 
a vexatious, oppressive or unfair manner.’60 In the context of ss 74A and 74B, if the 
highest professional ethical standards are not displayed, as explained above, SARS will 
have breached one of its constitutional obligations, and their conduct is reviewable. 
Section 195(1)(a) is a lawful step that SARS is constitutionally obliged to take to ensure 
that a decision it takes falls within the scope of its legislated powers. 
 
4.2.4 Services must be provided impartially, fairly, equitably and without bias 
 
                                               
60Chairman of the Board on Tariffs and Trade and Others vs Brenko Inc and Others 64 SATC 130 at para’s [29] and 
[30]; cf Bernstein and Others v Bester and Others NNO 1996(2) SA 751 (CC) at para’s 584F-I; See also Gardener v 
East London Transitional Local Council and Others 1996(3) SA 99 (E) 116E-G. 
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Section 195(1)(d) states: ‘services must be provided impartially, fairly, equitably and 
without bias’. All of these issues must be read in the context of the discussions on 
lawfulness and procedural fairness61 in this thesis.   
 
The concept of impartiality with reference to ss 74A and 74B means that SARS must 
apply the provisions without favour or prejudice, and in an unbiased manner.62 
 
The reference to the word ‘equitably’ implies just and impartial conduct by SARS. Just 
conduct is covered by the analysis and discussions around lawfulness in administrative 
law, where SARS must adhere to the rule of law and comply with the jurisdictional 
facts63 of the empowering provision of ss 74A and 74B.   
 
Reference to the word ‘fairly’ brings procedural fairness into play, as analysed and 
discussed earlier64 in this thesis.   
 
Within the context of ss 74A and 74B, if any impartiality or bias is present when SARS 
exercises its discretion, or the discretion is exercised without complying with the 
jurisdictional facts or required procedural fairness, the discretion will be reviewable.  Any 
justification65 by SARS that non-compliance is excusable because the discretion is not 
‘administrative action’ as defined in PAJA, or is part of a multi-staged decision-making 
process which is not ‘ripe’ for review, will be contrary to the constitutional obligation 
that SARS must comply with in terms of s 195(1)(d). Furthermore s 195(1)(d) is not 
subject to the limitations clause in s 36 of the Constitution. 
 
The SARS Code of Conduct for the general taxpayer public to take note of, creates a 
legitimate expectation that SARS will do the following: 
                                               
61 See section 3.3: Lawfulness and 3.5: Procedural Fairness, supra. 
62 Marcus G J et al Bill of Rights Compendium Lexis Nexis at 1A.2; This would include application of a practice by 
SARS such as the letter of findings; Drs Du Buisson, Bruinette & Kramer Inc. v C:SARS Case No. 4595/02 in the High 
Court of the Transvaal Provincial Division, where SARS provided reasons to the taxpayer for the inquiry and audit after 
the taxpayer brought the application to set the audit aside. 
63 See section 3.3: Reasonableness and 3.3.2: Jurisdictional facts supra. 
64 See section 3.5: Procedural Fairness supra. 
65 SARS would have to tread carefully here in the light of decisions such as Nyambirai v Nssa & Another 1995 (2) ZLR 
1 (S) and De Freitas v Permanent Secretary of Agriculture, Fisheries, Lands and Housing 1998 3 LRC 62;Ferucci and 
Others v Commissioner for South African Revenue Service and Another 65 SATC 47 at pages 54-55; Premier of 
Mpumalanga and Another v Executive Committee of the Association of Governing Bodies of State-Aided Schools: 
Eastern Transvaal 1999 (2) BCLR151 (CC) at para [42]: ‘…no question of justification …can arise as the decision 
taken…did not constitute ‘a law of general application’ as required by that provision…’; Compare Registrar of Pension 
Funds and another v Angus NO and others [2007] 2 All SA 608 (SCA); US v McCarthy 514 F 2d 368. 
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2.1 Right to certainty and to be informed, assisted and heard…give you an 
opportunity to be prepared for, and assisted by a representative during a 
meeting regarding an audit or investigation by SARS; provide you with 
the outcome of an audit or investigation; provide you with the opportunity 
to respond to adverse audit or investigation findings 
… 
2.6 In dealing with you, we will endeavor to: Respect, protect, promote 
and fulfill your constitutional rights; Act professionally and in accordance 
with a high standard of professional ethics; Treat you impartially, fairly, 
equitably and without bias; …Be accountable; Provide you with timely, 
accessible and accurate information and feedback; Treat you with 
respect…; (Emphasis supplied) 
 
The duties placed on SARS in terms of s 195(1)(d) are clear and obvious and emphasized 
in its Code of Conduct. Any transgression of s 195(1)(d) and the legitimate expectation 
created in the Code of Conduct at sections 3.1 and 6.6 above would be inconsistent with 
the Constitution and ‘invalid’ conduct. 
 
Meeting budgets imposed on them by management motivates SARS assessors. As a 
result, it is quite plausible in theory that an inquiry and audit may be motivated by 
meeting a budget target. That does not of itself mean that the inquiry and audit is 
unlawful, but unless SARS follows strict procedures in executing its powers to engage the 
taxpayer, sufficient suspicion may exist to justify an accusation by the taxpayer that the 
inquiry and audit is motivated by an ulterior or irrelevant factor, in a biased manner such 
as an improper personal gain, as referred to in the Code of Conduct. Such conduct by 
SARS would be reviewable. 
 
4.2.5 Public administration must be accountable 
 
Section 195(1)(f) states that public administration must be accountable.66Accountability 
can also be described as the ‘concept of justifiability’.67 In Carephone (Pty) Ltd v Marcus 
                                               
66Transnet Ltd and another v SA Metal Machinery Co (Pty) Ltd [2006] 1 All SA 352 (SCA) at para [55]. 
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NO and Others,68 the Labour Appeal Court considered the meaning of justifiability. It 
introduces a requirement of rationality in the merit or outcome of the administrative 
decision. When the Constitution requires administrative action to be justifiable it seeks to 
give expression to its fundamental values of accountability, responsiveness and openness. 
In determining justifiability, value judgements will have to be made which will, almost 
inevitably, involve the consideration of the ‘merits’ of the matter to determine whether 
the outcome is rationally justifiable. 
 
As suggested in Carephone (Pty) Ltd v Marcus NO and Others,69 the reviewer should ask 
the following question: 
 
Is there a rational objective basis justifying the connection made by the 
administrative decision-maker between the material properly available to 
him [or her] and the conclusion … eventually arrived at? 
 
Can SARS merely exercise the discretion in ss 74A and 74B in a vacuum, without at least 
some factual basis that is supported by one or more of the requirements set out in the 
definition of ‘the administration of this Act’ in s 74 of the Income Tax Act? This would 
be indicative of an unjustifiable and arbitrary decision. The jurisdictional facts of ss 74A 
and 74B, read with s 74, of the Income Tax Act require SARS to exercise its discretion 
with specific reference to one of more of the eight sub-sections set out in that definition. 
The practical manner in which SARS obtains the supporting facts to fulfil the 
jurisdictional facts, is set out in the SARS Internal Audit Manual.70 The legislature had a 
purpose when creating these provisions, and they were not merely inserted as sub-
sections that SARS could quote in support of its inquiry and audit, without at least some 
factual basis that placed SARS in the position to do so.71 The constitutional requirement 
                                                                                                                                            
67 Cheadle M H Davis D M  & Haysom N R L South African Constitutional Law: the Bill of Rights (2002) Butterworths 
at page 612.  
68 1998 (10) BCLR 1326 (LAC). 
69Ibid. at para’s 1337 F – G. 
70 The failure by SARS to follow its own internal guidelines without proper justification on its part would be indicative 
of unconstitutional and ‘invalid’ (lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair) conduct by SARS. 
71In the case of Nkondo & Gumede v Minister of Law and Order1986 (2) SA 756 (A) the Appellate Division held that 
the reiteration of the wording of the enabling legislation did not constitute reasons; Ferucci and Others v Commissioner 
for South African Revenue Service and Another65 SATC 47 at pages 56-7; Sachs v Minister of Justice 1934 AD 11; 
This is also affirmed in CSARS v Sprigg Investments 117CC t/a Global Investment 73 SATC 114 (SCA) at para’s [12] 
and [13] quoting with approval from Ansett Transport Industries (Operations) Pty Ltd and Another v Wraith and 
Others (1983) 48 ALR 500 that mere restating of the legislated provisions are not ‘adequate reasons’. 
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and duty placed upon SARS to be accountable in terms of s 195(1)(f) of the Constitution 
emphasises this fact. 
 
The Code of Conduct states: 
 
2.6 In dealing with you, we will endeavor to: Respect, protect, promote 
and fulfill your constitutional rights; Act professionally and in accordance 
with a high standard of professional ethics; Treat you impartially, fairly, 
equitably and without bias; …Be accountable; Provide you with timely, 
accessible and accurate information and feedback; Treat you with 
respect…; (Emphasis supplied) 
 
Some factual basis, matched to one of the requirements of the definition of ‘the 
administration of this Act’ in s 74, must exist to justify SARS’ decision to use its powers. 
This will ensure that the exercise of the discretion is lawful and reasonable. 
 
As stated by the late Professor Etienne Mureinik,72 the Constitution promotes a ‘culture 
of justification’, ‘a culture in which every exercise of power is expected to be justified; in 
which the leadership given by government rests on the cogency of the case offered in 
defence of its decisions, not the fear inspired by the force at its command. The new order 
must be a community built on persuasion, not coercion.’ 
 
Reasons given by SARS for exercising its discretion in ss 74A and 74B are important, as 
the inquiry and audit may in fact lead to revised assessments being raised against the 
taxpayer that will have a prejudicial effect on the taxpayer. Adequate reasons (which go 
to the root of accountability) must be given as held in the Supreme Court of Appeal case 
of Sprigg Investment.73 This requires that the decision maker (SARS) sets out its 
understanding of the relevant law, any findings of fact on which its conclusions depend 
(especially if those facts have been in dispute) and the reasoning process which led to 
                                               
72 Mureinik E A Bridge To Where? Introducing The Interim Bill of Rights (1994) South African Journal on Human 
Rights 10 at pages 31 and 32. 
73 See the discussion in section 2.5: Adequate Reasons supra. 
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those conclusions. SARS should do so in clear, unambiguous language, not in vague74 
generalities or the formal language of legislation. 
 
The letter of findings process introduced by SARS at the conclusion of the inquiry and 
audit is also aimed at addressing these requirements. However, in practice there are many 
instances where SARS does not apply the letter of findings process, especially towards 
smaller taxpayers. The opportunity for these taxpayers to question the findings of SARS 
before any prejudicial revised assessment is raised, is denied to them. Therefore it is 
necessary for taxpayers to question the proposed steps to be taken by SARS at the 
commencement of any inquiry and audit to ensure proper accountability on the part of 
SARS, and compliance with its Code of Conduct. 
SARS cannot expect taxpayers to seek justification for its reasons from a myriad of 
documents and previous communications where such reasons cannot reasonably be 
determined from those communications.75 Taxpayers cannot be expected to discover for 
themselves from the previous ‘writing and elaborate discussions’ what SARS’ reasons 
might be. Moreover, even if the correspondence contains adequate reasons, SARS should 
identify these reasons in the correspondence.76 
 
As already stated, the issue of accountability in s 195(1)(f) is fundamental to procedural 
fairness.  Without the ‘fair’ participation of the taxpayer in the process leading to the 
exercise of its discretion to conduct an inquiry or audit, it would be difficult for SARS to 
justify the connection between the available information and the conclusion it arrives at to 
proceed with the inquiry or audit, unless prior research has been conducted by SARS into 
the tax affairs of the taxpayer. If this were the case, there would be few justifiable reasons 
for SARS not to share these facts with the taxpayer, and to receive the appropriate 
                                               
74Ibid.; Powell NO and Others v Van Der Merwe and Others 2005 (5) SA 62 (SCA) at page 73 where search and 
seizure warrants were struck down as too broad and unjustifiably violated the appellant’s right to privacy; For 
comparative law from the United States of America:US v Williams 337 F Supp 1114 (quoted from the headnote): where 
the District Court in New York held the ‘enforcement …to compel production of message slips held by taxpayer's 
telephone answering service would have provided government with names of persons who were not patients of taxpayer 
at all, or who were not patients during relevant years, and … was overbroad and out of proportion to ends sought, and 
as such not entitled to enforcement’; Local 174 International Brotherhood of Teamsters v US, 240 F.2d 387 where 
‘agents had burden to show that demand was reasonable under all circumstances and to prove that books and records 
were relevant or material to tax liability of taxpayer …and the taxpayer… possessed books or records containing items 
relating to taxpayer's business.’ (Emphasis supplied); US v Newman 441 F.2d 170; US v Coopers and Lybrand F Supp 
942;  Hubner v Tucker 245 F.2d 35; First National Bank of Mobile v US 160 F.2d 532. 
75Rean International Supply Co (Pty) Ltd v Mpumalanga Gaming Board 1998 (8) BCLR 918.  
76See section 2.5: Adequate Reasons supra. 
 
  147 
response (as accountability and transparency demands). The fair participation of the 
taxpayer in the process started by ss 74A and 74Bis equally subject to the constitutional 
obligations imposed on SARS. As already stated, these constitutional obligations ins 
195(1) (read with s 41(1) of the Constitution) are not subject to any justification as 
envisaged in s 36 of the Constitution. 
 
In arriving at the decision to inquire about and audit in an accountable manner, SARS 
will have to show that it has adequate reasons which are informative, set out the decision, 
contain the findings on material questions of fact and law, refer to any relevant evidence 
and provide the real reasons for the decision to require the taxpayer to furnish SARS with 
information, documents or things – not simply restate the provisions of s 74 of the 
Income Tax Act. Where SARS does not comply with s 195(1)(f), aggrieved taxpayers 
will have the remedy of reviewing the unconstitutional and ‘invalid’ conduct in terms of s 
6, 7 and 8 of PAJA, or, alternatively, the constitutional principle of legality. 
 
4.2.6 Transparency must be fostered 
 
Section 195(1)(g) of the Constitution states: ‘Transparency must be fostered by providing 
the public with timely, accessible and accurate information…’.77 This obligation, read 
with its incorporation into s 4(2) of the SARS Act, also places a constitutional obligation 
on SARS where the taxpayer has a right to compel performance by SARS.  
 
In the interim Katz Commission Report,78 the Commission recommended: 
 
… that the Revenue Handbooks, and internal memoranda used by 
assessors in their decision-making process be formulated into documents 
which are accessible to the taxpaying community and accordingly made 
public. Furthermore, attention must be given … that in general an 
awareness on the part of Inland Revenue is created which results in 
compliance with the Constitution. 
                                               
77Transnet Ltd and another v SA Metal Machinery Co (Pty) Ltd [2006] 1 All SA 352 (SCA) at para [55] where the court 
held that constitutional obligations were central including transparency and accountability in terms of ss 195(1)(f) and 
(g). 
78 Interim Report of the Commission of Inquiry into certain aspects of the Tax structure of South Africa, 18 November 
1994; 77 at para 6.3.36. 
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The publication of one such Revenue Handbook is the SARS Income Tax Practice 
Manual.79 SARS has conceded in the past that it is bound by its contents.80 This has also 
been adjudicated upon by the Courts.81 In ITC 1682 Davis J stated:82 
 
It is clear that the Constitution … has been interpreted by the 
Constitutional Court in support of a recognition that there are cases where 
the concept of a legitimate expectation conferring a right to substantive 
relief may be recognised. There is considerable merit in the recognition of 
such a doctrine in a case such as the present dispute, where Mr H of the 
Commissioner’s office acknowledged that the principle [of a salary 
sacrifice] applied in the circumstances of a similar nature and where a 
clear unequivocal statement appears in respondent’s own practice 
manual.(Emphasis supplied) 
 
In the preface to the SARS Income Tax Practice Manual it is stated: 
 
The creation of the South African Revenue Service facilitated the release 
of its practice in the interests of greater transparency and equity, in line 
with its new aims to be an improved, more efficient and user-friendly tax 
collecting authority. (Emphasis supplied) 
 
These references to transparency emphasise the constitutional obligation of SARS to be 
transparent.   
 
It is for this reason that the SARS Internal Audit Manual should also be made available to 
taxpayers. The SARS Internal Audit Manual makes reference to the keeping of assessor 
records.83 The SARS constitutional obligation of transparency supports the fact that 
assessor records must be made available to the taxpayers on their request, and this will in 
turn throw light on some of the reasons why SARS is considering an investigation into 
                                               
79 Preiss, M, Silke J, & Zulman R H The Income Tax Practice Manual (November 2012), www.mylexisnexis.co.za. 
80 Ibid. B–Procedure Legitimate Expectations at para B26. 
81Ibid. 
82ITC 1682 62 SATC 380 at page 403. 
83 See section 3.2: The SARS Internal Audit Manual supra. 
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the affairs of the taxpayers in question. In support of this submission, the Code of 
Conductstates:‘2.6 In dealing with you, we will endeavor to: Respect, protect, promote 
and fulfill your constitutional rights; … Provide you with timely, accessible and accurate 
information and feedback…;’ (Emphasis supplied) 
 
Read together with the constitutional obligation of impartiality and unbiased conduct in s 
195(1)(d), failure by SARS to apply its ‘transparent’ and publically published 
undertakings in the SARS Income Tax Practice Manual and the Code of Conduct(read 
with the SARS Internal Audit Manual)consistently, will be reviewable in the context of an 
unconstitutional and ‘invalid’ ss 74A and 74B inquiry and audit.  
 
Should a review application be brought in terms of PAJA against SARS for such 
unconstitutional and ‘invalid’ conduct, SARS as an 'institution . . . exercising a public 
power or performing a public function in terms of any legislation'84that creates a record in 
the exercise of that power or performance of that function,85 is obliged, subject to certain 
limitations, to make the record available to an applicant’.86 At the commencement of 
Rule 53 review proceedings SARS will have to turn over its internal record to the 
taxpayer. This proves to be a good opportunity for a taxpayer to determine the level of 
compliance by SARS with its own internal inquiry and audit guideline, the SARS Internal 
Audit Manual, with an opportunity for the taxpayer to expose any unconstitutional 
conduct. This circumvents the complexities attempting to access such information by way 
of the Promotion of Access to Information Act87that falls outside the scope of this thesis.  
 
4.2.7 Limitations to s 195(1) 
 
Although s 195(1) of the Constitution regulates Public Administration generally by 
imposing constitutional obligations upon organs of state such as SARS, the Constitutional 
Court has held that it does not give rise to justiciable rights. In Chirwa v Transnet Limited 
and Others88 the court held: 
                                               
84 Section 1(b)(ii) – the definition of  'public body' of PAJA. 
85 Section 8 of PAJA. 
86Mittal Steel South Africa Ltd (formerly Iscor Ltd) v Hlatshwayo 2007 (1) SA 66 (SCA). 
87 Act 2 of 2000. In Alliance Cash and Carry (Pty) Ltd v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service 2002 (1) SA 
789 (T) the court held that taxpayers can access information in terms of the Promotion of Access to Information Act 
from SARS; Croome B & Olivier L Tax Administration 2010 (Juta) at pages 158-72. 
882008 (4) SA 367 (CC) at para’s [74] – [76], [146] and [195]. 
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[76] Therefore although section 195 of the Constitution provides valuable 
interpretive assistance it does not found a right to bring an action. 
 
The court did not conduct a thorough analysis by arriving at this decision, and merely 
passed judgment that as an alternate justiciable right to bring the action, the applicant 
could not rely on the provisions of s 195. The court did not say that public administrators 
did not have to adhere to these constitutional obligations. This brings non-compliance by 
SARS within the realm of the constitutional principle of legality. 
 
In taking this line of reasoning further, if SARS fails to adhere to a constitutional 
obligation, it would be conduct inconsistent with the Constitution and invalid. The 
taxpayer would be entitled to approach the court for judicial review as contemplated in 
section 5.5.6 below in terms of s 172(1) if the Constitution to have the unconstitutional 
conduct declared invalid. With the proper factual motivation in line with the analysis 
provided in this thesis, the court would not be able to ignore this, and the unconstitutional 
and ‘invalid’ conduct would be reviewable, either in terms of ss 6(2), 7 and 8 of PAJA,89 
or in terms of the principle of legality,90 through a rule 53 application. 
 
In the recent Constitution Court decision Glenister v President of the Republic of South 
Africa and Others91 the Constitutional Court held that the High Court had jurisdiction to 
hear applications challenging the non-fulfilment of constitutional obligations such as ‘to 
act reasonably and accountably; to cultivate good human resource management; to 
respect international treaty obligations; … and to respect values enshrined in the Bill of 
Rights.’  This opens the possibility for taxpayers to approach the courts if SARS fail to 




                                               
89‘…the action is otherwise unconstitutional or unlawful’, s 6(2)(i) of PAJA. 
90 Which entails inter alia a basic level of rationality in SARS’ decision-making, that SARS should apply its mind 
properly in deciding whether and in what manner to exercise its discretionary investigative powers, and that SARS 
should exercise such powers only for the purposes they were conferred in compliance with its constitutional 
obligations; Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of SA & Another: In re Ex parte President of South Africa & 
Others 2000 (2) SA 674 (CC) at para’s [79]-[90]. 
912011 (3) SA 347 (CC) at para’s [13] and [22]. 
 
  151 
CHAPTER 5 
 




5.1 INTRODUCTION 152 
5.2 WHAT IS MEANT BY REVIEW 155 
5.3 THE APPLICABILITY OF OBJECTION AND APPEAL 158 
5.4 REVIEW APPLICATION DIRECTLY TO THE TAX COURT 160 
5.5 REVIEWING UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDUCT 164 
 5.5.1 Introduction 164 
 5.5.2 Sections 6, 7 and 8 of PAJA 165 
 5.5.3 Rule 53 of the Uniform Rules of Court 169 
 5.5.4 Save where any law otherwise provides 170 
 5.5.5 Show cause 171 
 5.5.6 The grounds of review 178 
 5.5.6.1 Introduction 178 
 5.5.6.2 Constitutionality of the inquiry and audit 181 
 5.5.6.3 Appropriate authority 183 
 5.5.6.4 Jurisdictional facts 184 
 5.5.6.5 Abuse of discretion 185 
 5.5.6.6 Reasonableness 187 
 5.5.6.7 Natural justice and Procedural fairness 188 
 5.5.6.8 Legitimate expectation 189 
 5.5.6.9 Constitutional obligations in terms of s 195(1) 190 
5.6 SUPPORT FOR REVIEW OF ss 74A and 74B 191 
5.7 PITFALLS IN BRINGING THE RULE 53 APPLICATION 194 
 
  152 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The access to courts under the auspices of the Constitution, through the process of review 
either in terms of ss 6, 7 and 8,1 or the constitutional principle of legality, in terms of a 
Rule 53 application,2 is the practical manifestation of a state of perfect freedom3 where 
any public power is subject to constitutional scrutiny. It is through the enlightened 
approach, expounded in this thesis, that the Constitution is used for the protection of 
taxpayers’ rights (when SARS uses its powers in terms of ss 74A and 74B), nurturing the 
development of constitutional law in the making of investigative decisions that will 
ultimately materially and adversely affect taxpayers, with a direct, external legal effect.  
In the words of Stu Woolman:4 
[B]efore one can engage in indirect application and the development of 
new rules of law in terms of s 39(2) [of the Constitution],5 one must first 
ascertain what the ambit is of the allegedly applicable constitutional 
provisions. Only when one has determined that ambit, and found that it 
does not speak to the issues raised by an ordinary rule of law, can one turn 
to the more open-ended invitation of s 39(2). 
 
It has been reasoned in this thesis that to apply the fundamental principles of s 33 in the 
Bill of Rights to the power of SARS in ss 74A and 74B, leads the taxpayer through the 
constricted provisions of PAJA, where the definition of ‘administrative action’ could be 
too restrictive to include decisions of this nature. However, that is not where the enquiry 
ends. The taxpayer is entitled to expect that SARS adheres to its constitutional 
                                               
1The Rules of Procedure for Judicial Review of Administrative Action released in GG 32622 of 9 October 2009 have 
not yet come into effect, after the original rules were subjected to Constitutional review in the North Gauteng Court and 
held back from promulgation as explained by Plasket C Administrative Law Annual Survey 2009 (Juta) at pages 1- 5. 
To date there are no rules of procedure in effect for judicial review of administrative action under PAJA, and therefore 
Rule 53 of the Uniform Rules of Court, GNR 48 of 12 January 1965 apply. 
2 Rule 53, Uniform Rules of Court, GNR 48 of 12 January 1965, made under s 43(2)(a) of the Supreme Court Act  59 
of 1959, hereinafter referred to as ‘Rule 53’. 
3 As envisaged in Locke J The second treatise of government (1953) NewYork: Liberal Arts Press at sect. 4. 
4 Woolman S The Amazing, Vanishing Bill of Rights South African Law Journal (2008)page 124 at  page 777. 
5 Section 39(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 108 of 1996 provides: ‘When interpreting any 
legislation, and when developing the common law or customary law, every court, tribunal or forum must promote the 
spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights.’ Section 173 of the Constitution provides: ‘The Constitutional Court, 
Supreme Court of Appeal and High Courts have the inherent power to protect and regulate their own process, and to 
develop the common law, taking into account the interests of justice.’ 
 
  153 
obligations in terms of ss 1(c), 33, 41(1), 195(1) and 237 of the Constitution. In theory, 
this line of reasoning concludes that the taxpayer has, at the very least, a review remedy 
through the constitutional principle of legality6 – entitling taxpayers to lawfulness, 
reasonableness, procedural fairness and reasons, just as with the codified provisions of 
PAJA.  
 
Also, the rule of law and the principle of legality form the basis for the judicial review of 
administrative powers. Since the advent of the Constitution the law pertaining to review 
of administrators decisions has changed considerably.7 If there is no law supporting the 
conduct of SARS, SARS oversteps the rule of law. If there is a law which SARS 
oversteps, it is acting ultra vires8 the law. That includes compliance with its 
constitutional obligations. 
 
If SARS fails to cite ss 74A and 74B as the basis for its inquiry and audit, it is making a 
voluntary request not binding on the taxpayer, which can then be ignored by the taxpayer. 
Any enforcement of a voluntary request by SARS would be a transgression of the rule of 
law. 
 
If SARS asks for information in respect of persons who are not taxpayers, or fails to hold 
a letter of authority, or fails to adhere to the jurisdictional facts of s 74 and the definition 
of ‘the administration of the Act’, or does not comply with a legitimate expectation9 
created (such as compliance with its Code of Conduct10 read with the SARS Internal Audit 
Manual),11 it is acting unlawfully, unreasonably or procedurally unfairly. 
                                               
6 Which in terms of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of South Africa and another:  In Re:  Ex Parte 
President of the Republic of South African and Others 2000 (2) SA 674 (CC) entails inter alia, a basic level of 
rationality in SARS’ decision-making, that SARS should apply its mind properly in deciding whether and in what 
manner to exercise its discretionary investigative powers, and that SARS should exercise such powers only for the 
purposes they were conferred: satisfying the jurisdictional facts of the empowering provisions of ss 74A and 74B, read 
with the Constitution; and, ensure its conduct is not inconsistent with the Constitution, and in doing so, adhering to the 
norms, spirit and purpose of the Constitution, by fulfilling its constitutional obligations such as those in terms of 
s 195(1) of the Constitution. 
7Ibid. 
8 See section 3.3: Lawfulness supra. 
9 Legitimate expectations are not defined in the s 1 definition of ‘administrative action’ in PAJA; However, the 
Constitutional Court in Premier of Mpumalanga and Another v Executive Committee of the Association of Governing 
Bodies of State-Aided Schools: Eastern Transvaal 1999 (2) BCLR151 (CC) at para [31] has indicated that a ‘right’ 
should probably be interpreted more broadly to include liability incurred by the state through the making of unilateral 
promises or undertakings, which includes in its ambit legitimate expectations; See Currie I & Klaaren J Promotion of 
Administrative Justice Act Benchbook (2001) SiberInk at page 80; See also Williams R C et al Silke on Tax 
Administration (April 2009) Lexis Nexis at para 3.25 generally; See also section 3.6: Legitimate expectations supra. 
10http://www.sars.gov.za/home.asp?pid=54195 (last accessed 31 March 2013). 
11 See section 3.2: The SARS Internal Audit Manual supra. 
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What is the remedy, and what is the best forum to access this remedy? Furthermore, what 
is the next procedural step in the process of enabling the taxpayer to exercise its 
constitutional rights, and to ensure that SARS complies with its constitutional 
obligations?  
 
The appropriate remedy is for the taxpayer to apply to a court to review SARS’ decision 
or powers as exercised under ss 74A and 74B. Which court? The correct forum is the 
High Court, which has inherent jurisdiction to hear all reviews12 through s 172(1) of the 
Constitution, in terms of ss 6, 7 and 8 of PAJA, or failing that, in terms of the principle of 
legality, and both in terms of a Rule 53 application. The Rules of Procedure for Judicial 
Review of Administrative Action released in GG 32622 of 9 October 2009 have not yet 
come into effect, and at the time of writing had been re-released during March 2013 in 
redrafted form for further public comment, after being held back from promulgation, as 
explained by Plasket.13 To date there are no rules of procedure in effect for judicial 
review of administrative action under PAJA, and therefore Rule 53 would continue to 
apply, through s 172. Section 172 of the Constitution reads as follows: 
 
Section 172  Powers of courts in constitutional matters 
(1) When deciding a constitutional matter within its power, a court - 
(a) must declare that any law or conduct that is inconsistent with the 
Constitution is invalid to the extent of its inconsistency (with the 
Constitution); and 
(b) may make any order that is just and equitable, …(Emphasis supplied) 
 
If SARS transgresses is duty of ‘diligently and without delay’ executing its constitutional 
obligations, taxpayers have a clear review remedy in the courts, despite any specific 
restrictions imposed by the definition of ‘administrative action’ in PAJA. Taxpayers can 
seek an order to review the invalid conduct of SARS. In Oudekraal Estates (Pty) Ltd v 
                                               
12 As its jurisdiction has not been specifically ousted under ss 74A and 74B or any other provision in the Income Tax 
Act 58 of 1962. See also Harms LTC Civil Procedure in the Superior Courts, www.lexisnexis.co.za (accessed 30 
March 2013), at para B53.2; See also s 172(1) of the Constitution. 
13Plasket C Administrative Law Annual Survey 2009 (Juta) at pages 1- 5. 
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City of Cape Town and Others Howie P and Nugent JA stated14: ‘Until the 
Administrator’s approval (and thus the consequences of the approval) is set aside by a 
court in proceedings for judicial review it exists in fact and it has legal consequences that 
cannot simply be overlooked.’ The taxpayer has no choice but to approach the courts for 
a review of the unlawful and unconstitutional decision. The other avenue open to the 
taxpayer is to ignore the SARS request for information, documents or things where ‘just 
cause’ is shown.15 
 
5.2 WHAT IS MEANT BY REVIEW? 
 
The term ‘review’ is defined by Innes CJ in Johannesburg Consolidated Investment Co v 
Johannesburg Town Council16 in three parts, two of which are relevant to this thesis: 
1. … first and most usual signification denotes the process by which, 
apart from appeal, the proceedings of inferior courts of Justice … are 
bought before … [the High] Court … 
2.… second species of review [is] analogous [to the first]. Whenever a 
public body[such as SARS] has a duty imposed upon it by statute, and 
disregards important provisions of the statute, or is guilty of gross 
irregularity or clear illegality in the performance of the duty, this Court 
may be asked to review the proceedings … and set aside or correct 
them…  
3.… Then as to the third … [t]he legislature has from time to time 
conferred upon this court or a judge a power to review …(with) … wider 
… power which it possesses under either of the … (first two) … review 
procedures …(Emphasis supplied) .  
 
The first of the review proceedings has no application to this thesis. 
 
                                               
14 2004 (6) SA 222 (SCA) at para’s [26] – [31]; As to the form and content of the application see Safcor Forwarding 
(Pty) Ltd v National Transport Commission 1982 (3) SA 654 (A). 
15 See section 3.8: ‘Just Cause’ Defence supra. 
16 1903 TS 111 at  pages 114-16; Loxton v Kenhardt Liquor Licensing Board 1942 AD 275 at 309; Dawlaan 
Beleggings (Edms) BPk v Johannesburg Stock Exchange & Others 1983 (3) SA 344 (W) at 363pr-B; Blacker v 
University of Cape Town & another 1993 (4) SA 402 (C) at para’s 403F-I; Magano & another v District Magistrate, 
Johannesburg, & others (2) 1994 (4) SA 172 (W) at  para’s 175G-J; 1994 (2) SACR 307 at para’s 310G-J. 
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The third review proceeding is covered by the object and appeal process in the Income 
Tax Act, giving the Tax Court the power to revisit de novo the matter brought before it.17 
This type of review is not available in respect of the discretionary powers of ss 74A and 
74B, because these provisions are not specifically made subject to the objection and 
appeal process. 
 
That leaves the second type of review proceeding18 as the one applicable to ss 74A and 
74B of the Income Tax Act, including the review of any public power in terms of the rule 
of law, and the principle of legality.19 
 
As described in Civil Procedure in the Superior Courts,20 statutory bodies such as SARS 
are not courts when it exercises its powers. It does not hand down judgments or grant 
judicial orders that are enforceable by execution. It usually exercises discretionary 
powers, with penalties21 if taxpayers fail to adhere to these powers in the absence of a 
legitimate excuse.22 Although the powers of SARS are not bound to comply with the 
strict procedures that are required of an inferior court, SARS must conduct its proceeding 
in a manner that will be just to all parties.23 If SARS fails to do this, the High Court may 
intervene to ensure that natural justice is done, which is a right inherent in the High 
Court.24 
 
The neglect or wrongful performance by SARS of a statutory duty where the taxpayers 
are injured or aggrieved, is a cause falling within the ordinary jurisdiction of the court.25 
                                               
17Income Tax in South Africawww.mylexisnexis.co.za (accessed 13 March 2013): ‘27.29 Remedies of discretionary 
powers of the Commissioner… all income tax assessments are subject to objection and appeal in terms of ss 81 and 
83 of the Income Tax Act must mean that the discretionary decisions of the Commissioner giving rise to such an 
assessment must be subject to consideration by an Income Tax Special Court. Van der Walt J (in Transvaalse 
Suikerkorporasie 47 SATC 34) distinguished between cases where discretionary decisions are specifically made 
subject to objection and appeal and those where objection and appeal is neither granted nor excluded. He concluded 
that in the former cases the Income Tax Special Court can reach its own conclusions and substitute its own decision for 
that of the Commissioner, whereas in the latter cases the Special Court has the power to the exercise of the 
Commissioner’s discretion on the usual grounds for review (for example: that he acted in bad faith, or from improper 
motives, or did not apply his mind properly).’  
18LTC Harms Civil Procedure in the Superior Courtswww.lexisnexis.co.za (accessed 13 March 2013) B53.4 
(hereinafter referred to as ‘Harms’ in this thesis); See Hira v Booysen 1992 (4) SA 69 (A); Shidiack v Union 
Government (Minister of the Interior) 1912 AD 642; Britten v Pope 1916 AD 150. 
19Democratic Alliance and Others v Acting National Director of Public Prosecutions and 
Others 2012 (3) SA 486 (SCA). 
20Harms B53.1 to B53.22. 
21Section 75(1)(b) of the Income Tax Act. 
22Such as a ‘just cause’; Ibid. 
23Harms B53.4. 
24Ibid. B53.4 and Section 19(1)(a) of Act 59 of 1959. 
25Ibid B53.4; Routledge Cavendish Constitutional Law (2006) at page 126 reviewing flawed decisions. 
 
  157 
The court has the power to summarily correct or set aside proceedings which fall into the 
categories mentioned above.26 
 
This inherent right to review proceedings of bodies such as SARS, on which statutory 
duties are imposed, without having to follow special machinery of review created by the 
legislature,27 is traditionally termed review under the common law.28 
 
However, with the advent of the Constitution, and more particularly the Constitutional 
Court case of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers,29 Chaskalson P stated: ‘the exercise of all 
public power must comply with the Constitution which is the supreme law, and the 
doctrine of legality which is part of that law…’. He was dealing specifically with the 
issue of judicial review. Furthermore, in dealing with the contention that there is a body 
of common law distinct and separate from the Constitution, Chaskalson P stated the 
following: ‘[44] I cannot accept this contention which treats the common law as a body 
of law separate and distinct from the Constitution. There are not two systems of law, each 
with the same subject matter, each having similar requirements, each operating in its own 
field with its own highest court. There is only one system of law. It is shaped by the 
Constitution which is the supreme law, and all law, including the common law, derives 
its force from the Constitution and is subject to constitutional control…[45]…Courts no 
longer have to claim space and push boundaries to find means of controlling public 
power. That control is vested in them under the Constitution...’. 
 
The High Court has inherent jurisdiction to hear reviews in respect of a decision taken by 
SARS in terms of ss 74A and 74B, in the absence of an express exclusion, or by 
necessary implication.30SARS must consider the provisions of ss 7 and 8 of the 
                                               
26Ibid B53.4; Op. cit. Routledge at page 126; Gliksman v Transvaal Provincial Institute of the Institute of SA Architects 
& another 1951 (4) SA 56 (W);  Tayob v Ermelo Local Road Transportation Board & another 1951 (4) SA 440 (A);  
Northwest Townships (Pty) Ltd v The Administrator, Transvaal & another 1975 (4) SA 1 (T). 
27Ibid. B53.4. 
28Ibid. B53.4. Per Feetham JA in Loxton v Kenhardt Liquor Licensing Board 1942 AD 275 at 310. 
29Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of South Africa and another:  In Re:  Ex Parte President of the Republic 
of South Africa and Others 2000 (2) SA 674 (CC) at para’s [40] and [41]; See also Constitutional Cases Commentary 
De Rebus (September 2003) Lexis Nexis (last accessed 11 January 2013); Currie I & Klaaren J The Promotion of 
Administrative Justice Act Benchbook (2001) SiberInk. 
30Harms B53.4; Golube v Oosthuizen 1955 (3) SA 1 (T);  Main Line Transport v Durban Local Road Transportation 
Board 1958 (1) SA 65 (D);  Charmfit of Hollywood Inc v Registrar of Companies & another 1964 (2) SA 765 (T) at 
768 in fine – 769H:  Local Road Transportation Board and another v Durban City Council 1965 (1) SA 586 (A) at 
page 594. 
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Constitution, and so must the courts give effect to the scope, spirit and purpose of the Bill 
of Rights by virtue of s 39(2) read with s 173 of the Constitution. 
The authors in The Civil Practice of the Supreme Court of South Africa31 state: 
 
The courts have adopted the attitude that … the word ‘review’ must be 
understood in its widest and what may be called its popular sense, ... as 
conferring a wide exercise of supervision, and a great scope of authority. 
(Emphasis supplied) 
 
Sections 7, 8, and 173 of the Constitution32 supports this view. 
 
The unconstitutional conduct by SARS in making a decision in terms of ss 74A and 74B 
where taxpayers rights are adversely affected, with a direct, external legal effect (as 
demonstrated in chapters 2 and 3 in this thesis) is cause falling within the ordinary 
jurisdiction of the court.33 The court has the power to summarily correct or set aside 
proceedings in respect of the codified grounds of review read with ss 6, 7 and 8 of PAJA, 
or if SARS have transgressed the principle of legality. Both types of applications will be 
brought in terms of a Rule 53 application to the High Court. 
 
5.3 THE APPLICABILITY OF OBJECTION AND APPEAL  
 
The fact that ss 74A and 74B are in the Income Tax Act, and that SARS may attempt to 
aver that the objection and appeal procedures in the Income Tax Act must be exhausted 
                                               
31Erasmus et al The Civil Practice of the Supreme Court of South Africa Juta at page 948. 
32 Sections 7, 8 and 173 of the Constitution reads as follows: 
‘s7.  Rights. (1) This Bill of Rights is a cornerstone of democracy in South Africa. It enshrines the rights of all people 
in our country and affirms the democratic values of human dignity, equality and freedom. (2)  The state must respect, 
protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights. (3) The rights in the Bill of Rights are subject to the 
limitations contained or referred to in section 36, or elsewhere in the Bill. 
s 8.   Application. (1) The Bill of Rights applies to all law, and binds the legislature, the executive, the judiciary and all 
organs of state. (2)  A provision of the Bill of Rights binds a natural or a juristic person if, and to the extent that, it is 
applicable, taking into account the nature of the right and the nature of any duty imposed by the right. (3)  When 
applying a provision of the Bill of Rights to a natural or juristic person in terms of sub-section (2), a court—(a) in order 
to give effect to a right in the Bill, must apply, or if necessary develop, the common law to the extent that legislation 
does not give effect to that right; and (b) may develop rules of the common law to limit the right, provided that the is in 
accordance with section 36 (1). (4)  A juristic person is entitled to the rights in the Bill of Rights to the extent required 
by the nature of the rights and the nature of that juristic person.  
s173.   Inherent power. The Constitutional Court, Supreme Court of Appeal and High Courts have the inherent power 
to protect and regulate their own process, and to develop the common law, taking into account the interests of justice.’ 
33Erasmus et al. The Civil Practice of the Supreme Court of South Africa Juta at page 937.  Johannesburg Consolidated 
Investments Co v Johannesburg Town Council 1903 75 at pages 111-5. 
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first as an ‘internal remedy’ in terms of s 7(2) of PAJA. The provisions of s 7(2) of PAJA 
state: 
 
… no court or tribunal shall review an administrative action in terms of 
this Act unless any internal remedy provided for in any other law has first 
been exhausted. 
 
It could be argued by SARS34 that the internal remedy in the case of ss 74A and 74B 
should be the objection and appeal process prescribed in the Income Tax Act.  However, 
it is clear from the provisions of ss 74A and 74B, read with s 3 of the Income Tax Act, 
that there is no specific objection and appeal process applicable to these sub-sections.  
There is therefore no internal remedy35 that must first be exhausted in the Income Tax 
Act. 
 
Furthermore, special remedies in the Income Tax Act do not limit the remedies available 
to taxpayers as all avenues of relief provided for in the Constitution and PAJA, including 
judicial review. In Metcash Trading Ltd v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service, 
and Another36 Kriegler J stated the following: 
 
[33] …the Act nowhere excludes judicial review in the ordinary course. 
The Act creates a tailor-made mechanism for redressing complaints about 
the Commissioner’s decisions, but it leaves intact all other avenues of 
relief. 
 
Furthermore, refer to the discussion and analysis on internal remedies in 5.4: 
Review Application directly to the Tax Court, below. The conclusion is reached 
that the Tax Court (through the process of objection and appeal) is not an internal 
remedy that must first be satisfied before a taxpayer can approach the High Court 
to review a decision. The Tax Court is not part of the administrative hierarchy of 
                                               
34 Opinions expressed by Advocates G J Marcus SC, J Stein and W Trengove SC acting for SARS on issues of 
administrative law stating the advice they would give SARS in defending a review application brought by a taxpayer in 
the light of an inquiry or audit in terms of ss 74A and 74B. 
35 Croome B & Olivier L Tax Administration 2010 (Juta) at page 33 and pages 55-7; A relevant defence to avoiding 
internal remedies, if applicable, is exhausting internal remedies first have no merit because the officials concerned 
exhibit bias and the taxpayer is unlikely to receive a fair hearing, such as through the objection process: Gold Fields 
Ltd v Connellan NO and Others [2005] 3 All SA 142 (W) at page 170. 
36 2001 (1) SA 1109 (CC). 
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SARS. It is an independent specialist court that does not have, it is submitted, 
similar status to the High Court as contemplated in the definition of ‘court’ in 
PAJA, as Tax Court decisions are not subject to the stare decisis principle, and 
are not binding on the Commissioner in future matters. 
 
5.4 REVIEW APPLICATION DIRECTLY TO THE TAX COURT  
 
Can a review be brought directly to the Tax Court, as an alternative to an application to 
the High Court? The Electronic Meyerowitz commentary on Income Tax Cases and 
Materials37 with reference to the Transvaalse Suikerkorporasie38 case, states:  
 
The Income Tax Act confers three types of discretion on the 
Commissioner: (a) those which are subject to objection and appeal, (b) 
those which are excluded from objection and appeal, and (c) those which 
are neither subject to nor excluded from objection and appeal. In regard to 
(a), the proceedings before the Special Court amount to a rehearing of the 
matter and the Special Court is entitled to make its own finding; in regard 
to (b), no resort to the remedies of objection and appeal is possible; and in 
regard to (c), the taxpayer is entitled to object and to appeal to the Special 
Court by virtue of the provisions of s 81 and s 83 of the Act, applicable to 
all assessments issued by the Commissioner. In the latter case, however, 
the appeal amounts to a review of the Commissioner's exercise of his 
discretion on the recognised grounds of review (KBI v Transvaalse 
Suikerkorporasie Bpk …). 
 
The effect of the Transvaalse Suikerkorporasie39 case is that, despite the lack of reference 
to an objection and appeal procedure in ss 74A and 74B, SARS is exercising a discretion 
that is reviewable in the Tax Court. However, it is unlikely that the Tax Court is a 
‘tribunal’ contemplated in s 6(1) of PAJA for the purposes of a decision in terms of ss 
74A and 74B. Support for this contention can be found in the Supreme Court of Appeal 
                                               
37 On DVD from Meyerowitz D, at para 24.1. 
38 1985 (2) SA 668 (T). 
39 1985 (2) SA 668 (T); See also Van Schalkwyk L The discretionary powers of the Commissioner for the South 
African Revenue Service – Are they constitutional? Meditari Accountancy Research Vol. 12 No. 2 2004: pages 165-83 
at page 170. 
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judgment Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd (Rustenburg Section) v Commission for 
Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration40 where is was concluded that ‘the codificatory 
purpose’ of s 6 of PAJA has subsumed and extended limited grounds for review (in the 
context of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (LRA)) where Cameron JA reasoned that 
on the basis of s 39(2) of the Constitution ‘the overriding factor in determining the impact 
of PAJA on the LRA is the constitutional setting in which PAJA was enacted’ where he 
found that both s 33 of the Constitution and PAJA superseded the specialised provisions 
of the LRA in the field of administrative justice. This dictum will apply equally to a 
decision of SARS in terms of ss 74A and 74B in the absence of a clear objection and 
appeal process that clearly ousts PAJA, either by means of an initial tribunal inquiry in 
the Tax Court, or generally – due to lack of prejudice to the taxpayer, lack of ‘ripeness’ to 
adjudicate the matter, or ‘mootness’ where the court is loath to give opinions about 
abstract propositions of law.41 This view is also supported by Metcash42 where the 
Constitutional Court made it clear that review applications to the High Court are 
available to taxpayers. However, Metcash is also quoted to support the argument review 
to the High Court only pertains to a question of law, as opposed to the merits and the 
facts.43 
 
The provisions of s 7(2)(a) of PAJA have been described as stringent provisions cast in 
peremptory language:  
 
‘The Court is obliged to turn the applicant away if it is not satisfied that 
internal remedies have been exhausted, and may grant exemption from the 
duty only in exceptional circumstances where it is in the interests of 
justice to do so.’44 
 
Plasket J in Reed and Others v Master of the High Court of South Africa and Others45 
held that section 7(2) must be interpreted restrictively because it restricts the jurisdiction 
of a Court to determine an otherwise justiciable issue before it. He went on to say, the 
section applies to internal remedies, and not simply to any form of potential extra-curial 
                                               
40 2007 (1) SA 576 (SCA) at para [25]. 
41 Hoexter (2012) at pages 583-8. 
42Metcash Trading Limited v C SARS and Another2001(1) SA 1109 (CC) at para [33]. 
43Ibid. at para [44]. 
44Hoexter (2012) at page 540. 
45[2005] 2 All SA 429 (E) at para [45]. 
 
  162 
redress. A remedy, in this context, is defined in the New Shorter Oxford English 
Dictionary as a ‘means of counter-acting or removing something undesirable, redress, 
relief; legal redress’. Inherent in this concept, as it is used in its legal context is the idea 
that a remedy, must be an effective remedy. Section 7(2) of PAJA does not, in other 
words, place an obligation on a person aggrieved by a decision to exhaust all possible 
avenues of redress provided for in the political or administrative system - such as 
‘approaching a Parliamentary committee or a Member of Parliament, or writing to 
complain to the superiors of the decision-maker…(or) one or more of the Chapter 9 
institutions - such as Public Protector or the Human Rights Commission - prior to 
resorting to judicial review’. The Tax Court is a body that provides an entirely effective 
remedy to a person aggrieved by the issue of an assessment. Of more assistance is the 
following portion of the judgment:  
 
[25] The dictionary definitions of the words “internal” and “remedy” that I 
have cited are in harmony with the way the composite term “internal 
remedy” is understood in the more specialised context with which this 
matter is concerned: when the term is used in administrative law, it is used 
to connote an administrative appeal - an appeal, usually on the merits, to 
an official or tribunal within the same administrative hierarchy as the 
initial decision-maker - or, less common, an internal review. Often the 
appellate body will be more senior than the initial decision-maker, either 
administratively or politically, or possess greater expertise. Inevitably, the 
appellate body is given the power to confirm, substitute or vary the 
decision of the initial decision-maker on the merits. In South Africa there 
is no system of administrative appeals. Instead internal appeal tribunals 
are created by statute on an ad hoc basis. 
 
If this proposition is correct then an appeal to the Tax Court is not an internal remedy that 
must first be satisfied before a taxpayer can approach the High Court to review a 
decision. The Tax Court is not part of the administrative hierarchy of SARS. It is, instead, 
as Kriegler J pointed out in Metcash Trading Limited v CSARS,46 a body that satisfies the 
requirements of section 34 of the Constitution as being an ‘independent and impartial 
                                               
462001(1) SA 1109 (CC). 
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tribunal’ established for the purpose of resolving disputes that can be resolved by the 
application of law. It is presided over by a judge appointed by the Judge President of the 
division in which the Court is sitting and its decisions are appealable directly to the High 
Court and, with leave, directly to the Supreme Court of Appeal. 
 
However, a review of a decision by SARS in terms of ss 74A and 74Bcan be brought 
directly to the Tax Court as part of the objection and appeal process (as opposed to a 
review application), through ss 81 and 107A of the Income Tax Act, and the Rules of the 
Tax Court promulgated in terms of s 107A, following the principles in the Transvaalse 
Suikerkorporasie47 case above. The typical process in terms of these provisions is that the 
taxpayer will object within 30 days after receiving the revised assessment, setting out in 
its grounds of objection the conduct of SARS that is inconsistent with the Constitution, 
together with the grounds of objection that deal with the merits of the tax dispute. The 
Rules of the Tax Court promulgated in terms of s 107A allow for SARS to submit its 
Grounds of Assessment, and for the taxpayer to submit its Grounds of Appeal, after 
SARS has rejected the objection. The taxpayer would once again set out the complained 
about conduct of SARS in the Grounds of Appeal. 
 
The problem with this approach is the timing. The conduct of SARS will only be 
considered by the Tax Court alongside the merits of the revised assessment, which by 
now would have been issued with an enforcement of the ‘pay now argue later’ principle. 
In practice the procedural transgressions that took place before the revised assessment 
pale into insignificance as the Tax Court tends to focus on the substantive merits of the 
tax dispute. The advantage of bringing a review application to the High Court is that the 
current conduct of SARS will be reviewed, prior to any revised assessment being raised. 
Any decision by SARS to raise a revised assessment would also be suspended, pending 
the decision of the High Court. 
 
The taxpayer could also wait for the revised assessment to be issued, and then raise as 
one or more of  his or her grounds for objection the administrative law grounds of review, 
in addition to those applicable to the merits of the revised assessment. Here the grounds 
of review will form part of the usual objection and appeal process in the Income Tax Act.  
                                               
47 1985 (2) SA 668 (T). 
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Again, the difficulties raised in the previous paragraph are equally applicable to this 
scenario.  
 
It is, consequently, more advantageous for the taxpayer to take the conduct of SARS on 
review to the High Court, provided there is no dispute of fact, otherwise the application 
stands to be dismissed, first tier, or if a dispute of fact becomes apparent to the court at 
the hearing of the matter, the Plascon-Evans rule will find application,48 where the courts 
will apply certain second tier rules to determine whether or not a conflict of fact exists. In 
simplistic terms, the court will accept the version of the respondent (usually SARS in 
these applications), resulting in a usual insurmountable difficulty for the taxpayer to have 
the court accept its version of the facts, to require the court to make a finding in favour of 
the taxpayer. 
 




To recap, the major premise of this thesis: An inquiry and audit by SARS in terms of ss 
74A and 74B must be constitutional: lawful, reasonable, procedurally fair and done with 
adequate reasons – where SARS must comply with the relevant provisions of the 
Constitution, PAJA, including the jurisdictional facts in ss 74A and 74B as analysed in 
this thesis. In the words of D Walton author of Informal Logic: A Pragmatic Approach49: 
 
In…(the)…dialogue called inquiry, premises can only be propositions that 
are known to be true, that have been established as reliable knowledge to 
the satisfaction of all parties to the inquiry. 
… 
The basic goal of the inquiry is increment of knowledge…This inquiry 
seeks out proof, or the establishment of as much certainty as can be 
obtained by the given evidence. Evidential priority is the key feature of the 
                                               
48 The rule emanates from Plascon-Evans Paints Ltd v Van Riebeeck Paints 1984 (3) SA 623 (A) at pages 634E – 
635C. 
49 2ed (2008) Cambridge pages 5 and 6. 
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inquiry…This contrasts with persuasion dialogue…opinion based on 
reasoned (not conclusive) evidence. 
 
This quotation holds accord with the provisions of ss 1(c), 33, 41(1), 195(1) and 237 of 
the Constitution. Failure by SARS to adhere to these standards, principles and norms, will 
entitle the taxpayer to bring a review application through s 172(1) of the Constitution. 
Reviewing the exercise of a decision by SARS in terms of ss 74A and 74B is divided into 
two alternate categories through a Rule 53 application to the High Court: 
 
a. first and foremost, either in terms of ss 6, 7 and 8 of PAJA if the 
definition of ‘administrative action’ is satisfied: the grounds of 
review in s 6(2)(a) to (i) of PAJA as set out in 5.5.6 below; or, in the 
absence of s 6(2) of PAJA applying, 
 
b. in terms of the principle of legality creating an opportunity to review 
the public power of SARS. 
 
5.5.2 Sections 6, 7 and 8 of PAJA50 
 
If SARS in making a decision in terms of ss 74A and 74B of the Income Tax Act, acts 
inconsistently with its constitutional obligations (ss 1(c), 33, 41(1), 195(1) and 237 of the 
Constitution) as analysed in this thesis, or fails to give adequate notice as required in 
terms of s 3(2) of PAJA, and adequate reasons after making a decision in terms of s 5(1) 
and (2) of PAJA, taxpayers will have the remedies available to them in terms of ss 6, 7 
and 8 as read with the codified grounds of review in s 6(2) of PAJA. 
 
It has been submitted in this thesis that a decision in terms of ss 74A and 74B ‘adversely 
affects the rights of any person and which has a direct, external legal effect’, as 
contemplated in the definition of ‘administrative action’ in PAJA. With the development 
of constitutional law and the promulgation of PAJA giving effect to s 33(3) and the rights 
referred to in ss 33(1) and (2) of the Constitution, the provisions of PAJA must now, first 
and foremost, be considered in any review proceedings initiated against SARS for 
                                               
50 Croome B & Olivier L Tax Administration 2010 (Juta) at pages 55-7 
 
  166 
unconstitutional conduct. Chaskalson CJ in Minister of Health v New Clicks South Africa 
(Pty) Ltd51 rejected the Supreme Court of Appeal’s approach to review the regulations for 
lawfulness by applying the provisions of s 33(1) of the Constitution and the common law 
directly, and not in terms of PAJA. Chaskalson pointed out that PAJA had been enacted 
pursuant to a constitutional command to give effect to the right to administrative justice. 
To allow applicants to go behind the provisions of PAJA to utilise s 33(1) of the 
Constitution to review administrative action would frustrate the purpose with which s 
33(3) of the Constitution required the enactment of PAJA. In a concurring judgment, 
Nqcobo52 held that to allow access for review to s 33(1) of the Constitution would allow 
for the development of two parallel systems of law with the same subject matter which 
would be untenable. He went on to state that litigants would only be entitled to rely 
directly upon s 33(1) of the Constitution where it was alleged that the remedies afforded 
by PAJA were deficient – the action would be directed at the offending provision of 
PAJA, namely the restrictive definition of ‘administrative action’, and not at the 
offending administrative action itself. The provisions of ss 6(1), 7(1) and 8(1) of PAJA 
relevant to a review application state: 
 
6. (1) Any person may institute proceedings in a court or a tribunal for the 
judicial review of an administrative action… 
7. (1) Any proceedings for judicial review in terms of section 6(1) must be 
instituted without unreasonable delay and not later than 180 days after the 
date… 
8. (1) The court or tribunal, in proceedings for judicial review in terms of 
section 6(1), may grant any order that is just and equitable… 
 
The starting point for any review application in terms of PAJA in relation to a ss 74A and 
74B decision by SARS would be the failure by SARS to comply with the provisions of s 
3 of PAJA before making a decision: 
 
3. (1) Administrative action which materially and adversely affects the 
rights or legitimate expectations of any person must be procedurally fair. 
(2)(a)A fair administrative procedure depends on the circumstances of 
                                               
51 2006 (2) SA 311 (CC) at para [95]. 
52 Para’s [436] and [437]. 
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each case. 
(b)  In order to give effect to the right to procedurally fair administrative 
action, an administrator, subject to sub-section (4), must give a person 
referred to in sub-section(l) - 
(a) adequate notice of the nature and purpose of the proposed 
administrative action; 
(b) a reasonable opportunity to make representations; 
(c) a clear statement of the administrative action; 
(d) adequate notice of any right of review or internal appeal, where 
applicable; and 
(e) adequate notice of the right to request reasons in terms of section 5. 
(3) In order to give effect to the right to procedurally fair administrative 
action, an administrator may, in his or her or its discretion, also give a 
person referred to in sub-section (1) an opportunity to - 
(a) obtain assistance and, in serious or complex cases, legal 
representation; 
(b) present and dispute information and arguments; and 
(c) appear in person. 
(Emphasis supplied) 
 
If SARS, without proper justification, fails to adhere to these fair administrative 
procedures when making a decision in terms of ss 74A and 74B, its ‘administrative 
action’ will be subject to the ground of review in s 6(2)(c) that the decision or 
‘administrative action’ was ‘procedurally unfair’. 
 
In terms of s 5(1), (2) and (3) of PAJA, SARS must adhere to the following provisions 
and give adequate reasons for its decision in terms of ss 74A and 74B: 
 
5. (1) Any person whose rights have been materially and adversely 
affected by administrative action and who has not been given reasons for 
the action may, within 90 days after the date on which that person became 
aware of the action or might reasonably have been expected to have 
become aware of the action, request that the administrator concerned 
furnish written reasons for the action. 
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(2) The administrator to whom the request is made must, within 90 days 
after receiving the request, give that person adequate reasons in writing 
for the administrative action. 
(3) If an administrator fails to furnish adequate reasons for an 
administrative action, it must, subject to sub-section (4) and in the absence 
of proof to the contrary, be presumed in any proceedings for judicial 
review that the administrative action was taken without good reason. 
(Emphasis supplied) 
 
Bearing in mind that if SARS ‘fails to furnish adequate reasons…it must…be presumed 
in any proceedings for judicial review that the administrative action was taken without 
good reason’, if SARS, without proper justification, fails to adhere to these fair 
administrative procedures when making a decision in terms of ss 74A and 74B, its 
‘administrative action’ will also be subject to the ground of review in s 6(2)(c) that the 
decision or ‘administrative action’ was ‘procedurally unfair’, or in terms of s 6(2)(i) as 
‘otherwise unconstitutional or unlawful’. 
 
Apart from these preliminary fair administrative procedures, the lawfulness and 
reasonableness of a decision by SARS in terms of ss 74A and 74B, the decision must not 
be conduct is inconsistent with s 2 of the Constitution, otherwise it will be contrary to the 
constitutional principle of legality, or the codified grounds of review of s 6(2) of PAJA53 
are applicable.54 
 
If the court holds that the decision by SARS is not ‘administrative action’ as defined, then 
the taxpayer would have two further alternatives: (1) challenging the constitutionality of 
the restrictive definition of ‘administrative action’ in PAJA alleging that the remedies 
afforded by PAJA are deficient where the action is directed at the offending provision of 
PAJA; and (2) an application for review where the transgression of the constitutional 
                                               
53 Sections 6(2)(a)-(i) and 6(3) of PAJA; Gliksman v Transvaal Provincial Institute of the Institute of SA Architects & 
another 1951 (4) SA 56 (W) where the court held that where a discretion has been exercised with supporting evidence, 
the courts in the past and before the advent of the Constitution did not interfere unless there was gross irregularity or a 
failure of natural justice (Emphasis supplied); In University of Cape Town v Ministers of Education & Culture (House 
of Assembly & House of Representatives) 1988 3 SA 203 (C); LAWSA Volume 1 2nd ed Administrative Law Lexis 
Nexis at para 139 footnote 6.  
54Ibid.; See also US v Williams 337 F Supp 1114;Local 174 International Brotherhood of Teamsters v US, 240 F.2d 
387; US v Newman 441 F.2d 170; US v Coopers and Lybrand F Supp 942;  Hubner v Tucker 245 F.2d 35; First 
National Bank of Mobile v US 160 F.2d 532. 
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principle of legality would be the cause of action, on the basis that SARS’ conduct is 
unlawful, unreasonable, procedurally unfair and exercised without giving adequate 
reasons. In essence similar grounds of review to those set out in s 6(2) of PAJA come into 
play.55 
 
In both a review application brought in terms of PAJA, or it terms of the principle of 
legality, the preferred route, in the absence of express court rules applicable to PAJA, 
would be by way of Rule 53 application to the High Court. 
 
5.5.3 Rule 53 of the Uniform Rules of Court 
 
Section 172(1) of the Constitution opens the way for taxpayers to review any conduct by 
SARS that is inconsistent with s 2 of the Constitution, and invalid, either in respect of a 
transgression of PAJA, or the constitutional principle of legality. The appropriate review 
application would be brought in terms of Rule 53(1) of the Uniform Rules of Court that 
provides: 
 (1) Save where any law otherwise provides, all proceedings to bring 
under review the decision or proceedings of any inferior court and of any 
tribunal, board or officer performing judicial, quasi-judicial or 
administrative functions shall be by way of notice of motion directed and 
delivered by the party seeking to review such decision or proceedings to 
the magistrate, presiding officer or chairman of the court, tribunal or board 
or to the officer, as the case may be, and to all other parties affected - 
(a) calling upon such persons to show cause why such decision or 
proceedings should not be reviewed and corrected or set aside, and 
(b) calling upon the magistrate, presiding officer, chairman or officer, as 
the case may be, to despatch, within fourteen days of the receipt of the 
notice of motion, to the registrar the record of such proceedings sought to 
be corrected or set aside together with such reasons as he is by law 
                                               
55Hoexter (2012) at pages 121-5. 
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required or desires to give or make, and to notify the applicant that he has 
done so. 
(2) The notice of motion shall set out the decision or proceedings sought 
to be reviewed and shall be supported by affidavit setting out the grounds 
and the facts and circumstances upon which applicant relies to have the 
decision or proceedings set aside or corrected.56 (Emphasis supplied) 
 
In the Jockey Club of South Africa v Forbes,57 the Appellate Division held that the 
primary purpose of Rule 53 of the Uniform Rules of Court was to facilitate and regulate 
application for review, and on the face thereof was designed to ‘aid and not shackle the 
applicant’. This is equally applicable to taxpayers who have the constitutional complaints 
against SARS where SARS have allegedly transgressed one or more of its constitutional 
obligations when invoking its powers in terms of ss 74A and 74B. Any founding affidavit 
prepared by the aggrieved taxpayer would commence with identifying the invalid 
conduct performed by SARS as envisaged in s 2 of the Constitution, and supported by the 
appropriate codified grounds of review in s 6(2) of PAJA, or the applicable aspects of the 
principle of legality that have been transgressed. 
 
5.5.4 Save where any law otherwise provides 
 
The ‘save where any other law otherwise provides’ is a limitation to applying Rule 53. 
This limitation would be applicable in the case where statutory provisions require a 
specific course of action to be taken, such as following the objection and appeal 
procedure prescribed in the Income Tax Act in specified and promulgated instances. This 
is not the case with ss 74A and 74B, as this decision is not subject to the objection and 
appeal procedures in the Income Tax Act. The analysis in section 5.4: Review Application 
directly to the Tax Court above is also applicable to this section. 
 
                                               
56Kennasystems South Africa CC v Chairman, Board on Tariffs and Trade and Others, 58 SATC 150 at page 151. 
571993 (1) SA 649 (A). 
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Consequently, the review of ss 74A and 74B is available to the taxpayers seeking redress 
against any unconstitutional and ‘invalid’ conduct by SARS in the exercise of public 
power, in terms of Rule 53(1).  
 
5.5.5 Show cause 
 
In the notice of motion under Rule 53, a supporting affidavit must set out the 
grounds and the facts and circumstances upon which the taxpayer relies to have 
the SARS decision set aside or corrected, giving SARS the opportunity to show 
cause why the decision or proceedings should not be reviewed and corrected or 
set aside. 
 
In such an affidavit, the major premise will set out the provisions of ss 74A and 
74B that are being subjected to review, and the supporting constitutional legal 
principles: 
 
(a) the constitutional premise on which any conduct by SARS must be 
based, and on which the application is based; 
(b) ‘may’, and the manner in which the discretion of SARS is 
exercised; 
(c) for the purposes of ‘the administration of this (Income Tax) Act’, 
and the satisfaction of one or more of the jurisdictional facts 
(words added); 
(d) ‘taxpayer’, and whether or not the inquiry relates to a named 
taxpayer; 
(e) ‘information, documents and things’, and whether or not the 
requested information, documents or things are available in a less 
intrusive manner58 to SARS. 
 
The minor premise will narrow down the legal provisions that are applicable to the facts 
of the matter under review. The taxpayer can explain that the conduct of SARS in making 
a decision in terms of ss 74A and 74B is unconstitutional and ‘invalid’ in terms of s 2 of 
                                               
58 See also US v Coopers and Lybrand 913 F Supp 942. 
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the Constitution, in that SARS has exercised its powers, and has therefore exercised 
unconstitutional and ‘invalid’ conduct in one or more of the following ways: 
 
o SARS has transgressed ‘the rule of law’ in contravention of s 1(c) of the 
Constitution by failing generally to comply with its constitution obligations spelt 
out below – this includes the constitutional principle of legality; 
o SARS has failed to ‘respect and protect’ the dignity of the taxpayer (where a 
natural person), because the overhanded conduct by SARS in making demands 
without proper reasons impairs the self-esteem of the taxpayer, as the taxpayer 
regards SARS’ conduct offensive, and SARS has failed to respect the taxpayer’s 
right to privacy without proper justification (applicable to all taxpayers);59 
o SARS has acted ultra vires as demonstrated by not satisfying the jurisdictional 
facts of ss 74A and 74B, read with the constitutional obligations set out in ss 1(c), 
41(1), 195(1) and 237 of the Constitution, and read with s 4(2) of the SARS Act; 
o SARS has not complied with the taxpayer’s right to ‘just administrative action’ in 
terms of s 33 of the Constitution, and as expanded in terms of PAJA, in that 
SARS has failed to comply with its obligations to give proper and adequate notice 
of its decision in terms of s 3(2) of PAJA, and ‘adequate reasons’ in terms of s 
5(1) and (2) of PAJA (without proper justification in terms of s 5(3)) for its 
decision in terms of ss 74A and 74B, thereby transgressing one or more of the 
grounds of review in s 6(2) of PAJA; 
o SARS has transgressed its constitutional obligation in terms of s 41(1) of the 
Constitution, and thereby the constitutional principle of legality60 by ignoring that 
provision – SARS is not entitled to ‘assume any power or function except those 
conferred on them in terms of s 41(1) of the Constitution’. In terms of the 
constitutional principle of legality SARS cannot act ultra vires its empowering 
provision in ss 74A and 74B, meaning compliance with all the jurisdictional facts 
                                               
59 Sections 10 and 14 of the Bill of Rights; See Pretoria Portland Cement & Another v Competition ommission & 
Others 2003(2) SA 385 (SCA); Bernstein & Others v Bester NO & Others 1996(2) SA 751 (CC) at parra’s [67], [73] 
and [79] identifies ‘privacy’ with the ‘inner sanctum of a person’, but that all privacy rights are limited ‘to the most 
personal aspects of a person’s existence, and not to every aspect within his/her personal knowledge and experience.’; 
See also Investigative Directorate: Serious Economic Offences v Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd: In re Hyundai 
Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd v Smit NO 2001(1) SA 545 (CC) at para [18] where it was held that the right to privacy 
protects intimate space because such a space is a prerequisite for human dignity; See also Probe Security CC v Security 
Offices’ Board and Others 98 JER 0849 (W). 
60 See section 2.4: The Relevance of PAJA and the Principle of Legality supra. 
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read with its constitutional obligations in ss 1(c), 33, 195(1) and 237 of the 
Constitution, read with s 4(2) of the SARS Act; 
o SARS has transgressed its constitutional obligations in terms of s 195(1) of the 
Constitution, as SARS is not entitled to conduct itself contrary to: 
 Promoting and maintaining ‘a high standard of ethics’; 
 Promoting ‘efficient, economic and effective use of resources’; 
 Services that are delivered ‘impartially, fairly, equitably and without bias’; 
 ‘accountable’ Public Administration; and 
 ‘timely, accessible and accurate information’ fostering ‘transparency’, 
as set out in s 195(1)(a), (b), (d), (f) and (g); 
o SARS has transgressed s 237 of the Constitution, and thereby the principle of 
legality by ignoring the provisions that state ‘all constitutional obligations must be 
performed diligently and without delay’; and/or 
o SARS has transgressed its legitimate expectations created.61 
 
To illustrate this effectively, the following set of hypothetical facts62 is discussed: 
 
The taxpayer, a professional consultant, has acted on behalf 
of high profiled clients over a number of years. 
 
A major dispute develops between the taxpayer and one 
high profile client. The dispute is widely covered in a 
negative light in the media, setting out unproven and 
unsubstantiated allegations about the taxpayer’s business 
dealings. 
 
The client in question is also closely connected to various 
politicians and government administrators. 
 
At the height of the media reports, the taxpayer receives 
notices in terms of ss 74A and 74B in respect of various 
entities where the taxpayer is a shareholder and/or director. 
                                               
61in accordance with the analysis in section 3.6: Legitimate Expectations supra. 
62 Based on various actual case studies in the writer’s legal practice. 
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The notices are not addressed to the public officers of these 
entities, which is the customary manner in which these 
investigations are usually conducted. 
 
Despite the suspicion that SARS are on a blind fishing 
expedition63 that is being motivated by the negative media 
publicity, and the possibility of a complaint lodged by the 
former high profile client, the taxpayer decides not to 
question the motives of SARS and enters into an agreed 
arrangement with SARS to provide information on a 
weekly basis over a period of time. 
 
In line with the agreement, the exchange of information 
takes place weekly, until abruptly one week SARS fails to 
respond to numerous calls made by the taxpayer to furnish 
the next segment of information. 
 
As a result of this, the taxpayer accepts that SARS have 
ceased and concluded the audit, without making any 
findings. 
 
For three years there is no further communication between 
SARS and the taxpayer. 
 
Until, as abruptly as the inquiry ended, the taxpayer 
receives a telephone call from SARS to request a meeting. 
The meeting is conducted and the taxpayer is handed seven 
notices in terms of ss 74A and 74B, requesting information, 
documents or things. 
 
                                               
63Croome B & Olivier L Tax Administration 2010 (Juta) at page 155 where the authors infer fishing expeditions are not 
lawful; For a comparative American viewpoint see US v Third Northwestern National Bank 102 F Supp 879 where the 
court held that an arbitrary (random) audit would be unlawful. 
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It appears ex facie the notices that three of them are in 
respect of the previous entities already inquired about, 
where the inquiry ended some three years ago without 
further explanation or communication. Two of the notices 
were in respect of shelf companies which the taxpayer sold 
to clients, in which he has no further interest. 
 
The taxpayer is now especially suspicious that the latest 
inquiries are being driven by ulterior motives, and that 
SARS have not done the required homework before they 
embark upon such an audit. They make no reference to any 
of the provisions of s 74, or to why the previously 
concluded audits are being commenced again. 
 
In following and applying the logical sequence of a 
syllogistic argument in the founding affidavit (based on 
these hypothetical facts), the minor premise that will 
underpin the legal principles being sought to being applied 
will be as follows: 
 
(a) The taxpayer will as applicant aver that he is requesting the 
review of the conduct of SARS in accordance with the 
provisions of the Constitution64 on the basis that: 
 
a. The rule of law and the principle of legality is 
applicable to SARS;65 
b. Conduct of SARS must be consistent with the 
Constitution;66 
                                               
64 All administrative law and the review thereof is no seen as part of the Constitution in line with the decision in 
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of South Africa and another:  In Re:  Ex Parte President of the Republic of 
South African and Others 2000 (2) SA 674 (CC). 
65 Section 1(c) of the Constitution; Section 2.4: The Relevance of PAJA and the Principle of Legality supra. 
66Ibid. s 2. 
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c. The conduct of SARS is governed by the constitutional 
obligations imposed on it by ss 1(c), 33, 41(1), 195(1) 
and 237 of the Constitution. 
 
(b) The following material facts are present: 
 
a. SARS made a decision to audit or investigate the taxpayer, 
which is conduct as contemplated in the Constitution and 
PAJA; 
b. SARS’ decision was originally made at the height of the 
negative media reports of the taxpayer; 
c. SARS and the taxpayer agreed on what they were auditing 
and the basis for the exchange of information; 
d. The taxpayer complied with the terms of that agreement; 
e. SARS unilaterally terminated the agreement abruptly 
without explanation; 
f. The taxpayer accepted SARS’ decision to terminate the 
audit; 
g. Three years later SARS suddenly re-commenced the audit 
expanding its parameters to include new entities by 
delivering seven notices on the taxpayer; 
h. It is clear ex facie the notices that none of the notices: 
i. Are addressed to the public officer, where it is 
customary for SARS to request and obtain 
information from an entity’s public officer, unless 
they are unable to do so; 
ii. State compliance with one or more of the 
jurisdictional facts in the definition of ‘for the 
purposes of the administration’ of the Income Tax 
Act; 
iii. State why the audit of the previous three entities is 
being reopened and the same information is being 
requested again; 
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iv. State why the notices are being addressed to the 
taxpayer in respect of two entities that he has no 
association with; 
v. Indicate that SARS has at least complied with its 
Practice Manual that requires it to rely upon concrete 
evidence, or its Code of Conduct read with the SARS 
Internal Audit Manual, that requires it to follow 
certain preliminary procedures on conducting an 
audit. 
i. The taxpayer has not agreed at this early re-commenced 
audit to participate in the audit absent SARS answering 
certain questions about the lawfulness of the audit – so as 
to ensure that SARS is not conducting a fishing expedition 
influenced by improper motives. 
 
The conclusion to the founding affidavit will match the legal 
principles to the facts. The decision made by SARS to issue seven 
new notices in terms of ss 74A and 74B to the taxpayer, must be: 
 
(a) grounded on the rule of law and the constitutional principle of 
legality and be made in compliance will all the jurisdictional 
facts of ss 74A and 74B - this has not happened here because 
SARS do not specify which provisions of s 74 (with supporting 
and explanatory facts) are applicable in the notices. Proof of its 
compliance would be an explanation of the preparatory work 
done by it in accordance with the provisions of its Code of 
Conduct read with the SARS Internal Audit Manual. Evidence 
of the existence of this (or not) will become apparent when 
SARS is expected to make its internal record available to the 
taxpayer as part of the Rule 53 review proceedings; 
 
(b) consistent with the provisions of the Constitution in that the 
decision must be: 
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a. driven by a high standard of professional ethics - this has 
not been adhered to because SARS abruptly terminated the 
audit without reason, and as suddenly recommenced the 
audit on an expanded basis without reason or explanation; 
b. impartial and not influenced by the dictates of outsiders – 
a reasonable inference can be drawn that the bad media 
publicity is the one motivator for the audit, as opposed to 
the audit risk indicators that SARS researches in 
accordance with the provisions of its Code of Conduct 
read with the SARS Internal Audit Manual; 
c. unbiased conduct – not unduly influenced by financial 
reward of the SARS officials; 
d. accountable - SARS must demonstrate why it is necessary 
to reopen the previous three audits that it deemed closed, 
and why the taxpayer must supply it with the same 
information again. SARS must comply with the 
jurisdictional facts of s 74 in giving these reasons; 
e. transparent - to what extent has SARS conducted a 
preliminary internal investigation to justify approaching 
the taxpayer for the information, and is SARS able to 
furnish proof of this. 
 
It is clear from the conclusions drawn above that sufficient opportunity exists for 
taxpayers to raise various grounds for reviewing the unlawful, unreasonable or 
procedurally unfair (and unconstitutional) conduct of SARS in the exercise of its powers 
in terms of ss 74A and 74B. Sufficient cause would exist to bring a review application in 
terms of PAJA, or, the principle of legality, in that the conduct of SARS is inconsistent 
with the terms of the Constitution, and is ‘invalid’ conduct.  
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The grounds of review upon which the taxpayer may rely to have the SARS decision set 
aside or corrected, go beyond the historical common law grounds of review,67 which tend 
to be limited to a SARS official acting mala fides68 or dishonestly, or for ulterior reasons, 
or with such gross unreasonableness as to be inexplicable.69 
 
In the spirit and purpose of the Bill of Rights, and of the Constitution generally, s 39(2) 
of the Constitution (when interpreting any legislation, and when developing the common 
law or customary law, every court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, purport and 
objects of the Bill of Rights) read with s 173 of the Constitution (the Constitutional 
Court, Supreme Court of Appeal and High Courts have the inherent power to protect and 
regulate their own process, and to develop the common law, taking into account the 
interests of justice), places both SARS officers and the courts in a position where they 
should interpret the powers of SARS in the light of these broader constitutional directions 
– ‘must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights’. SARS is a trustee of 
public interest and should use all means to ascertain all the relevant facts in order to 
arrive at the right decision in exercising any discretion.70 To the extent that SARS’ 
decision transgresses the lawfulness, reasonableness and procedural fairness requirement 
of administrative law, or breaks the rule of law and the principle of legality, SARS’ 
unconstitutional conduct is subject to review. In this regard, every questionable exercise 
of power by SARS may be brought before the court to test its validity.71 
 
In this regard, the grounds of review set out in s 6(2) of PAJA will apply if the review 
application is brought in compliance with ss 6(1) and 7(1) of PAJA, or provide guidance 
in developing the grounds of review applicable to a breach of the principle of legality, as 
suggested by Hoexter.72 This is also in accordance with the judgment of Cameron JA in 
Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd (Rustenburg Section) v Commission for Conciliation, 
Mediation and Arbitration73 where is was concluded that ‘the codificatory purpose’ of s 6 
                                               
67 Error of law, wrong or non-performance giving rise to common-law review; See Hira v Booysen 1992 (4) SA 69 (A); 
See Shidiack v Union Government (Minister of the Interior) 1912 AD 642; Britten v Pope 1916 AD 150. 
68 Dishonesty, fraud or harassment; See US v Roundtree 420 F.2d 845 where (quoted from the headnote) a ‘(t)axpayer 
against whom government was attempting to enforce summons and who claimed harassment was entitled to take 
deposition of internal revenue agent in charge of case in order to investigate Internal Revenue Service’s purpose.’ 
69Erasmus et al The Civil Practice of the Supreme Court of South Africa Juta at page 939. African Realty Trust Ltd v 
Johannesburg Municipality 1906 TH 179 at 182. 
70 Singh M P German Administrative Law in Common Law Amazon Kindle Edition 1156 (accessed 7 March 2013). 
71Ibid. 
72Hoexter (2012) at pages 121-5. 
73 2007 (1) SA 576 (SCA) at para [25]. 
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of PAJA has subsumed and extended the limited grounds for review (in the context of the 
Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (LRA)) where it was reasoned that on the basis of s 
39(2) of the Constitution ‘the overriding factor in determining the impact of PAJA on the 
LRA is the constitutional setting in which PAJA was enacted’ where both s 33 of the 
Constitution and PAJA supersedes the specialised provisions of the LRA in the field of 
administrative justice. This will apply equally to the powers of SARS in terms of ss 74A 
and 74B, namely: authority and conduct of the administrator; non-compliance with a 
mandatory and material procedure or condition; procedurally unfair action; action 
materially influenced by an error of law; manner of exercise of administrative action; 
rational connection grounds; failure to take a decision; unreasonableness; and otherwise 
unconstitutional or unlawful action. 
 
These principal areas of review exclude two common-law grounds of review that would 
probably fall under s 6(2)(i) of PAJA (otherwise unconstitutional or unlawful action), 
namely: vagueness74 and the ‘fettering by rigidity of a discretion’.75 In light of the 
Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd (Rustenburg Section) v Commission for Conciliation, 
Mediation and Arbitration76 it is unlikely that the courts will ignore the codified grounds 
of review in a review of a decision taken by SARS in terms of ss 74A and 74B, where the 
review provisions of s 6 may not be directly applicable due to the decision of SARS 
being held by a court to fall outside the scope of PAJA. In developing constitutional law, 
and in particular the constitutional principle of legality, taking into account the interests 
of justice, the courts will most likely be informed by these codified grounds of review. It 
is also submitted that this reasoning is in line with the decision of Carmichele v Minister 
of Safety and Security77(and other authorities)78 where the Constitutional Court held that 
                                               
74 See also US v Williams 337 F Supp 1114 where the District Court in New York held the ‘enforcement …to compel 
production of message slips held by taxpayer's telephone answering service would have provided government with 
names of persons who were not patients of taxpayer at all, or who were not patients during relevant years, and … was 
overbroad and out of proportion to ends sought, and as such not entitled to enforcement’; See also Local 174 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters v US, 240 F.2d 387 where ‘agents had burden to show that demand was 
reasonable under all circumstances and to prove that books and records were relevant or material to tax liability of 
taxpayer …and the taxpayer… possessed books or records containing items relating to taxpayer's business’. (Emphasis 
supplied); US v Newman 441 F.2d 170; US v Coopers and Lybrand F Supp 942;  Hubner v Tucker 245 F.2d 35; First 
National Bank of Mobile v US 160 F.2d 532. 
75 Hoexter C The Future of Judicial Review in South African Administrative Law South African Law Journal (2000) 
Vol 17 at page 497. 
76Supra footnote 74. 
77 2001 (10) BCLR 995 (CC); 2001 (4) SA 938 (CC). 
78 Per Chaskalson P in Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of SA: In re Ex parte President of the Republic of 
South Africa 2000 (2) SA 674 (CC) at page 696D: ‘The interim Constitution which came into force in April 1994 was a 
legal watershed. It shifted constitutionalism, and with it all aspects of public law, from the realm of common law to the 
prescripts of a written constitution which is the supreme law. That is not to say that the principles of common law have 
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it was the duty of courts to develop the common law, in line with the Constitution, and 
with the more recent decisions set out at the end of section 2.4: The Relevance of PAJA 
and the Principle of Legality above.79 
 
Grounds for judicial review in terms of s 6(2)80 would exist under PAJA in the following 
instances where SARS has made a decision envisaged in ss 74A and 74B that falls within 
the definition of ‘administrative action’: 
 
(a) Where SARS has failed to act with the appropriate authority; 
(b) Where SARS has failed to comply with the relevant ‘jurisdictional facts’ of ss 74A 
and 74B; 
(c) Where SARS has abused its discretion;81 
(d) Where SARS has failed to exercise reasonableness in exercising its discretion. 
This includes an improper or ulterior purpose or motive;82 
(e) Where SARS has committed a breach of the rules of natural justice or procedural 
fairness;83 
(f) Where SARS has breached a taxpayer’s legitimate expectation of being treated in a 
certain way by SARS.84 
 
5.5.6.2 Constitutionality of the inquiry and audit 
 
The lawfulness of the inquiry and audit on constitutional grounds is applicable in this 
instance where SARS has failed to comply with its constitutional obligations in ss 1(c),  
33, 41(1), 195(1) and 237 of the Constitution, read with s 4(2) of the SARS Act. SARS is 
governed by the values and principles enshrined in the Constitution that specifically 
obligate it to provide services within the scope of the powers provided in the 
Constitution, and which are impartial, fair, equitable and without bias, in an accountable 
fashion and through fostering transparency with timely, accessible and accurate 
information (as analysed and discussed in Chapter 4).  Transgressing these constitutional 
                                                                                                                                
ceased to be material to the development of public law. These well-established principles will continue to inform the 
content of administrative law and other aspects of public law, and will contribute to their future development.’. 
79At page 47 of this thesis. 
80 Section 6(2)(a)-(i) of PAJA. 
81See section 3.3.3: Abuse of discretion supra. 
82See section 3.3.3.1: Improper or ulterior purpose or motive supra. 
83See section 3.5: Procedural Fairness supra. 
84See section 3.6: Legitimate Expectations supra. 
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obligations brings the conduct of SARS within the realms of the constitutional principle 
of legality, and subject to review in terms of Rule 53. 
 
SARS would also have to show compliance with its Code of Conduct85 published on the 
SARS website, read with its unpublished SARS Internal Audit Manual86 which provides 
specific guidelines to SARS officials on how to conduct an inquiry and audit in line with 
these constitutional obligations. The manual is a practical working tool for SARS 
officials, ensuring that they perform their statutory duties in accordance with the 
directions given under the hand of the Commissioner, who is given the power to 
administer the Income Tax Act. Consequently, for SARS to exercise its discretion 
lawfully in terms of ss 74A and 74B, it should (in line with the guidelines) demonstrate 
that:  it has ‘insight into…the business process of the taxpayer…’;87 after ‘screening the 
tax returns…(the taxpayer)…warrant(s) an audit…’;88 it has identified ‘which elements 
of the tax return(s) need to be audited…’;89 and it has obtained ‘information from other 
sources…(on)…the potential issues of the relevant case…’.90 
 
Furthermore, one or more of the jurisdictional facts set out in the definition of ‘the 
administration of this Act’ in s 74 of the Income Tax Act must exist.  For instance:  there 
must be an amount received by accrual to any person that must be in question;91 there 
must be a property disposed of under a donation;92 there must be a dividend declared;93  
in relation to an inquiry into a return, financial statement, document, declaration of facts 
or valuation, the originating document must also exist to enable the further inquiry;94 the 
determination of a liability to any tax, interest or penalty with the existence of general 
evidence to suggest that the person is a taxpayer should at least exist;95 on collecting a 
liability, where a liability must exist;96 ascertaining an offence under civil investigation 
(which in itself is an unconstitutional provision because the inquiry and audit provisions 
                                               
85http://www.sars.gov.za/home.asp?pid=54195 (last accessed 31 March 2013). 
86 See section 3.2: The SARS Internal Audit Manual supra. 
87Ibid, at page 2. 
88Ibid, at page 4. 
89Ibid, at page 5. 
90Ibid, at page 6. 
91 Section 74(1)(a)(i) of the Income Tax Act. 
92Ibid s 74(1)(a)(ii). 
93Ibid s 74(1)(a)(iii). 
94Ibid s 74(1)(b). 
95Ibid s 74(1)(c). 
96Ibid s 74(1)(d). 
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are being used for self-incrimination purposes);97 ascertaining general compliance of tax 
affairs, prefaced by evidence that the person under investigation is subject to the 
provisions in question by virtue of some fact that exists pointing to the fact that the 
person is or should be a taxpayer;98 and the enforcement and performance of 
administrative functions generally under the provision of the Income Tax Act. 
 
If these jurisdictional facts are not met, the conduct of SARS will be unlawful, and 
inconsistent with the Constitution, and therefore invalid in terms of s 2 of the 
Constitution.  
 
As a result, ‘just cause’ can be shown to exist under s 75(1)(b) of the Income Tax Act as 
to why a taxpayer may challenge SARS’ entitlement to seek to enforce the provisions of 
ss 74A and 74B.  The unconstitutional conduct of SARS is also reviewable by virtue of 
the provisions of s 172(1) of the Constitution: in terms of Rule 53 to the High Court on 
the basis of a transgression of s 6(2)(i) being ‘action that is otherwise unconstitutional or 
unlawful’, or in terms of the constitutional principle of legality. 
 
5.5.6.3 Appropriate authority 
 
The first principle of administrative law (and of the rule of law) is that the exercise of 
power must be authorised by law. SARS does not have inherent powers99 to exercise 
public power: its power to act must be derived from a lawful empowering source100such 
as in the form of ss 74A and 74B. Any discretion performed by SARS without any lawful 
authority or empowering provision is illegal, contrary to the rule of law (including the 
principle of legality) and ultra vires.101 This is also the case if SARS does not comply in 
full with the jurisdictional requirements of an empowering provision. An act performed 
by SARS, where it cannot produce an ‘authorisation letter’ as contemplated in s 74 of the 
Income Tax Act, or where the ‘authorisation letter’ does not specifically authorise the 
official to conduct an inquiry and audit under ss 74A and 74B in respect of a specific and 
named taxpayer,  would be beyond its powers.   
                                               
97R v Jarvis 2002 (3) SCR 757. 
98Ibid s74(1)(f). 
99 Section 41(1) of the Constitution; Hoexter (2012) at page 255;  
100 Beinart B Administrative Law (1948) 11 THRHR 204 at page 215; Fedsure Life Assurance Limited v Greater 
Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council 1999(1) SA 374 (CC) at para [58]. 
101 Hoexter (2012) at page 114 footnote 33; See section 3.3: Lawfulness supra. 
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Section 6(2)(a)(i) of PAJA allows the judicial review of administrative action by SARS 
when it ‘was not authorised to do so by the empowering provision’. The mere exercising 
of a power which has not been conferred upon SARS in accordance with an 
‘authorisation letter’ would be in contravention of the lawfulness requirement of 
administrative law, and the principle of legality, and, as such, reviewable. The taxpayer 
would call upon SARS to show why its decision should not be set aside for lacking the 
appropriate authority. The application would rely on s 6(2)(a)(i) of PAJA, and failing 
that, in the alternative as contrary to the principle of legality in that SARS’ conduct is 
unlawful and thus unconstitutional. 
 
5.5.6.4 Jurisdictional facts 
 
Before SARS is entitled to exercise its power to audit and investigate a taxpayer, it must 
satisfy the jurisdictional facts102 set forth in ss 74A and 74B, including those referred to 
in the definition of ‘the administration of the Act’. 
The inquiry and audit must be in respect of a specifically named taxpayer. The 
investigating SARS officials must also hold the appropriate authorisation letter permitting 
the specific inquiry and audit. In complying with the definition of ‘for the purposes of 
administration of the Income Tax Act’, SARS must satisfy one or more of the eight sub-
sections of that definition with supporting facts from the subject matter of the inquiry and 
audit.  SARS will in any event at a later stage have to produce concrete evidence to 
justify any revised assessment, in accordance with the legitimate expectation created in 
its Code of Conduct read with the SARS Income Tax Practice Manual.103 
 
                                               
102 See section 3.3.2: Jurisdictional facts supra; South African Defence and Aid Fund and Another v Minister of Justice 
1967 (1) SA 31 (C) where Corbett J at page 33 states the following in relation to jurisdictional facts: Before the State 
President is entitled to exercise this power to declare an organisation to be an unlawful organisation he must be 
satisfied that one or more of the conditions set forth in paras (a) to (e) of sec. 2 (2) exist. In order to satisfy himself in 
this way he must have before him some information relating to such matters as the aims and objects of the organisation 
in question, its membership, organisation and control, the nature and scope of its activities, what its purpose is and what 
it professes to be.…The content of this kind of condition is often referred to as a 'jurisdictional fact' (see Minister of the 
Interior v Bechler and Others, 1948 (3) SA 409 (AD) at p. 442; Rose-Innes, Judicial Review of Administrative 
Tribunals in S.A., pp. 99 - 100) in the sense that it is a fact the existence of which is contemplated by the Legislature as 
a necessary pre-requisite to the exercise of the statutory power. The power itself is a discretionary one. Even though the 
jurisdictional fact exists, the authority in whom the power resides is not bound to exercise it. On the other hand, if the 
jurisdictional fact does not exist, then the power may not be exercised and any purported exercise of the power would 
be invalid. 
103Preiss, M, Silke J, & Zulman R H The Income Tax Practice Manual (November 2012), www.mylexisnexis.co.za. 
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Another requirement is compliance by SARS with the duties and responsibilities attached 
to exercising a discretion as denoted by the use of the word ‘may’ in ss 74A and 74B. 
 
In Dawood’s case104 it was made clear that it is relevant to an inquiry and audit that 
where broad, unguided discretionary powers are given to SARS, guidelines should be 
provided and must be adhered to.  
 
In this regard, Dawood’s105 case applies to the Code of Conduct and the unpublished 
guidelines in the SARS Internal Audit Manual. These guidelines should not be ignored by 
SARS in exercising its discretion in terms of ss 74A and 74B, unless specific justification 
exists for such a transgression. Any non-compliance with these internal guidelines would 
prima facie be indicative of SARS’ non-compliance with its constitutional obligations, 
the rule of law and the principle of legality. It is also a transgression of SARS’ duty to 
comply with its own self-imposed practices, indiscriminately. Impartiality and unbiased 
conduct by SARS are part of their constitutional obligations in terms of s 195(1) of the 
Constitution. These guidelines internally regulate the powers given to various SARS 
officials, where SARS officials must be satisfied as to whether or not they have: ‘insight 
into … the business process of the taxpayer …’; ‘screened the tax returns of the taxpayer 
and determined that they warrant an audit’; ‘identified which elements of the tax return(s) 
need to be audited’; and obtained ‘information from other sources … (on) … the potential 
issues of the relevant (audit) …’.106 
 
In terms of s 6(2)(b) of PAJA (dealing with mandatory procedures), the failure on the part 
of SARS to comply with a ‘mandatory’ procedure or condition, would result in its 
conduct being unconstitutional, and invalid, and reviewable. These procedures are 
mandatory insofar as these guidelines have created a legitimate expectation for taxpayers 
and non-compliance by SARS will illustrate and highlight conduct ‘otherwise 
unconstitutional or unlawful’ contemplated in s 6(2)(i) of PAJA. This in turn will point 
towards transgressions in the headings discussed below. 
 
5.5.6.5 Abuse of discretion 
                                               
104Dawood and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Others 2000 (3) SA 936 (CC). 
105Ibid. 
106SARS Internal Audit Manual – Part 4:  The Audit Process, at pages 2-6. 
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An abuse of discretion in the context of ss 74A and 74B would result by SARS’ failure to 
comply generally with the principles analysed in 3.3:Lawfulness above. This would 
include, by way of example, failure to comply with the specific statutory requirements of 
‘the administration of this Act’ in terms of s 74 of the Income Tax Act, and failure to 
comply with its Code of Conduct read with its internal guidelines in the unpublished 
SARS Internal Audit Manual indicative that SARS are transgressing legitimate 
expectations and their constitutional obligations summarised and illustrated in these 
guidelines. 
 
Another form of abuse of discretion occurs when SARS exercises its discretion with an 
improper or ulterior purpose or motive, such as conducting a criminal inquiry and audit107 
simultaneously under the guise of an inquiry and audit merely for civil regulatory 
purposes, using the provisions of ss 74A and 74B, as opposed to the extensive legislated 
criminal procedure provisions and s 74D of the Income Tax Act.108 
 
In order to ensure that it does not exercise a discretion in an abusive manner, SARS must 
be mindful of the guideline principles in Dawood’s109 case and the principles set out in 
the Stroud Riley110 case. The former supports a conservative approach by SARS in 
following its Code of Conduct and the guidelines in the unpublished SARS Internal Audit 
Manual.111 This ensures that an audit and inquiry by SARS into the tax affairs of a 
taxpayer will only be considered necessary after initial preparatory work has been done to 
justify the inquiry and audit. If SARS finds nothing in the preliminary audit that is 
materially wrong, these internal guidelines state that the audit must cease – unless the risk 
indicators for that industry suggest that a further investigation is necessary due to the 
external intelligence garnered from that industry as a whole. Stroud Riley112compels 
SARS to exercise a discretion in favour of the taxpayer where the facts warrant this. This 
means that if a preliminary review into the tax affairs of the taxpayer does not deliver 
anything materially wrong, and in the absence of another justification to proceed with the 
                                               
107Broadway Mansions (Pty) Ltd vs Pretoria City Council1955(1) S A 517 (A) at 522: ‘The question is simply, did 
respondent have power purported to be exercised.  Where power is granted for a specific purpose it cannot be used for a 
purpose other than that for which it was intended.  In rotation to such other purpose the power does not exist.’ 
108See the discussion in this thesis on the Canadian Supreme Court case of R v Jarvis 2002 (3) SCR 757, at page 88. 
109Dawood and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Others 2000 (3) SA 936 (CC). 
110Stroud Riley & Co Ltd v SIR 36 SATC 143. 
111 See section 3.2: SARS Internal Audit Manual supra at pages 2-6. 
112Ibid. 
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audit, the proposed audit must be ceased. Compliance with these lawfulness principles is 
peremptory for SARS.113 
 
If the taxpayer can show that the issue being investigated by SARS has already been 
investigated by it in the past, SARS will most likely be obliged to exercise its discretion 
in favour of the taxpayer and terminate the inquiry and audit, unless new facts have come 




In determining the reasonableness114 of the decision, SARS must satisfy a number of 
factors in justifying the reasonableness of its decision: 
 
a) the nature of the decision; 
b) the range of factors relevant to the decision; 
c) The reasons for the decision;  
d) The nature of the competing interests involved and ‘the impact of the decision on the 
lives and well-being of those affected.115 
 
In this regard, SARS decisions must be rationally116 related to the purpose for which the 
power was given to them. Otherwise, its conduct is arbitrary and inconsistent with this 
requirement.117 If the purpose of the inquiry and audit is to obtain evidence for a criminal 
investigation that is running in tandem with the current inquiry and audit, the purpose is 
contrary the jurisdictional requirements of ss 74A and 74B, and s 35(3)(j) of the 
Constitution (dealing with the unlawfulness of being compelled118 to give self-
incriminating evidence by a taxpayer). 
 
Any transgression of the reasonableness requirement is also subject to review. 
                                               
113See section 3.3: Lawfulness supra. 
114 See section 3.4: Reasonableness supra. 
115Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v The Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 2004 (4) SA 490 (CC) at para [45]. 
116 In University of Cape Town v Ministers of Education & Culture (House of Assembly & House of Representatives) 
1988 3 SA 203 (C) ; LAWSA Volume 1 2nd ed Administrative Law Lexis Nexis at para 139 footnote 6. See also s 
6(2)(f) of PAJA. 
117Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of South Africa and another:  In Re:  Ex Parte President of the Republic 
of South African and Others 2000 (2) SA 674 (CC) at para [85]. 
118 Sections 35(3)(h)-(j) of the Constitution; See also ITC 1818 69 SATC 98 and Seapoint Computer Bureau (Pty) Ltd v 
McLoughlin and de Wet NNO 1997 (2) SA 636 (W). 
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5.5.6.7 Natural justice and Procedural Fairness 
 
Natural justice comprises three basic principles, namely, the principle of bias, the audi 
alteram partem principle and the general duty of SARS to act fairly. In determining the 
standards required of a decision maker, the courts tend to use the terms ‘natural justice’ 
and ‘fairness’ interchangeably.119 These concepts are now entrenched in PAJA, which 
forms the starting point in determining what remedies are available to the taxpayer, where 
SARS transgresses any of its constitutional obligations in this regard. The audi alteram 
partem principle and the general duty of SARS to act fairly is dealt with in ss 3 and 5 of 
PAJA where SARS is required to give fair notice, the opportunity for the taxpayer to 
respond, and adequate reasons in making a decision that is ‘administrative action’ in 
terms of the definition of ‘administrative action’ in PAJA. Failure to do so without proper 
justification would immediately trigger one or more of the codified grounds of review in 
s 6(2)(a) to (i) of PAJA. As to bias, this is mentioned as a constitutional obligation in s 
195(1)(c) of the Constitution. But a transgression of this principle would also be covered 
by the codified grounds of review in s 6(2)(a)(iii) of PAJA. 
 
Bias may occur where the SARS assessors randomly choose a taxpayer to audit or inquire 
into because they are expected to raise revised assessments in order to meet their internal 
financial targets, and thus their contractual commitments to SARS. In this case, it is 
virtually impossible for the assessors to act in an impartial manner, because their 
motivation is driven by the fulfilment of a budget imposed upon them by management. 
Tell-tale indicators are audits or inquiries that take place before SARS is prepared to 
refund taxes to the taxpayer, or where the three-year prescription of the taxpayer is 
imminent. Often the SARS officials will not have done their mandatory preparatory work 
as required in terms of SARS’ Code of Conduct read with its internal guidelines in the 
unpublished SARS Internal Audit Manual to determine whether or not an inquiry and 
audit is warranted. SARS, in practice, will simply commence the audit. This conduct on 
the part of SARS is questionable and suspiciously biased, and arguably a mere fishing 
expedition. For that reason, grounds for a review application in terms of s 6(2)(a) (lack of 
authority), (c) (procedurally unfair), (h) (unreasonableness) and (i) (otherwise 
                                               
119 Routledge Cavendish Constitutional Law 5ed. (2006) at page 145.   
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unconstitutional or unlawful) (amongst others) of PAJA would exist. Similar grounds 
would be applicable in terms of the principle of legality. The ‘just cause’ defence would 
also be applicable. 
 
5.5.6.8 Legitimate expectations 
 
Depending upon the circumstances of the case, a taxpayer may have legitimate 
expectations120 that a hearing will be given, or that he or she will be consulted before a 
decision is taken, or that a decision will be taken in his or her favour when SARS seeks to 
invoke its powers in terms of ss 74A and 74B. Such legitimate expectations may arise 
because a taxpayer has relied on an arrangement (SARS has agreed to enter into an 
exchange of information with the taxpayer), a promise (SARS has agreed not to take 
further steps until certain undertakings for information have been concluded with the 
taxpayer – such as a letter of findings) or previous conduct by SARS where it has become 
practice or customary for SARS to exchange information with the taxpayer before 
making formal demands in terms of ss 74A and 74B – such as compliance with SARS’ 
Code of Conduct read with its internal guidelines in the unpublished SARS Internal Audit 
Manual. 
 
In many instances these open lines of communication will not exist between SARS and 
the taxpayer. So, in order for the taxpayer to determine the lawfulness, reasonableness 
and procedural fairness121 of SARS’ actions in commencing any inquiry and audit, it is 
necessary for the taxpayer to obtain certain key information that SARS  to ensure that 
their conduct is constitutionally compliant with their constitutional obligations of a high 
degree of professional ethics being displayed, impartiality, fairness and unbiased conduct, 
with accountability and transparency, as envisaged in s 195(1) of the Constitution, read 
together with SARS’ general duty to give adequate notice of its decision to inquire and 
audit in terms of s 3(1) and (2) of PAJA, and adequate reasons in terms of s 5(1) and (2) 
of PAJA as to why the inquiry and audit is required. All these constitutional obligations 
                                               
120Section 3.6: Legitimate Expectations supra; See also Williams R C et al Silke on Tax Administration (April 2012) 
Lexis Nexis at para 3.25 generally.  
121See sections 3.3: Lawfulness, 3.4: Reasonableness and 3.5: Procedural Fairness, supra; LAWSA Vol 5(3) 2nd ed at 
para 165; Commissioner of Taxes v CW (Pvt) Ltd 1989 (3) ZLR 361 (S) at 370F-372C; Union Government (Minister of 
Mines and Industries) v Union Steel Corporation (South Africa) Limited 1928 AD 220, 236-7; and National Transport 
Commission v Chetty's Motor Transport (Pty) Ltd 1972 (3) SA 726 (A); See also Local 174 International Brotherhood 
of Teamsters v US, 240 F.2d 387; US v Newman 441 F.2d 170; US v Coopers and Lybrand F Supp 942; Hubner v 
Tucker 245 F.2d 35; First National Bank of Mobile v US 160 F.2d 532. 
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form part of SARS’ Code of Conduct, creating the legitimate expectations (with the 
constitutional obligations imposed on them) that taxpayers are entitled to rely upon. 
 
Should SARS fail to adhere to these legitimate expectations (with the supporting 
constitutional obligations), the taxpayer may refuse to submit to the requests of SARS in 
terms of ss 74A and 74B. The appropriate defence to SARS raising the criminal 
provisions of s 75(1)(b) of Income Tax Act would be that the taxpayer’s conduct is 
justified, and that the taxpayer has ‘just cause ‘not to answer to SARS’ request, until 
SARS complies with its legitimate expectations, and other constitutional obligations. 
 
Should SARS seek to obtain the information by force, it would have to bring the 
appropriate application to court in terms of s 74D122 of the Income Tax Act setting out in 
an ex parte application what its suspicions regarding the taxpayer are – so SARS would 
have to provide a form of ‘adequate reasons’ anyway. The process of providing 
information to the court is in essence no different to providing the taxpayer with the 
information justifying the decision by SARS in terms of ss 74A and 74B.The taxpayer 
would also be entitled to the information placed before the court to justify the application 
brought by SARS in terms of s 74D. 
 
Once a legitimate expectation has been created, any attempt by SARS to avoid that 
legitimate expectation can be met by a review application, and ss 6, 7 and 8 of PAJA, or 
the principle of legality, would be appropriate. The transgression of a legitimate 
expectation will be reviewable directly in accordance with a transgression of the codified 
ground of review that SARS’ conduct is unlawful or unconstitutional as envisaged in s 
6(2)(i) of PAJA, or contrary to certainty and compliance with the rule of law in terms of 
the constitutional principle of legality.  
 
5.5.6.9 Constitutional obligations in terms of s 195(1) 
 
                                               
122 In Pullen NO Bartman NO & Orr NO v Waja 1929 TPD 838; Haynes v Commissioner for Inland Revenue 2000 (6) 
BCLR 596 (T); See also Hunter et al v Southam Inc (1984) 2 SCR 184, (1984) 11 DLR (4th) 641 (SCC); Williams R C 
et alSilke on Tax Administration (April 2009) Lexis Nexis at para 8.12 generally. 
 
  191 
What is also clear from case law123, and the wording of ss 1(c), 33, 41(1), 195(1) and 237 
of the Constitution, is that the constitutional obligations set out in s 195(1) of the 
Constitution must be followed, promoted and ‘must be performed diligently and without 
delay.’ This includes: 
 
(a) a right to a high standard of ethics from SARS; 
(b) fairness, absence of bias, and impartiality; 
(c) accountability; and 
(d) transparency. 
 
As previously stated, these constitutional obligations placed upon SARS are also repeated 
in s 4(2) of the SARS Act to ensure proper compliance by SARS with these duties. Any 
transgression of these constitutional obligations will amount to SARS acting ultra vires124 
the Constitution, and that in itself would amount to conduct that is inconsistent with the 
Constitution and ‘invalid’. 
 
Section 172(1) of the Constitution is clear: ‘When deciding a constitutional matter within 
its power, a court…must declare that any law or conduct that is inconsistent with the 
Constitution is invalid to the extent of its inconsistency; and…may make an order that is 
just and equitable…’. If a taxpayer has a complaint about unconstitutional conduct of 
SARS, such as SARS not complying with its constitutional obligations in terms of ss 
1(c), 33, 41(1), 195(1) and 237 of the Constitution, it must approach the appropriate court 
for relief. In terms of s 172(1)(b) and (2)(b) the court may make an order that is just and 
equitable, and grant a temporary interdict or other temporary relief to the taxpayer.  
 
The appropriate relief would be sought in terms of the ground of review in s 6(2)(i) being 
conduct ‘otherwise unconstitutional or unlawful’, or in terms of a transgression of the 
principle of legality – the rule of law, supreme to the Constitution, has been transgressed. 
 
5.6 SUPPORT FOR REVIEW OF SS 74A AND 74B 
                                               
123Premier, Western Cape v President of the Republic of South Africa 1999 (3) SA 657 (CC) at para 44;  The 
Permanent Secretary, Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape Provincial Government and Ano v Ngxuza and Others 
2001 (4) SA 1154 (SCA) at para [15] footnote 23;  Reuters Group Plc and Others v Viljoen NO and Others 2001 (2) 
SACR 519 (C) at para [46]; Carephone (Pty) Ltd v Marcus NO and Others 1999 (3) SA 504 (LAC) at para’s [9]-[14]. 
124 See section 3.3: Lawfulness supra. 
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Throughout this thesis, the difficulties surrounding the definition of ‘administrative 
action’ in PAJA, and the general submission that a discretion under ss 74A and 74B may 
not fall into that definition, have been discussed.  
 
Section 6(2) of PAJA codified the grounds of review.125 Although PAJA only applies to 
the review of ‘administrative action’ as defined this does not mean that ‘administrative 
action that is excluded from the definition of ‘administrative action’ is not reviewable: 
‘like all other exercises of power by public officials and public bodies, such actions are 
reviewable for compliance with the founding value of the rule of law, including its 
principle of legality, entrenched in section 1(c) of the Constitution, at the very least.’ 
 
In Nomala v Permanent Secretary, Department of Welfare and Another,126 the court held 
that a matter was ripe for adjudication in relation to the lawfulness of administrative 
action where prejudice was inevitable even though the action had not yet occurred. 
 
These judgments127 support the conclusion that the provisions of ss 74A and 74 are ripe 
for review in the appropriate circumstances, despite the general objections that maybe 
raised by SARS that its discretion does not fall into the definition of ‘administrative 
action’ in PAJA, or the fact that the provisions are investigative in nature, and 
preliminary as part of a multi-staged investigation. The exercise by SARS of its decision 
to conduct an inquiry and audit is the exercise of a power, and establishing the 
lawfulness, reasonableness and procedural fairness of the inquiry and audit require 
compliance by SARS with constitutional and other legislated jurisdictional facts.128 
 
In light of a more recent development in the Supreme Court of Appeal that may have an 
                                               
125 Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism and Others 2004 (4) SA 490 (CC). 
126 2001 (8) BCLR 844 (E): ‘Even at common law, it was not only actual infringements of rights which were 
considered ‘ripe’ for adjudication. Courts have been prepared to adjudicate on the lawfulness of administrative action 
measured against the yardstick of whether prejudice was inevitable, irrespective of whether the action had occurred or 
not.’ (Transvaal Coal Owners Association and Others v Board of Control 1921 TPD 447 at 452; Gool v Minister of 
Justice 1995 (2) SA 682 (C); Afdelings-Raad van Swartland v Administrateur, Kaap 1983 (3) SA 469 (C). A similar 
approach to this question was adopted by the Constitutional Court in the Levin matter where the provisions of the 
legislation sought to be declared inconsistent with the Constitution applied to an inquiry that had not yet commenced. 
(Ferreira v Levin NO and Others; Vryenhoek and Others v Powell NO and Others 1996 (1) BCLR 1 (CC) at 981B–H 
(para’s [165]–[166]).  
127 This is also in line with Kriegler J’s judgment in Metcash Trading Limited v Commissioner, South African Revenue 
Service 2001(1) SA 1109 (CC). 
128 See also the discussion on lawfulness, reasonableness and procedural fairness in sections 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5 supra. 
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impact on the submissions made in this thesis, it is necessary to comment on the dictum  
in Fuel Retailers of Southern Africa v Director General, Environmental Management, 
Department of Agriculture, Conservation and Environment, Mpumalanga Province and 
others,129 where it was held ‘that ‘[t]he cause of action for the judicial review of 
administrative action now ordinarily arises from PAJA, not from the common law as in 
the past.’ 
 
In the Bato Star case, O’Regan J130 contemplates ‘causes of action for judicial review of 
administrative action that do not fall within the scope of PAJA’, such as in terms of the 
principle of legality.  She also stated that common law that remains relevant to 
administrative review will be developed on a case-by-case basis as the courts interpret 
and apply the Constitution and PAJA.131 This would include the development of the 
constitutional principle of legality in addressing those review areas that fall outside the 
scope of the definition of ‘administrative action in PAJA,132 if one is to accept that the 
definition of ‘administrative action’ is not wide enough to include the powers exercised 
by SARS under ss 74A and 74B relevant to administrative review will have to be 
developed on a case-by-case basis in the courts interpreting the provisions of PAJA and 
the Constitution. But one area that is made clear by the Supreme Court of Appeal in 
Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd (Rustenburg Section) v Commission for Conciliation, 
Mediation and Arbitration133 is the fact that the grounds for review in s 6 of PAJA inform 
the development of the common law as to the extent of the grounds of review that may be 
applied in reviewing powers such as those of SARS under ss 74A and 74B (through the 
principle of legality, where the provisions of PAJA are held not to be applicable). 
 
However, if one is to argue successfully that the exercise of powers by SARS fall within 
the definition of ‘administrative action’ as submitted in this thesis, then the grounds of 
review in terms of s 6(2) of PAJA are available directly to the taxpayer in reviewing the 
powers of SARS under ss 74A and 74B.134 
                                               
129[2008] 1 All SA 627 (C) at page 632. 
130 Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism and Others 2004 (4) SA 490 (CC). 
131Ibid. at para [22]. 
132 For instance, wrong or non-performance giving rise to common-law review; See Hira v 
Booysen[1992] 2 All SA 344; Shidiack v Union Government (Minister of the Interior) 1912 AD 642; Britten v Pope 
1916 AD 150. 
133 2007(1) SA 576 (SCA) at para [25]. 
134 Similar tot he restrictions placed on the meaning of ‚administrative action’ under PAJA, in American jurisprudence, 
only final administrative decisions are subject to judicial review. In order to be final, conduct or action must mark the 
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5.7 PITFALLS IN BRINGING THE RULE 53 APPLICATION 
 
Exercising SARS’ discretion in terms of ss 74A and 74B is final because the exercise of 
the discretion in ss 74A and 74B is of itself not of a tentative or intermediate nature. The 
decision stands on its own, although it is part of a more lengthy process, culminating in a 
possible later letter of findings and then finally a revised assessment. The decision 
determines rights or obligations on the part of taxpayers in that they must now furnish 
information, documents or things, which they may already have provided. Legal 
consequences flow from the action, in that jurisdictional facts must be complied with, 
both in terms of the provisions of ss 74A and 74B, and in terms of the Constitution.  
 
When SARS makes demands under ss 74A and 74B, its decision to demand is final in 
nature. Has the complainant exhausted all administrative remedies? There is no objection 
and appeal process for ss 74A and 74B. There is no other internal remedy. The taxpayer 
may also have attempted to make contact with SARS to obtain answers as to the purpose 
of the inquiry and audit, and would probably have been met with rejection. 
 
Is the matter ripe, in that it is sufficiently developed for judicial resolution? Here the fact 
pattern of the matter will determine whether or not a court will be convinced. However, 
the prejudice that will be suffered by the taxpayer immediately after the inquiry and 
audit, where SARS has acted unlawfully, unreasonably or unfairly, is severe enough to 
make the matter ripe for review prior to any revised assessment being raised. The ‘pay 
now argue later’ principle looms. 
 
Apart from the issues of finality, exhausting all internal remedies, and ripeness of the 
matter, the case of Contract Support Services (Pty) Ltd and Others v CSARS135 is a good 
starting point in determining the requirements for bringing a successful review 
application against SARS in terms of PAJA or a Rule 53 application. 
                                                                                                                                
consummation of its decision-making process, and must not be of a tentative or intermediate nature. Furthermore the 
action must be one by which 'rights or obligations have been determined', or from which 'legal consequences flow’ - 
Following American jurisprudence in Funk W F et al Administrative Law 2nd ed (2006) Aspen Publishers at page 234 – 
239. 
135 1999(3) SA 1133 (WLD), 61 SATC 338. 
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In this case, SARS had obtained a search and seizure warrant in terms of Section 57D of 
the Value Added Tax Act136 and Section 74D of the Income Tax Act to search the 
premises where Contract Support Services (Pty) Ltd137 conducted business.     
Contract Support Services (Pty) Ltd conducted business as the agent for various 
contractors and collected moneys from clients on behalf of the contractors. After SARS 
had conducted the search and seizure operation and had seized documents, it caused 
notices in terms of Section 47 of the Value Added Tax Act to be served on the debtors of 
Contract Support Services (Pty) Ltd and others (the Applicants in the case).   
 
This resulted in the Applicants making an application to the High Court for an interdict as 
a matter of urgency.138 The Applicants asked the Court for various orders, inter alia to 
direct that SARS and others to make available to the Applicants all documents (other than 
those protected by legal professional privilege) and other information in terms of Section 
32 of the Constitution. The Applicants also requested the Court to declare the search and 
seizure warrant issued by the Fifth Respondent (Judge Snyders) on 4 November 1998 to 
be set aside. In addition, the Applicants requested the Court to declare that the Value 
Added Tax Assessment issued should be corrected or set aside in terms of Rule 53(1)(a) 
of the Uniform Rules of Court.   
 
The Applicants obtained an order before Malan J. This order was, however, rescinded on 
the same day by application from SARS after the leading of viva voce evidence.  
Thereafter the matter was postponed to the urgent roll. 
 
At the hearing of the matter before court, Brett AJ first considered whether the Court was 
competent to consider the interim relief requested by the Applicants.  In this regard the 
Court referred to the matter of Safcor Forwarding (Pty) Ltd v VNTC139 where Corbett J A 
held that the rule nisi is available to applicants that can show prima facie that their rights 
have been infringed and that they will suffer real loss or disadvantage if compelled to rely 
on normal procedures to bring the dispute to the attention of the courts. He went on to 
                                               
136 Act 89 of 1991. 
137Contract Support Services (Pty) Ltd and Others v Commissioner of Receiver of Revenue and Others 1999 (3) SA 
1133 (W). 
138 For the principles to be applied in interim interdicts, see Cape Town Municipality v LF Boshoff Investments (Pty) 
Ltd 1969 (2) SA 256 (C). 
139 1982(3) SA 654AD at pages 674H-675D. 
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state that: ‘The decisions of public bodies or officialdom sometimes bear hard on the 
individual.  The impact thereof may be sudden and devastating.  Therefore, as in the case 
of other types of litigation, applications for the review of such decisions may require 
urgent handling and in proper circumstances the grant of interim relief.  In my opinion it 
would be unfortunate if our review procedures did not admit of this.’ 
 
Brett AJ held, after quoting extensively from the case of Safcor Forwarding (Pty) Ltd v 
NTC,140 that the court was competent to grant interim relief to the Applicants if they 
succeeded in proving a prima facie case.   
 
The next issue to decide was whether the notice issued by SARS in terms of Section 47 
of the Value Added Tax Act should be set aside on review.  More particularly, Brett AJ 
had to decide whether the Applicants were entitled to approach the court to review the 
decisions that SARS had taken to appoint agents in terms of Section 47 of the Value 
Added Tax Act, and secondly whether the Applicants had made a prima facie case on the 
merits of the matter.  
 
Counsel for SARS contended that a notice under Section 47 of the Income Tax Act was 
not capable of review by the High Court. The basis for this argument was that the 
obligation on the taxpayer to pay (because of the self-assessment system of our Value 
Added Tax Act), exists notwithstanding any objection and appeal noted by the 
Applicants, by virtue of the operation of the various sections such as Section 28(1), 40, 
48(6) and 49 of the Value Added Tax Act, and that the decision to use Section 47 of the 
Value Added Tax Act did not create any further obligation for a taxpayer and therefore 
did not constitute an administrative decision capable of review.   
 
Brett AJ did not agree with this contention of the counsel for SARS. He referred to the 
unreported judgment of Yusuf Vahed and Others v The Commissioner of Inland 
Revenue,141 where Swart J decided that the ‘satisfaction’ of SARS was an administrative 
decision, separate and distinguishable from the merits of the rest of the case, in that 
                                               
140 1982 (3) SA 654 (AD). 
141 Case Number 28225/97. 
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instance the additional assessment. The relevant excerpt from the judgment of Yusuf 
Vahed and Others v The Commissioner of Inland Revenue142 is as follows:  
 
I am accordingly of the view that the decision to issue notices in terms of 
Section 47 of the VAT Act constituted an administrative decision affecting 
the rights of the applicants to freely conduct their bank account held at the 
third Respondent and to receive payment from their debtors. For these 
reasons I consider the decision to issue the notices in terms of Section 47 
capable of being reviewed and set aside.143 (Emphasis supplied) 
 
The only issue left to decide was whether the Applicants had in fact made a prima facie 
case on the merits for the interim relief sought. In this regard the Applicants relied on 
Item 23(2)(b) of the Constitution144 prior to the promulgation of PAJA, where it is stated 
that every person has the right to: 
 
(a) lawful administrative action where any of their rights or interests are 
affected or threatened; 
(b) procedurally fair administrative action where any of their rights or 
legitimate expectations are affected or threatened; 
(c) be furnished with reasons in writing for administrative action which 
affects any of their rights or interests; and 
(d) administrative action which is justifiable in relation to the reasons 
given for it where any of their rights are affected or threatened. 
 
The Applicants relied specifically on the audi alteram partem rule.  Brett AJ agreed with 
SARS’ submissions that the audi alteram partem rule did not apply145 under these 
circumstances:  
 
I agree with the submission made … that not all administrative acts 
require the application of the audi alteram partem rule before they are 
                                               
142Ibid. 
143 This is in line with Kriegler J’s judgment in Metcash Trading Limited v Commissioner, South African Revenue 
Service 2001(1) SA 1109 (CC). 
144 Schedule 6 of the Constitution. 
145At page 350. 
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given effect to. Indeed Section 47 itself requires no such prior hearing. I 
also agree … that to require a prior hearing would defeat the very purpose 
of the notice. It would alert the defaulting VAT payer to the intention to 
require payment from the latter’s debtors and so enable the defaulting 
taxpayer to receive payment of the funds due and to enable the taxpayer to 
spirit such funds away. Where prior notice and a hearing would render 
the proposed act nugatory, no such prior notice or hearing is required. I 
refer in this regard to the case of Gardener v East London Transitional 
Council and Others 1996(3) SA 99 (ECD) at 116 D-G. (Emphasis 
supplied) 
 
Brett AJ then quoted from the Gardener v East London Transitional Council and 
Others146 where it is stated that fairness is a relative concept that must be viewed in the 
light of the relevant circumstances. The procedure must be fair not only to the holder of 
the right affected by the administrative act but also the executive or administration acting 
in the public interest. It was held that the audi alteram partem principle is not applicable 
to every administrative act. Such an interpretation would lead to the possible misuse of 
the Constitution. 
Brett AJ then found specifically that the provision of Section 47 of the Income Tax Act 
excluded the audi alteram partem principle.  He also found that the Applicants did not 
make out a prima facie case for interim relief and found in favour of SARS by not 
granting any interim relief to the taxpayers. 
 
This case illustrates the technical difficulties facing a taxpayer who is seeking to bring a 
review application either in terms of PAJA (on the basis that the taxpayer’s rights have 
been adversely affected, which create a direct, external legal effect as set out in the 
definition of ‘administrative conduct’ in PAJA), or in terms of Rule 53. These technical 
difficulties can be summarised as follows: 
 
                                               
146 1996(3) SA 99 (ECD) at para’s 116 D-G. 
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(a) where taxpayers seek interim relief the provisions of Safcor Forwarding (Pty) 
Ltd v VNTC147 must be adhered to; the taxpayer must show prima facie that its 
rights have been infringed and that it will suffer real loss or disadvantage if 
compelled to rely solely on the normal procedures for bringing disputes to the 
tax court after revised assessments are issued. Metcash Trading Limited v C 
SARS and Another148and Yusuf Vahed and Others v The Commissioner of 
Inland Revenue149 is authority that the decision taken by SARS to conduct an 
audit is a separate decision, that in itself is subject to the inherent review 
jurisdiction of the High Court;  
 
(b) the question will be asked whether the subject matter of the review is in fact 
reviewable by the High Court; in this regard the issue that may be raised by 
SARS will be the fact that it is not ‘administrative action’ as defined in PAJA. 
SARS may also contend that the matter is not final or ‘ripe’ for review, as the 
decision relates to conduct which forms part of a multi-staged decision-
making process. SARS may also contend that the final decision will be made 
when the revised assessment is issued by SARS in the future. It is at this stage 
that the taxpayer will be given the full opportunity to exercise its rights 
(through the objection and appeal process). In this regard the reference by 
Brett AJ to the fact that the word ‘satisfaction’ denotes an administrative 
decision which is separate and distinguishable from the merits of the rest of 
the case (in the matter of Contract Support Services (Pty) Ltd)150 will assist 
the taxpayer in arguing that the use of the word ‘may’ denotes a discretion 
being exercised by SARS, which is separate from any merits of the rest of the 
case, capable of review. Metcash Trading Limited v C SARS and Another151 
and Yusuf Vahed and Others v The Commissioner of Inland Revenue152 is 
authority that the decision taken by SARS to commence an audit of a taxpayer 
is a separate reviewable decision. That decision may result in significant 
transgressions of taxpayers constitutional rights in the near future in line with 
                                               
147 1982(3) SA 654AD at pages 674H-675D. 
148 2001(1) SA 1109 (CC). 
149 Case Number 28225/97, Witwatersrand Local Division. 
1501999 (3) SA 1133 (W). 
151 2001(1) SA 1109 (CC). 
152 Case Number 28225/97, Witwatersrand Local Division. 
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various authorities.153 In the alternative, if it is held that the decision to audit is 
not an administrative decision or action, the constitutional principle of legality 
will apply where lawfulness, reasonableness, fair procedure and reasons apply 
to the conduct of SARS;154 
 
(c) in most instances, taxpayers will rely on the audi alteram partem rule. 
Arguments will have to be proffered why this rule would apply in the instance 
of ss 74A and 74B, as discussed in the Contract Support Services (Pty) Ltd155, 
and analysed in this thesis.156 The primary reason given by the taxpayer would 
be that, in accordance with s 3(1) and (2), read with s 5(1) and (2) of PAJA, 
and s 195(1)(f), SARS is to be held accountable and must adhere to just 
administrative procedures in arriving at any decision it takes in terms of ss 
74A and 74B. Such a decision would ultimately give rise to serious 
consequences for the taxpayer in the form of a revised assessment in the 
future, which could be prejudicial to the taxpayer and would adversely affect 
the rights of the taxpayer, with direct, external legal effect. Unlike the 
circumstances of the Contract Support Services case,157 the application of the 
audi principle would not be a misuse of the Constitution resulting in the ss 
74A and 74B process being nugatory.158 The decision by SARS to access 
information, documents and things to base its findings on for a revised 
assessment, is final. Once the revised assessment is issued the ‘pay now argue 
later’ principle becomes immediately applicable, as any challenge against the 
findings of SARS does not suspend the payment of the revised assessment tax 
that is due. For the taxpayer to wait for the completion of the audit and the 
issuance of the revised assessment is too late if the taxpayer is to challenge 
                                               
153Hoexter (2012) at page 229 footnote 438; Du Preez v Truth and Reconciliation Commission 1997(3) SA 204 (A) and 
Director: Mineral Development, Gauteng Region v Save the Vaal Environment 1999(2) SA 709 (SCA); Ferreira v 
Levin NO and Others; Vryenhoek and Others V Powell NO and Others1996 (1) BCLR 1 (CC) at para’s [165] – [166]; 
See also Croome B Taxpayers’ Rights in South Africa Juta 2010 at page 207; Wheelright K Taxpayer’ Rights in 
Australia in Bentley D Taxpayers’ Rights: An International Perspective Revenue Law Journal Bond University: 
Queensland 1998 at page 49; Park-Ross and Another v Director: Office for Serious Economic Offences 1995 (2) SA 
148 (C) paras [1641-165A]; Nomala v Permanent Secretary, Department of Welfare and Another 2001 (8) BCLR 844 
(E); Transvaal Coal Owners Association and Others v Board of Control 1921 TPD 447 at 452; Gool v Minister of 
Justice 1995 (2) SA 682 (C); Afdelings-Raad van Swartland v Administrateur, Kaap 1983 (3) SA 469 (C). 
154 Hoexter (2012) at pages 121-5. 
155Contract Support Services (Pty) Ltd and Others v Commissioner for South African Revenue Service & Others 1999 
(3) SA 1133 (W). 
156 See sections 3.5: Procedural Fairness and 3.5.2: Audi Alteram Partem supra. 
157Op. cit. 
158 As envisaged in s 75(1)(b) of the Income Tax Act. 
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any conduct of SARS that is constitutionally invalid, whilst SARS invokes its 
extensive powers. This is in accordance with the principles set out in various 
authorities, including Ferreira v Levin NO and Others; Vryenhoek and Others 
v Powell NO and Others.159 The Constitutional Court entertained an 
application from the applicant to determine a constitutional issue before the 
event actually took place. Had the event taken place first, the constitutional 
rights of the applicant would then have been transgressed – not to be 
compelled to give self-incriminating evidence.160 The taxpayer facing a SARS 
audit is in a similar position to the applicant in the Ferreira v Levin NO and 
Others; Vryenhoek and Others v Powell NO and Others161case, and the 
taxpayer is entitled to seek clarification from SARS as to the scope and 
purpose of the audit, and in the process to obtain certainty from SARS that it 
will comply with all of its constitutional obligations in favour of taxpayers. 
 
Finally, in Kimberley Girls’ High School and another v Head of Department of 
Education, Northern Cape Province and others162 the court reiterated that ‘(t)he onus of 
establishing that there are grounds on which a court can review a functionary’s decision, 
rests on an applicant’. The taxpayer has the onus of establishing that there are grounds on 
which a court can review SARS’ conduct – as discussed throughout this thesis. This will 
be made by the taxpayer in the application for review in terms of Rule 53 of the SARS 
decision in terms of ss 74A and 74B. 
 
                                               
1591996 (1) BCLR 1 (CC) at para’s [165] – [166]. 
160 Sections 35(3)(h)-(j) of the Constitution; See also ITC 1818 69 SATC 98 and Seapoint Computer Bureau (Pty) Ltd v 
McLoughlin and de Wet NNO 1997 (2) SA 636 (W). 
161Supra footnote 162. 
162 [2005] 1 All SA 360 (NC), in a case where s 195(1) of the Constitution was also considered as part of the grounds of 
review under consideration; See also Chirwa v Transnet Limited and Others 2008 (4) SA 367 (CC) (28 November 
2007) at para’s [74] – [76], [146] and [195]: ‘[76] Therefore although section 195 of the Constitution provides valuable 
interpretive assistance it does not found a right to bring an action.’ 
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6.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
In 2005 the Minister of Finance announced in the Budget Review 2005 a project ‘to 
incorporate into one piece of legislation certain generic administrative provisions, which 
are currently duplicated in the different (tax) Acts.’  
 
This project culminated in the release for public comment the proposed Tax 
Administration Act 28 of 2011,1 and with a request that comments be submitted by the 
public.  
 
Many criticisms were submitted to the draft legislation questioning the constitutional 
validity of many of its severely encroaching provisions dealing with the entitlement of 
SARS to conduct random investigations, obtain any information in respect of any person 
and not just in relation to the affairs of a taxpayer, conduct warrantless search and seizure 
operations, enforce tax collection procedures against third parties in their personal 
capacities in an attempt to recover taxes due by a taxpayer, and seek to raise ‘jeopardy 
assessments’ against taxpayers even before the tax information is due by that taxpayer to 
SARS for assessment.2 Other than the information gathering provisions in the proposed 
Tax Administration Act, the other provisions fall outside the scope of this thesis. In 
summary, some of the negative consequences of the proposed Tax Administration Act 
can be summarised as follows from an opening statement by the writer to various 
professional audiences at continuing tax training sessions conducted for the South 
African Institute of Tax Practitioners throughout South Africa commencing March 20103: 
 
The Tax Administration Act when it finally takes effect on 1 October 2012, will allow 
SARS to have some draconian powers. These include: on raising a revised assessment 
SARS will be entitled to immediately enforce the pay now argue later provisions of the 
Act(despite legitimate expectations granted in the past by the Commissioner that 
                                               
1Hereinafter referred to as the ‘Tax Administration Act’. 
2 Copies of some of the criticisms submitted by the Law Societies of South Africa (“LSSA”), the KwaZulu-Natal Law 
Society, the South African Institute of Tax Practitioners, the Advocates Bar Association of South Africa, professional 
firm Edward Nathan Sonnenberg and the South African Institute of Professional Accountants are available on the 
website www.TaxRiskManagement.com (last accessed 18 March 2013). 
3 Between 8 – 12 March 2010 in Cape Town, Port Elizabeth, Durban, Johannesburg, Bloemfontein, George and 
Pretoria, under a training series called SAIT Tax Administration Bill by the writer in his capacity as adjunct Professor of 
Law, Thomas Jefferson School of Law, San Diego, California – see the website the South African Institute of Tax 
Practitioners (“SAIT”) www.thesait.org.za (last accessed 18 March 2013). This series of lectures was repeated 
nationwide in South Africa during October 2011 and to be repeated in October 2012. 
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application can be made for the suspension of payment under certain broad 
circumstances, and despite the past automatic suspension of the principle in terms of the 
Supreme Court of Appeal judgment in Singh v C:SARS4 until the objection process is 
completed); SARS will be entitled to obtain an asset preservation order; enforce the 
assessment against third parties personally involved in the financial management of the 
taxpayer; apply to court to withdraw the taxpayer’s authorisation to conduct business in 
South Africa; and require the taxpayer to cease trading. It can be anticipated that SARS 
will use these powers liberally.  
 
The provisions that will replace ss 74A and 74B are contained in the definitions of 
‘administration of a tax Act’ and ‘relevant material’ read together with ss 3, and 40 
through 49 of the proposed Tax Administration Act, and in particular s 46 dealing with 
the request by SARS for ‘relevant material’ – ‘foreseeably relevant’ and with ‘reasonable 
specificity’, within a ‘reasonable period’.  
 
The provisions, are couched more widely to allow the inspection and investigation of 
persons who may not be taxpayers, the specific inclusion of random audits5, and granting 
SARS specific powers to investigate in its scope of an audit whether or not an offence has 
been committed, in respect of tax offences where a senior SARS official may lay the 
appropriate criminal charges.  
 
It is, however, submitted that taxpayers may have stronger ‘just cause’6 not to participate 
in a proposed audit by virtue of some of the stated extended SARS powers, and may in 
fact have greater constitutional justification in having the decisions taken by SARS to 
embark upon an audit reviewed by the courts – in that the current ‘softer’ environment to 
suspend the ‘pay now argue later’ principle will be eliminated, and the fact that SARS is 
given express and specific powers to investigate a taxpayer, obtain self-incriminating 
evidence from that taxpayer, and then use it to lay a criminal charge against the taxpayer. 
The taxpayer is expected to incriminate itself (contrary to the Bill of Rights s 35(3)(j) 
guarantee) by handing over any ‘relevant material’ that SARS may require as being 
                                               
42003 (4) 520 (SCA). 
5 This is a specific attempt to circumvent principles in jurisprudence such as that set out in the American case of US v 
Third Northwestern National Bank 102 F Supp. 879. 
6See section 3.8: ‘Just Cause’ Defence supra. 
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useful to conduct the audit, for SARS to then simply use that information7(or information 
derived from that information handed over in self-incriminatory circumstances) as 
evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the guilt of the taxpayer in committing a 
statutory or common law tax-related offence. This is contrary to the principles laid out by 
the Constitutional Court in Ferreira v Levin NO and Others; Vryenhoek and Others V 
Powell NO and Others8 in a  similar instance where a person was compelled9 to make 
available self-incriminating evidence. The Constitutional Court held that where public 
policy dictates that self-incriminating evidence should be made available by a person, 
that evidence cannot be used to incriminate that person both in its direct form, or any 
other evidence derived from it. This issue falls outside the scope of this thesis, but the 
constitutional issue that flows from it will no doubt give rise to much litigation, and 
opportunities for taxpayers to raise the ‘just cause’ defence to refuse to participate in any 
SARS audit by refusing to submit to SARS’ demands for ‘relevant material’. 
 
Despite the above criticisms and comments, it is the writer’s submission that the new 
proposed provisions in the Tax Administration Act do not affect the submissions and 
conclusions reached in this thesis.  
 
6.2 THE NEW PROPOSED TAX ADMINISTRATION ACT 
 
The definition in the new proposed Tax Administration Act for ‘administration of a tax 
act’ as defined in s 3(2) in so far as it is used in selecting taxpayers for inquiry and audit 
in ss 40 through 49 of the Tax Administration Act, states that SARS is responsible for the 
administration of a tax act, which in turns basically repeats the definition (with a few 
exceptions mentioned infra) of ‘the administration of this act’ contained in the current s 
74 of the Income Tax Act and as one of the jurisdictional facts in ss 74A and 74B.  
 
The definition is wider in that included in its ambit is the ability for SARS to: determine 
the future tax liability of a person (who may not even be a current taxpayer); establish the 
identity of a person to determine such a future tax liability; and an emphasis on the ability 
for SARS to investigate tax related offences and lay the appropriate statutory and 
                                               
7Section 72 of the Tax Administration Act, unless a court directs otherwise. 
81996 (1) SA 984 (CC). 
9 Sections 35(3)(h)-(j) of the Constitution; See also ITC 1818 69 SATC 98 and Seapoint Computer Bureau (Pty) Ltd v 
McLoughlin and de Wet NNO 1997 (2) SA 636 (W). 
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common law criminal charges, and do all reasonably required for the investigation and 
prosecution of tax offences. 
 
It is with reference to the later administrative action that the writer believes constitutional 
challenges will occur, either in challenging the law as being unconstitutional in its current 
form, in that it does not purport to give a clear line of separation between a necessary 
administrative audit for SARS to revisit the tax compliance of a taxpayer, and impose 
various administrative penalties10 (Chapter 15 and 16 of the Tax Administration Act) and 
penalty interest (Chapter 12 of the Tax Administration Act), and criminal prosecution as 
envisaged in the Canadian Supreme Court case of R v Jarvis.11 In that case a clear line 
between a civil or administrative audit, and a criminal investigation was drawn, as 
analysed earlier in this thesis.  
 
To take matters further, the Constitutional Court in South Africa in Ferreira v Levin NO 
and Others; Vryenhoek and Others V Powell NO and Others12 is authority for the 
submission that where any person has been compelled to give self-incriminating evidence 
in the interests of public policy, that direct, and any derivative, evidence cannot be used 
against the person in any subsequent criminal prosecution. This decision is in line with 
the constitutional guarantees given to persons in ss 35(3)(j) and (5) of the Bill of Rights13. 
                                               
10 The reverse onus usually applies in the case of penalties. On setting aside the ‘reverse onus’ by the Constitutional 
Court, see William Mello and Constantina Botolo v S1998 (3) SA 712 (CC). The Tax Administration Act places the 
onus of proof for understatement tax in Chapter 16 on SARS. On the difference between administrative and criminal 
penalties, attention should be paid to the facts. Administrative penalties are designed to assist SARS recover its costs in 
recovering undeclared taxes. Criminal penalties are imposed as a form of punishment. If administrative penalties are 
excessive under the circumstances, the issue of criminal or punitive penalties arises. Then the question of double 
jeopardy becomes relevant. The principles governing double jeopardy in South Africa are well summarised in Tax 
Board Decision 198, by Advocate B Spligg SC as Chairman, Lexis Nexis online at 
www.mylexisnexis.co.zahttp://www.mylexisnexis.co.za/nxt/gateway.dll/lc/u3b/w3b/yi1ea?f=templates$fn=default.htm
$vid=mylnb:10.1048/enu (last accessed 31 March 2013), at para’s [12]ff. 
11 2002 (3) SCR 757; See also US v LaSalle Bank 437 US 298 US where it was held ‘Congress intended Internal 
Revenue Service summons authority to be used to aid determination and collection of taxes, which purposes do not 
include goal of filing criminal charges against citizens; consequently, summons authority does not exist to aid criminal 
investigations solely’ and ‘(p)rior to recommendation for prosecution to Department of Justice, Internal Revenue 
Service must use its summons authority in good faith; dispositive question in each case is whether Service is pursuing 
authorized purposes in good faith or whether it has abandoned, in institutional sense, pursuit of civil tax determination 
or collection’. Emphasis supplied; SARS in its SARS Internal Audit Process Manual at Chapter 5 Comparison with The 
United States of America, p 7 – 8 quote the LaSalle case in conjunction with US v Powell 379 US 48 where they state: 
‘…the provisions…(are)…important for the South African situation in that the four requirements …on…the standards 
of good faith should substantially be complied with under South African circumstances.’Hale v Hinkle 201 US 43 
where it was held that ‘(t)he privilege against self-incrimination given by the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution, 
U.S.C.A., is personal to the witness and cannot be invoked in favor of another person, or of a corporation of which the 
witness is an officer or employee’; Murdock v Pa 319 US 105. 
121996 (1) SA 984 (CC). 
13 Sections 35(3)(h)-(j) of the Constitution. See also ITC 1818 69 SATC 98 and Seapoint Computer Bureau (Pty) Ltd v 
McLoughlin and de Wet NNO 1997 (2) SA 636 (W). 
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The encroachment of the right not to give self-incriminating evidence was justified14as 
envisaged in s 36 of the Bill of Rights by guaranteeing the exclusion of the evidence so 
obtained, and any derivative evidence, from any future prosecution of the accused person.  
 
These constitutional principles are now recognised in the Tax Administration Act. In s 57 
of the Tax Administration Act it is stated that incriminating evidence obtained from a 
person at an inquiry is not admissible in any subsequent criminal proceedings against that 
person. A contrary provision appears in s 72 of the Tax Administration Act, but is subject 
to the court making a finding that the evidence be excluded for criminal prosecution 
purposes. However, no mention is made of the derivative evidence, or of evidence 
obtained by way of written interrogatories as envisaged in ss 40 through 49 of the Tax 
Administration Act. No further exclusion or mention is made of this in Chapter 17 of the 
Tax Administration Act dealing with criminal offences. 
 
It is the writer’s submission that these lacunae in the Tax Administration Act will entitle 
a suspicious taxpayer, before participating in any SARS audit, to raise the defence of  
‘just cause’ in refusing to participate in an administrative audit commenced by SARS in 
terms of ss 40 through 49 of the Tax Administration Act, until one of three things 
happens: 
 
1. SARS gives written assurances that the audit will remain an administrative 
one, and that no evidence or communication with the SARS criminal 
investigation unit will take place, and all evidence obtained from the 
taxpayer will be excluded (including any derivative evidence) from any 
future prosecution;  
 
2. The appropriate court application is brought to the Constitutional Court to 
declare the law or conduct of SARS invalid, and/or to seek the appropriate 
                                               
14 Careful note would have to be taken by SARS of Nyambirai v Nssa & Another 1995 (2) ZLR 1 (S) and De Freitas v 
Permanent Secretary of Agriculture, Fisheries, Lands and Housing 1998 3 LRC 62 where this Privy Council decision 
was cited with approval on the issue of what is ‘reasonably justifiable in a democratic society’ to limit a person’s 
fundamental constitutional rights in the Zimbabwean Supreme Court case of Law Society of Zimbabwe and Another v 
Minister of Finance 61 SATC 458: ‘1.Whether the legislative objective is sufficiently important to justify limiting a 
fundamental right? 2.Whether the measures designed to meet the legislative objective are rationally connected to it? 
3.Whether the means used to impair the right or freedom are no more than is necessary to accomplish the objective?’ 
(Emphasis supplied); See also US v McCarthy 514 F 2d 368; Ferucci and Others v Commissioner for South African 
Revenue Service and Another 65 SATC 47 at pages 54-55. 
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guarantees given to the applicant in Ferreira v Levin NO and Others; 
Vryenhoek and Others V Powell NO and Others15; and/or  
 
3. Request detailed information from SARS in terms of s 73 of the Tax 
Administration Act in establishing the source of the audit, the scope of the 
audit, whether or not any criminal investigation is taking place or 
anticipated, and on what grounds. Seeking this type of information 
requires the taxpayer in terms of s 73 of the Tax Administration Act to do 
so through the mechanisms created in terms of the Promotion of Access to 
Information Act.16 This requires the taxpayer to correspond with the 
information officer of SARS at its head office in Pretoria. A very slow, 
laborious and frustrating process, often resulting in the information officer 
refusing to make the requested information available, and expecting the 
taxpayer to seek redress through the internal appeal process set out in that 
Act,17 which in turn causes delays running into numerous months. The 
purpose of the information request addressed to SARS will be to allow the 
taxpayer to insure SARS meets its constitutional obligations towards the 
taxpayer, as envisaged in 1. and 2. above. 
 
The ‘just cause’ defence will prevent SARS seeking a positive conviction under s 234of 
the Tax Administration Act(read with ss 49(2) and 127 of the Tax Administration Act) 
for the taxpayer refusing to impart any ‘relevant material’ on the basis that SARS has 
made a decision that is inconsistent with the Constitution, and invalid. 
 
6.3 RELEVANT MATERIAL 
 
The definition of ‘relevant material’ in the Tax Administration Act provides for 
‘information, a document, or a thing (all in turn defined, but creating meanings the same 
as those in the current Income Tax Act, 1962) that may be useful in assessing a tax, 
collecting tax, or showing non-compliance with an obligation under a tax act or a tax 
                                               
151996 (1) SA 984 (CC). 
16 Act 2 of 2000. 
17 The writer’s experience in attempting to deal with the information officer of SARS since 2003 on numerous 
occasions after the promulgation of the Promotion of Access to Information Act. 
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offence was committed (which is specifically defined to include any other offence 
involving fraud on SARS)’. 
 
In ITC 173618 Selikowitz P made the following pertinent comments: 
The term ‘administration of this Act’ is defined in s 74 and what is clear is 
that administration of the Act is a matter which falls within the domain of 
the Commissioner for Inland Revenue and should not be confused with 
this court’s independent jurisdiction to decide upon matters which arise 
out of that administration. In other words, the rights of the Commissioner 
to seek to obtain information, documents and such things as he may 
require is not a right which is a substitute for any procedure which may be 
found to be applicable before this tribunal. Indeed, the purpose of 
discovery is far wider than the purposes required for the administration of 
the Act. Discovery is by its nature an extremely important aspect of our 
litigation procedure. It entitles a party to prepare properly by knowing 
what documents and other discoverable items are in existence. They may 
be, either items which the other party who has to discover them, is going 
to use in the course of presenting his or her case, or, indeed, they may be 
documents according to the provisions of the Magistrates’ Court which 
tend to prove or disprove either party’s case. Discovery is intended to 
permit the parties to litigation, to have full information as to what 
documentation and other discoverable items are in existence. That is a 
different concept to that expressed in s 74A of the Act where the 
Commissioner would be seeking documents which he in his own mind 
decides could be relevant. Clearly there may be documents in existence 
and in the possession of the other party which the Commissioner may not 
consider necessary because either he does not know that they exist or he 
does not know what they contain. It is therefore not an answer to suggest 
that s 74A of the Income Tax Act provides the Commissioner with a 
substitute for formal discovery. 
 
                                               
1864 SATC 464 at pages 467-8. 
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The principles set out in this judgment apply equally to the new ‘relevant material’ 
definition in the Tax Administration Act. However, one distinguishing factor may be the 
use of the words ‘that may be useful in assessing tax, collecting tax, or showing non-
compliance’. These words seek to broaden the scope of what SARS is entitled to now in 
terms of the current Income Tax Act, and may include much more than mere factual 
information about a taxpayer’s tax affairs. This may include views or opinions (excluding 
those subject to attorney and client privilege)19 that would otherwise not be only of a 
factual nature. In a sense, SARS is attempting to bring forward the discovery process 
referred to by Selikowitz P in ITC 173620 above. 
 
Despite these general criticisms, the main issue with the definition of ‘relevant material’ 
relates back to the mixed civil audit and criminal investigation audit referred to above in 
this thesis: ‘information, a document, or a thing … that may be useful in … showing non-
compliance with an obligation under a tax act or a tax offence was committed’. The 
definition goes a long way to contribute to the potential transgression of taxpayers 
constitutional rights, in either not being able to be compelled21 to give self-incriminating 
evidence, or where compelled to do so by public policy, receive a guarantee that any such 
direct or derivative evidence obtained under compulsion, will not be used against the 
taxpayer in any subsequent criminal prosecution. 
 
6.4 REQUEST FOR RELEVANT MATERIAL, AUDIT SELECTION AND FIELD 
AUDIT 
 
The differences between the provisions of ss 40 through 49 of the proposed Tax 
Administration Act, and ss 74A and 74B are summarised infra. SARS will be able to: 
 
1.  Request information ‘that may be useful in assessing tax, collecting tax, 
or showing non-compliance’,22 broadening the scope of its audit 
investigation to include ‘relevant material’ that it subjectively believes 
‘may be useful’ for its purpose; 
                                               
19 Heiman Maasdorp & Barker v SIR  1968 (4) SA 160 (W). 
2064 SATC 464. 
21 Sections 35(3)(h)-(j) of the Constitution; See also ITC 1818 69 SATC 98; Seapoint Computer Bureau (Pty) Ltd v 
McLoughlin and de Wet NNO 1997 (2) SA 636 (W). 
22 Section 1 of the Tax Administration Act, definition of ‘relevant material’. 
 
  212 
 
2.  Request information for the ‘administration of a tax act’ to ‘investigate 
whether an offence has been committed in terms of a tax act’ and then, if 
in its subjective belief this is so ‘lay criminal charges…(and)…provide the 
assistance that is reasonably required for the investigation and prosecution 
of tax offences or related common law’,23 broadening the scope of the 
offence investigation provisions currently contained in s 74 of the Income 
Tax Act under the definition of ‘the administration of this Act’;  
 
3. Request information in respect of classes of taxpayers, and not just in 
respect of a named taxpayer, ‘whether identified by name or otherwise 
objectively identifiable’ and ‘objectively identifiable class of taxpayers’.24 
For example, members of an exclusive sports club, although SARS will 
still have to identify the class of taxpayers using an objective means. It 
may be in the example cited that some of the members of the club are 
foreigners, who are not taxpayers, and the club may have no objective 
means at its disposal to objectively identify who is a taxpayer, or should 
be a taxpayer, and who is not. The scope of the request for information has 
broadened to ‘for the purposes of tax policy design or estimation’.25 If the 
‘relevant material’ is specifically requested for this purpose, based on the 
conclusions reached elsewhere in this thesis, if SARS were to make this 
information available to assessors to issue revised assessments or criminal 
investigators to investigate a prosecution or imposition of a penalty26 (that 
is punitive in nature, such as additional tax), the legal concept of 
entrapment would be available to the taxpayer as a defence. This is an 
untested proposition, but one that is nevertheless available to taxpayers, 
simply because SARS would have obtained information from the 
taxpayers concerned under the false pretences of actually accumulating 
information to attend to statistical analysis, and not to collect evidence for 
revised assessment or criminal investigation purposes. Taxpayers are 
always, in terms of constitutional guarantees analysed in this thesis, 
                                               
23Ibid. s 3(1)(f). 
24Ibid. s46. 
25Ibid. s 70(1)(b). 
26See the discussion in this thesis on the Canadian Supreme Court case of R v Jarvis2002 (3) SCR 757, at page 88. 
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entitled to know what case they are facing if they are the subject of an 
adversarial investigation.27 Facing an inquiry for statistical information 
that is subsequently used to pursue the taxpayer would be constitutionally 
questionable. However, in S v Riaz Hassen and Another28 the 
Constitutional Court endorsed the finding of Le Roux J that 'entrapment' is 
not per se a violation of an accused's right to a 'fair trial' contained in 
s 35(3) of the Constitution. The Constitutional Court confirmed that the 
propriety of the admission of evidence consequent to the 'entrapment' of 
an accused must be examined on an ad hoc basis with the court carefully 
examining whether the prerequisites for the setting up of the trap were 
complied with prior to the setting up thereof.29 The question of entrapment 
is potentially a difficult one. In Dube v S30 the constitutional challenge of 
the appellant was whether the admission of the evidence of the entrapment 
rendered the trial of the appellant unfair. The court concluded that the 
admission of the evidence of the entrapment had not rendered the trial 
unfair and that, if anything, it was advantageous to the administration of 
justice. There was, in its opinion, nothing unfair about the setting up of the 
trap and it was held that the appellant was the victim of his own greed and 
dishonesty.31 However, entrapment was specifically used in that case to 
entrap a suspected and allegedly dishonest accused. The approach by 
SARS would not normally be premised by such facts. What would more 
likely happen is that SARS may discover evidence, in the course of 
conducting the statistical analysis, of a transgression and only then submit 
the information to the assessor or the criminal investigator after the fact. In 
Nortjé v S32 Foxcroft J at 459 states: 
 
In a work called “Entrapment in Canadian Criminal Law”, 
Michael Stober summarizes the position in Canada as follows at 
74: “Although entrapment situations have been before the Courts 
                                               
27R v Jarvis [2002] 3 SCR 757. 
28 1997 (1) SACR 247 (T). 
29 Omar Z The right to privacy and an accused's right to a 'fair trial' under the Constitution De Rebus December 1998 
Lexis Nexis (lasted accessed 21 March 2010). 
30 [2000] 1 All SA 41 (N). 
31Dube v S [2000] 1 All SA 41 (N) at page 62b. 
32 [1996] 4 All SA 449 (C). 
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in Canada on several occasions, there is no clear authority, 
statutory or otherwise, nor a rational foundation for a defence of 
entrapment. In some cases, Judges have either denied the 
existence of the defence or skirted the issue entirely, disposing 
of the case before them upon other considerations. In others, 
there has been a common feeling among Judges that a person 
should not be subjected to such unconscionable practices, and 
consequently, courts have groped for some legal principle or 
device in order to exonerate the accused.” The Canadian cases 
show a move towards recognising the defence but in R v Mack 
44 CCC 3D at 513, the Canadian Supreme Court ruled that while 
entrapment is a “defence”, it is based on the need to preserve the 
purity of the administration of justice and to prevent an abuse of 
its own processes. With reference to the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and the defence of entrapment, Stober points out (and I 
use the language of the Report at page 63), that “an aggrieved 
person must demonstrate to the court that police action infringed 
his rights and freedoms. The courts must, in reviewing police 
practices, decide first whether these practices violated the 
person’s fundamental rights (for example right to life, liberty 
and security) and second whether such practices have been 
carried out in accordance with the principles of fundamental 
justice. In answering these questions the Charter prescribes that 
such limits be placed on these rights as can be demonstrably 
justified in a free and democratic society.” Stober concludes at 
189 that where, for example, government officials violate the 
personal integrity and privacy of a person through entrapment 
(by means of coercive tactics designed to induce an innocent 
person to commit an offence) it cannot be denied that his 
fundamental rights have been infringed. “Such conduct is far 
removed from any notion of fair play inherent in the principles 
of fundamental justice.” See Commission Report, p 64. The 
Canadian Courts are therefore not prepared to allow the criminal 
justice system to be discredited by the admission of evidence 
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obtained in contravention of constitutional rights. Where the 
police act improperly, a balance should be struck between 
protection of the community and the protection of the individual. 
This balance is struck by the exclusion of evidence which brings 
the administration of justice into disrepute. In the words of 
Stober at 217: “It is offensive to common notions of decency 
and fair play to admit such evidence.” [Commission Report, p 
65]. 
 
The writer submits that the Constitutional Court should ultimately follow 
the line of reasoning set out in the Canadian Commission report above. 
However, further discussion or analysis of this point is outside the scope 
of this thesis. 
 
Despite the difficulties with entrapment, the other defence available to the 
taxpayer would be a transgression by SARS of the constitutional guarantee 
of not using any evidence given to SARS under compulsion, as discussed 
in detail earlier in this chapter. This defence would assist in criminal 
prosecutions, but not in SARS raising a revised assessment. The final 
point on this proposed section, is that the taxpayer would have ‘just cause’ 
in not furnishing any information to SARS until it was advised what the 
precise scope and purpose of the request for ‘relevant material’ was, so as 
to enable it to enforce any rights the taxpayer may have to avoid 
constitutional breaches by SARS. This begs the question – if the taxpayer 
has been dishonest and this has been unearthed by the statistical analysis 
taking place, why should SARS not be entitled to hand over the 
information to the appropriate authorities? The answer to this question lies 
in the fact that organs of state such as SARS must also abide by a set of 
laws equally applicable to them that ensures the prevalence of the rule of 
law. Just because the taxpayer breaks the law, does not mean that SARS 
can also break the law so as to pursue the taxpayer. The wrong of SARS 
does not trump the wrong of the accused. The provisions of the 
Constitution apply specifically to SARS to ensure they comply with 
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respecting the fundamental rights of accused who have allegedly broken 
provisions of tax acts; 
 
4.  Request any ‘relevant material’ that ‘is foreseeably relevant’.33 This new 
proposed addition can be relied upon by taxpayers to ensure that SARS is 
specific in what they require as ‘relevant material’ from taxpayers. It 
would not suffice to request the taxpayer to make available general 
information such as all trial balances for specified years of assessment, but 
that SARS is required to be more specific – specify which information 
from the trial balances they require. Again ‘just cause’ would arise in 
favour of the taxpayer not to submit just any ‘relevant material’ until 
SARS can specify with ‘reasonable certainty’ what is specifically sought 
by SARS, and for what purpose; 
 
5. Request that the person submitting the ‘relevant material’ must do so 
‘under oath or solemn declaration’34 giving rise to the additional potential 
exposure to that person of a criminal charge of perjury, if the information 
turns out to be incorrect. Once again, ‘just cause’ will arise in favour of 
that person not to submit any information ‘under oath or solemn 
declaration’ until they are certain they will not be committing perjury at 
some point in the future; 
 
6.  Select a taxpayer for audit ‘for the proper administration of a tax act, 
including on random or a risk assessment basis’.35 Despite the specific 
proposed wording referring to ‘random’ audits, this is in line with current 
practice of SARS. Constitutional questions still arise, nevertheless, on 
                                               
33 Definition of ‘relevant material’ in the Tax Administration Act. These provisions echo the findings of the American 
courts as follows: US v Powell 379 US 48 (quoted from the headnote): where ‘(p)rimary purpose of clause that no 
taxpayer shall be subjected to unnecessary examinations or investigations in sub-section of statute going on to provide 
that only one inspection of taxpayer's books shall be made for each taxable year unless taxpayer otherwise requests or 
Secretary or delegate, after investigation, notifies taxpayer in writing that additional inspections are necessary, was no 
more than to emphasize responsibility of agents to exercise prudent judgment in wielding extensive powers granted to 
them by Internal Revenue Code’. (Emphasis supplied); US v Brown 536 F.2d 117 (quoted from the headnote): where 
the cout held ‘“Books, papers, records, or other data” to be produced under … the Internal Revenue Code relating to 
examination of books and witnesses … did not … authorize the IRS to require the manufacture of documents or other 
data for examination’; see also Local 174 International Brotherhood of Teamsters v US 240 F.2d 387, where ‘revenue 
agents … had burden to show that demand was reasonable under all circumstances and to prove that books and records 
were relevant or material to tax liability of taxpayer…’; May v Davis 7 F Supp 596. 
34Supra footnote 1 at s 46(7). 
35Ibid. s 40. 
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whether or not the conduct by SARS would be arbitrary in conducting 
random audits without the support of at least a risk analysis performed 
internally at SARS to suggest that a random audit of that taxpayer would 
be appropriate. Taxpayers would be entitled to access any information 
from SARS in terms of the Promotion of Access to Information Act36 to 
access any relevant information from SARS on a risk review of a group of 
taxpayers that the taxpayer being sought to audit falls into, so that the 
taxpayer can better understand what the scope and purpose of the random 
audit is. If SARS can provide these answers, the random audit would not 
simply be arbitrary, and can be justified by SARS and in line with the Bill 
of Rights guarantee to taxpayers that they can expect just administrative 
action from SARS;37 
 
7.  Request entry to the business premises of the taxpayer to conduct the 
audit as set out in s 74B of the current Income Tax Act, but in terms of s 
37(5) ‘a SARS official must not enter a dwelling-house or domestic 
premises (except any part thereof used for the purposes of trade) … 
without the consent of the occupant’. The use of the word ‘occupant’ is 
not specific to a representative of a taxpayer, or the owner, or lessee of the 
premises, but may be any occupant, as long as the occupant gives consent. 
This provision is in accordance with developed Constitutional Court 
judgments on the privacy of persons, where the invasion of privacy 
becomes more justified where the premises in the place of business of the 
taxpayer.38 
 
                                               
36 Act 2 of 2000. 
37 Sections 33 of the Constitution. Section 195(1)(b) and (f) requires SARS to use its resources efficiently and cost 
effectively, and requires SARS to be accountable for its decisions. Any arbitrary decision unsupported by underlying 
research analysis or a reason, would be conduct that is contrary to the provisions of the Constitution, and invalid 
conduct as stated in s 2 of the Constitution. 
38 In Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic Offences and Others v Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd and 
Others: In re Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd and Others v Smit NO and Others 2001 (1) SA 545 (CC); 2000 
(10) BCLR 1079, Langa DP stated (with reference to Bernstein and Others v Bester and Others NNO 1996 (2) SA 751 
(CC); 1996 (4) BCLR 449 at para [68]) that the right to privacy lies along a continuum, where the more a person 
interrelates with the world, the more the right to privacy becomes attenuated (at para [15]). The right, however, does 
not relate solely to the individual within his intimate space, and when people are in their offices, in their cars or on 
mobile telephones, they still retain a right to be left alone by the state unless certain conditions are satisfied. See M. 
Dendy, Protection of Privacy, de Rebus, August 2009, Lexis Nexis. http://www.mylexisnexis.co.za (last accessed 31 
March 2012). S 14 of the Constitution, 1996. Silke on Tax Administration, at para. 8.19, Lexis Nexis. 
http://www.mylexisnexis.co.za (last accessed 31 March 2013). Stricter enforcement of the privacy provisions on the 
Consttution, 1996 are enforced at the dwelling of the person concerned. 
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The proposed information gathering provisions in the proposed Tax Administration Act 
do not change the conclusions reached in this thesis. As demonstrated above, the 
opportunity for the taxpayer to raise the ‘just cause’ defence is increased in some 
instances where taxpayers have good reason not to participate in an audit. Section 
3(3)(f) of the Tax Administration Act on what is meant by for the purposes of the 
administration of a tax act, was severely criticised by submissions made by the Law 
Societies of South Africa in respect of the Tax Administration Act,39 as follows: 
 
In terms of paragraph 3 of the Tax Administration Act, SARS is 
authorised to liaise with the prosecuting authorities and charged 
with the duty to do all things required for the due prosecution of 
tax and other offences. In my view Parliament does not have the 
power to pass an Act containing such a provision. An amendment 
to the Constitution, 1996 would be required. This is so because 
section 179 of the Constitution establishes an independent 
prosecuting authority. It must exercise its functions without fear, 
favour or prejudice. Neither the Constitution nor the national 
legislation contemplated in section 179 contemplates that another 
organ of state, in the executive arm of Government, should be 
charged with the responsibility of ensuring the due prosecution of 
charges in relation to which it is the complainant! It is the function 
of the prosecuting authority to deal fairly with any charge made by 
a complainant, to have due regard to the rights of the accused 
person and to decide independently and without fear or favour 
whether to proceed with a prosecution. I am aware that SARS 
already has a Criminal Investigations Division that has a liaison of 
sorts with the DPP. It has with some justification been referred to 
as a “clandestine collusion” between SARS and the DPP. Details 
of the liaison have not, as far as I am aware, been made public but 
we are all aware of the arrangements in terms of which the work of 
the traditional “investigating officer” [very definitely not employed 
by the complainant] is now done by a SARS employee in the 
                                               
39 Drafted by Prof. H Vorster, and first submitted to SARS in June 2009, and again on 5 March 2010 by the LSSA Kris 
Devan, the PA: Manager Professional Affairs. 
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SARS Criminal Investigations Division, assisted, or even directed, 
by the special prosecutor presented by the DPP by arrangement 
with SARS. The prosecution is presided over by a magistrate 
specially arranged to hear prosecutions of tax offences and 
presented by courtesy of the Department of Justice by prior 
arrangement with SARS. Early morning arrests and search and 
seizure raids are conducted by SARS officials and police officers 
with media reporters and television cameras in tow arranged, 
according to the evidence of a SARS official in a recent case, by 
courtesy of the SARS Media Department. There are those who 
hold the view that these arrangements and the involvement of 
SARS officials in the investigation and prosecution process will 
not withstand scrutiny. They might well be correct. Even if they 
were not, I am of the opinion that the involvement of SARS 
officials in the prosecution process cannot be legitimised in the 
manner now provided for in paragraph 3(2)(e)(ii) and (iii) of the 
Tax Administration Act. 
 
The Cape Bar prepared a memorandum criticising the Tax Administration Act under the 
hand of Advocates Milton Seligson SC, Trevor Emslie SC and Joe van Dorsten, 
published in the February 2010 edition of The Taxpayer journal:40 
 
(On s 3(1), (2) and (3) of the Tax Administration Act) - In our 
view, it should be clarified that the role of SARS is 
limited…(and)…not itself prosecute taxpayers…The power to 
prosecute is vested by s 179 of the Constitution in the national 
prosecuting authority. 
 
(On s 33(1) (and what is now s 40) of the Tax Administration Act) 
- The broad category of ‘another person’ may include persons who 
are in possession of ‘relevant material’ that includes material that 
is subject to legal professional privilege. Provision should be made 
                                               
40Comment on the Draft Tax Administration Bill, The Taxpayer Journal, February 2010, at page 24. 
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for a procedure to challenge any requirement of SARS relating to 
privileged material, in order to safeguard documents or 
information that is subject to such privilege. 
 
The scope of the LSSA, Cape Bar Council and other criticisms are beyond the subject 
matter of this thesis. However, the criticisms clearly illustrate the extent of other concerns 
expressed on the ability for SARS to investigate, lay and prosecute criminal charges as 
set out in the Tax Administration Act, and the potential ability for SARS to access 
through third parties information of a taxpayer subject to legal professional privilege.41 
 
If these proposed provisions become law, taxpayers will have more reason than before to 
challenge SARS on the scope and purpose of a contemplated inquiry and audit.  
 
Any participation in the prosecution of taxpayers by SARS in the Tax Administration 
Act is contrary to the provisions of s 179 of the Constitution and the doctrine of the 
separation of powers entrenched in the Constitution. This may cause a constitutional 
challenge as to the validity of this aspect of the proposed s 3 of the Tax Administration 
Act. This may lead to an opportunity for taxpayers affected by this offending proposed 
provision to raise the ‘just cause’ defence in not participating in an inquiry and audit 
initiated by SARS, until the constitutional validity of the proposed provision is 
deliberated upon by the courts. 
 
The uncertainty surrounding the issue of legal privileged information will give taxpayers 
the opportunity with ‘just cause’ not to participate in the SARS inquiry and audit, until 
either SARS or a court acknowledges that the ‘relevant material’ excludes legal 




Until the taxpayer is satisfied that its constitutional rights are not being transgressed by 
SARS implementing the proposed provisions of ss 3, 33 36 and 37 of the Tax 
                                               
41 Heiman Maasdorp & Barker v SIR  1968 (4) SA 160 (W). 
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Administration Act, the taxpayer will have ‘just cause’ not to participate in the audit, 
inquiry or any request for ‘relevant material’ by SARS. 
 
Should SARS attempt to force the taxpayer to comply with the proposed provisions of ss 
3, and 40 through 49 of the Tax Administration Act, judicial review of the decision of 
SARS to compel the taxpayer to comply, would be available to the taxpayer. The process 
of  judicial review is discussed in Chapter 5. Nothing in the proposed Tax Administration 
Act changes the ability for taxpayers to review decisions taken by SARS in an attempt to 
enforce the proposed provisions of the Tax Administration Act, where SARS have failed 
to diligently and without delay perform its obligations in terms of s 237 of the 
Constitution, in complying with its duties as set out in ss 1(c), 33, 41(1) and 195(1) of the 
Constitution, and as analysed in this thesis.42 
 
In summary ss 1 (c), 33, 41(1) and 195(1) SARS (as reiterated in s 4(2) of the SARS Act) 
are the constitutional duties that SARS must adhere to in order to comply with the rule of 
law, where SARS may only assume power and functions provided in terms of the 
Constitution, act with a high degree of professional ethics, use resources efficiently, be 
impartial, equitable, fair, unbiased, accountable, and transparent in their conduct and 
administrative actions. Failure by SARS to adhere to its constitutional duties will be 
reviewable in terms of PAJA and the principle of legality.43 
  
                                               
42See Chapter 3 supra. 
43 See Chapter 4 supra. 
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7.1 GENERAL CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
 
Despite the wide powers to conduct audits and inquiries into the tax affairs of 
taxpayers granted to SARS in terms of ss 74A and 74B, administrative law, as 
bolstered by the Constitution, contains important steps that SARS must adhere to in 
exercising its conduct. 
 
The Constitution is the starting point as the supreme law of South Africa, governing 
all laws and conduct, including the Income Tax Act and discretions given to SARS, 
such as in the case of ss 74A and 74B, to make a decision to commence an inquiry 
and audit. 
 
The Constitution requires adherence to the rule of law and the constitutional 
principle of legality, which prescribes that organs of state such as SARS must be 
governed by the law, and in particular the Constitution, the SARS Act and the 
relevant provisions of the Income Tax Act, in this instance, ss 74A and 74B, in 
exercising its discretion to audit or inquire into the tax affairs of the taxpayer. If it 
can be shown that the conduct of SARS is inconsistent with the Constitution, this 
conduct is invalid and application can be brought, on the basis of the s 172(1) of the 
Constitution, to have the conduct reviewed and set aside. 
 
In terms of s 172(1)(b)(ii) the court may make ‘any order that is just and equitable’ 
that would include organs of state such as SARS to adhere to the scope, spirit and 
purpose of the Constitution in carrying out its constitutional duties and obligations. 
 
7.2 SECTION 33 OF THE CONSTITUTION AND PAJA 
 
In s 33 the Bill of Rights sets out three important steps that SARS must adhere to in 
emphasising its wide public powers, namely: lawfulness, reasonableness, procedural 
fairness and the giving of adequate reasons for any administrative action.1 
 
This in turn has been developed in the promulgation of PAJA, which has codified 
                                               
1 See sections 2.5: Adequate Reasons, 3.3: Lawfulness, 3.4: Reasonableness and 3.5: Procedural Fairness, 
supra.  
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the grounds of review in s 6(2). However, applying a decision in terms of ss 74A 
and 74B to the definition of ‘administrative action’ presents a difficulty in that the 
definition of 'administrative action' is limited enough to allow SARS to make an 
argument that the exercise of its decision under ss 74A and 74B is not subject to the 
provisions of PAJA; if it was, SARS may argue that its ability to conduct audits and 
inquiries could be severely hindered.2 
 
In interpreting these provisions, not only should the ordinary grammatical meaning 
be ascertained, but SARS should also give full recognition and effect to the 
fundamental rights and freedoms of taxpayers in line with the Constitution. In this 
regard, any interpretation should be a generous rather than a legalistic one, aimed at 
limiting the infringement of the rights of taxpayers, and with the view to fulfilling 
the purpose of the legislation. Because procedural fairness plays a pivotal role in 
SARS’ exercise of any discretion under ss 74A and 74B, the particular situation and 
circumstances of the taxpayer must be carefully considered to ensure full 
compliance with the rule of law and the constitutional principle of legality3 by 
SARS. 
 
With regard to the definition of ‘administrative action’, the Supreme Court of 
Appeal held in the Grey's Marine case4 that the definition of 'administrative action' 
must not be taken too literally, and here the purposive approach to interpreting the 
Constitution and PAJA must be applied. This dictum supports the view that the 
discretion of SARS in ss 74A and 74B is ‘administrative action’. But even if it is 
held by a court in the future not to be ‘administrative action’ (denying taxpayers the 
right to review SARS’ unlawful, unreasonable, or procedurally unfair and 
unconstitutional or ‘invalid’ conduct in terms of PAJA), ss 1(c), 33, 41(1), 195(1) 
and 237 of the Constitution, read with s 4(2) of the SARS Act, and the publication of 
the SARS Code of Conduct,5 read with the SARS Internal Audit Manual,6 creating a 
                                               
2 As argued by SARS in the unreported application of Drs Du Buisson, Bruinette & Kramer Inc. v C:SARS Case 
No. 4595/02 in the High Court of the Transvaal Provincial Division brought by a taxpayer to prevent SARS 
proceeding with an audit in terms of ss 74A and 74B. 
3 See section 2.4: The Relevance of PAJA and the Principle of Legality supra. 
4Grey’s Marine Hout Bay (Pty) Ltd and Othersv Minister of Public Works and Others2005 (6) SA 313 (SCA). 
5http://www.sars.gov.za/home.asp?pid=54195 (last accessed 31 March 2013). 
6 See section 3.2 supra. 
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legitimate expectation,7 will support a review application through s 172(1) of the 
Constitution as a transgression of the constitutional principle of legality – which in 
any event requires SARS in exercising their public power to act lawfully, 
reasonably, procedurally fairly, and where appropriate with reasons. Taxpayers will 
be entitled to review any ss 74A and 74B discretion by SARS if it transgresses any 
of these provisions, guidelines or legitimate expectations in terms of a Rule 53 
application to the High Court.8 
 
Furthermore, the constitutional limitations, as stated in s 36 of the Constitution, do 
not apply to conduct (including the exercise of a discretion by SARS under ss 74A 
and 74B) because the exercise of a discretion is not ‘law of general application’ as 
required by s 36 of the Constitution (although the enabling law usually 
is).9Furthermore s 36 applies to justifying non compliance with s 33 of the 
Constitution, but does not specifically apply to the constitutional obligations in ss 
1(c), 41, 195(1) and s 237. It will therefore be very difficult for SARS to justify10 
that its conduct in an inquiry and audit falls outside the constitutional scrutiny 
proposed in this thesis. 
 
7.3 SECTION 195(1) OF THE CONSTITUTION 
 
The specific constitutional provisions are those set out in s 195(1) of the 
Constitution as analysed in Chapter 4 supra, which in summary are: ‘(a)A high 
standard of professional ethics must be promoted and maintained…(d)Services must 
be provided impartially, fairly, equitably and without bias…(f)Public administration 
must be accountable.(g)Transparency must be fostered …’.(Emphasis supplied) 
 
                                               
7 See Currie I & Klaaren J Promotion of Administrative Justice Act Benchbook (2001) SiberInk at 80. See also 
Williams R C et al Silke on Tax Administration (April 2009) Lexis Nexis at para 3.25 generally. 
8 See Chapter 5 supra. 
9Premier of Mpumalanga and Another v Executive Committee of the Association of Governing Bodies of State-
Aided Schools: Eastern Transvaal 1999 (2) BCLR151 (CC) at para [42]: ‘…no question of justification …can 
arise as the decision taken …did not constitute “a law of general application” as required by that provision.’; 
cf.Registrar of Pension Funds and another v Angus NO and others [2007] 2 All SA 608 (SCA) where the court 
held ‘in terms of law [of general application]’ would enable a decision. SARS decisions are enabled ‘in terms of 
law [of general application]. 
10 SARS will need to consider the decisions of Nyambirai v Nssa & Another 1995 (2) ZLR 1 (S) and De Freitas 
v Permanent Secretary of Agriculture, Fisheries, Lands and Housing 1998 3 LRC 62 as to the justification, 
rationality and limitation of a SARS decision; See alsoFerucci and Others v Commissioner for South African 
Revenue Service and Another 65 SATC 47 at pages 54-55; US v McCarthy 514 F 2d 368. 
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These provisions are constitutional obligations, and the failure by SARS to adhere to 
any of them, read with the Code of Conduct and the SARS Internal Audit Manual, 
will result in conduct that is inconsistent with the Constitution, and invalid. The 
cause of action in an application to the High Court  in terms of Rule 53 for review of 
SARS’ conduct will either be one or more of the codified grounds of review in s 
6(2) of PAJA, or, alternatively the principle of legality.  
 
The codified grounds of review in s 6(2) of PAJA fall into nine principal groups, 
namely: authority and conduct of the administrator non-compliance with a 
mandatory and material procedure or condition; procedurally unfair action; action 
materially influenced by an error of law; manner of exercise of administrative 
action; grounds; failure to take a decision; unreasonableness; and otherwise 
unconstitutional or unlawful action. These nine principal areas of review exclude the 
two common-law grounds of review that would probably fall under s 6(2)(i) 
(otherwise unconstitutional or unlawful action),11 namely vagueness and the 
‘fettering by rigidity of a discretion’.12 
 
The constitutional principle of legality requires SARS to act lawfully, reasonably, 
procedurally fairly, and to give reasons where appropriate, in exercising public 
powers. 
 
7.4 ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION, THE RULE OF LAW AND THE 
PRINCIPLE OF LEGALITY 
 
The rule of law concept in the words of Neil MacCormick is as follows: ‘[t]he very 
idea of the “rule of law” or Rechtsstaat is that of a state in which determinate and 
pre-determined rules govern and restrict the exercise of power and regulate the 
affairs of citizens.’13 Primarily, the rule of law principle requires that the legal 
system comply with minimum standards of certainty, generality and equality. The 
rule of law is a fundamental ideological principle of modern Western democracies, 
                                               
11 Sections 6(2)(a), 6(2)(b), 6(2)(c), 6(2)(d), 6(2)(e), 6(2)(e), 6(2)(f), 6(2)(g), 6(2)(h), 6(2)(i) and 6(3) of PAJA. 
12 Hoexter C The Future of Judicial Review in South African Administrative Law South African Law Journal 
(2000) Vol 17 at page 497. See also: US v Williams 337 F Supp 1114; Local 174 International Brotherhood of 
Teamsters v US, 240 F.2d 387; US v Newman 441 F.2d 170; US v Coopers and Lybrand F Supp 942;  Hubner v 
Tucker 245 F.2d 35; First National Bank of Mobile v US 160 F.2d 532. 
13MacCormick N Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory (1995) at page xi. 
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and as such, we are often asked to believe in it with unquestioning acceptance, even 
though Western states often honour the principle in the breach.’14 
 
To exercise its discretion under ss 74A or 74B, SARS is exercising public power 
that is conduct. If that conduct is contrary to the rule of law as set out in s 1(c) of the 
Constitution, and the constitutional principle of legality, because it does not comply 
with, inter alia, the basic jurisdictional facts of the provisions of ss 74A and 74B, 
read with s 74 of the Income Tax Act, or the constitutional obligations in ss 33, 
41(1), 195(1) (read with s 4(2) of the SARS Act) and 237 of the Constitution 
(including lawfulness, reasonableness, procedural fairness, and reasons), the conduct 
will be invalid. 
 
The jurisdictional facts require that the inquiry and audit is in respect of a specific 
taxpayer.15 One or more of the jurisdictional facts in the definition of ‘the 
administration of this Act' in s 74 must be present and substantiated with rational 
reasons that connect the provision in the definition in question in s 74 to a specific 
fact driving the necessity to conduct the inquiry and audit, or to an inference drawn 
from a specific fact. 
 
Here the Code of Conduct and the SARS Internal Audit Manual serve an important 
purpose as a guide to what to expect as proper administrative governance where 
SARS exercises this discretion and makes a valid decision. In essence a legitimate 
expectation is created in favour of taxpayers as to what they can expect in ss 74A 
and 74B interactions with SARS from the Code of Conduct with the unpublished 
SARS Internal Audit Manual serving an important purpose by informing the 
taxpayer what can be expected of SARS in complying with its constitutional 
obligations when inquiring and auditing the tax affairs of a taxpayer – where the 
taxpayer can expect fairness, equal treatment, impartiality, accountability and 
transparency. It is for this reason that the unpublished SARS Internal Audit Manual 
should be made available to the public, as the approach by SARS to taxpayers’ tax 
                                               
14 Stewart C The Rule Of Law And The Tinker bell Effect: Theoretical Considerations, Criticisms And 
Justifications For The Rule Of Law. MacQuarie Law Journal at page 7. 
15 See section 3.3.2: Jurisdictional facts supra. 
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affairs are directly affected by its content.16 
 
The discretion, as indicated by the use of the word 'may', must be exercised lawfully, 
reasonably and procedurally fairly.17 The SARS official must not, inter alia, be 
driven in pursuing the inquiry and audit by the ulterior motive of fulfilling his or her 
internal management goals or budget at SARS, or be using this administrative 
process as a means to obtain evidence to penalise the taxpayer, contrary to the 
provisions of s 35(3)(j) of the Constitution, or to follow a discretion fettered by a 
SARS management directive, without considering its proper application to the facts 
of the taxpayer in question. The official cannot exercise power arbitrarily or merely 
in good faith in the belief that a decision is rationally18 related to the purpose for 
which the power was given, albeit mistakenly. This would give credence to form 
over substance, undermining the applicable constitutional principles.  
 
Lawfulness embraces the administrative law concepts of authority, jurisdictional 
facts and abuse of discretion (including improper or ulterior purpose or motive, mala 
fides,19 failure to apply minds or relevant and irrelevant considerations, unlawful 
fettering, and arbitrary and capricious decision making) in limiting the ability of 
SARS to act in terms of its powers under ss 74A and 74B.   
 
These concepts of administrative law relate to SARS’ duty to attend to the following 
points regarding inquiries and investigations in relation to ss 74A and 74B:   
 
                                               
16 Relying on the Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 of 2000 has been unsuccesful to compel SARS to 
produce the SARS Internal Audit Manual to show the guidelines created by SARS in its directions to officials 
making an inquiry or doing an audit. In Scherer v Kelley (1978) 584 F.2d 170 (quoted from the headnote): where 
the United States of America Freedom of Information Act §552(a)(2)(C) requires agencies to make public 
administrative staff manuals and instructions to staff that affect members of the public. See Williams R C et al 
Silke on Tax Administration (April 2009) Lexis Nexis at para 8.17 generally. In Minister for Provincial and 
Local Government of the RSA v Unrecognised Traditional Leaders of the Limpopo Province, Sekhukhuneland 
[2005] 1 All SA 559 (SCA) the appeal court found in favour of the public member seeking a report upholding 
the right of access to information held by the State, read with sections 36 (the limitation clause) and 39(2) 
(obliging every court to promote “the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights of the Constitution” (Bato 
Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs 2004 (7) BCLR 687 (CC) followed). 
17 See sections 3.3: Lawfulness, 3.4: Reasonableness and 3.5: Procedural Fairness, supra. 
18University of Cape Town v Ministers of Education & Culture (House of Assembly & House of Representatives) 
1988 3 SA 203 (C); See also LAWSA Volume 1 2nd ed Administrative Law Lexis Nexis at para 139 footnote 6; 
See also s 6(2)(f) of PAJA.   
19 See section 3.3.3: Abuse of discretion supra; See also US v Roundtree 420 F.2d 845 where a ‘(t)axpayer 
against whom government was attempting to enforce summons and who claimed harassment was entitled to take 
deposition of internal revenue agent in charge of case in order to investigate Internal Revenue Service’s 
purpose.’ 
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a) the inquiry and investigation must relate to a taxpayer as defined; 
b) the SARS official must hold a valid letter of authorisation; 
c) the discretion of SARS must be exercised lawfully subject to its 
guidelines;20 
d) the inquiry or investigation must relate to the facts relevant to the definition 
of ‘the administration of this act’ contained in s 74. 
 
In addition to the satisfaction of the above requirements, SARS must ensure that 
invoking ss 74A and 74B is reasonable (rational and proportional)21 and 
procedurally fair(no bias, adherence to the audi principle  and  any  legitimate 
expectation22 created).23 
 
Reasonableness24 deals with the administrative law concepts of rationality and 
proportionality where SARS seeks to invoke its powers under ss 74A and 74B. 
SARS must show a rational connection between the decision to invoke ss 74A and 
74B and the inquiry and audit of a named taxpayer, who has not already undergone 
an inquiry and audit in respect of the same tax issue, in the absence of new 
information not previously considered. This approach is in line with the 
methodology promoted by SARS to its assessors in terms of the Code of Conduct 
and the SARS Internal Audit Manual.  
 
In terms of the concept of proportionality, when SARS conducts an inquiry and 
audit pursuing a legitimate aim, where the means adopted to achieve the aim are 
appropriate, the least restrictive means should be adopted to achieve that aim, and 
SARS must be able to demonstrate that the exercise of its powers in terms of ss 74A 
                                               
20Code of Conduct and the SARS Internal Audit Manual.  
21 See section 3.4: Reasonableness supra. 
22 See section 3.6: Legitimate Expectations supra. See also Currie I & Klaaren J Promotion of Administrative 
Justice Act Benchbook (2001) SiberInk at 80. See also Williams R C et al Silke on Tax Administration (April 
2009) Lexis Nexis at para 3.25 generally. 
23 See section 3.5: Procedural Fairness supra. 
24 See section 3.4: Reasonableness supra; LAWSA Volume 5(3) 2nd ed at para 165; Commissioner of Taxes v 
CW (Pvt) Ltd 1989 (3) ZLR 361 (S) at 370F-372C; Union Government (Minister of Mines and Industries) v 
Union Steel Corporation (South Africa) Limited 1928 AD 220 , 236-7; and National Transport Commission v 
Chetty's Motor Transport (Pty) Ltd 1972 (3) SA 726 (A); See also Local 174 International Brotherhood of 
Teamsters v US, 240 F.2d 38; US v Newman 441 F.2d 170; US v Coopers and Lybrand F Supp 942;  Hubner v 
Tucker 245 F.2d 35; First National Bank of Mobile v US 160 F.2d 532. 
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and 74B is justified,25 and is the least intrusive26 means of achieving this legitimate 
aim. SARS must show that the information can only be obtained from the taxpayer 
and not by some other, less intrusive means, or that it does not already have the 
information from tax return filings made by the taxpayer, or from information 
previously submitted by the taxpayer or third parties.27 
 
The concept of procedural fairness28 in relation to ss 74A and 74B concerns the 
question of bias and the audi alteram partem principle. Where a SARS official has 
the smallest pecuniary interest in the outcome of a decision taken in terms of ss 74A 
and 74B, a reasonable suspicion of financial bias will exist. The taxpayer has to 
prove merely the appearance of partiality, rather than its actual existence. If these 
elements are present the procedural fairness of SARS’ conduct will be in question.   
 
The audi principle gives taxpayers an opportunity to participate in any decisions that 
affect them, and allows them to influence the outcome of those decisions. The 
difficulty in the audi principle is that the courts have held that there is no single set 
of principles for giving effect to the rules of natural justice which will apply to all 
investigations, inquiries and exercises of power, regardless of their nature.  There are 
instances where SARS will argue that the audi principle would not be fair to it in its 
exercising of its duty to conduct inquiries and investigations, as the taxpayer will be 
given ample opportunity to object as part of the statutory dispute process under 
objections and appeals in the Income Tax Act. SARS will argue that the application 
of the audi principle to inquiries and investigations would be disruptive to this 
process and would create unnecessary hardship for SARS in exercising its duties. 
The counter argument to this is that a matter is right for adjudication under 
administrative law when, although the right that may be transgressed in future is not 
yet available to the taxpayer, it is clear that the preliminary steps taken by SARS 
                                               
25Nyambirai v Nssa & Another 1995 (2) ZLR 1 (S) and De Freitas v Permanent Secretary of Agriculture, 
Fisheries, Lands and Housing 1998 3 LRC 62; See also Law Society of Zimbabwe and Another v Minister of 
Finance 61 SATC 458; Ferucci and Others v Commissioner for South African Revenue Service and Another 65 
SATC 47 at pages 54-55; US v McCarthy 514 F 2d 368. 
26R v McKinlay Transport [1990] 1 S.C.R. 627; cf.US v McKay 372 F.2d 174 where the court held the ‘(p)ower of 
Commissioner of Internal Revenue to investigate records and affairs of taxpayers is greater than that of a party in 
civil litigation; such power may be characterized as an inquisitorial power...which should be liberally construed, 
in context of which the criteria of relevancy and materiality have broader connotations than in context of trial 
evidence.’ 
27Supra footnote 25. 
28 See section 3.5: Procedural Fairness supra. 
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will eventually prejudice that right in the future, giving the taxpayer the right to 
challenge and review any unlawful, unreasonable, or procedurally unfair (and 
unconstitutional and ‘invalid’) conduct by SARS in making the decision.29 
 
Apart from the right to lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair administrative 
action, taxpayers may also have a legitimate expectation30 that SARS will invoke its 
powers under ss 74A and 74B in a particular manner. Here taxpayers may expect 
SARS to have complied with its Code of Conduct and to have taken the appropriate 
steps as detailed in the guidelines provided to assessors in the SARS Internal Audit 
Manual. 
 
SARS’ Code of Conduct states that SARS :  ‘…[will be] loyal to the Republic, 
honour the Constitution and abide by it in the execution of daily tasks; put the 
public’s interest first …; … serve the public in an unbiased and impartial manner …; 
… treating members of the public as valued clients who are entitled to receive the 
highest standards of service; … recognises the public’s right of access to 
information …; strives to achieve the objectives … cost-effectively and cost 
efficiently without compromising the legitimate expectations of the public; … 
recuses … (itself) … from any … action or decision-making process which may 
result in improper personal gain … (and) … promotes sound, efficient, effective, 
transparent and accountable administration …’. 
 
These extracts from SARS’ Code of Conduct also reiterate the constitutional 
obligations of SARS. Furthermore, the publication by SARS of this document on its 
website creates the legitimate expectations stated in the document that SARS will 
‘… strive … to achieve the objective … cost effectively and cost efficiently without 
                                               
29Hoexter(2012) at page 229 footnote 438 – Du Preez v Truth and Reconciliation Commission 1997(3) SA 204 
(A); Director: Mineral Development, Gauteng Region v Save the Vaal Environment 1999(2) SA 709 (SCA); 
Ferreira v Levin NO and Others; Vryenhoek and Others V Powell NO and Others1996 (1) BCLR 1 (CC) at 
para’s [165] – [166]; See also Croome B Taxpayers’ Rights in South Africa Juta 2010 page 207; Wheelright K 
Taxpayer’ Rights in Australia in Bentley D Taxpayers’ Rights: An International Perspective Revenue Law 
Journal Bond University: Queensland 1998 at page 49; Park-Ross and Another v Director: Office for Serious 
Economic Offences1995 (2) SA 148 (C) at paras [1641-165A; Nomala v Permanent Secretary, Department of 
Welfare and Another 2001 (8) BCLR 844 (E); Transvaal Coal Owners Association and Others v Board of 
Control 1921 TPD 447 at 452; Gool v Minister of Justice 1995 (2) SA 682 (C); Afdelings-Raad van Swartland v 
Administrateur, Kaap 1983 (3) SA 469 (C). 
30 See section 3.6: Legitimate Expectations supra; See also Currie I & Klaaren J Promotion of Administrative 
Justice Act Benchbook (2001) SiberInk at 80. See also Williams R C et al Silke on Tax Administration (April 
2009) Lexis Nexis at para 3.25 generally. 
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comprising the legitimate expectations of the public …’ and in accordance with its 
constitutional obligations set out in ss 1(c), 33, 41(1), 195(1) and 237 of the 
Constitution. 
 
In addition, by virtue of the provisions of ss 3(2), 5(1) and 5(3) of PAJA the 
taxpayer may require SARS to issue the taxpayer with adequate reasons31on making 
the decision to inquire and audit in terms of ss 74A and 74B, before embarking on 
any such inquiries or audit.   
 
As part of the justification or defence raised by SARS against a challenge from a 
taxpayer that ss 74A and 74B is being unlawfully, unreasonably and procedurally 
unfairly (and unconstitutionally) invoked, and that SARS is not required to give 
adequate reasons at this stage of the process, SARS may argue that the inquiry and 
investigation process is part of a multi-staged decision-making process which will 
culminate in a final administrative act to which the taxpayer can object in 
accordance with the statutory procedures in the Income Tax Act. On this basis, 
SARS may argue that it is premature for the taxpayer to raise any objection at the 
inquiry and investigation stage. The counter argument by the taxpayer would be that 
an inquiry or investigation may lead to the serious consequence of an additional 
assessment being raised unlawfully if proper administrative procedures leading up to 
that revised assessment are not followed. In this regard, administrative law has 
developed in terms of the Constitution as analysed in this thesis to ensure that 
administrators such as SARS follow a prescribed set of rules in executing every part 
of its duties so as to ensure that the final decision reached is lawful, reasonable and 
arrived at in a procedurally fair manner.   
                                               
31 See section 2.5: Adequate Reasons supra; In this regard, the taxpayer would be entitled to request ‘adequate 
reasons’ in terms of section 5(1) and (2) of PAJA for the decision taken by SARS to invoke the provisions of ss 
74A and 74B; See also CSARS v Sprigg Investments 117CC t/a Global Investment 73 SATC 114 (SCA) at para’s 
[12] and [13]; Ansett Transport Industries (Operations) Pty Ltd and Another v Wraith and Others (1983) 48 
ALR 500; Minister of Environmental Affairs & Tourism & others v Phambili Fisheries (Pty) Ltd & another 
[2003] 2 All SA 616 SCA at para [40]; Gumede v Minister of Law and Order 1984 (4) SA 915 (N); Van Dorsten 
J L The Right to reasons for Decisions in Taxation Matters The Taxpayer October (2005) at 186-190 before 
CSARS v Sprigg Investments 117CC t/a Global Investment 73 SATC 114 (SCA). As to reason in tax matters 
generally in the United States Supreme Court in US v Powell 379 US 48 (quoted from the headnote): the court 
held that where the ‘(p)rimary purpose of clause that no taxpayer shall be subjected to unnecessary examinations 
or investigations in sub-section of statute going on to provide that only one inspection of taxpayer's books shall 
be made for each taxable year unless taxpayer otherwise requests or Secretary or delegate, after investigation, 
notifies taxpayer in writing that additional inspections are necessary,was no more than to emphasize 
responsibility of agents to exercise prudent judgment in wielding extensive powers granted to them by Internal 
Revenue Code’. (Emphasis supplied) 
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The constitutional obligations that the taxpayer can expect SARS to obey and fulfil 
as quickly as possible in terms of ss 1(c), 33, 41(1), 195(1) and 237 of the 
Constitution strengthens the taxpayer’s position in demanding lawful, reasonable 
and procedurally fair conduct by SARS when invoking ss 74A and 74B. Public 
administration duties, as set out in ss 41(1) and 195(1) of the Constitution are 
constitutional obligations that SARS must adhere to.  
 
In exercising a discretion under ss 74A and 74B, all constitutional obligations 
imposed on SARS must be performed diligently and without delay.32 
 
The enforcement of these constitutional obligations should also now be easier after 
the Constitutional Court Glenister v President of the Republic of South Africa and 
Others33 judgment. These constitutional obligations include the duties imposed on 
government and public administrators (including organs of state such as SARS), in 
terms of ss 41(1)(d) (which states ‘… all organs of state … must … be loyal to the 
Constitution …’) and 195(1) of the Constitution. These constitutional obligations 
help to inform the fundamental rights set out in s 33 of the Constitution, read with 
PAJA. Failure to adhere diligently to these duties and without delay would result in 
conduct inconsistent with the Constitution and invalid, which would immediately be 
reviewable in terms of s 172(1) of the Constitution in terms of PAJA, or the 
principle of legality,34 as set out in Chapter 5 above. 
 
7.5 REVIEW IN TERMS OF SS 6, 7 and 8 OF PAJA OR THE PRINCIPLE OF 
LEGALITY 
 
Where a review application is based on SARS’ non-compliance with the provisions 
of s 195(1) of the Constitution and section 4(2) of the SARS Act, it is arguable that a 
right of the taxpayer has been adversely affected with direct, external legal effect, 
                                               
32Section 237 of the Constitution; See also Minister of Health and Others v Treatment Action Campaign and 
Others (1) 2002 (10) BCLR 1033 (CC) at para [112]. 
332011 (3) SA 347 (CC) at para’s [13] and [22] held that the High Court had jurisdiction to hear applications 
challenging the non fulfilment of constitutional obligations such as ‘to act reasonably and accountably; to 
cultivate good human resource management; to respect international treaty obligations; … and to respect values 
enshrined in the Bill of Rights.’; See section 2.4 supra. 
34 Through a Rule 53 application to the High Court - Uniform Rules of Court, GNR 48 of 12 January 1965, made 
under s 43(2)(a) of the Supreme Court Act  59 of 1959, hereinafter referred to as ‘Rule 53’. 
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and consequently the provisions of s 6(1), 7(1) and 8(1) of PAJA would be met, 
entitling the taxpayer to access the codified grounds of review in terms of s 6(2) of 
PAJA.  Here the usual meaning of ‘a right’, is that of an enforceable claim against a 
duty-holder, is met.35 A decision will have a direct, external legal effect if it has an 
actual impact on the taxpayer’s rights or interests.36 It may also affect propriety steps 
leading to a final determination.37 
 
Where the conduct of SARS exercising powers in terms of ss 74A and 74B is 
unlawful, unreasonable and procedurally unfair (and unconstitutional or ‘invalid’), 
taxpayers have a number of grounds of review, developed by the Constitution 
through specific legislated provisions, namely: sections 1(c), 33, 41(1), 172(1), 
195(1) and 237 of the Constitution, read with s 4(2) of the SARS Act, and ss 6(2), 
7(1) and 8(1) of PAJA. In addition, the jurisdictional facts38 of ss 74A and 74B, read 
with 74 of the Income Tax Act, must be met. If any of these provisions are not 
complied with, the conduct of SARS will be inconsistent with the Constitution and 
may be reviewed by the High Court in terms of PAJA, and failing that, in terms of a 
transgression of the principle of legality, both by way of a Rule 53 application.  
 
A review application in terms of PAJA, and in the alternative, a review application 
in terms of a transgression of the principle of legality, will entail a Rule 53 
application process, with the grounds for review as set out in section 5.5.6 above 
being applicable. However, if PAJA is not available to the taxpayer, the principle of 
legality is.  
 
Rule 53 is the preferred route to review the conduct of SARS in respect of a decision 
in terms of ss 74A and 74B. It was promulgated to come to the aid of, inter alia, 
taxpayers who need to review public power. The application process allows 
taxpayers to state their complaint and to request that SARS makes available its 
                                               
35 Klaaren J & Penfold G Just Administrative Action Second ed (2002) at page 63-21. 
36Ibid. at page 63-22. 
37Nextcom Cellular (Pty) Ltd v Funde NO and Others 2000 (4) SA 491 (T), in which Coetzee AJ held that a 
recommendation of the South African Telecommunications Regulatory Authority to the Minister of 
Communications as to the award of the third cellular licence constituted a reviewable decision, even though 
preliminary in nature. Also see Gertis Trading (Pty) Ltd v West Sun Hotel (Pty) Ltd and Others 1984 (2) SA 431 
(D).   
38 See the analysis in section 3.3.2: Jurisdictional facts supra. 
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record on exercising the discretion. This also creates compliance with the 
transparency requirements in the Constitution. 
 
Once the taxpayer has access to the SARS record, he or she can establish whether or 
not SARS has complied with its Code of Conduct, and the internal SARS Internal 
Audit Manual for assessors. The taxpayer then has the option of amending the 
application to take into account any observations made from the SARS record. The 
grounds of review can then be carefully determined, in line with the submissions 
made in this thesis. 
 
SARS may reply to the application by stating that the taxpayer’s application is 
premature, because the process leading to the issue of the revised assessment is not 
complete. SARS may argue that its decision-making process is not final, and that the 
matter is not ripe for hearing. The revised assessment will give the taxpayer the 
opportunity to object and appeal in the normal course of the dispute procedure. 
 
The taxpayer may respond that the nature of the decision by SARS to obtain 
information is a final one. Other new decisions may follow. But that decision is 
final.  
 
The procedures of objection and appeal to review this decision in terms of the 
Income Tax Act are not available to the taxpayer. Sections 74A and 74B are not 
subject to objection and appeal. That leaves the taxpayer with the choice: access to 
the High Court, by virtue of ss 34 and 172 of the Constitution. 
 
In essence, by challenging the conduct of SARS at the time that the inquiry and 
audit commences the taxpayer is immediately able to bring a suite of rights into 
play. SARS, on the other hand, when called upon to do so, must justify its actions. 
As a result, instead of SARS merely requesting information and then simply 
proceeding to the next point of issuing revised assessments, triggering the ‘pay now 
argue later’ principle, a proper inquiry is brought about between the adversaries 
where the taxpayer questions the motivation, purpose, and nature of the audit, in 
order to narrow down its scope. This ensures that the necessary infringement by 
SARS of the taxpayers’ tax affairs in carrying out a regulatory process is kept to a 
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minimum, in line with the spirit of the Constitution. To repeat the words of John 
Locke in the Second Treatise of Government in 169039: 
…we must consider, what state all men are naturally in, and that 
is, a state of perfect freedom to order their actions, and dispose of 
their possessions and persons, as they think fit, within the bounds 
of the law of nature, without asking leave, or depending upon the 
will of any other man. 
A state also of equality, wherein all the power and jurisdiction is 
reciprocal, no one having more than another; …  
 
The process of allowing the taxpayer to question and review the conduct of SARS in 
the exercise of its broad public powers in ss 74A and 74B accomplishes the ideal set 
by John Locke in 1690, as it has found its way into the main thread underlying the 
Constitution of South Africa. The public power of SARS to regulate through access 
to taxpayers’ information is balanced by the rights of taxpayers to question and 
review. The circle is complete. 
 
7.6  ‘JUST CAUSE’ SHOWN DEFENCE40 
 
In order to avoid providing SARS with information, documents or things, ‘good 
cause shown’ in terms of s 75(1)(b) is also available as a defence to taxpayers, 
where SARS attempts to compel compliance by the taxpayer by invoking the 
criminal sanctions under s 75(1)(b) of the Income Tax Act, in an attempt to enforce 
its requests under ss 74A and 74B. The refusal to provide SARS with the 
information, pending the outcome of the review proceedings, will prevent the 
inquiry and audit going forward until the question of the lawfulness,41 
reasonableness42 and procedural fairness43 of SARS conduct has been addressed by 
the court. 
                                               
39 John Locke Second Treatise of Government Amazon Kindle Edition chapter two: Of the State of Nature, Sect. 
4. 
40See section 3.8: ‘Just Cause’ Defence supra. 
41See section 3.3: Lawfulness supra. 
42 See section 3.4: Reasonableness supra; See also Local 174 International Brotherhood of Teamsters v US 240 
F.2d 387. 
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7.7 THE PROPOSED TAX ADMINISTRATION ACT 
 
The proposed Tax Administration Act 28 of 201144 does not negatively impact on 
the ability for taxpayers to use the ‘just cause’ defence analysed in this thesis, when 
taxpayers refuse to participate in SARS’ audits due to SARS’ inability to illustrate to 
taxpayers the scope and purpose of the audit and inquiry by invoking its powers in 
terms of ss 3, 40 through 49 of the Tax Administration Act. 
 
Furthermore, some of the amendments to the existing tax administration legislation 
that is proposed in the Tax Administration Act will only enhance the ability for 
taxpayers to raise the ‘just cause’ defence. 
 
Should SARS attempt to enforce its will to proceed with an audit and inquiry 
through the various search and seizure mechanisms available to it in the Tax 
Administration Act, that decision taken by SARS will clearly fall into the ambit of 
‘administrative action’ as defined in the PAJA, and the provisions of ss 6(1), 7(1) 
and 8(1) of PAJA as analysed in this thesis will be available to taxpayers to take the 
decision by SARS to conduct the search and seizure process, under review. If 
correspondence is placed before the High Court setting out the information that 
taxpayers have sought to clarify the scope and purpose of the audit and inquiry, and 
show that SARS have ignored these requests, this will cast SARS in a bad light 
before the High Court – with much explaining to do. Unless the taxpayer concerned 
is suspected of committing fraud that SARS can prima facie demonstrate to the High 
Court,45 in all probability the search and seizure process will be set aside, and all 
‘relevant information’ seized will be either returned to the taxpayer, or placed in a 
neutral secure place for access by the taxpayer, but not SARS. SARS access will 
                                                                                                                                    
43See section 3.5: Procedural Fairness supra. 
44 Hereinafter referred to as the ‘Tax Administration Act’. 
45Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic Offences and Others v Hyundai Motor Distributors (Ply) Ltd and 
Others:In re Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd and Others v Smit NO and Others 2001 (1) SA 545 (CC), 
(2000 (10) BCLR 1079) where the Constitutional Court held at para [37]: ‘It is implicit in the section that the 
judicial officer will in his or her mind to the question whether the suspicion which led to the preparatory 
investigation, and the need for the search and seizure to be sanctioned, are sufficient to justif the invasion of 
privacy that is to take place. On the basis of that information, the judicial officer has to make an independent 
evaluation and determine whether or not there are reasonable grounds to suspect that an object that might have a 
bearing on a preparatory investigation is on the targeted premises.’ 
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usually depend on terms and conditions being agreed upon between the parties as to 
the process the audit and inquiry will follow.46 
 
The conclusion is that compelling SARS to diligently perform its obligations under 
the Constitution, in terms of ss 1(c), 33, 41(1), 195(1) and 237, will equip taxpayers 
with a ‘just cause’ defence not to participate in an audit or inquiry, unless SARS 
complies with the requests from the taxpayer as to the scope and purpose of the 
audit, and taxpayers will be entitled to review the conduct of SARS in terms of 
PAJA, or, by virtue of the constitutional principle of legality, through a Rule 
53application to the High Court, should SARS seek to compel the taxpayer to 
participate in the inquiry and audit. Nothing in the proposed Tax Administration Act 
will change this conclusion. 
  
                                               
46 On the basis of unreasonable conduct by SARS exceeding the boundaries of what would be considered 
proportional to the result SARS is attempting to achieve – obtaining information for an inquiry and audit; See 
section 3.4.2: Proportionality supra; This is also based on the experience of the writer in bringing an 
appplication of a similar nature on behalf of a taxpayer against SARS in 2002 in the unreported matter of Drs Du 
Buisson, Bruinette & Kramer Inc. v C:SARS Case No. 4595/02 in the High Court of the Transvaal Provincial 
Division, and subsequent similar applications over the past 12 years. None of the applications were finally 
argued before the High Court. All applications were settled in negotiations with SARS where its legal 
department agreed to a process to be followed in accessing information required for specific aspects of the audit 
and inquiry in circumstances where the taxpayers understood the scope and purpose of the audit. In all instances 
the result of the audits resulted in no revised assessments being issued against the taxpayers concerned. In one 
instance, a consent court order was taken against SARS to rescind a defective letter of findings, denying SARS 
the opportunity to raise revised assessments, as the years of assessment prescribed a few days later - Xstrata 
South Africa (Pty) Ltd v C:SARS North Gauteng Provincial Division Case No 53772/2010 (unreported 21 
September 2010). 
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